Incentivising trust

We argue that trust can be incentivised by measures which increase the ability of trusters to protect themselves against risk. We work within the framework originally established by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) in which trust is measured experimentally as the ability to generate reciprocity in response to an initial offer of money within a two-person game. An incentive is conveyed both by means of variations in the multiplier applied to the first player’s initial offer and by giving the first player the opportunity to insure themselves against the possibility that the second player will fail to reciprocate their initial offer. Measured trust is strongly responsive to both these incentives. Thus third parties have the ability to influence the outcome of the game, not only, as in the analysis of Charness, Cobo-Reyes, and Jimenez (2008), by punishing failure to reciprocate and rewarding ‘good’ initial offers, but also by offering protection which strengthens the first player’s risk efficacy, or ratio of assets to risk.     

Locus of control and other-regarding behavior: Experimental evidence from a large heterogeneous sample

This paper investigates the relationship between locus of control and other-regarding behavior in a large and heterogeneous sample of the French population. We relate locus of control with incentivized measures of other-regarding behavior in the dictator and ultimatum games. Participants with high internal locus of control offer comparatively less in situations with passive responders (dictator game) but tend to increase their offers when their counterparts have veto power (ultimatum game). Moreover, they appear better at anticipating responders’ behavior in the ultimatum game, which leads to offers with a higher probability of acceptance and higher expected payoff. Some results for the ultimatum game, however, are sensitive to model specification and sample composition. Our findings suggest that a high internal locus of control increases individuals’ ability to adapt to strategic and non-strategic settings.     

NON‐MONETARY INCENTIVES AND OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOR: EVIDENCE FROM A LABORATORY PUBLIC GOOD GAME

This study reports data from a laboratory experiment that investigates the incentive effect of three distinct social communication schemes on free‐riding behavior. We use performance‐based approval and disapproval ratings and a linear public good game to address the above issues. The treatments vary in terms of subjects' opportunities to anonymously assign (1) only the approval ratings to other group members, (2) only the disapproval ratings to other group members, and (3) either the approval or the disapproval ratings to other group members (but not both to the same group member), after they play a standard linear public good game. Despite the Nash prediction of zero individual contribution in all three treatments, the data show that the disapproval points generate significantly higher contribution than the approval points. The treatment in which subjects could communicate either the approval or the disapproval points produces the highest level of contribution. We discuss the implications that these findings may have for efficient design of organizations. (JEL D03, H41, C72, C92)     

Voting games,indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules

We present four choice functions which characterize the stationary points of sequential search rules derived from a preference relation over outcomes. These functions are contrasted with others in the literature in terms of narrowness of choice as well as their ability to satisfy certain normative and consistency conditions, and it is shown how two of these sets arise as the set of equilibrium outcomes of a voting game under different tie-breaking assumptions.We would like to thank Nicholas Miller for introducing us and two anonymous referees for valuable comments and suggestions.     

MEDIA AND HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT: CAN VIDEO GAME PLAYING MAKE YOU SMARTER?

According to the literature, video game playing can improve such cognitive skills as problem solving, abstract reasoning, and spatial logic. I test this hypothesis using the data from the Child Development Supplement to the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The endogeneity of video game playing is addressed by using panel data methods and controlling for an extensive list of child and family characteristics. To address the measurement error in video game playing, I instrument children's weekday time use with their weekend time use. After taking into account the endogeneity and measurement error, video game playing is found to positively affect children's problem solving ability. The effect of video game playing on problem solving ability is comparable to the effect of educational activities. (JEL I2, J13, J24)     

SUSTAINABILITY OF THE FRIEDMAN RULE IN AN INTERNATIONAL MONETARY POLICY GAME

This article develops a two-country monetary economy model in order to analyze the international monetary policy game between governments and the domestic monetary policy game between each government and its private sector. We prove that if governments can commit to their own private sectors, the cooperative equilibrium of the game between governments is for them to follow the Friedman rule. When governments lack such ability to commit, we find that the Friedman rule is more likely to be sustained in our open-economy model than in the closed-economy model of Ireland. ( JEL E31, E52, E61)     

Group diversity and salience: A natural experiment from a television game show

We take advantage of a naturally occurring experiment in a television game show to study the impact of group characteristics on the group's ability to select salient solutions in a matching game. The Family Feud features families seeking to earn prizes by matching the results of public opinion surveys on various subjects. Our main result is that, controlling for task difficulty, families that are more diverse, as measured by both the intra-family generational gap and the relatedness of their members, are more successful at matching wider ranges of survey responses. This highlights the importance of member diversity in expanding information and decision frames of reference within a group.     

