How Far Has Fertility in China Really Declined?

According to births in the last year as reported in China's 2000 census, the total fertility rate (TFR) in the year 2000 in China was 1.22 children per woman. This estimate is widely considered to be too low, primarily because some women who had out‐of‐quota births according to China's one‐child family policy did not report those births to the census enumerator. Analysis of fertility trends derived by applying the own‐children method of fertility estimation to China's 1990 and 2000 censuses indicates that the true level of the TFR in 2000 was probably between 1.5 and 1.6 children per woman. A decomposition analysis of change in the TFR between 1990 and 2000, based on our best estimate of 1.59 for the TFR in 2000, indicates that about two‐fifths of the decline in the conventional TFR between 1990 and 2000 is accounted for by later marriage and less marriage, and three‐fifths by declining fertility within marriage. The analysis also applies the birth history reconstruction method of fertility estimation to the two censuses, yielding an alternative set of fertility estimates that are compared with the set derived by the own‐children method. The analysis also includes estimates of trends in fertility by urban/rural residence, education, ethnicity, and migration status. Over time, fertility has declined sharply within all categories of these characteristics, indicating that the one‐child policy has had large across‐the‐board effects.     

Age patterns of chinese marital fertility, 1950–1981

Coale and Trussell’s model of marital fertility is used to analyze data from China’s National One-per-Thousand Fertility Survey. Rural China experienced a regime of natural fertility until 1970, after which levels of fertility control rose with unprecedented speed and with an age pattern starkly dissimilar from that observed in other populations. Urban marital fertility was apparently under a modest level of deliberate control in the 1950s, with a sustained rise in control beginning in 1963. Natural fertility was low relative to other populations, with the urban level exceeding the rural.     

Immigrant fertility patterns and differentials in Australia, 1971–1976

In this paper the fertility patterns and differentials among various immigrant groups in Australia are examined. Official vital statistics for the period 1971–76 are used.

Fertility ratios standardized by age and marital status suggest that the overall fertility of foreign-born women was higher in both 1971 and 1976; however, some evidence -of convergence towards an ‘Australian’ norm was found.

Four distinct patterns of fertility were noted. In two of them, Arab and South European, marital fertility was substantially higher but non-marital fertility quite low. The North-West European pattern was closest to that of the native-born; however, in the East European pattern fertility was lowest. Component analysis showed that most of the differences between the total fertility rate of Australians and those of the other groups reflect the significantly higher marital fertility rates and proportions married among the foreign-born groups.     

Marital Status and Reproductive Performance in Kipsigis Women: Re-evaluating the Polygyny-Fertility Hypothesis

The effects of marital status on fertility and offspring survivorship are examined with data on six marriage cohorts of Kipsigis women, agro-pastoralists of south western Kenya. Neither marriage order, nor the average number of co-wives married to a man during a woman's reproductive years, is associated with completed family size, nor with any of the components of reproductive performance. The mechanisms whereby polygyny might potentially lower the reproductive performance of polygynously married women in the Kipsigis and other populations are discussed in some detail, with particular reference to resource shortages, sexual and economic favouritism, the observance of post partum taboos, disease, husband's age, co-wife co-operation, education, sterility, and age at menarche and marriage.     

China's Below‐Replacement Fertility: Recent Trends and Future Prospects

Between 1970 and 1990, China experiencoed a rapid and sharp fertility decline—from total fertility rates of approximately six births to two. The degree to which Chinese fertility has continued to fall after 1990 is controversial. We use survey data from the 1997 National Population and Reproductive Health Survey and from the 2001 Reproductive Health and Family Planning Survey to document recent trends in Chinese fertility. Our estimates provide further evidence that China's fertility is well below‐replacement level at the turn of the twenty‐first century—with TFR levels of approximately 1.5 children per woman. Trends in parity‐specific cohort fertility by age also suggest below replacement completed fertility for cohorts still in the childbearing years. In the article's second section, we identify key components of low period fertility in order to frame our discussion of two questions: 1) in what ways is Chinese low fertility different from/similar to that in other low‐fertility countries? And 2) what are the likely future trends in Chinese fertility?     

