Population dynamics in Germany: the role of immigration and population momentum

The effects of changes in rates of mortality, fertility, and migration depend not only on the age-specific patterns and levels of these rates, but on the age structure of the population. In order to remove the influences of the age structure and concentrate on the effects of the demographic rates themselves, a common practice is to analyze the influences of the rates for a standard age structure. This paper analyzes current and future population changes in Germany, using a stationary population equivalent model (SPE) that shows long-term effects of current fertility, mortality, and international migration patterns. Results indicate that the German population will eventually decline because of below replacement fertility, if net immigration does not counteract this decrease. This means, for instance, that the long-term stationary population levels for Germany will decrease by approximately 6.5 million during a decade in which current fertility, mortality, and international migration levels prevail. The paper also reports how various other assumptions for mortality, fertility, and international migration affect the SPE model for Germany.     

The Impact of Migration on Fertility under China’s Underlying Restrictions: A Comparative Study Between Permanent and Temporary Migrants

Compared with that in other countries, the issue of fertility in China is more complicated because of its restriction policy or system. Several major hypotheses have been proposed to explain and predict the impact of migration on China’s fertility regardless of China’s real situation. Therefore, this paper analyzes the impact of migration on fertility considering China’s underlying restrictions using the data from the Chinese General Social Survey carried out in 2008. The social class in this study was divided into two, namely urban class and rural class. By building the 2 × 2 mobility tables and the diagonal mobility model, the study determined the impact of migration on fertility and analyzed the influence of some restrictions, such as family planning, traditional fertility concept, and household registration system. Results show that migration greatly affects fertility: upward migration (i.e., from rural to urban) may decrease the fertility, whereas downward migration (i.e., from urban to rural) may increase it. The degree of decline on fertility is greater than that of increase. Family planning still plays a role in fertility decline. Traditional concepts on fertility, for example, bringing up sons to take care of parents in their old age and preferring boys to girls, are anchored on the people’s mind, which is detrimental to the stability of the fertility rate. Moreover, the household registration system primarily influences the fertility behavior of temporary migration, with a negative relationship between them.     

Effects of demographic and retirement-age policies on future pension deficits, with an application to China

A simple method is proposed for projecting future deficits in a defined benefit or defined contribution pension scheme. The annual pension deficit rate is expressed in terms of the elderly dependency ratio (determined by demographic factors), the average retirement age, and a few parameters describing the scheme. An illustrative application to China demonstrates that if the average age at retirement gradually increases from the current low level to age 65 for both men and women in 2050, the annual pension deficit rate would be greatly reduced or even eliminated under various plausible demographic regimes over this period. With all else equal, a transition to a two-child policy (assuming this would raise fertility) would also lower the deficit rate in comparison to keeping the current fertility policy unchanged, although the effect would be seen only after 2030. The effect of potentially faster mortality decline in raising future deficits is appreciable and starts earlier than the effects of fertility change. The proposed method may also be used to gauge the magnitudes and timing of impacts on future pension deficits of alternative assumptions regarding levels and age/sex composition of international migration.     

A look at Philippine population in the year 2000

The major subject areas explored by the University of the Population Institute were fertility, mortality, the Filipino family and nuptiality, migration and urbanization, and the structure and growth of the labor force. Data were extracted primarily from the Philippine Censuses (1903-1970) the National Demographic Surveys of 1968 and 1973, and special surveys conducted by the Institute research team. On the basis of the findings, a range of alternative population futures is projected for the year 2000, with their respective policy implications. The estimate of the crude birthrate for 1970 placed the range at between 39.3 and 42.7. The crude birthrate may have declined by 21-23% in the last 70 years, and by almost 13% in 1960-1970 alone. On the national level, fertility rates will continue to decline if the trend of delayed marriages continues. Fertility was found to decrease with the introduction of the positive socioeconomic factors that make some regions more developed than others. The present low levels of mortality have decreased its importance in relation to fertility. Mortality prospects can be improved by several policy actions which are presented here in the order of priority. Current evidence points strongly to an increase in the proportion of single individuals who delay marriage and those not planning to marry at all. The record of internal migration in the Philippines during the 20th century has been dominated by the phenomenon of urbanization, which increased from 13% in 1903 to 33% in 1970. An effort needs to be made to achieve greater rural-urban balance. The country's high population growth has increased the number of job seekers in recent years; the expansion of the regional labor force in the 1960-1970 decade was highly correlated with the growth of regional populations. Fertility, mortality, nuptiality, migration, and urbanization are the major factors determining the growth and structure of Philippine population. Alternative projections for each of these factors were combined in different ways and 3 alternative scenarios for population in the year 2000 are presented.     

