Durkheim's Response to Spencer: An Essay Toward Historicism in the Historiography of Sociology*

Merton has made an important distinction between the “history” any “systematics” of sociological theory, and outlined the valuable functions of the former. Most histories of sociology, however, have been “presetist” or “Whiggish” in perspective; we propose an “historicist” alternative. Within this perspective, Durkheim's response to Spencer is analyzed in three areas: (1) the relation between “individual” and “society;” (2) evolution and social change; and (3) the scope and method of sociology. In these areas, Durkheim's critical style reveals a repetitive theme which is termed “inversion.” The essay concludes by re-affirming Merton's distinction and urging that the “historicist” perspective is the most valid and useful approach to the history of sociology.     

Spencer is dead, long live Spencer: individualism, holism, and the problem of norms

The debate between the advocates of sociological individualism and those of holism has been pervasive in the development of social theory. This debate is often situated in the false problems of sociology, since it is seen as a particular form of the perennial and irresolvable dilemma between social nominalism and realism, as well as between freedom and determinism. Nevertheless, the debate is far from over within contemporary sociology and other social science, as indicated by the resurgence of individualism in rational action theory and its repudiation by holistic social theories. The aim of this paper is to identify some modern variations on this theme as well as to discern certain common tendencies of two seemingly opposite theoretical perspectives, viz. the convergence upon a normative solution to the problem of social order. This convergence is therefore denoted normative convergence between sociological individualism and holistic sociology.     

Social change and selectionist thought: on Spencer,Darwin and Runciman

Deep divisions persist within sociology over the potential of a neo‐Darwinian selectionist paradigm of explanation to contribute positively to social theory and research. Herbert Spencer's concern with the progressive direction of evolution, and uncertainty about the divergences between Darwinian and Spencerian thought over ‘natural selection’ and the ‘survival of the fittest’, often freight preconceptions of the potential of the paradigm. This article first explains how ideas primarily attributable to Spencer rather than Darwin have served to cloud the debate. It thus clarifies Spencer's ideas on evolutionary process, disentangling them from and establishing their marginality to Darwin's central concerns. Second, it considers recent work by Runciman on selectionism and change in Britain, and suggests that the usefulness of adopting a selectionist paradigm need not (yet) involve a quasi‐genetic unit of change as a component: novel ‘variations’, with some and not other practices ‘selected’ over time, may suffice. Third, it considers with examples, including Goffman on ‘stigma’ and the decline of the poor law, the new questions opened up for social theory by this modestly selectionist mode of analysis. It also discusses how recent work from neo‐Darwinian, biologically‐based researchers in the field of gene‐culture coevolution is proving, in a complementary way, innovative in its conceptualisation of the central role of agency in social life.     

Response to Fugard and Hines

ABSTRACT

This article replies to the responses to my article on “Sex and the Census: Why surveys should not conflate sex and gender identity“. Fugard conflates sex itself with the characteristics associated with sex, such as finger length ratios, leading to the erroneous implication that binary sex is not a useful explanatory variable. Hines fundamentally misrepresents my article, claiming that I have argued against asking respondents to the 2021 Census about their gender identity. In fact I make clear that information on gender identity is useful, but cannot replace data on sex. Muddling gender identity and sex will lead to the collection of inaccurate data on both. Hines resorts to a series of ad hominem attacks rather than engaging with the substance of the argument. Neither Fugard nor Hines is able to give a reason why we should not seek to collect accurate data on sex in the census or elsewhere.