Effects of population policy and economic reform on the trend in fertility in Guangdong province,China, 1975–2005

An analysis of data mainly from China's 1990 and 2000 censuses and 2005 mini-census shows how fertility decline between 1975 and 2005 in the province of Guangdong has been influenced by both fertility policy and economic and social development. Guangdong's development since 1975 has been very rapid and has attracted huge numbers of migrants from other provinces. The analysis of the province's fertility trend from 1975 shows clearly the influence of fertility policy on the trend. The analysis also shows that economic development has brought about large changes in population composition by urban/rural residence, education, occupation, and migration status, which, together with large fertility differentials by these characteristics, have contributed substantially to Guangdong's fertility decline, in large part through changes in proportions currently married.     

Closing a Sociodemographic Chapter of Chinese History

At its recent Fifth Plenary Session held in Beijing, the Eighteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided to abolish the one‐child policy and allow all couples to have two children, thus closing an important chapter of China's social and demographic history. Recent fertility trends make it clear why it is urgent to abandon this policy. Census and survey data show that China's TFR had already fallen below replacement in 1991. Since the mid‐1990s, TFRs in most years have been lower than 1.5 children per woman. Since 2010, even lower fertility rates have been recorded by the annual population change surveys. Since the mid‐1990s, fertility decline has been increasingly driven by generalized ideational changes resulting from the social, economic, and cultural transformation of recent decades. In recent years many couples who were entitled to have a second child have chosen not to do so. For this reason, the termination of the one‐child policy is unlikely to lead to a major upturn in fertility, but rather to the continuation of a low‐fertility regime with more diverse fertility patterns across different sub‐populations, a pattern that has been observed in many countries.     

Reexamining China's Fertility Puzzle: Data Collection and Quality over the Last Two Decades

China's fertility level has become a matter of considerable debate since the early 1990s. Despite the widespread concern over data quality, a review of the literature reveals little systematic examination of how fertility data are collected, what specific problems they pose, and how they have been used in demographic research. This article examines five major fertility data sources and identifies problems in producing and using fertility data and discusses their implications. Issues relating to China's controversial 2000 census results and the reported low fertility are examined. The analysis concludes that the prevalent uncertainty about fertility levels may not only be related to the problem of data quality, but could also arise from misinterpreting fertility data and exaggerating the problem of undercounting.     

The Effect of Parental Education on Marital Fertility in Developing Countries

The effects of parents' education on marital fertility are analysed with data from 38 Surveys in the WFS programme, and a two-parameter model in which the age-dependent level of fertility and a duration-dependent slope of fertility are estimated. The level parameter reflects post-partum infecundity and, in some populations, contraceptive spacing of births. The slope parameter reflects parity-specific birth control. The effects of the husband's and of the wife's education are estimated, both before and after adjustment for other socio-economic factors. The schooling of the wife emerges as a more decisive influence on fertility than that of the husband, with substantial net effects even after controlling for urban-rural residence, husband's socio-economic status and wife's employment. In Latin America and the Arab states, monotonic declines in marital fertility are found, as the level of the wife's education increases. However, in many Asian and African populations, the highest fertility is observed among women with moderate exposure to schooling, because the relaxation of traditional spacing mechanisms is not matched by increased birth control. This regional diversity cannot be explained convincingly by national levels of economic development or efforts made to popularize contraception, but appears to relect ill-understood cultural factors.     

Many Chinas? The Economic Diversity of China's Provinces

This note analyzes China's provincial diversity from two perspectives. First, the regional gross domestic products of China's 31 mainland provinces are compared with the national GDP of other countries. This demonstrates that China's most advanced provinces and urban areas have per capita GDP levels comparable to those of Sweden and Singapore. On the other hand, China's least developed provinces have a standard of living similar to those of Sudan and Honduras. The second part of the analysis demonstrates that China's economic diversity is not unique. In fact, European countries exhibit almost the same degree of income diversity as do Chinese provinces.     

