STRATEGIC EXCLUSION OF THE HIGHEST‐VALUED BIDDERS IN WHOLESALE AUTOMOBILE AUCTIONS

By restricting bidders to be qualified dealers, wholesale automobile auctions exclude the bidders who place the highest value on the vehicles: consumers. This article provides an explanation for this puzzling entry restriction by modeling the inventory‐management decisions of a firm. If an automobile dealer has more vehicles in inventory than is optimal, it cannot reduce its inventory by selling directly to consumers without impacting the demand for the automobiles that remain. However, if the dealer sells his/her excess inventory to a competitor, the demand for his/her remaining vehicles increases as the competitor responds by acquiring fewer additional vehicles. We demonstrate that for any market demand function and any cost of the competitor acquiring additional vehicles, a dealer with excess inventory does better by selling a subset of its vehicles to a competitor rather than directly to consumers. We discuss the market for wholesale automobiles in relation to other markets where goods are also auctioned but where entry is not restricted to qualified dealers. Doing so allows us to compare our inventory‐management explanation to common explanations provided by industry practitioners. We find that intuitive alternative stories do not consistently explain practices across markets. (JEL D44, L11, L62)     

SQUEALER DEALERS: THE MARKET FOR INFORMATION IN FEDERAL DRUG TRAFFICKING PROSECUTIONS

Federal data on drug trafficking sentences are used to determine factors that affect market quantities of providing information against other defendants (i.e., defendant probabilities of receiving testimony‐related sentence reductions) and market prices of information (i.e., the sizes of such sentence reductions). Women and better‐educated defendants experience high demand (higher quantities and prices) for information. Blacks, Hispanics, and non‐U.S. citizens experience low demand. Defendants expecting longer sentences have higher supply of information. Conditional on expected sentence, crack dealers, high‐level dealers, and dealers with long criminal histories experience low demand, while low‐level dealers experience high demand. Women of all races experience high demand for information. (JEL K14, J15, J16)     

WHY HOLD-UPS OCCUR: THE SELF-ENFORCING RANGE OF CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS

Court enforcement and private enforcement are not alternative contract enforcement mechanisms, but are used jointly by transactors to define the self-enforcing range of a contractual relationship. Within this framework contract terms economize on the limited amounts of private enforcement capital possessed by transactors, either by directly controlling transactor behavior or by shifting private enforcement capital between transactors to coincide with likely future market conditions. Hold-ups occur when market conditions change sufficiently to place the relationship outside the self-enforcing range. This probabilistic view of hold-ups is contrasted with opportunism more generally and with moral hazard behavior.     

RISK, TRANSACTIONS CHARGES, AND THE MARKET FOR FOREIGN EXCHANGE SERVICES

This paper suggests that transactions charges in foreign exchange markets, rather than being solely brokerage fees, represent exchange rate uncertainty in periods of great fluctuations by including remuneration for the assumption of risk by foreign exchange dealers. Since most of the cost of exchange rate uncertainty may be largely endogenously included in the foreign exchange markets, attempts to examine the efficient market hypothesis in these markets should most appropriately include specific consideration of transactions costs. There appears to be empirical support for the premise that transactions charges are positively related to exchange rate risk, and, as well, inclusion of contemporaneous bid-ask spreads into the interest parity schedule leaves few unexplained profits from dollar-pound covered interest arbitrage during the 1970's and underscores the notion of classifying periods by degree of turbulence in analyzing covered interest arbitrage.     

Gangster,victim or both? The interdiscursive construction of sameness and difference in self‐presentations

The paper conceptualizes two contradictory discourses, both used by ethnic minority drug dealers in a street drug market in Oslo, Norway. Oppression discourse includes personal narratives of unemployment, racism and psycho-social problems, often combined with stories about the government and city council being unwilling to help. Drug dealers use the discourse to justify drug dealing and violence, both for themselves and in meetings with welfare organizations. Gangster discourse , on the other hand, includes a series of personal narratives emphasizing how hard, smart, and sexually alluring the young men are. Drug dealers use this discourse to gain self-respect and respect from others, and it dominates interactions on the street. An important argument in this paper is that the discursive practice of criminals inspires theoretical perspectives on criminal practice. Oppression and gangster discourses have inspired, respectively, neutralization and subculture theory. When the same people use both discourses, however, the picture becomes more complicated. The 'bilingual' discursive practice of the street drug dealers reflects the ambivalent role of the researcher, and a Scandinavian institutional and social context where street drug dealers have extensive contact with a welfare state apparatus. The paper still suggests that similar interdiscursivity may have been sacrificed in previous research to produce more coherent theoretical frameworks.     

