Prospects for fertility reduction and projections for future population growth in Kenya

In 1979 Kenya's annual rate of natural population growth was 3.8%. Data from the1989 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey indicate that significant decreases in fertility levels were experienced during the 1980s. Factors associated with conditions supportive of high fertility in Kenya are discussed, and progress toward attaining significant fertility reduction thresholds during the 1980s is assessed. Findings from recent fertility surveys are presented, and 1969–1989 national level family planning data are evaluated. Four population projections for 1985–2025 are presented and analyzed. One projection is based on official government growth targets; two are based on estimates provided by the United Nations and the Population Reference Bureau, and a fourth projection is based on the assumption that Kenya will attain an annual natural population growth rate of less than 1% by the year 2025. Each projection assumes that fertility declines will be experienced. Kenya's prospects for reducing the annual population growth rate to 1% within the next sixty years and a cost-sharing development policy are addressed briefly in the concluding section. Recent data suggest that Kenya will probably not complete the demographic transition before the year 2050, but Kenya should continue to move through the transition stage.     

World population projections: alternative paths to zero growth

This article discusses Frejka's analysis of alternative paths to zero population growth. A net reproduction rate (NRR) of 1 is a vital step in reaching zero growth, but because of age distribution variances, it does not necessarily represent zero growth. The projections described here include: 1)the immediate path of achieving NRR of 1 in 1970-1975: 2)rapid path of an NRR of 1 in 2000-2005: and 3)slow path of NRR of 1 in 2040-2045. The population of the world in the year 2000 would be respectively: 5,700,000,000; 6,000000,000; and 7,000,000,000. Zero growth would be reached in 2000 for the immediate path; in 2100 with a population of 8,000,000,000 in the rapid path; and in 2045 with a population of 15,000,000,000. Individual projections are also given for several countries on different continents.     

Our population predicament: a new look

Issued to mark the Population Reference Bureau's 50th anniversary, this issue updates the story of world population presented in its popular predecessor of 1971, "Man's Population Predicament." Estimated at 1/2 billion in 1650, world population reached about 2 billion in 1930, 4 billion in 1975, and is projected to be about 6 billion in 2000. Most of today's rapid growth is occurring among the 3/4 of the world's peoples living in less developed countries where the post-World War II gap between high birth rates and falling death rates has only recently begun to narrow. This growth, coupled with high consumption in developing countries, is putting tremendous pressures on the Earth's resources, environment, and social fabric. New evidence on Europe's population transition and from China, Indonesia, and Thailand in the 1970s suggests that well-designed family planning programs can speed fertility decline but rapid worldwide attainment of replacement level fertility will also require special development efforts and measures that go beyond family planning. Current projections of the world's ultimate peak population range from 8 billion in the mid 21st century to 11 billion in about 2125, depending on when replacement-level fertility is reached. China's drive for a drastic birth rate reduction and the oil crisis might change fertility behavior more rapidly than most demographers have heretofore thought likely.     

The Soviet Union: population trends and dilemmas

Focus in this discussion of population trends and dilemmas in the Soviet Union is on demographic problems, data limitations, early population growth, geography and resources, the 15 republics of the Soviet Union and nationalities, agriculture and the economy, population growth over the 1950-1980 period (national trend, regional differences); age and sex composition of the population, fertility trends, nationality differentials in fertility, the reasons for fertility differentials (child care, divorce, abortion and contraception, illegitimacy), labor shortages and military personnel, mortality (mortality trends, life expectancy), reasons for mortality increases, urbanization and emigration, and future population prospects and projections. For mid-1982 the population of the Soviet Union was estimated at 270 million. The country's current rate of natural increase (births minus deaths) is about 0.8% a year, higher than current rates of natural increase in the U.S. (0.7%) and in developed countries as a whole (0.6%). Net immigration plays no part in Soviet population growth, but emigration was noticeable in some years during the 1970s, while remaining insignificant relative to total population size. National population growth has dropped by more than half in the last 2 decades, from 1.8% a year in the 1950s to 0.8% in 1980-1981, due mostly to declining fertility. The national fertility decline masks sharp differences among the 15 republics and even more so among the some 125 nationalities. In 1980, the Russian Republic had an estimated fertility rate of 1.9 births/woman, and the rate was just 2.0 in the other 2 Slavic republics, the Ukraine and Belorussia. In the Central Asian republics the rates ranged up to 5.8. Although the Russians will no doubt continue to be the dominant nationality, low fertility and a relatively higher death rate will reduce their share of the total population by less than half by the end of the century. Soviet leaders have launched a pronatalist policy which they hope will lead to an increase in fertility, at least among the dominant Slavic groups of the multinational country. More than 9 billion rubles (U.S. $12.2 billion) is to be spent over the next 5 years to implement measures aimed at increasing state aid to families with children, to be carried out step by step in different regions of the country. It is this writer's opinion that overall fertility is not likely to increase markedly despite the recent efforts of the central authorities, and the Russian share of the total population will probably continue to drop while that of Central Asian Muslim peoples increases.     

