Social Policies and Families in Stress: Gender and Educational Differences in Work–Family Conflict from a European Perspective

In modern welfare states, family policies may resolve the tension between employment and care-focused demands. However these policies sometimes have adverse consequences for distinct social groups. This study examined gender and educational differences in working parents’ perceived work–family conflict and used a comparative approach to test whether family policies, in particular support for child care and leave from paid work, are capable of reducing work–family conflict as well as the gender and educational gaps in work–family conflict. We use data from the European Social Survey 2010 for 20 countries and 5296 respondents (parents), extended with information on national policies for maternity and parental leave and child care support from the OECD Family Database. Employing multilevel analysis, we find that mothers and the higher educated report most work–family conflict. Policies supporting child care reduce the level of experienced work–family conflict; family leave policy appears to have no alleviating impact on working parents’ work–family conflict. Our findings indicate that family policies appear to be unable to reduce the gender gap in conflict perception and even widen the educational gap in work–family conflict.     

Working and caring for large families: do mothers face a trade-off?

Does having three or more children lower the chance that mothers participate in the labour force compared to those who have two children? Most of the previous literature on this topic describes the substantial indirect costs of children for first-time mothers, but having additional children at higher parities can entail even higher indirect costs. This paper finds a labour force participation gap between mothers who have three or more children and those who have two children. It explores whether this gap is caused by the selectivity of those who purposely choose to have large families or by family size itself. It also questions if the gap occurs simply because mothers with 3 or more children are consequently more likely to care for young children: 42?% of them have a child under the age of five compared to only 38.7?% of mothers with 2 children. A priori, it is unclear if the employment gap between these two groups of mothers is driven by the difference in the age of the youngest child or by the difference in the number of children. This paper contributes to the literature by disentangling the effect of having an additional child from having an additional young child in the household with a simple but innovative approach (grouping by mother??s age and her age at the second pregnancy) that avoids controlling for the age of the youngest child in regression.     

Develop family planning work based on the reality of minority regions]

Pingtang County, Guizhou Province, is the home of the Bu-i and Miao minorities, who comprise 55% of the county's population. Since 1980, the county has vigorously followed family planning such that the rate of birth control rose from 20% in 1978 to 95% in 1985, the rate of natural growth went from 34/1000 to 3.6/1000, and the multiple child rate dropped to about 6% from 37.7% Following 5 years of work, the following observations are made: 1) The first step is to determine whether or not to have family planning because the common feeling about minorities is that by virtue of being a minority, family planning is not a serious issue. But family planning became a necessity when it was realized that population was growing faster than food production, creating problems in housing and public health, and in a dependence on the nation at large. 2) The initial step in family planning is ideological; a plan should be implemented whereby goals to reform old customs and thoughts (such as favoring males over females) are carried out by local leaders and cadres at all levels.     

Another Child? Fertility Ideals,Resources and Opportunities

Low fertility in most developed countries has prompted policy concern in relation to labour market supply, pensions, and expenditure on health and welfare services as well as policy debate about both the cost of children and the opportunity costs of parenthood. The extent to which family policy interventions can be effective in slowing or reversing fertility decline is much debated. This paper, based on a fertility module of the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 2005, examines the current fertility, and ideal and expected fertility of a nationally representative sample of 455 parents of reproductive age and focuses on whether they plan to have another child. It compares the characteristics of those who intend to have another child with those who do not, and how parents with one child differ from those with more children. It addresses three questions about family size: (1) fertility ideals, (2) resources and the economic implications of childbearing, and (3) opportunities for childbearing and the effects of a late start on fertility expectations. It concludes that, despite a sustained period of low fertility in Scotland, childbearing ideals are robust and explanations of low fertility must derive from difficulties in realising those ideals. Difficulties in realising fertility aspirations are associated less with resources than with opportunities for childbearing, especially the timing of first birth. Those who delay their first birth are less likely to realise their ideal family size, and their lower fertility is associated with the opportunity costs of childbearing in terms of foregone qualifications, careers and earnings.     