INCOMPLETE OWNERSHIP, RENT DISSIPATION, AND THE RETURN TO RELATED INVESTMENTS

The welfare loss from free access resource use is examined in a general equilibrium model. Actions that intensify competition for the resource, either by lowering the private cost or raising the private benefit of using it, can raise this loss above the rent the resource would earn if owned. Such 'excess dissipation'is illustrated with examples applicable to unowned groundwater. Regulatory policies that fix inputs needed to acquire the resource work by transferring part of the resource's rent to controlled inputs. The resulting welfare effect depends on the elasticity of substitution between, and relative prices of, controlled and uncontrolled inputs.     

Transparency in the European Bond Market

The European bond market is made up of many segments characterised by varying levels of liquidity and of pre- and post-trade transparency. The possibility of extending the transparency provisions envisioned in the Directive 2004/39/EC, disciplining the functioning of markets in financial instruments in Europe (MiFID), from the equity to the bond market is currently being discussed. This poses risks to the status quo through trading fragmentation and strong negotiating power of a few large dealers, particularly with respect to small retail investors. The main conclusion of the paper is that if MiFID transparency rules are to be extended to the bond market, this must be “real” transparency, meaning pre-trade dissemination of real-time executable prices and a transparent order book. Under current provisions, this kind of information is available if not directly to everybody, at least directly to dealers and indirectly to professional and retail clients through business-to-business electronic platforms.     

A Criminogenic Market Structure: the Automobile Industry*

Sociologists have come under attack for ignoring the role powerful elites play in controlling society's central master institutions by establishing policies which set structural conditions that cause other (lower level) people to commit crimes. This study suggests how one elite, automobile manufacturers, creates a “criminogenic market structure” by imposing on their new car dealers a pricing policy which requires high volume and low per unit profit While this strategy gives the manufacturer increased total net aggregate profit (by achieving economies of scale and by minimizing direct competition among oligopolist “rivals”), it places the new car dealer in a financial squeeze by forcing him to constantly free-up and continuously re-cycle capital into fixed margin new car inventory. This squeeze sets in motion a downward spiral of illegal activities which (1) inclines the new car dealer to engage in compensatory profit taking through fraudulent service operations, (2) under certain conditions, generates a “kickback” system which enables used car managers of new car dealerships to exact graft from independent used car wholesalers, and (3) forces the independent used car wholesaler into illegal “short-sales” in order to generate unrecorded cash for kickback payments.     

Symbolic meanings of prices: Constructing the value of contemporary art in Amsterdam and New York galleries

This article develops a sociological analysis of the price mechanism on the market for contemporary art. On the basis of in-depth interviews with art dealers in New York and Amsterdam, I address two pricing norms: one norm inhibits art dealers from decreasing prices; the other induces them to set prices according to size. To account for these pricing norms, I argue that price setting is not just an economic but also a signifying act: despite their impersonal, businesslike connotations, actors on markets manage to express a range of cognitive and cultural meanings through prices. Previously, meanings of prices have been recognized in signaling theories within economics. However, these meanings are restricted to profit opportunities. Within the humanities, by contrast, meanings of prices are restricted to contaminating or corrosive meanings. The sociological perspective I develop claims that prices, price differences, and price changes convey multiple meanings related to the reputation of artists, the social status of dealers, and the quality of the artworks that are traded.     

THE IMPACT OF A PUBLIC OPTION IN THE U.S. HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET

We develop a game‐theoretical framework to examine the implications of the introduction of a nonprofit “public option” in the U.S. health insurance market. In this model, heterogeneous consumers have to choose between two competing insurance plans. One plan is offered by a profit‐maximizing private insurer; the other by social‐welfare‐maximizing public option. In equilibrium, the distinct objectives of the two insurers induce adverse selection in consumer choice: the public option covers the less healthy consumers, yielding the more profitable segment of market to the private insurer. However, our empirical results suggest that both insurers will capture significant parts of the health insurance market. (JEL I11, L10, L21, L32)     

Market Liberalisation,Vertical Integration and Price Behaviour in Tanzania's Coffee Auction

Whether market liberalisation can promote agricultural development in Africa depends on how well existing institutions can facilitate trade by private agents. This article assesses the performance of the Tanzania coffee marketing system after liberalisation and the emergence of private, vertically integrated exporters (VIEs). Increasing producer prices, declining marketing margins, and the continued provision of a useful auction for coffee that is delivered by traders who are not VIEs all suggest a degree of success for liberalisation. The presence of VIEs seems to have provided investment to reduce marketing costs, whilst a sufficient number of competing firms has limited non‐competitive behaviour in the market for coffee that is traded at the auction by non‐VIEs.     