The demographic transition in the Korean peninsula, 1910-1990: South and North Korea compared

North and South Korea have both experienced demographic transition and fertility and mortality declines. The fertility declines came later in North Korea. In 1990, the population was 43.4 million in South Korea and 21.4 million in North Korea and the age and sex compositions were similar. This evolution of population structure occurred despite differences in political systems and fertility determinants. Differences were in the fertility rate and the rate of natural increase. The total fertility rate was 2.5 children in North Korea and 1.6 in South Korea. The rate of natural increase was 18.5 per 1000 in North Korea and 9.8 in South Korea. Until 1910, the Korean peninsula was in the traditional stage characterized by high fertility and mortality. The early transitional stage came during 1910-45 under the Japanese annexation. Health and medical facilities improved and the crude birth rate rose and then declined. With the exception of the war years, population expanded as a function of births, deaths, and international migration. Poor economic conditions in rural areas acted as a push factor for south-directed migration, migration to Japan, and urban migration. Next came the chaotic stage, during 1945-60. South Korean population expanded during this period of political unrest. Repatriation and refugee migration constituted a large proportion of the population increase. Although the war brought high mortality, new medicine and disease treatment reduced the mortality rate after the war. By 1955-60, the crude death rate was 16.1 per 1000 in South Korea. The crude birth rate remained high at 42 per 1000 between 1950-55. The postwar period was characterized by the baby boom and higher fertility than the pre-war period of 1925-45. Total fertility was 6.3 by 1955-60. The late transitional stage occurred during 1960-85 with reduced fertility and continued mortality decline. By 1980-85, total fertility was 2.3 in the closed population. The restabilization stage occurred during 1985-90, and fertility declined to 1.6. In North Korea, strong population control policies precipitated fertility decline. In South Korea, the determinants were contraception, rising marriage age, and increased use of abortion concomitant with improved socioeconomic conditions.     

Effect of mortality change on stable population parameters

The stable population model is used to establish formulas expressing the effects of mortality change on population growth rates, birth rates, and age composition. The change in the intrinsic growth rate is shown to be quite accurately approximated by the average decline in age-specific death rates between age zero and the mean age at childbearing in the stable population. This change is essentially independent of the initial level of fertility in the population. Changes in birth rates and age composition are shown to be simple functions of the age pattern of cumulative changes in mortality rates relative to an appropriately defined “neutral” standard.     

The Middle East population puzzle

An overview is provided of Middle Eastern countries on the following topics; population change, epidemiological transition theory and 4 patterns of transition in the middle East, transition in causes of death, infant mortality declines, war mortality, fertility, family planning, age and sex composition, ethnicity, educational status, urbanization, labor force, international labor migration, refugees, Jewish immigration, families, marriage patterns, and future growth. The Middle East is geographically defined as Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Gaza and the West Bank, Iran, Turkey, and Israel. The Middle East's population grew very little until 1990 when the population was 43 million. Population was about doubled in the mid-1950s at 80 million. Rapid growth occurred after 1950 with declines in mortality due to widespread disease control and sanitation efforts. Countries are grouped in the following ways: persistent high fertility and declining mortality with low to medium socioeconomic conditions (Jordan, Oman, Syria, Yemen, and the West Bank and Gaza), declining fertility and mortality in intermediate socioeconomic development (Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iran), high fertility and declining mortality in high socioeconomic conditions (Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates), and low fertility and mortality in average socioeconomic conditions (Israel). As birth and death rates decline, there is an accompanying shift from communicable diseases to degenerative diseases and increases in life expectancy; this pattern is reflected in the available data from Egypt, Kuwait, and Israel. High infant and child mortality tends to remain a problem throughout the Middle East, with the exception of Israel and the Gulf States. War casualties are undetermined, yet have not impeded the fastest growing population growth rate in the world. The average fertility is 5 births/woman by the age of 45. Muslim countries tend to have larger families. Contraceptive use is low in the region, with the exception of Turkey and Egypt and among urban and educated populations. More than 40% of the population is under 15 years of age. The region is about 50% Arabic (140 million). Educational status has increased, particularly for men; the lowest literacy rates for women are in Yemen and Egypt. The largest countries are Iran, Turkey, and Egypt.     

The development and use of demographic models

In this review, we first examine two classical demographic models - conventional life tables and stable populations - and a modern generalization of stable population theory; we then discuss mathematical models of conception and birth. These models involve purely mathematical relations in formal demography as opposed to empirical regularities. Next we consider model age schedules of mortality, nuptialitiy, marital fertility, fertility, and migration that are explicitly based on such empirical patterns. We close this empirical section with a discussion of model stable populations, which are based on model life tables. We next examine the use of demographic models in forecasting future mortality, nuptiality, and fertility and in population projection. Following a discussion of microsimulation models, which gives us the opportunity to mention model age schedules of post partum amenorrhoea and of sterility, we close with observations about the purposes and uses of demographic models.     