The outlook of China's population after the stabilization of birth policy

A professor of the Institute of Population Research of the People's University of China attempts to project the future population development of China so that stabilization of the birth policy can be assessed. He divides China into the economically developed and population-controlled area (29% of the population), the economically subdeveloped and population fairly-controlled areas (59% of the population), and the economically less-developed areas where fertility is high (12% of the population). China's population is expected to increase because of the baby boom to 1.25-1.3 billion by the year 2000. Between 1996 and 2000, the growth rate is expected to decelerate and reach zero growth. After 2010, if growth is held at the replacement rate of 2.1, the population will still continue to grow slowly. Around 2100, China's population should be around 1.45-1.59 billion. This would cause a decrease of 27% of arable land. With a decline in fertility rate comes a rise in the amount of the aged population (4.9% in 1982 vs. 5.5% in 1987). The proportion of aged citizens is expected to rise with the stabilization policy until around 2040 where it can be held at about 18%. China's GNP by the year 2000 is expected to be US$1183.8 billion with the per capita GNP about US$934 (providing the population is controlled). Compare this figure with the per capita GNP of the world (US$30,100) and of developed countries (US$10,700) in 1988, and one can see that China is far behind the rest of the world in economic growth.     

The demographic situation in the ESCAP region viewed in terms of social welfare. (Abstracted information from Committee on Population,Second Session,Bangkok, Thailand,December 13-19, 1978.)

The combined population of the ESCAP region is estimated to be growing by an annual increment of 50 million people, and is expected to reach an estimated 2936 million in 1990, when it will constitute 55.4% of the total world population. Continued population growth implies a demand for food, and the majority of the ESCAP countries have to depend on imports to meet their food requirements. Main problems are to improve the capability to produce more food, to adequately provide for health services, housing, and educational facilities for a fast expanding school-age population. With the continuing high rate of population growth the labor force will continue to increase and result in a high rate of unemployment. Population planning must be made an integral part of the over-all plans for socioeconomic development of the entire region.     

A survey of population in the ESCAP region

In 1983, the ESCAP region added 44 million people, bringing its total population to 2600 million, which is 56% of the world population. The annual rate of population growth was 1.7% in 1983 compared to 2.4% in 1970-75. The urban population rose from 23.4% in 1970 to 26.4% in 1983, indicative of the drift from rural areas to large cities. In 1980, 12 of the world's 25 largest cities were in the ESCAP region, and there is concern about the deterioration of living conditions in these metropoles. In general, however, increasing urbanization in the developing countries of the ESCAP region has not been directly linked to increasing industrialization, possibly because of the success of rural development programs. With the exception of a few low fertility countries, a large proportion of the region's population is concentrated in the younger age groups; 50% of the population was under 22 years of age in 1983 and over 1/3 was under 15 years. In 1983, there were 69 dependents for every 100 persons of working age, although declines in the dependency ratio are projected. The region's labor force grew from 1100 million in 1970 to 1600 million in 1983; this growth has exceeded the capacity of country economies to generate adequate employment. The region is characterized by large variations in life expectancy at birth, largely reflecting differences in infant mortality rates. Whereas there are less than 10 infant deaths/1000 live births in Japan, the corresponding rates in Afghanistan and India are 203 and 121, respectively. Maternal-child health care programs are expected to reduce infant mortality in the years ahead. Finally, fertility declines have been noted in almost every country in the ESCAP region and have been most dramatic in East Asia, where 1983's total fertility rate was 40% lower than that in 1970-75. Key factors behind this decline include more aggressive government policies aimed at limiting population growth, developments in the fields of education and primary health care, and greater availability of contraception through family planning programs.     