Ups and downs of art commerce: narratives of “crisis” in the contemporary art markets of Russia and India

This article develops an analytical framework to study the role of narratives in markets and argues that there is a relationship between the structure and composition of narratives produced by market actors and market dynamics. With respect to theory, the article bridges the perspectives that study markets as cultures and as fields and draws from the organizational studies approach to the analysis of narratives. Two empirical cases of the crises narratives in the emerging contemporary art markets of Russia and India illustrate the use of the framework. The analysis is based on in-depth interviews with artists and art dealers as well as observations in Moscow, Saint Petersburg, New Delhi, and Mumbai conducted between April 2012 and June 2013. The article shows that there is a widely shared crisis narrative with a coherent structure in the Indian art market. In contrast, fragmented and contested stories that lack narrative structure dominate in the Russian art market. The analysis of the first case highlights the narrative structure and shows the productive work it does in the Indian market—it provides a moral justification of existing market norms and produces a perspective for the future. The analysis of the second case focuses on the context of narrative production and connects the conflicting interpretations of the crisis in the Russian art market to contested hierarchies and persistent uncertainty.     

Much Ado About Nothing? Macro-Prudential Ideas and the Post-Crisis Regulation of Shadow Banking

Post-crisis, macro-prudential ideas have challenged the epistemic authority of private risk management technologies, declaring them to be pro-cyclical contributors to systemic risk. This discursive challenge has been most critical of the shadow banking system, where private risk management instruments are central. This challenge, however, has not been translated into regulatory tools which reflect these convictions. This paper studies this process of discursive challenge to (failed) regulatory intervention for the case of the repo-market, the heart of the current shadow banking system. It traces regulatory efforts on the global and EU level from regulatory statements to (lack of) action, documenting both the persistent articulation of macro-prudential ideas challenging private risk-management systems and timid to no regulatory intervention. It links this hiatus to international coordination problems, the need for macro-prudential action to span regulatory communities, involving banking and financial market authorities and disagreements between micro- and macro-prudentially oriented regulators. The lack of evidence and the difficulty to generate it are identified as major impediments for regulatory consensus, further aggravated by ambiguities about the goals of anti-cyclical regulation. Beyond governance problems and the persistent appeal of private risk-management systems, the paper thus points to difficulties operationalizing macro-prudential ideas as a major explanatory factor.     

Louis Kelso's binary economy

Louis Kelso's binary economics offers a distinct economic paradigm for understanding growth, poverty, inflation, private property, and the necessary conditions for market efficiency in an industrial economy. It also proposes a concrete, democratic, private property system for achieving sustained growth and distributive justice on market principles. In essence, binary theory holds that capital has not only a productive, but also an independent (and very potent), distributive relationship to growth that is suppressed in a closed private property system. By opening the private property system to all people on market principles, binary logic explains how the unnatural scarcity and gross distributional disparities that now prevail throughout the world can be replaced with the natural, widespread abundance and leisure promised by the industrial revolution, and the distributive justice that is necessary for market efficiency. If valid, binary economics provides a way of significantly helping poor and working people everywhere without taking from the rich. This article presents an overview of binary economics and describes a national binary economy. It examines the promise of sustained growth and distributive justice based on binary logic and explains how that logic differs from traditional economic analysis. Finally, it discusses questions raised by binary theory that merit additional inquiry by socioeconomists concerned about poor and working people everywhere.     

Fair Trade: Social regulation in global food markets

This article analyzes the theoretical and empirical parameters of social regulation in contemporary global food markets, focusing on the rapidly expanding Fair Trade initiative. Fair Trade seeks to transform North/South relations by fostering ethical consumption, producer empowerment, and certified commodity sales. This initiative joins an array of labor and environmental standard and certification systems which are often conceptualized as “private regulations” since they depend on the voluntary participation of firms. I argue that these new institutional arrangements are better understood as “social regulations” since they operate beyond the traditional bounds of private and public (corporate and state) domains and are animated by individual and collective actors. In the case of Fair Trade, I illuminate how relational and civic values are embedded in economic practices and institutions and how new quality assessments are promoted as much by social movement groups and loosely aligned consumers and producers as they are by market forces. This initiative's recent commercial success has deepened price competition and buyer control and eroded its traditional peasant base, yet it has simultaneously created new openings for progressive politics. The study reveals the complex and contested nature of social regulation in the global food market as movement efforts move beyond critique to institution building.     