An exponential model of female sterility

It is suggested that a useful component of a fertility simulation would be proportions of females sterile by age. Data on this phenomenon are rather limited, but they indicate that proportional sterility may not easily be described by a simple function. We propose that rates of becoming sterile may be adequately described by an exponential function utilizing proper parameter values. Such exponential-model rates form the basis for computation of a fecundity decrement table presented in this paper. Sterility proportions from the table are compared to some empirical data.     

Migration and fertility in Puerto Rico

Abstract In an investigation based on special tabulations of the 25 per cent sample from the 1960 Census of Population for Puerto Rico, it is found that migration experience tends to be associated with fertility for various marital statuses, including consensual unions, and for rural, urban and metropolitan residence. The findings cannot be attributed to variations in age composition among the various categories as age standardization and age-specificcomparisons yield similar results. However, it is also found that rural-urban and consensually-legally mated differentials in fertility cannot be accounted for by variations in the migration variables that are examined. Thus, consistently higher fertility is found for non-migrants than for migrants; for consensually mated than for legally married and for rural than for urban or metropolitan residents. With a single exception, women in consensual unions, fertility is lower for women in the San Juan metropolitan area than in the other urban areas.     

Public policy and the total fertility rate: cross-sectional evidence from the LDCs

A framework developed by Easterlin for the analysis of fertility in developing societies is modified and then tested using a sample of 65 less-developed countries. The focus is on assessing the impact of public policy on the national fertility rate. Public policy is reflected in the average levels of education and health in the population and in the condition of the national family planning program. To test for threshold effects with respect to socioeconomic development, the sample is divided on the basis of the infant mortality rate. Fertility rates in those nations characterized by high infant mortality are likely to be determined more by conditions of natural fertility. Those nations with lower infant mortality, and hence greater socioeconomic development, are more likely to exhibit deliberate fertility control. The results of the regression analysis do suggest that different factors influence the national fertility rate depending upon the stage of development. For the least-developed nations, the secondary school enrollment rate, an indicator of the extent of economic mobility, and the ratio of school age children to teachers, a proxy for the national commitment to human capital formation, are important. For the more advanced of the LDCs, adult literacy and the infant mortality rate seem to predominate. For all the developing nations, however, the results confirm the importance of strong family planning programs. The paper concludes with a discussion of the policy implications of the research.     

The analysis of linkages in demographic theory

Many seemingly different questions that arise in the analysis of population change can be phrased as the same technical question: How, within a given demographic model, would variable y change if the age- or time-specific function f were to change arbitrarily in shape and intensity? At present demography lacks the machinery to answer this question in analytical and general form. This paper suggests a method based on modern functional calculus for deriving closed-form expressions for the sensitivity of demographic variables to changes in input functions or schedules. It uses this “linkage method” to obtain closed-form expressions for the response of the intrinsic growth rate, birth rate, and age composition of a stable population to arbitrary marginal changes in its age patterns of fertility and mortality. It uses it also to obtain expressions for the transient response of the age composition of a nonstable population to time-varying changes in the birth sequence, and to age-specific fertility and mortality patterns that change over time. The problem of “bias” in period vital rates is also looked at.     