Asia's population and development in retrospect and prospect

By 1989 Asia's population will reach 3 billion. That Asia's countries can change the course of population development has been shown by China, whose population growth rate has decreased to 1.2%. 58% of the world's population in 1985 was Asian, and 53% of it was concentrated in 11 Asian countries, of which 37.6% was accounted for by India and China. Asia's population density is 3 times the world average, and the number of persons sustained by a square kilometer of land in Asia is 2.5 times the world average. Asia's population is young (median age 20.3), which means a high dependency burden, a large number of women of childbearing age, and low quality of life, as measured by infant mortality, life expectancy, and literacy. Rapid population growth ensures a low rate of development. Asia's goals are to achieve a 1% growth rate by year 2000, zero population growth and replacement level by 2015 for East Asia and 2020 for South Asia. The World Bank estimates that Asia's population will not stabilize until the end of the 21st century, by which time it will have reached 6 billion. Asia must find a way of achieving both population control and economic development. 5 recommendations are made to the Asian Forum of Parliamentarians on Population and Development (AFPPD): 1) that the AFPPD sponsor the activities of "the Day of 3 billion"; 2) that seminars and conferences on population be held among Asian nations; 3) that high-fertility countries adopt late marriages, few births, and programs for maternal and child health; 4) that organizations for family planning be strengthened and given the resources to upgrade the status of women; and 5) that international cooperation in the area of population be intensified.     

Probabilistic Projections of the Total Fertility Rate for All Countries

We describe a Bayesian projection model to produce country-specific projections of the total fertility rate (TFR) for all countries. The model decomposes the evolution of TFR into three phases: pre-transition high fertility, the fertility transition, and post-transition low fertility. The model for the fertility decline builds on the United Nations Population Division’s current deterministic projection methodology, which assumes that fertility will eventually fall below replacement level. It models the decline in TFR as the sum of two logistic functions that depend on the current TFR level, and a random term. A Bayesian hierarchical model is used to project future TFR based on both the country’s TFR history and the pattern of all countries. It is estimated from United Nations estimates of past TFR in all countries using a Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm. The post-transition low fertility phase is modeled using an autoregressive model, in which long-term TFR projections converge toward and oscillate around replacement level. The method is evaluated using out-of-sample projections for the period since 1980 and the period since 1995, and is found to be well calibrated.     

A summary analysis of the 3rd inquiry

20 ESCAP member countries responded to the "Third Population Inquiry among Governments: Population policies in the context of development in 1976." The questionnaire sent to the member countries covered economic and social development and population growth, mortality, fertility and family formation, population distribution and internal migration, international migration, population data collection and research, training, and institutional arrangements for the formulation of population policies within development. Most of the governments in the ESCAP region that responded indicate that the present rate of population growth constrains their social and economic development. Among the governments that consider the present rate of population growth to constrain economic and social development, 13 countries regarded the most appropriate response to the constraint would include an adjustment of both socioeconomic and demographic factors. 11 of the governments regarded their present levels of average life expectancy at birth "acceptable" and 7 identified their levels as "unacceptable." Most of the governments who responded consider that, in general, their present level of fertility is too high and constrains family well-being. Internal migration and population distribution are coming to be seen as concerns for government population policy. The most popular approaches to distributing economic and social activities are rural development, urban and regional development and industrial dispersion. There was much less concern among the governments returning the questionnaire about the effect of international migration than internal migration on social and economic development.     