The claim that China's fertility restrictions contributed to the use of prenatal sex selection: A sceptical reappraisal

Most observers assume that China's fertility restrictions contribute to the use of prenatal sex selection. I question the logic and evidence underlying that assumption. Experts often stress that China's low fertility is largely voluntary, and that fertility restrictions are an unneeded safety valve. Others claim that China's ‘1.5-child’ loophole, common throughout rural areas, reinforces son preference or intensifies prenatal sex discrimination by hardening fertility constraints. These claims defy logic upon closer examination. Moreover, almost two-thirds of the exceptional distortion of the sex ratio in 1.5-child areas results from excess underreporting of daughters and enforced sex-specific stopping. Prenatal sex selection may explain the remaining third but probably reflects the stronger rural son preference that led to the 1.5-child loophole itself. The recent surge in sex selection of first births that has perpetuated the distortions also seems unrelated to policy. Some son-preferring parents who formerly wanted two children may now genuinely want only one.     

Reproduction,Compositional Demography,and Economic Growth: Family Planning in England Long Before the Fertility Decline

This article offers a radical reinterpretation of the chronology of control over reproduction in England's history. It argues that, as a result of post–World War II policy preoccupations, there has been too narrow a focus in the literature on the significance of reductions in marital fertility. In England's case this is conventionally dated to have occurred from 1876, long after the industrial revolution. With a wider angle focus on “reproduction,” the historical evidence for England indicates that family planning began much earlier in the process of economic growth. Using a “compositional demography” approach, a novel social pattern of highly prudential, late marriage can be seen emerging among the bourgeoisie in the course of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. There is also evidence for a more widespread resort to such prudential marriage throughout the population after 1816. When placed in this context, the reduction in national fertility indexes visible from 1876 can be seen as only a further phase, not a revolution, in the population's management of its reproduction.     

Fertility Decline in Czechoslovakia During the Last Two Centuries

The decline of fertility in Czechoslovakia on the territory of the Czech Socialist Republic began with a rise in the age at marriage; the decline of marital fertility began only after 1860. On the territory of the Slovak Socialist Republic marital fertility began to decline after 1900 without previous significant changes in the age at marriage. The differences between the demographic behaviour in the two parts of Czechoslovakia have persisted, although they are now gradually disappearing. There are other significant regional differences in the fertility decline caused by the overall process of economic and social development. The end of the demographic transition in the Czech Socialist Republic came during the 1930's and in the Slovak Socialist Republic during the 1960's.     

Marital moratorium and fertility control in China

Abstract Since 1949, the issue of marital postponement has been extensively discussed in China. Unlike some other means of fertility control (e.g. abortion and oral contraception), marital postponement has been welcomed with the fewest misgivings. Lately, marital postponement has also been given renewed emphasis by those outside China who see a weak link between various current national family planning programmes based on improved technology and the goal of fertility reduction. One aim of this paper is to render a comprehensive account of the marital postponement programme in China in the course of the birth control campaign during the last two decades. The second objective is to discuss the lessons that may be learned from it, and its implications for the current fertility controversy in the United States. Four general conclusions emerge from a careful analysis of the available documents: (1) in China, proponents of delayed marriage were divided on the question of how to secure its general acceptance. One issue dividing them was whether or not China's Marriage Law of 1950 should be amended in order to achieve it. Those who favoured raising the minimum legal age disagreed on the details of the presumably needed change. There is enough evidence to suggest that medical personnel were the chief advocates of compulsory postponement of marriage. The government rejected this legalistic approach and, in so doing, agreed with Chen Ta (a noted demographer) and others who sought to achieve postponement of marriage through appropriate social and economic measures. (2) Decisions to delay matrimony in different socio-cultural settings are not necessarily identical sociological phenomena. In some societies, (e.g. the United States), they may amount to no more than a course of action that enables individuals involved to realize or develop alternate goals in life. In others (e.g. China), they are literally acts of rebellion. (3) The fertility policy dispute has been carried on in a context of revolutionary change, and involved persons who have committed themselves to transforming the Chinese family. This prior commitment was mainly responsible for the relative lack of controversy about marital postponement as a means of fertility control. (4) Use of contraception is private, hidden from open view. But postponement of marriage is public and may be a source of inter-generational and interpersonal conflict. In China and other parallel situations, a decision to delay marriage is in itself against tradition. In this sense, a full-scale marital moratorium cannot but be more than a partial assault on the hold that the family has over its offspring. This must be unequivocally reflected in discussions of fertility control policy everywhere.     