Child mortality and reproductive behaviour in German village populations in the past: A micro-level analysis of the replacement effect

Abstract Reproductive histories of couples married during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in a sample of 14 German villages are analysed in order to answer several questions regarding the relationship between child mortality and reproductive behaviour. An effort is made through selection of cases and use of multiple classification analysis to eliminate or control non-volitional or otherwise confounding influences on the relationship between a couple's experience with child mortality and their fertility. The results do not provide a decisive answer to the question of whether, under a regime of otherwise presumed natural fertility, previous experience of child mortality affected subsequent reproductive behaviour. The evidence was much clearer in indicating that behaviour consistent with replacement efforts emerged or strengthened as family limitation spread. Finally, the results indicated that though it was not necessary for overall child mortality to decline before family limitation practices were adopted, couples with the most favourable child mortality experience were most likely to practise family limitation and to reduce their fertility. Child mortality appeared at least to impede, if not totally prevent, efforts to reduce the number of children ever born or to cease childbearing at an earlier age or at a given parity.     

Support for new mothers and fertility in the United Kingdom: Not all support is equal in the decision to have a second child

Low fertility across Europe highlights the need to understand reproductive decisions in high-income countries better. Availability of support may be one factor influencing reproductive decisions, though within high-income countries availability varies between environments, including socio-economic environments. We test whether receiving higher levels of support, from different sources (informal and formal) and of different types (practical and emotional), is positively correlated with second births in the United Kingdom (UK) Millennium Cohort Study, and whether these relationships differ by socio-economic position (SEP). Our hypothesis is only partially supported: receiving emotional support correlates with higher likelihood of second birth, but the opposite is true for practical support. Availability of different types of support varies across SEP, but relationships between support and fertility are similar, with one exception: kin-provided childcare increases the likelihood of birth only among lower-SEP women. Our results highlight that not all support is equal in the decision to have a second child.     

Economic Insecurity and the Fertility Intentions of Italian Women with One Child

The present study addresses the issue of economic insecurity and its relationship with the reproductive plans of 5,358 Italian women in couples who have recently had their first child. Data were sourced from the ISTAT Sample Survey on Births, 2005 edition. This article’s originality lies in the conceptualization of economic insecurity and the investigation of its effects on fertility intentions. We propose to capture economic insecurity by considering both the insecurity associated to the two partners’ employment status and a variety of aspects that contribute to the household’s ability to cope with possible unpredictable future events. Then, we investigate whether and how economic insecurity shapes the fertility intentions of women over their entire reproductive life span. With specific respect to women who intend to have one additional child only, we also observe the effect of economic insecurity on their intention to give birth sooner (i.e., within the next 3 years) or later. Our data show the existence of a critical factor in the passage from the generic fertility intentions to the contingent plan to have a child in the next 3 years: only half of women with one child who intend to follow the two-child family model feel ready to plan to have a second child in the next 3 years. The study also reinforces an argument that is frequently made: fertility intentions over the entire lifetime are less conditioned upon contingent constraints, and are often more closely related to individual traits and/or preferences.     

Factors related to the intention to have additional children in the United States: A reanalysis of data from the 1965 and 1970 national fertility studies

Reproductive intentions of white mothers with no more than three children in 1965 and in 1970 were analyzed for their stability and change with respect to such factors as parity, age of the youngest child, wife’s employment, and husband’s education. Parity and age of the youngest child were found to have a much more important effect on the intent to have additional children than were such socioeconomic variables as wife’s employment and husband’s education. Parity and the interval since the latest birth (or the age of the youngest child) were found to have a nonlinear effect and to interact in affecting the reproductive intention. This suggests a convergence to a twochild family as the threshold size and that the length of childspacing is contingent on the parity. Change during 1965–1970 in this direction was found to be greater among mothers with husbands having college or higher educations.     

Do family planning programs enhance children's health?

