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1.
Externality games are studied in Grafe et al. (1998, Math. Methods Op. Res. 48, 71). We define a generalization of this class of games and show, using the methodology in Izquierdo and Rafels (1996, 2001, Working paper, Univ Barcelona; Games Econ. Behav. 36, 174), some properties of the new class of generalized externality games. They include, among others, the algebraic structure of the game, convexity, and their implications for the study of cooperative solutions. Also the proportional rule is characterized for this class of games. 相似文献
2.
There have been two main lines in the literature on restricted games: the first line was started by Myerson (1977) that studied graph-restricted games an the second one was initiated by Faigle (1989). The present paper provides a unified way to look on the literature and establishes connections between the two different lines on restricted games. The strength and advantages of this unified approach becomes clear in the study of the inheritance of the convexity from the game to the restricted game where an interesting result by Nouweland and Borm (1991) on the convexity of graph-restricted games is turned into a direct consequence of the corresponding result by Faigle (1989), by means of this relation. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
3.
Bayesian equilibria are characterized by means of consistency and one-person rationality in combination with non-emptiness or converse consistency. Moreover, strong and coalition-proof Bayesian equilibria of extended Bayesian games are introduced and it is seen that these notions can be characterized by means of consistency, one-person rationality, a version of Pareto optimality and a modification of converse consistency. It is shown that, in case of the strong Bayesian equilibrium correspondence, converse consistency can be replaced by non-emptiness. As examples we treat Bayesian potential games and Bayesian congestion games. 相似文献
4.
Nabil Al-Najjar 《Theory and Decision》1995,38(2):173-193
A forward induction solution for finitely repeated games with complete information is developed. This notion is motivated in terms of its implications on the way deviations affect the opponents' expectations about the future behavior of the deviating player. We argue that the inability of the notion of perfect equilibrium to take account of forward induction is a key factor responsible for a number of difficulties encountered in the use of perfect equilibria in repeated games. It is then shown that the solution proposed in this paper remedies some of these problems in the study of three important classes of repeated games: (i) finitely repeated coordination games; (ii) repeated games where one long-term player plays a sequence of short-term players; (iii) repeated battle of the sexes games. 相似文献
5.
In a recent volume of this journal John Carroll argued that there exist only uncooperative equilibria in indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games. We show that this claim depends on modeling such games as finitely but indefinitely repeated games, which reduce simply to finitely repeated games. We propose an alternative general model of probabilistically indefinitely repeated games, and discuss the appropriateness of each of these models of indefinitely repeated games. 相似文献
6.
Bernard Walliser 《Theory and Decision》1988,25(2):163-191
All 2 × 2 games are classified into eight configurations, following three natural criteria, and prototypes given for each, especially as concerns the Newcomb and chain-store paradoxes. Two pseudo-dynamic properties, move priority and dynamic inconsistency, are examined in that framework, as well as more specifically, the problem of the origin of social institutions. 相似文献
7.
This article discusses interactive minimum cost spanning tree problems and argues that the standard approach of using a transferable utility game to come up with a fair allocation of the total costs has some flaws. A new model of spillover games is presented, in which each player??s decision whether or not to cooperate is properly taken into account. 相似文献
8.
Françoise Forges 《Theory and Decision》1993,35(3):277-310
Aumann's (1987) theorem shows that correlated equilibrium is an expression of Bayesian rationality. We extend this result to games with incomplete information.First, we rely on Harsanyi's (1967) model and represent the underlying multiperson decision problem as a fixed game with imperfect information. We survey four definitions of correlated equilibrium which have appeared in the literature. We show that these definitions are not equivalent to each other. We prove that one of them fits Aumann's framework; the agents normal form correlated equilibrium is an expression of Bayesian rationality in games with incomplete information.We also follow a universal Bayesian approach based on Mertens and Zamir's (1985) construction of the universal beliefs space. Hierarchies of beliefs over independent variables (states of nature) and dependent variables (actions) are then constructed simultaneously. We establish that the universal set of Bayesian solutions satisfies another extension of Aumann's theorem.We get the following corollary: once the types of the players are not fixed by the model, the various definitions of correlated equilibrium previously considered are equivalent. 相似文献
9.
In this paper, we are concerned with the preorderings (SS) and (BC) induced in the set of players of a simple game by the Shapley–Shubik and the Banzhaf–Coleman's indices, respectively. Our main result is a generalization of Tomiyama's 1987 result on ordinal power equivalence in simple games; more precisely, we obtain a characterization of the simple games for which the (SS) and the (BC) preorderings coincide with the desirability preordering (T), a concept introduced by Isbell (1958), and recently reconsidered by Taylor (1995): this happens if and only if the game is swap robust, a concept introduced by Taylor and Zwicker (1993). Since any weighted majority game is swap robust, our result is therefore a generalization of Tomiyama's. Other results obtained in this paper say that the desirability relation keeps itself in all the veto-holder extensions of any simple game, and so does the (SS) preordering in all the veto-holder extensions of any swap robust simple game. 相似文献
10.