Endogenous agenda formation in three-person committees

This paper analyzes a 3-person voting game in which two or three players have the ability to choose alternatives to be considered. Once the set of possible alternatives and the structure of the voting procedure are known, the players can solve for the outcome. Thus, the actual choice over outcomes takes place in the choice of alternatives to be voted on, i.e., the agenda. An equilibrium to this agenda-formation game in shown to exist under different assumptions about the information relative to the order of the players in the voting game. Further, this equilibrium is computed and found to possess certain features which are attractive from a normative point of view.Prepared for delivery at the 1985 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, The New Orleans Hilton, August 29–September 1, 1985. We would like to thank Richard McKelvey, Norman Schofield and two anonymous referees for valuable comments and suggestions. We retain responsibility for remaining errors.     

Gender,electrodermal activity,and videogames: Adding a psychophysiological dimension to sociolinguistic methods

User experience research on the affective dimensions of videogame players’ interactions has looked to psychophysiological measures as proxies for emotional states. We add to the growing body of literature on this topic and offer our research as a novel application to the methodological toolbox of sociolinguistics. We present a case study of an interaction occurring in a mixed‐gender group (3m/1f) playing a video game that has a potentially sexualized component in gameplay, using a Nintendo Wii‐mote joystick as a mimetic penis in the game Mario Party 8. Through a detailed analysis of (1) gameplay interaction, including talk, laughter and gesture, (2) participants’ electrodermal activity (EDA), and (3) a post‐game debriefing, we track the varied engagements of the players in‐game and with each other, showing how the design of the game itself and the entanglement of hardware and software design with gendered gameplay serve to marginalize and exclude the female participant.     

Trust and risk revisited

A trustor faces a risky choice in the trust game when he acts upon his belief regarding the chances of betrayal by the trustee. Despite intensive research there is no clear evidence for a link between lottery risk preferences and risk involved in trusting others. We argue that this is due to crucial differences between the risk measurements in the two settings. Trusting is giving up control to a human while lottery risk arises from a mechanistic randomization device. We propose a risky trust game that experimentally measures risk in the same context as the standard trust game, but nevertheless reduces the trust decision to objective risk. Our results show that transfers in the trust game can indeed be explained by individual risk attitudes elicited with the risky trust game, while lottery risk preferences have no explanatory power.     

The Development of Anticipatory Smiling

When do infants begin to communicate positive affect about physical objects to their social partners? We examined developmental changes in the timing of smiles during episodes of initiating joint attention that involved an infant gazing between an object and a social partner. Twenty‐six typically developing infants were observed at 8, 10, and 12 months during the Early Social‐Communication Scales, a semistructured assessment for eliciting initiating joint attention and related behaviors. The proportion of infant smiling during initiating joint attention episodes did not change with age, but there was a change in the timing of the smiles. The likelihood of infants smiling at an object and then gazing at the experimenter while smiling (anticipatory smiling) increased between 8 and 10 months and remained stable between 10 and 12 months. The increase in the number of infants who smiled at an object and then made eye contact suggests a developing ability to communicate positive affect about an object.     

Losses Disguised as Wins Affect Game Selection on Multiline Slots

Multiline slots are exciting games that contain features which make them alluring. One such feature is a loss disguised as a win (LDW); wherein, players win less than they wager (e.g., bet 2 dollars, win back 50 cents), but this net loss is disguised by flashing graphics and winning sounds. Research to date concludes that LDWs are both rewarding and reinforcing. Here, we investigated whether LDWs affect players’ game selection. Thirty-two undergraduate students with experience playing slot machines played 100 spins on four games—two had positive payback percentages (115%) and two had negative payback percentages (85%) after 100 spins. For each payback percentage condition, there was a game with no LDWs and a game with a moderate number of LDWs. For the 100 spins, players could choose to play whichever game they wished. They then rated their preference for each game following the 100-spins and chose a game to continue playing. The majority of players preferred playing the positive payback percentage game with LDWs and chose to continue playing this game over the three other games. We conclude that in addition to LDWs being reinforcing and rewarding, LDWs do in fact influence game selection. We conclude that responsible gambling initiatives should educate players about LDWs.     

Probabilistic cheap talk

We consider a model in which there is uncertainty over when a one-shot game will be played. We show how a mechanism designer can implement desirable outcomes in certain economic games by manipulating only the probability that the game is played in a given round while leaving all other aspects of the game unchanged. We also show that if there is no discounting, this uncertainty imparts a sequential structure that is almost mathematically equivalent to a repeated version of the game with discounting. In particular, a folk theorem applies to such games. Thus, games of probabilistic cheap provide a third interpretation of the repeated game framework with the additional feature that expected payoff is invariant to the probability of the game ending. Received: 10 May 1999/Accepted: 16 October 2000     

The representation of alienable and inalienable rights: games in transition function form

We propose a new type of cooperative game—a game in transition function (TF) form—as a means of representing social decision-making procedures that is suitable for the analysis of rights. The TF form is a generalisation of the effectivity function (EF) form, and in particular it tells us (where the EF form does not) about the alienability of a right. We describe procedures for generating a (unique) EF game from a TF game, and for generating a (non-unique) TF game from an EF game. We make some specific proposals about the representation of rights as properties of TF games and comment on some implications about the relationship between rights and Pareto efficiency.     