The findings of the 1993 National Demographic Survey (NDS) in the Philippines provide implications for child health of family size and whether a child was wanted at the time of conception. About 15% of the more than 8000 births considered in the NDS were classified as unwanted. In 1995, the East-West Center's Program on Population has helped research centers in the Philippines to conduct an extended analysis of NDS results. Children under age 5 who had been unwanted at the time of conception (unwanted children) were almost 25% and 15% more likely to have had diarrhea or respiratory infections, respectively, in the last two weeks than those who were wanted at the time of conception (wanted children). Unwantedness had little effect on the likelihood of treatment once the child was ill, however. When the researchers controlled all other variables, including unwantedness, family size did not have a direct influence on the likelihood that a child would become ill, but it did have a significant influence on whether or not an ill child would receive treatment. Each additional sibling reduced the likelihood that an ill child would receive treatment by about 5% for diarrhea and by about 4% for respiratory infection. Another factor that influenced disease incidence was age (at 18 months, most likely to be ill with respiratory infection or diarrhea). Older children were more likely to receive treatment than younger children. Other factors influencing treatment and disease incidence were socioeconomic status and maternal educational status. These findings further justify family planning programs based on child health. They demonstrate that children suffer when they are born into a household where they are not wanted. Since about 33% of all child deaths are caused by diarrhea or respiratory infections in the Philippines, unwantedness affects the incidence of these infections, and family size has a direct effect on the likelihood an ill child will receive treatment. A policy intervention that would greatly reduce child mortality would be extremely beneficial.     

Emphasizing ideological education, implementing birth control measures and carrying out family planning in an appropriate way]

Since the establishment of responsible production system, certain existing measures for family planning have lost their original effectiveness. At the same time, some changes in the peasants' minds concerning family planning have also taken place. Many peasant families, especially those which have no male child, wish to have more children. In order to solve this problem, family planning work should be done all over again from the lowest administrative level. Through correct population and ideological education, the general public may understand that there is a surplus of agricultural labor and a shortage of arable land at the present time. Secondly, birth control measures, family planning techniques, and training of medical personnel should be improved in order to serve the people better. A full-time working staff for family planning work should be increased so that they may work closely with local people and solve practical problems. In addition, nursing homes should be established and managed well in each commune. All such nursing homes should receive financial support from the State. In the this way, childless aging people may receive proper care after retirement. The worries of those single-child households may also be greatly reduced. The overall resistance met by family planning personnel is thus eliminated.     

The International Child Poverty Gap: Does Demography Matter?

According to the Luxembourg Income Study data, the U.S. child poverty rate is the second highest among 15 high-income nations. The present work reveals that 55% of all American children living in a household headed by a single female with no other adult present live in poverty-the highest rate for any of the five living arrangements in the 15 countries examined in this study. While previous analyses have focused on market forces and governmental redistribution across households, we question the contribution of demographic factors that place children in family structures with different poverty risks relative to other factors such as differential market opportunities and governmental benefits for adults caring for children in various living arrangements. Applying a classic demographic decomposition technique to the overall poverty gap, we find that the distributional effect of demographic behavior contributes little to the U.S. poverty gap with other nations (and none with respect to the United Kingdom). Overall differences in labor markets and welfare schemes best explain the U.S. child poverty gap, although for some countries, the gap is accentuated by the gradient of governmental transfers, and for most countries, by the gradient of market earnings across living arrangements.     

Some psychological problems in family planning work]

Psychology has significance in family planning work, because it may promote the scientific nature of family planning work and thus increase its effectiveness. Since people have some common aspects in their psychological process, family planning workers should master some common rules of the people's psychological process in order to understand psychological trends and possible behavior. Through this method, family planning workers may find how to adjust to problems they may encounter in their daily work, such as the worries about a single child being too lonely, spoiled, and hard to handle for the parents, the traditional belief that more children represent good fortune, and more male children may provide security for one's old age. Traditionally, the Chinese people believed that only male children can carry on the family line and that more children will provide a larger labor force, which is beneficial to a family's financial situation. In family planning work, all such incorrect ways of thinking should be corrected and revised. Studies of children's psychology should also be developed so that children may develop a healthy mentality. All these are crucial to the success of family planning work and the promotion of population quality.     

Does low fertility call for new policies in some Asian countries?