Charles Figuières 《Theory and Decision》2009,66(1):39-68
This paper contributes to the understanding of economic strategic behaviors in inter-temporal settings. Comparing the MPE
and the OLNE of a widely used class of differential games it is shown: (i) what qualifications on behaviors a markov (dynamic)
information structure brings about compared with an open-loop (static) information structure, (ii) what is the reason leading
to intensified or reduced competition between the agents in the long run. It depends on whether agents’ interactions are characterized
by markov substitutability or markov complementarity, which can be seen as dynamic translations of the ideas of strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity (Bulow et al. 1985, Journal of Political Economy 93:488–511). In addition, an important practical contribution of the paper
for modelers is to show that these results can be directly deduced from the payoff structure, with no need to compute equilibria
first.
I dedicate this paper to Philippe Michel, who introduced me to the literature on differential games. 相似文献
11.
Klaus Ritzberger 《Theory and Decision》1996,40(1):1-27
Expected utility with rank dependent probabilities is a generalization of expected utility. If such preference representations are used for the payoffs in the mixed extension of a finite game, Nash equilibrium may fail to exist. Set-valued solutions, however, do exist even for those more general utility functions. But some set-valued solutions may have certain conceptual shortcomings. The paper thus proposes a new set-valued solution concept, called fixed sets under the best reply correspondence. All set-valued solution concepts are robust to perturbations of the expected utility hypothesis. 相似文献
12.
This paper reports an experimental investigation of the hypothesis that in coordination games, players draw on shared concepts of salience to identify focal points on which they can coordinate. The experiment involves games in which equilibria can be distinguished from one another only in terms of the way strategies are labelled. The games are designed to test a number of specific hypotheses about the determinants of salience. These hypotheses are generally confirmed by the results of the experiment. 相似文献
13.
Eric Rasmusen 《Theory and Decision》1992,32(2):147-164
The fact that infinitely repeated games have many different equilibrium outcomes is known as the Folk Theorem. Previous versions of the Folk Theorem have characterized only the payoffs of the game. This paper shows that over a finite portion of an infinitely repeated game, the concept of perfect equilibrium imposes virtually no restrictions on observable behavior. The Prisoner's Dilemma is presented as an example and discussed in detail.I would like to thank an anonymous referee, Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, David Levine, Thomas Voss, and participants in the UCLA Game Theory Seminar for helpful comments. 相似文献
14.
The 2 × 2 game is the simplest interactive decision model that portrays concerned decision makers with genuine choices. There are two players, each of whom must choose one of two strategies, so that there are four possible outcomes. Binary 2 × 2 games are 2 × 2 games with no restrictions on the players' preference relations over the outcomes. They therefore generalize the strict ordinal 2 × 2 games and the ordinal 2 × 2 games, classes which have already been studied extensively. This paper enumerates the strategically distinct binary 2 × 2 games. It also identifies important subsets defined by the number of pure Nash equilibria and the occurrence of dominant strategies. 相似文献
15.
16.
语言不仅是信息的载体,而且是文化的载体,语言运用方式集中反映了各民族的文化特征。习俗是一个民族在特定的历史条件和地理环境中发展和承袭下来的,是一种文化形态的象征和体现。习俗文化是文化的重要组成部分。跨文化交际中产生的许多问题,包括误解、不快、关系紧张,甚至产生严重后果,都是由于交际双方不了解对方的习俗文化造成的。习俗文化差异是跨文化交际成功的重要障碍之一。这就要求人们在跨文化交际中具备深厚的文化功底,建立良好的习俗差异意识。 相似文献
17.
Proxy fights have received comparatively little attention relative to the more popular methods for corporate control transfer: merger and tender offers. This paper presents an analytic model of the proxy contest as a cooperative game with four players: management, passive shareholders, insurgent shareholders and a trust fund. The power of the players and the effectiveness of certain managerial actions is discussed. 相似文献
18.
文化交流是人类社会和各民族发展进步的重要推动力。在世界各国对外文化交流的历史中,古代中日文化交流格外引人注目。传播学是研究人类社会信息传播规律的科学,人类一切与精神或精神文化有关的历史,其实就是传播的历史。运用传播学的基本原理和传播活动的构成要素分析古代中日间的信息传递,为研究中日文化交流史提供了新的、独特的视角。 相似文献
19.
语言是人们交流思想的重要工具,语言交际是交际交流中的重要手段。本文拟从语言交际这一角度出发,来探讨现代英语的交际功能。 相似文献
20.
宋代的走马承受公事是皇帝派驻地方的使者.他们的主要职责是信息通进,内容包括地方边情与军政等信息.其中,奏报边情、为帅司传递信息体现的是其军事功能,监视将帅则体现着他们的监察功能.走马承受公事的奏报是宋廷据以决策的重要依据. 相似文献