Depth of reasoning in strategic form games

The depth of human reasoning in interactive decision-making situations can be assessed experimentally in dominance solvable non-cooperative games. We first review the studies employing two sorts of games—the Beauty Contest game and the Investment game. Studies employing these games show that: (i) people typically engage in relatively low levels of strategic reasoning; and (ii) there are individual differences in the depth of reasoning. There are other lines of research employing other types of games and definitions of the depth of reasoning that support the two conclusions above. We argue that these studies underestimate depth of reasoning because it is also necessary to apply a mental model about other players’ reasoning ability in order to play well. Implications of those findings to the theory-of-mind or Machiavellian Intelligence research are discussed.     

Opportunities and challenges of the digital lifespan: views of service providers and citizens in the UK

Information about UK citizens’ use of digital technologies is often expressed in statistics – x% lack Internet access; y% get online to engage in online banking, update social media sites, or participate in online auctions. There are many social implications to digital technology use, however – individuals may communicate online as a major way to stay in touch with friends and family, and as Internet access rises and government and public sector budgets shrink, online services become an increasingly attractive way for government and public sector service providers to communicate with citizens. This paper presents selected results of an exploratory study designed to investigate the digital personhood of UK citizens through interviews with participants at three life transitions: leaving secondary school, becoming a parent, and retiring from work. Digital personhood in this paper implies identity information online, and some interaction with others around that information. We then report on our presentation of a selection of these results to thirteen stakeholders who represented UK government departments, public sector organisations, and industry. We found that citizen and stakeholder concerns were quite different, especially at the new parent life transition, and that stakeholders tended to underestimate the willingness and ability of citizens to become involved online with the government and public sector, and overestimate citizens’ vulnerability online. Future research should investigate practical strategies for increasing communication between stakeholders and citizens, and also how to encourage stakeholders to work together to benefit their common clientele – the citizens.     

What’s in a frame? Goal framing,trust and reciprocity

Economists often rely on the Berg et al. (1995) trust game, or variants thereof, to identify levels of trust and reciprocity, which are fundamental to discussions of social capital. But to what extent is behavior in this game sensitive to the way the instructions are framed? We use the Berg et al. trust game played for ten rounds with random re-matching to study this. We implement a number of variations in the way the game is presented to subjects. We show that levels of trust, reciprocity and returns to trust are significantly higher under “goal framing”, which highlights the conflict inherent in the game, between self-interest and maximizing social surplus. Furthermore, with such framing, trust measured via the experimental game exhibits significant positive correlation with trust measured via the Social Values Orientation questionnaire.     

Huck Finn and the game model gloss

Several authors have cited the metaphor of game playing as an analytical device to study social behavior. Traditionally, the game model has been used either to promote a more strict or instrumental control upon actual social behavior or to match a formal game model construction of a social event with actual behavior in everyday life, and through this method shed light upon aspects which otherwise would be overlooked. In another connection, various authors have discussed the concept of glossing in social relations. This paper uses Mark Twain's last chapters ofThe Adventures of Huckleberry Finn to explicate how the game model can be used as a gloss. The game model gloss then is a unique combination of sociological conceptualizations presented through the medium of a lively literary allegory. We feel this paper extends the concept of glossing and furthers the understanding of the game metaphor in sociological theory.This paper has been presented at the Spring 1977 meetings of the Southern Sociological Society in Atlanta, Georgia.     

The Development of the Sexual Assertiveness Questionnaire (SAQ): A Comprehensive Measure of Sexual Assertiveness for Women

Sexual assertiveness has been defined in a number of ways by many researchers, with different aspects of sexual assertiveness emphasized in different measures. Most previous measures have included condom insistence as an important aspect of sexual assertiveness, but this may not translate well to women at all life stages or in varied types of relationships. The goal of the current study was to develop a comprehensive measure of sexual assertiveness that encompasses the aspects of sexual assertiveness that have been emphasized by previous researchers, with the exception of condom insistence. Items were generated based on previous measures and definitions, and an exploratory factor analysis was conducted (Study 1) to better understand the dimensions of sexual assertiveness. The proposed scale was revised and further refined using both exploratory factor analysis and confirmatory factor analysis in Study 2. The final scale consisted of 18 items that seem to capture three dimensions of sexual assertiveness: the ability to initiate and communicate about desired sex, the ability to refuse unwanted sex, and the ability to communicate about sexual history and risk. Model fit indices indicate that this three-factor solution fits the data well. Implications and suggestions for future research are discussed.