Intermediate preferences and Rawlsian arbitration rules

Given the preferences of two agents over a finite set of alternatives, an arbitration rule selects some fair compromise. We study the idea that more consensus should not be harmful: the closer your preferences are to mine (in the sense of Grandmont's (1978) intermediate preferences), the better I like the selected alternative. We describe several Pareto optimal rules satisfying this principle. If, in addition, a condition akin to Suppes' (1966) grading principle is imposed, the rule must always choose an alternative maximizing the welfare of the worst-off agent, measured by the number of alternatives that he finds worse than the chosen one.Stimulating discussions with H. Moulin and helpful comments from J. Crémer are gratefully acknowledged. The author also wishes to thank a referee and an associate editor for challenging remarks. This research was partly supported by a CAFIR grant from the Université de Montréal.     

The effect of gender on arbitration decisions

The effect of grievant’s and arbitrator’s gender on arbitration decisions is investigated using 169 arbitration cases fromLabor Arbitration Awards. Three hypotheses were tested: (1) arbitrators treat female grievants less severely than male grievants; (2) female arbitrators render less severe judgments than their male counterparts; and (3) arbitrator’s gender and grievant’s gender interact so that female arbitrators will treat female grievants more favorably than male arbitrators and male arbitrators will treat male grievants more favorably than female arbitrators. The empirical findings supported none of these hypotheses and the authors conclude that the arbitration process is free of gender bias.     

An arbitration game and the egalitarian bargaining solution

We analyze a simple arbitration procedure which is a multi-stage variant of Nash's demand game. In the absence of discounting, all Nash equilibria of the game yield the egalitarian solution in the first stage. The crucial feature of our arbitration procedure is that, in the case of incompatible demands, the game is allowed to continue and the player who demands the higher gain over the disagreement point is penalized by restricting her or his feasible demands in the following stage. Suitable modifications of the arbitration game yield the lexicographic extension of the egalitarian solution, resp. the proportional solutions. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C78.Financial support through grants from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the University of Waterloo is gratefully acknowledged. Earlier versions of the paper were presented at McMaster University and Brock University. The authors thank Nejat Anbarci, Michele Piccione, Venkatraman Sadanand, an editor, and the referees for their useful comments.     

Police bargaining,arbitration, and fringe benefits

Data from a national sample of 500 to 600 U.S. cities with over 25,000 in population indicated that the practice of police collective bargaining has a positive, strong association with fringe benefits (measured by city contributions for police retirement and insurance benefits per police officer). The availability of arbitration, however, seems to have little or no influence on the dollar amount of police fringes, and neither the current nor the prior use of arbitration (i.e., actually receiving an arbitration award) has any consistent association with police fringes. The results indicate that collective bargaining and regional location influence the level of police fringes more than do other variables. We are grateful to Steve Kawakami, Mark Phillips, Joe Schimansky, and Dick Williams for some excellent research assistance. We are also grateful to the National Institute of Justice of the U.S. Department of Justice for financially supporting this research. Such support does not mean that the Institute or Department necessarily agrees with our methods or conclusions.     

“Chilling” under arbitration and mixed strike-arbitration regimes

This paper investigates the “chilling effect” of arbitration hypothesis using data from public sector collective bargaining activity in Minnesota. Settlement rates under a regime requiring the compulsory arbitration of impasses are compared to rates under a regime permitting a limited right to strike. The authors find a significantly lower settlement rate under the pure arbitration regime. Other factors that could result in this rate differential are discussed. While not ruling out the possibility of unmeasured differences, the authors conclude that the differential is due to differences in regime and not to the confounding factors discussed. The authors wish to thank Paul Schumann and an anonymous referee for comments resulting in substantial improvements in this paper.     

The effect of lawyers on non-discipline/discharge arbitration decisions

Both labor and management often have a lawyer present their case at an arbitration hearing. This paper investigates whether the probability of obtaining a favorable arbitration outcome was related to the use of legal counsel. An analysis of 1,284 Canadian non-discipline/discharge cases revealed that a party was more likely to receive a favorable award when it had legal representation and the other side did not. However, there was no difference in win rates when the outcomes of cases in which both parties used lawyers were compared with those in which neither side was represented by legal counsel. Support for this research was provided by a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council/Saint Mary’s University Matching Grant. The excellent research assistance of Nancy Canavan is gratefully acknowledged.     

The chilling effect of optimism: The case of final-offer arbitration

This article examines the incentive effects of final-offer arbitration (FOA) when disputants have optimistic (i.e., biased) beliefs about the arbitrator's settlement preferences. Optimism is shown to increase the divergence in Nash equilibrium final offers, and the divergence is largest under naïve, rather than sophisticated, optimism. Therefore, though FOA rules were instituted to lessen the “chilling” effect of arbitration, FOA interacts with optimism to worsen the chilling effect. Data from controlled laboratory experiments confirm that optimism leads to more divergent final bargaining positions and higher dispute rates. These results highlight the role that de-biasing expectations can play in improving bargaining outcomes.     

A Premarital Contract

A couple sought therapy after 19 years of marriage. The roots of their current difficulties had been quite apparent at the time of their marriage, when the wife's father imposed a marriage contract upon the young couple. Marriage contracts are being increasingly accepted by courts, and an informal process of contracting as a mode of clarifying expectations of marriage and of marital partners is being advocated by lawyers, marital therapists, and others. Premarital consultation regarding legal and emotional issues in marriage could be an area of constructive collaboration for the mental health and legal professions.     

外部环境对高新技术企业生命周期的影响

高新技术企业生命周期可细分为孕育期、创建期．成长期，成熟期、衰退期及死亡期。对于一些具体的高新技术企业来说，其生命周期可能只经历了其中的某些阶段，如没到成熟期就已不复存在。影响高新技术企业生命周期的因素很多，本文将主要探讨金融环境．法律政策环境、技术环境，市场环境、区域环境等外部环境对高新技术企业生命周期的影响。