Over the past 2 decades, Japan, China, Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea have completed a demographic transition from high birth and death rates and runaway population growth to reduced fertility and mortality and population growth approaching replacement levels. Among the outcomes of fertility decline, 3 have particularly far reaching effects: 1) Changes in family types and structures. Marriage and family formation are postponed, childbearing is compressed into a narrow reproductive span that begins later and ends earlier, and higher-order births become rare. Large families are replaced by small ones, and joint and extended families tend to be replaced by nuclear families. 2) Shifts in the proportions of young and old. Declining fertility means that the population as a whole becomes older. Decreases in the proportion of children provides an opportunity to increase the coverage of education. Increases in the proportion of the elderly means higher medical costs and social and economic problems about care of the aged. 3) Changes in the work force. There is concern that low fertility and shortages of workers will cause investment labor-intensive industries to shift to countries with labor surpluses. Another outcome may be an increase in female participation in the work force. The potential consequences of rapid fertility decline have sparked debate among population experts and policy makers throughout Asia. Current family planning programs will emphasize: 1) offering a choice of methods to fit individual preferences; 2) strengthening programs for sexually active unmarried people; 3) encouraging child spacing and reproductive choice rather than simply limiting the number of births; 4) making information available on the side effects of various family planning methods; 5) providing special information and services to introduce new methods; and 6) promoting the maternal and child health benefits of breast feeding and birth spacing.     

独生子女家庭结构演变与养老方案选择研究①——以安徽省为例

独生子女家庭关系简单、脆弱,具有很强的风险性,为此引起学界和政府高度关注。文章利用2010年全国第六次人口普查数据资料,利用生命表方法构建独生子女家庭生命表．并推算丧子家庭、丧偶家庭、单人家庭等各类家庭结构演变趋势。得出：独生子女家庭中,丧子家庭在子女60岁时达到高峰,比例达到3．1％,其中丧子的父母单人家庭比例达到高峰值2．6％,丧子的父母空巢家庭在独生子女50岁达到高峰1．1％：独生子女单亲家庭（丧父或丧母）在独生子女55岁时达到峰值50％。不同的独生子女家庭,有着不同的养老需求,政府应该根据不同的家庭属性设置多样化的养老支持方案。     

The impact of child care on fertility in urban Thailand

Women’s labor force participation in Thailand, particularly in the modem sector, recently has increased in conjunction with rapid declines in fertility. This paper examines whether a relationship exists between child care considerations and fertility decision making among Bangkok women. Although the two-child family has become the norm in recent years, and although most respondents said that ideally they would like to have two children, a high proportion of women surveyed said they planned to only have one child. Women’s work status and type of employment is found to strongly affect the likelihood of having a second birth: those who work at jobs that not only are low-paying but are located in a formal setting are least likely to have a second child. The type of child care for the first child also has an impact: those whose first child is in a less preferred situation are less likely to have a second. Variables measuring the need for and type of child care are found to have greater consequences for fertility than do usual measures of socioeconomic status.     

Some principles of cost-benefit analysis of family planning services in developing countries

A number of controversial issues are discussed, relating to the assessment of both costs and benefits of family planning services. All costs and benefits, whether accruing to society or the parents of the child whose birth is averted, and the child itself, should be included in the analysis, even if they cannot easily be measured or appear as externalities. Different rates of interest to be used in discounting to obtain present values apply to various items; these rates may vary between the commercial rates of interest and negative values. It is also shown that the costs of running a service include, in addition to current expenditure, not only basic investments, but also that the benefit accruing to society by averting births comprises a kind of investment, namely the amount spent on the subsistence of the child whose birth is averted before he would have started producing. Marginal values are to be preferred to average values for the calculation of costs and benefits. Thus, the costs of a family planning service should be expressed as the amount of money needed to avert one additional birth and the benefits as the amount saved by one additional averted birth. The latter cannot be measured by comparing the GNP per head when the birth is averted, with the situation when it is not. This can only be done by computing the excess of the child’s life-time consumption over his life-time production.     