Innenansichten eines Wohlfahrtsmarkts

The 2001 pension reform act (“Riester reform”) has recast old-age security in Germany by placing more emphasis on private provisions. The new policy draws on markets and competitive structures in social welfare, as done earlier in long-term care and in public utilities. In the social welfare sector in Germany, such privatisation mostly goes hand in hand with a far-reaching “social” regulation of markets. Old-age pensions are the most recent case in point. For the first time, financial markets figure as welfare markets. This is done in the politically most sensitive sector of the German welfare state, old-age security. In theoretical terms, we interpret the change as a structural transformation of German “social capitalism”. Empirically, we investigate the structure of the new welfare market and the attitudes of the providers, based on a survey of all providers of private pensions in Germany. The findings include: (1) Markets can produce the welfare good “income security in old-age” only by way of a complex arrangement of three markets – financial markets, pension markets and markets for financial consultancy services. (2) The pension reform of 2001 has given rise to a new welfare market: an old-age pension market as a distinct sub sector of the wider market for financial investment and saving. The pension market constitutes a new field of business, with new actors, new products and new arenas of competition. The new market is created and shaped by politics. (3) The new private pension market combines market principles with welfare state principles. The providers conceive of their business as contributing to social security, and they recognise that the state sustains and structures the market.     

CORRUPTION,TAX EVASION AND THE ROLE OF WAGE INCENTIVES WITH ENDOGENOUS MONITORING TECHNOLOGY

The importance of high salaries to circumvent bureaucratic corruption has been widely recognized in the policy debate. Yet, there appears to be much reluctance when it comes to the implementation. In this paper, we argue that deterring corruption through wage incentives may become prohibitively expensive that the government finds it optimal to accept higher net revenues at the expense of honesty. Deviating from the existing literature, we set an endogenous monitoring technology that allows us to capture the dual role of auditing, as a complement with and as a substitute for wage incentives to deter bribery. We find that the government is better‐off either completely eliminating corruption or accepting corruption by offering wages lower than the market wage. Offering public wage premium that does not deter bribery is suboptimal. When it is optimal to deter bribery, the government can do it either through wage incentives or monitoring. The role of wage incentives decreases in societies with higher level of dishonesty. (JEL D73, H26, J33, J41)     

DIVIDEND POLICY IN REGULATED NETWORK INDUSTRIES: EVIDENCE FROM THE EU

We study the dividend policy of firms in regulated network industries, focusing on the impact of different regulatory regimes and government control. We link payout and smoothing decisions to different regulatory mechanisms (cost‐based vs. incentive regulation) and state versus private ownership. We test our predictions on a panel of listed European electric utilities, accounting for potential endogeneity of the choice of regulatory and ownership patterns. We find that incentive‐regulated firms smooth their dividends less than cost‐based regulated firms and that they report higher target payout ratios. Consistent with the interest group theory of regulation, we find that incentive regulation schemes are less likely when the state is still an important shareholder in the sector. Additionally, our results show that government control undermines the efficiency‐enhancing effects of incentive regulation on dividend policy, for example, lower smoothing is only due to private firms. (JEL G35, L51, L32, L9)     

Art dealers as competitors and community builders: Understanding the overlapping social logics of the contemporary art world

Art dealers are often described as gatekeepers who are focused on their own position as well as the status of their artists and collectors. We argue that this is an incomplete account of art dealing. The goal of this article is to explain how art dealing is a “toolkit” that does not exclusively focus on status building and social capital, but also includes behavior associated with accessing the visual arts field and community development. First, art dealers often have a background that has strong social ties to art, which provides them with intimate knowledge of the art world and social connections with artists, collectors, and other art world actors. For that reason, entry into art dealing reflects intimate knowledge of art practices, what we call “proximate connoisseurship.” Second, art dealerships reflect both competitive and communal factors. Art dealers may choose to work with artists based on their ability to generate income, social capital, and prestige (“competitive logic”), but art dealers may also employ a “communal logic” focused on friendships and creating community. This theory of art dealers is illustrated with excerpts from interviews with 34 dealers randomly selected from the rosters of international art fairs such as Art Basel Miami, EXPO Chicago, Aqua, and the New Art Dealers Alliance show.     

Art Without A Market: Creating Artistic Value In A Provincial Art World

Symbolic interactionism is defined as the study of social acts and social objects. Paintings are social objects whose value is almost entirely created in the social acts called art worlds. Important art worlds are currently organized as art markets, in which art is created, exhibited, bought, sold and discussed by artists, museums, dealers, collectors, and critics. In St. Louis, where fieldwork was done, the art market is marginal; art schools and faculty artists replace dealers, collectors, museums, galleries, and critics in the local production of art, the creation of art value, and the determination of artistic status.