Media use and political learning: Comparing Trump supporters to celebrity candidate voters

This study examines whether political media use behaviors of voters who supported Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election align with those of “celebrity candidate voters” portrayed in the literature. The study used a national online survey (N = 1,608) conducted during the 2016 primary, and findings reveal that Trump supporters, more than other voters, are driven by entertainment motivations and follow campaign news using entertainment media: specifically, the video-sharing site YouTube. Although Trump voters are interested in the campaign, their level of political knowledge is lower than other voters, and no one media outlet made a significant contribution to their learning. A comparison group of other voters showed significant knowledge gains from news websites and Twitter. Results for Trump voters are consistent with scholars’ characterization of the celebrity candidate audience, particularly in studies suggesting that celebrity politicians may increase citizens’ engagement through entertainment gratifications rather than by a desire to become informed.     

The Impact of Cell Phone Noncoverage Bias on Polling in the 2004 Presidential Election

Despite concerns that the accuracy of preelection telephonepolls would be harmed by the omission of voters who could bereached only by cell phone, most national polls performed wellin predicting President George W. Bush’s reelection in2004, and state polls were generally accurate as well. The nationalexit poll conducted by the National Election Pool found that7 percent of Election Day voters had cell phone service butno land line; younger voters were far more likely to be cell-only:19 percent among those age 18–24 and 20 percent amongthose age 25–29. Within these two youngest age cohorts,cell-only voters were significantly more likely to be singleand childless. While cell-only voters were more supportive ofJohn Kerry than voters overall, they were similar to other voterswithin their own age cohort. Because of this, preelection telephonesurveys that weighted their data appropriately by age were notsignificantly biased by the absence of the cell-only voters.     

Ensuring every candidate wins under positional voting

Given a fixed set of voter preferences, different candidates may win outright given different scoring rules. We investigate how many voters are able to allow all n candidates to win for some scoring rule. We will say that these voters impose a disordering on these candidates. The minimum number of voters it takes to impose a disordering on three candidates is nine. For four candidates, six voters are necessary, for five candidates, four voters are necessary, and it takes only three voters to disorder nine candidates. In general, we prove that m voters can disorder n candidates when m and n are both greater than or equal to three, except when m = 3 and n ≤ 8, when n = 3 and m ≤ 8, and when n = 4 and m = 4 or 5.     

The power of a collectivity to act in weighted voting games with many small voters

We analyze the propensity to approve a random proposal of a large committee that makes decisions by weighted voting. The approach is a generalized version of James Coleman’s “power of a collectivity to act”. Throughout the paper it is assumed that the voters are of two kinds: a fixed (possibly empty) set of “major” (big) voters with fixed weights, and an ever-increasing number of “minor” (small) voters, whose total weight is also fixed, but where each individual’s weight becomes negligible. As our main result, we obtain that asymptotically many minor voters act like a modification of the quota for the vote among major voters. The paper estimates the rate of convergence which turns out to be very high if the weight distribution among the small voters is not too skewed. The results obtained are illustrated by evaluating the decision rules for the Council of Ministers of the EU for various scenarios of EU enlargement. I wish to thank Matthew Braham, Sidartha Gordon, Maurice Koster, Moshé Machover, Guillermo Owen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

DECEPTION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: THEORY AND LABORATORY EVIDENCE

We model two‐candidate elections in which (1) voters are uncertain about candidates' attributes; and (2) candidates can inform voters of their attributes by sending advertisements. We compare between political campaigns with truthful advertising and campaigns in which there is a small chance of deceptive advertising. Our model predicts that voters should vote in‐line with an advertisement's information. We test our model's predictions using laboratory elections. We find, in the presence of even a small probability that an advertisement is deceptive, voters become substantially more likely to elect a “low‐quality” candidate. We discuss implications of this for existing models of voting decisions. (JEL C92, D72, D82)     

Does uncertainty lead to sincerity? Simple and complex voting mechanisms

We ask whether the absence of information about other voters’ preferences allows optimal voting to be interpreted as sincere.We start by classifying voting mechanisms as simple and complex according to the number of message types voters can use to elect alternatives. We show that while in simple voting mechanisms the elimination of information about other voters’ preferences allows optimal voting to be interpreted as sincere, this is no longer always true for complex ones. In complex voting mechanisms, voters’ optimal strategy may vary with the size of the electorate. Therefore, in order to interpret optimal voting as sincere for complex voting mechanisms, we describe the optimal voting strategy when voters not only have no information but also have no pivotal power, i.e., as the size of the electorate tends to infinity.     