Sex preference for children in a Meifu Li community in Hainan,China

Sex preferences for children are contingent on institutional and economic contexts, including family system. While the patrilineal joint family system of the Han Chinese tends to devalue daughters, the family systems of many of China's southern minorities are conducive to female autonomy and more equal sex preferences. The Li of Hainan Island provide an example. We examined household registers and surveyed women in a relatively isolated highland township inhabited by the Meifu, a Li sub-group. The Meifu depend largely on swidden agriculture, permit considerable sexual freedom to adolescent females, and, as expected, have more equal sex ratios among their children than other Hainan populations. There was a tendency for a preference for males in the one hamlet in the community with an exceptional endowment of irrigated land, suggesting that sex preferences are sensitive to local economic circumstances.     

Sexual Behavior in China: Trends and Comparisons

Dramatic political, economic, and social changes in China over the past several decades have been accompanied by much discussion in popular media and among academics of a fundamental transformation in Chinese sexual behavior. Several studies have examined current Chinese sexual behavior but have been limited to particular provinces or cities and have been based on non‐random samples. The potential threat of a generalized HIV epidemic in China highlights the dearth of population‐based information on current patterns of sexual behavior that could help design better intervention strategies and prevent misguided ones. This article uses data from the first national probability survey of adult sexual behavior in China completed during 1999–2000, along with a historical and literature review, to address three key questions: 1) Has there been a revolution in sexual behavior in China? 2) Is China unique compared to other countries in these transformations? 3) What are the implications of these findings for China's risk of a generalized HIV epidemic?     

Marital dissolution,remarriage, and childbearing

Earlier models of fertility hypothesize that marital dissolution and remarriage influence subsequent childbearing. This issue is examined by comparing the fertility of those in disrupted marriages with that of those in stable marriages. The results indicate that, by transferring women into a nonmarried status, marital dissolution decreases childbearing. The data also suggest that discord reduces fertility even before separation occurs—separated women had reduced fertility during the two years just before separation. It was found that marital dissolution without remarriage operates to truncate childbearing, thus decreasing family size. Dissolution followed by remarriage, however, lengthens the childbearing span of whites and has no influence on average family size; remarrying white women are able to make up for the childbearing lost between marriages. For nonwhites, we found that dissolution and remarriage increase the average time to childbirth, but, even more importantly, these events greatly decrease the number of children born.     

Duration of Marriage,Fertility and Women's Employment Opportunities in England and Wales in 1911

Data from the 1911 Census of England and Wales are examined for evidence of family limitation early in marriage. It is shown that a substantial number of couples used birth control for ‘spacing’ as well as for ‘stopping’ fertility. Moreover ‘spacing’ of births appears to have been more widespread in districts in which women's employment opportunities were relatively good. In general, the results obtained do not fit with the Princeton view of the European fertility transition with its stress on parity-specific family limitation spreading in response to improvements in contraceptive information and technology.     

The Origins of the Chinese Fertility Decline

Education and urbanization are shown to have been negatively correlated to marital fertility in both urban and rural China prior to the initiation of the substantial family planning programs. We maintain that early use of contraception by better educated and urban strata is a plausible cause of the observed fertility differentials because other proximate variables are unlikely. Coale's m, a presumed indicator of controlled fertility, suggests early fertility control in urban and better educated strata. The apparent preprogram beginnings of fertility control among educational and urban elites does not, however, minimize the awesome effects on fertility of the powerful Chinese family planning programs, once begun.