Declining world fertility: trends,causes, implications

This Bulletin examines the evidence that the world's fertility has declined in recent years, the factors that appear to have accounted for the decline, and the implications for fertility and population growth rates to the end of the century. On the basis of a compilation of estimates available for all nations of the world, the authors derive estimates which indicate that the world's total fertility rate dropped from 4.6 to 4.1 births per woman between 1968 and 1975, thanks largely to an earlier and more rapid and universal decline in the fertility of less developed countries (LDCs) than had been anticipated. Statistical analysis of available data suggests that the socioeconomic progress made by LDCs in this period was not great enough to account for more than a proportion of the fertility decline and that organized family planning programs were a major contributing factor. The authors' projections, which are compared to similar projections from the World Bank, the United Nations, and the U.S. Bureau of the Census, indicate that, by the year 2000, less than 1/5 of the world's population will be in the "red danger" circle of explosive population growth (2.1% or more annually); most LDCs will be in a phase of fertility decline; and many of them -- along with most now developed countries -- will be at or near replacement level of fertility. The authors warn that "our optimistic prediction is premised upon a big IF -- if (organized) family planning (in LDCs) continues. It remains imperative that all of the developed nations of the world continue their contribution to this program undiminished."     

The Philippines: country statement prepared for the International Conference on Population,Mexico City,August 1984

This statement, prepared for the 1984 International Conference on Population, summarizes the demographic situation in the Philippines, the Philippine position regarding implementation of the World Population Plan of Action, and current population policies. In 1980, the population of the Philippines stood at 48.1 million. The country's current population growth rate reflects the interplay between decreasing mortality and still high but declining fertility. The 1984-87 Philippine Development Plan aims to achieve sustainable economic growth, equitable distribution of the gains of development, and personal development. A net reproduction rate of unity by the year 2000 is sought, and preschool-age children, youth, premarriage-age groups, and married couples of reproductive age have been targeted for special outreach efforts. The national population program will concentrate on developing a network of public and private community-based organizations, strengthening the capacity of local government and community organizations to plan and manage the population program, developing community capacity to finance family planning services, upgrading the quality of natural family planning practice, continuing the promotion of effective contraceptive methods, developing a population data bank, and upgrading the technical and management capabilities of population program personnel. Increasing attention is being paid to regional development and spatial distribution. The average annual population growth rate is expected to decline from 2.8% in 1970-75 to 2.2% by 1987. The crude birth rate is expected to drop from 34/1000 in 1980 to 31/1000 in 1987. To help achieve this goal, the contraceptive prevalence rate should increase from 34% in 1983 to 41% in 1987 and 50% by 1993. In addition, attempts will be made to reduce the proportion of women marrying below the age of 20 years and to improve women's access to educational and employment opportunities.     

Population growth trends in India: 1991 census

The decennial census counted the total population of India at 843.931 million as of the sunrise of March 1, 1991. The total is 160.6 million higher than that of a decade earlier in 1981. The actual census count exceeded by 45 million the official projections for 1991 based on the 1971 census. However, the official projections for the same year based on the 1981 census fell short by 7.6 million only. Most of the observed differences are explained by the slower decline in the fertility levels. The population growth ratepeaked during 1971–81, perhaps in 1972–73 (based on the Sample Registration Scheme data). The average annualexponential growth rate declined marginally to 2.11 per cent (4.5%) after having remained at a plateau for the previous two decades of 1961–71 and 1971–81. At this point in time, the fertility and mortality trends indicate that India will reach the replacement level fertility [Net Reproductive Rate of Unity] by the years 2010–2015. It can be said with a greater degree of certainty that the official target of reaching the replacement level fertility by the year 2000a.d. will not be reached. Based on the 1991 census results, it can be said that India will reach the billion mark by the turn of the century. The World Bank projects a population of 1,350 million by the year 2025a.d., and a stationary population of 1,862 million by the year 2150a.d., assuming that the replacement level fertility [Net Reproductive Rate = 1] in India is reached about the year 2015a.d.     