ATTRIBUTION ERROR IN ECONOMIC VOTING: EVIDENCE FROM TRADE SHOCKS

This article exploits the international transmission of business cycles to examine the prevalence of attribution error in economic voting in a large panel of countries from 1990 to 2009. We find that voters, on average, exhibit a strong tendency to oust the incumbent governments during an economic downturn, regardless of whether the recession is home‐grown or merely imported from trading partners. However, we find important heterogeneity in the extent of attribution error. A split sample analysis shows that countries with more experienced voters, more educated voters, and possibly more informed voters—all conditions that have been shown to mitigate other voter agency problems—do better in distinguishing imported from domestic growth. (JEL E3, E6)     

Elder Participation and Senior Power in Australian Electoral Politics

This article seeks to assess the “goodness of fit” between the social science literature on the impact of older voters on electoral outcomes and the Australian experience of the politics of aging. While the literature suggests that the notion of senior power is a flawed one, Australia's 2004 federal election campaign indicated that this is not quite so. This article offers a possible explanation for the difference between the literature and the Australian experience in terms of the calculus that underpinned the election campaign, namely, capturing the votes of swing voters in marginal seats including “silver” swing voters in seats with a disproportionate number of older voters. The preliminary findings of a small exploratory study of campaign strategists suggest that there may be a real basis to this explanation. Thus, there does appear to be some basis for asserting that “gray power” does play a role in Australian national electoral politics.     

VOTING FOR INCOME‐IMMISERIZING REDISTRIBUTION IN THE MELTZER–RICHARD MODEL

This paper argues that income received via redistributive transfers, unlike labor income, requires no direct sacrifice of leisure; this makes it attractive to many voters even if it leaves them poorer. This point is made within the classic Meltzer and Richard (1981) model wherein heterogeneous voters evaluate an income‐redistribution program that finances a lump‐sum transfer to all via a distorting income tax. The political‐equilibrium policy under majority rule is the tax most preferred, utility‐wise, by the median voter. Ironically, this voter, and many poorer voters, may support a redistribution policy that leaves them poorer in income terms but with higher utility. (JEL H2, E6, D72)     

The Undeserving Rich: “Moral Values” and the White Working Class1

White working‐class citizens who vote for the Republican Party have been fodder for much political discussion and speculation recently, and a debate has arisen about the role that “moral values” played in the political decision making of this segment of voters. In this article, we defend a version of the moral values claim. We show that although the Republicans’ policies are unpopular, they are bundled with an overarching moral framework that is extremely resonant to this set of voters, and we use in‐depth interviews to uncover this framework. A key feature of this framework, on which in the 2004 presidential election George W. Bush scored high and John Kerry scored low, is the appropriate attitude to wealth, which serves as an indicator for a candidate’s general moral philosophy and as a heuristic about whether the candidate will govern with working‐class voters’ interests in mind. National Election Studies data support the argument that this was a key influence on the voting decision in 2004, even controlling for voters’ partisan identification.     

Pre-election polling and third party candidates

I analyze voters’ incentives in responding to pre-election polls with a third party candidate. Third party supporters normally have an incentive to vote strategically in the election by voting for one of the major candidates. But these voters would vote third party if the third party candidate is doing surprisingly well in the polls. Because voters are more likely to vote third party if the third party candidate is doing well in polls, voters who like the third party candidate best have an incentive to claim they will vote third party in the polls so that more voters will ultimately vote third party in the election. The differing incentives faced during polls and elections accounts for why third party candidates do better in polls than in elections.     