One-child families also have possibilities for getting rich]

The common people believe that families with more children have a larger labor force and more income, and that families with 1 child have a smaller labor force and thus less income. Recent findings from Zhangqiu County of Shandong Province show that families with only 1 child have 67.8% more income than families with 2 children. The reason is that families with 1 child have fewer dependents and the financial burden for them is less. When the husband goes to work, the wife, who is taking care of only one child, will have more time and energy for part-time work to be done at home to increase income. In addition, if a family has fewer children, expenditures are also lower, and this is a beneficial condition for becoming wealthy. Furthermore, the nation offers a great many financial privileges and special treatment to families with 1 child, such as tuition exemptions, medical and health care allowances, more grain quotas, and better marketing arrangements for products from households with 1 child. All these have improved the livelihood of families with 1 child. An adequate ideological education to families with 1 child is needed in order to increase their motivation and productivity. Good nurseries and kindergartens are also needed so that parents may concentrate on their daily work and improve productivity. Birth control measures for childbearing women should be improved and efforts should be made to emphasize the importance of birth control to the nation.     

Two Is Best? The Persistence of a Two‐Child Family Ideal in Europe

How persistent and universal has the two child family ideal been in Europe during the last three decades? We analyze responses of women of reproductive age from 168 surveys conducted in 37 countries in 1979–2012. A two‐child ideal has become nearly universal among women in all parts of Europe. Countries that used to display higher ideal family size have converged over time toward a two‐child model. Six out of ten women in Europe consider two children as ideal, and this proportion is very similar in different regions. The mean ideal family size has become closely clustered around 2.2 in most countries. Gradual shifts can be documented toward more women expressing an ideal of having one child (and, quite rarely, having no children) and a parallel decline in an ideal of three or more children. An increasing number of European countries saw their mean ideal family size falling to relatively low levels around 1.95–2.15. However, with the exception of one survey for eastern Germany and two of the surveys not included in our study owing to high nonresponse or low sample size, none of the analyzed surveys suggests a decline in mean ideal family size to levels considerably below replacement, i.e., below 1.9 children per woman.     

Birth Cohort and the Specialization Gap Between Same-Sex and Different-Sex Couples

We examine differences in household specialization between same-sex and different-sex couples within and across three birth cohorts: Baby Boomers, Generation X, and Generation Y. Using three measures of household specialization, we find that same-sex couples are less likely than their different-sex counterparts to exhibit a high degree of specialization. However, the “specialization gap” between same-sex and different-sex couples narrows across birth cohorts. These findings are indicative of a cohort effect. Our results are largely robust to the inclusion of a control for the presence of children and for subsets of couples with and without children. We provide three potential explanations for why the specialization gap narrows across cohorts. First, different-sex couples from more recent birth cohorts may have become more like same-sex couples in terms of household specialization. Second, social and legal changes may have prompted a greater degree of specialization within same-sex couples relative to different-sex couples. Last, the advent of reproductive technologies, which made having children easier for same-sex couples from more recent birth cohorts, could result in more specialization in such couples relative to different-sex couples.     

Some principles of cost-benefit analysis of family planning services in developing countries

Summary A number of controversial issues are discussed, relating to the assessment of both costs and benefits of family planning services. All costs and benefits, whether accruing to society or the parents of the child whose birth is averted, and the child itself, should be included in the analysis, even if they cannot easily be measured or appear as externalities. Different rates of interest to be used in discounting to obtain present values apply to various items; these rates may vary between the commercial rates of interest and negative values. It is also shown that the costs of running a service include, in addition to current expenditure, not only basic investments, but also that the benefit accruing to society by averting births comprises a kind of investment, namely the amount spent on the subsistence of the child whose birth is averted before he would have started producing. Marginal values are to be preferred to average values for the calculation of costs and benefits. Thus, the costs of a family planning service should be expressed as the amount of money needed to avert one additional birth and the benefits as the amount saved by one additional averted birth. The latter cannot be measured by comparing the GNP per head when the birth is averted, with the situation when it is not. This can only be done by computing the excess of the child's life-time consumption over his life-time production.