The population program shifts to 'high-scenario' targets

The Philippine Population Program would like to achieve a replacement level of 1 daughter per childbearing woman by the year 2000 to reduce the population growth rate to 2% by 1992. Laing projected that high performance by the National Population Program would mean continued increase of sterilization prevalence at an average 1978-1983 rate. Strategies have been adopted to strengthen information-education-communication efforts, to attain higher contraceptive prevalence rates and use-effectiveness, to develop manpower, to achieve self-reliance, and to effect better program coordination, monitoring, research use. Effective service delivery will be a key to achieving the high-scenario targets. Effective use of natural family planning (NFP), will help in achieving the high-scenario goals. Apart from the heavy demand on NFP follow-up, need for prompt delivery of supplies, and lack of doctors and nurses, other factors may impede the high-scenario targets. Saniel believes that program workers should be allowed to insert IUDs and to dispense pills. Under the cost-recovery and cost-sharing schemes of the high-scenario targets, only sterilization will be done for free. It might affect the campaign for increased acceptors, but the start for self-reliance must happen now.     

Is the fertility of Asian and Pacific Islander Americans converging to the U.S. norm?

This paper examines the process of assimilation in fertility behavior for Asians and Pacific Islanders in the US, using census-based estimates of recent fertility trends for the period 1965-1980. The authors examine fertility trends for all Asians and all Pacific Islanders, and separately for Asian Indians, Chinese, Filipinos, Japanese, Koreans, Vietnamese, Guamanians, Hawaiians, and Samoans. The authors also examine, for each of these groups, differential fertility by urban-rural residence, educational attainment, nativity, and year of immigration if foreign-born. The fertility of most Asian and Pacific Islander groups in the US fell substantially between 1965 and 1980, as did the fertility of the US population as a whole. The fertility of most Asian groups was initially lower than that of most Pacific Islander groups. Most Asian groups experienced fertility trends not much different from those of the US as a whole. In contrast, most Pacific Islander groups experienced faster than average fertility decline, thereby showing some evidence of assimilation toward the US fertility norm. Differential fertility conformed to familiar patterns; urban fertility tended to be lower than rural fertility. The fertility of the more-educated tended to be lower than the fertility of the less-educated. The fertility of the native-born tended to be lower than the fertility of the foreign-born. The fertility of established migrants tended to be lower than the fertility of recent migrants. Fertility tended to fall not only for each racial group as a whole, but also for each socioeconomic category.     

Bangladesh: National Population Policy approved

The National Population Council of Bangladesh set a policy to reduce the national growth rate from 2.8 to 2% by 1980, and increase the frequency of family planning use by eligible couples from 4.7 to 12% in 1978 and 20% in 1980. If the replacement level can be reached by 1985, then the population of Bangladesh will stabilize at 121 million. The orientation of family planning programs will be switched from clinics to a national mobilization of programs. All methods of contraception will be used throughout the policy implementation.     

Demography in China: from zero to now

After 20 years of neglect the study of population and demography in China have come to be considered imperative. China has even accepted $50 million from the UN Fund for Population Activities to defray the cost of the 1982 census and help pay for action, training, and research programs. Institutions directed toward population studies have been established in many provinces during the 1970s. The principal types are population training and research institutes and offices within institutions of higher learning. In addition institutes outside the system of higher education and special units of population studies in various medical colleges were initiated. Between 1957-77 the large increase in population began to cause economic problems which were not admitted until the late 1970s. Since 1979 the country's efforts to lower the level of fertility have been organized in major policy statements calling for 1 child/couple and a rate of natural increase causing zero population growth by the year 2000. The Institute of Population Research was created in 1974 and it has provided population projections that have helped form population policy with a major focus on historical stages of growth in China as well as counteracting the lopsided population optimism which existed earlier. In 1978 a conference was held on the science of population theory which identified areas for study such as: 1) population and economics, 2) capitalist population theories, 3) population policies, 4) family planning and economics, and 5) population problems in foreign countries. The author describes some of the literature which was published after the 1978 conference and the reappearance of academic journals in 1979 as well as the 1979 conference. 1980 and 1981 studies dealt with such topics as debates on Malthusian theory, zero population growth, urban and rural populations, historical demography, housing, employment, health improvement of the population, minorities, and fertility determinants. Chinese scholars have also begun to cooperate with their foreign colleagues in a variety of studies. In order to illustrate the wide variety of directions which Chinese population studies are taking the author provides a bibliography of population studies from 1977-81.     