Do Absentee Voters Differ from Polling Place Voters?: New Evidence from California

In the 2003 California gubernatorial recall election 2,775,785absentee ballots were cast, representing about 30 percent ofall voters statewide. Given the number of absentee ballots andthe increasing propensity for voters in California and elsewhereto choose this voting method, we some basic questions: Who areabsentee voters, and are they different from polling place voters?To answer these questions, we fielded a statewide survey ofabsentee voters in the days before the October 7 recall election,asking respondents why they voted absentee, their partisan andideological preferences, demographic characteristics, and otherrelevant questions. We find that absentee voters do not differsignificantly from the overall state electorate in terms oftheir vote preferences, despite being older and better educated.For example, 56 percent of absentee voters in our survey voted"yes" on the recall, compared with 55 percent for the entirestate, according to official returns. Further, absentee votersfavored Arnold Schwarzenegger over Cruz Bustamante by a considerablemargin, similar to the overall election results. We found partyregistration among absentee voters to be nearly identical tostatewide partisan registration.     

The probability of an undominated central voter in 2-dimensional spatial majority voting

Place a voter v in the plane and scatter additional voters at random about v. What are v's chances of being undominated? When the number of voters, n, is even, this probability is known to be nonzero [5]. Here we prove that the exact probability is 2^?(n?2).     

Secondary issues and party politics: an application to environmental policy

This article develops a political economy model to assess the interplay between party formation and an environmental policy dimension viewed as secondary to the redistributive dimension. We define being a secondary issue in terms of the intensity of preferences over this issue rather than in terms of the proportion of voters who care for the environment. Equilibrium policies are the outcome of an electoral competition game between endogenous parties. We obtain the following results: (i) The Pigouvian tax never emerges in an equilibrium; (ii) The equilibrium environmental tax is larger when there is a minority of green voters; (iii) Stable green parties exist only if there is a minority of green voters and income polarization is large enough relative to the saliency of the environmental issue. We also study the redistributive policies advocated by green parties.     

Effects of pronoun use in campaign advertisements on young Taiwanese voters

Campaign advertisements can greatly influence voters; however, the effects of subtle variations in advertising content have rarely been investigated. This study was conducted to quantify the effects of minor variations in pronoun use on young Taiwanese voters’ responses to campaign advertisements. Also examined were the moderating effects of voters’ perceptions of the candidate’s personality characteristics as shaped by the candidate’s physical appearance and the camera angle used in the candidate’s photo. The experimental results indicated that the use of the pronoun “we” in a campaign advertisement led to a closer perceived relationship between voters and the candidate compared to the inclusive pronoun “you,” which generated better advertising effects. Moreover, the results showed that when the voters visually inferred that a candidate had higher competence or when the candidate was photographed from a low angle, which created the perception of greater power, the use of the pronoun “we” was more suitable. The inclusive “you,” in contrast, was more suitable for candidates that were perceived by the voters to have greater warmth or for candidates that were photographed from a high angle, which created the perception of less power.     

The Google voter: search engines and elections in the new media ecology

This paper explores key Internet search trends for electoral information vis-à-vis the broader media ecology in the UK and the US. An innovative methodology is introduced that maps the informational trajectories of key election events by combining Google Trends data linked to significant news events during the campaigns. While the research found spikes of search that suggested a seemingly trivial event in the US could drive voters to search out deeper information on related policy issues, the study did not find the same phenomenon in the UK. This invites a reflection on the opportunities available to Internet users/voters in the changing informational landscape and how scholars can leverage Google Trends records to better understand how voters seek information in new and evolving media ecologies.     

On existence of pure strategy equilibrium with endogenous income

It is well known that in a voting-over-income-taxation game, there exists no pure strategy equilibrium when voters’ incomes are exogenous (i.e., when individual voters make only consumption choices). I prove that in an environment with endogenous income (i.e., where individual voters make labor-leisure choices, in addition to consumption choices) and candidates propose marginally progressive taxes, it is possible to get existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium tax schedule.     

The Relative Irrelevance of Candidate Sex

Abstract

This study tests the relevance of candidate sex to electoral contests. We predict that voters, in general, will use issue or party cues to select between candidates and not the sex of the candidate. This will not hold under two conditions: party or issue cues are unavailable or candidate sex is likely to be particularly salient to the voter. Data were collected from a random sample of registered voters who were presented with hypothetical elections featuring candidates who were systematically varied by party, position on abortion, and sex. The results are consistent with the line of research that suggests that the majority of voters do not use candidate sex as a cue for choice, but candidate sex does affect choice among those for whom gender equality issues are particularly salient. Although generally irrelevant, candidate sex can have significant implications for the outcome of particular contests.