The United Nations on World Population in 2300

The Population Division of the United Nations biennially issues detailed population estimates and projections covering the period 1950–2050. The most recent revision of these estimates and projections, the 2002 assessment, was released in February 2003. At irregular intervals, the Population Division also publishes long‐range projections. The most recent of these, covering the period up to 2150, was issued in 2000, based on the 1998 assessment. On 9 December 2003, the Population Division released the preliminary report on a new set of long‐range projections, dovetailing with the 2002 assessment, that extend over a much longer time span: up to 2300 ( http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/longrange2/longrange2.htm ). Unlike previous long‐range projections, which, apart from China and In‐dia, were prepared for large regional groupings only, the new projections are elaborated separately for 192 countries. Given the enormous uncertainties of the character of demographic trends over such an extended period, the information content of these projections is somewhat elusive. However, they are expected to be used to provide the demographic input for long‐range models of global climate change. Long‐range population projections also serve to demonstrate the unsustainability of certain seemingly plausible assumptions as to the future course of particular demographic parameters. In the present case, for example, the high‐fertility projection, reflecting a sustained total fertility rate at the relatively modest level of 2.35, by 2300 would yield a population of some 32 billion in the countries now classified as less developed. Or, in a yet more extreme exercise 0/reductio ad absurdum, maintaining constant fertility at present rates would result in a population size of some 120 trillion in the countries now classified as least developed. Apart from the “high fertility” and “constant fertility” models just cited, the projections are calculated for three additional instructive variants: “low fertility,”“medium fertility,” and “zero growth.” Underlying each of the five variants is a single assumption on mortality change: expectation of life at birth creeping up, country‐by‐country, to a 2300 level ranging between 88 and 106 years. International migration is set at zero throughout the period 2050‐2300 in each variant. Thus the projections are unabashedly stylized and surprise‐free, providing a simple demonstration of the consequences, in terms of population size and age structure, of clearly stated assumptions on the future course of demographic variables. Reproduced below is the Executive Summary of the preliminary report on the UN long‐range projections presented to a UN technical working group on long‐range projections at its December 2003 meeting in New York and slightly revised afterward. A full final report on this topic by the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat will be published later in 2004.     

Planet earth 1984-2034: a demographic vision

In recognition of 1984 as the year of both Orwell's famous futuristic novel and the International Population Conference following up the 1974 World Population Conference, this Bulletin examines the current state of world population and presents the author's speculations on what it might be 50 years from now. World population, now close to 4.8 billion and growing at 1.8%/year, is being shaped by 3 demographic phenomena: prolonged below-replacement fertility in developed nations, perhaps partly in response to the reduced need for workers in the emerging information era; rapid growth despite failing fertility in developing nations, due to earlier rapid mortality decline; and rapid urbanization in developing nations and unprecedented migration from poor to better-off nations. The author's assumptions for nondemographic factors related to population change in the next 50 years are no world war, nuclear or otherwise; global resource adequacy; rapid scientific and technological progress shared equitably; and the demise of capitalism and communism and greatly increased economic aid from advanced to less advanced nations. For 2034 the author envisages nations divided into service/information societies (4% of global population) where immigration balances low fertility to prevent population decline; industrialized nations (38% of total), with fertility close to or at replacement level and growth slowing; developing nations (43%), in sight of replacement level fertility; and least developed nations, with still critical demographic problems but only 15% of the world population. Total population will be 8.03 billion, but growth will be down to 0.8%/year and global zero growth is possible in another 50 years. This relatively optimistic scenario for 2034 will only be possible if mankind acts to see that the stated nondemographic assumptions are borne out.