The UN Population Division on Replacement Migration

The most salient demographic trend pictured by the influential set of population projections prepared by the Population Division of the United Nations (a unit in the UN's Department of Economic and Social Affairs) is the continuing substantial increase—albeit at a declining rate—of the global population during the coming decades. According to the “medium” variant of the most recent (1998) revision of these projections, between 2000 and 2050 the expected net addition to the size of the world population will be some 2.85 billion, a figure larger than that of the total world population as recently as the mid‐1950s. All of this increase will occur in the countries currently classified as less developed; in fact, as a result of their anticipated persistent below‐replacement levels of fertility, the more developed regions as a whole would experience declining population size beginning about 2020, and would register a net population loss of some 33 million between 2000 and 2050. A report prepared by the UN Population Division and released on 21 March 2000 addresses some of the implications of the changes in population size and age structure that low‐fertility countries will be likely to experience. The 143‐page report, issued under the eyecatching title Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?, highlights the expected magnitude of these changes by the imaginative device of answering three hypothetical questions. The answer to each of these questions is predicated on the assumption that some specified demographic feature of various country or regional populations would be maintained at the highest level that feature would exhibit, in the absence of international migration, in the United Nations' medium population projections (as revised in 1998) during the period 1995–2050. The selected demographic features are total population size, the size of the working‐age population (15–64 years), and the so‐called potential support ratio: the ratio of the working‐age population to the old‐age population (65 years and older). The illustrative device chosen for accomplishing the specified feats of preserving the selected demographic parameters (i.e., keeping them unchanged up to 2050 once their highest value is attained) is international migration. Hence the term “replacement migration.” Given the low levels of fertility and mortality now prevailing in the more developed world (and specifically in the eight countries and the two overlapping regions for which the numerical answers to the above questions are presented in the report), and given the expected future evolution of fertility and mortality incorporated in the UN population projections, the results are predictably startling. The magnitudes of the requisite compensatory migration streams tend to be huge relative both to current net inmigration flows and to the size of the receiving populations; least so in the case of the migration needed to maintain total population size and most so in the case of migration needed to counterbalance population aging by maintaining the support ratio. Reflecting its relatively high fertility and its past and current record of receiving a large influx of international migrants, the United States is a partial exception to this rule. But even for the US to maintain the support ratio at its highest—year 1995—level of 5.21 would require increasing net inmigration more than tenfold. The country, the report states, would have to receive 593 million immigrants between 1995 and 2050, or a yearly average of 10.8 million. The extreme case is the Republic of Korea, where the exercise calls for maintaining a support ratio of 12.6. To satisfy this requirement, Korea, with a current population of some 47 million, would need 5.1 billion immigrants between 1995 and 2050, or an average of 94 million immigrants per year. (In the calculations, the age and sex distribution of migrants is assumed to be the same as that observed in the past in the main immigration countries. The fertility and mortality of immigrants are assumed to be identical with those of the receiving population.) The “Executive Summary” of the report is reproduced below, with the permission of the United Nations. Chapters of the full report set out the issues that prompted the exercise; provide a selective review of the literature; explain the methodology and the assumptions underlying the calculations; and present the detailed results for the eight countries and two regions selected for illustrative purposes. A brief discussion of the implications of the findings concludes the report. As is evident even from the figures just cited, immigration is shown to be at best a modest potential palliative to whatever problems declining population size and population aging are likely to pose to low‐fertility countries. The calculations, however, vividly illustrate that demographic changes will profoundly affect society and the economy, and will require adjustments that remain inadequately appreciated and assessed. The criteria specified in the UN calculations—maintenance of particular demographic parameters at a peak value—of course do not necessarily have special normative significance. Past demographic changes, with respect notably to the age distribution as well as population size, have been substantial, yet they have been successfully accommodated under circumstances of growing prosperity in many countries. But the past may be an imperfect guide in confronting the evolving dynamics of low‐fertility populations. As the report convincingly states, the new demographic challenges will require comprehensive reassessments of many established economic and social policies and programs.     

Options for Fertility Policy Transition in China

This article compares five currently debated scenarios for fertility policy transition in China, in terms of their implications for future population growth and population aging, the proportions of elderly living alone, labor force trends, pension deficits, economic costs, the marriage squeeze, and other socioeconomic outcomes. Based on these comparative analyses, the author concludes that China needs to begin a gradual modification of its fertility policy as soon as possible. He proposes a three‐stage “soft‐landing” strategy for fertility policy transition: (1) a 7‐year initial smooth transition period; (2) from approximately 2014‐15 to 2032‐35 a universal two‐child policy combined with late childbearing in both rural and urban areas; (3) after 2032‐35 all Chinese citizens would be free to choose family size and fertility timing. This strategy will enable China to have much more favorable demographic conditions and socioeconomic outcomes, as compared to keeping the current policy unchanged.     

Age distribution and the stable equivalent

Some populations, like that of the United States in the 1950's, have a smaller proportion of women of reproductive age than they would ultimately attain with continuance of their age-specific birth and deaths rates, a continuance which produces the condition known in demography as stability. Others, like that of the United States in the 1930's, have relatively more women of reproductive age than they would ultimately attain with stability. A way of studying ages is to calculate how many women of stable age distribution would be equivalent from the viewpoint of reproduction to the women observed. This stable equivalent was 69,535,000 or 16 percent below the observed United States female population in 1955, and 12 percent above the observed in 1935. The stable equivalent is a measure of fertility potential, closely related to R. A. Fisher's reproductive value. Calculations for four countries illustrate how a fall of the birth rate, for example in demographic transition, occasions an age distribution in which the stable equivalent is greater than the observed number of women. The notion of stable equivalent is useful for comparison because changes in it are nearly invariant with respect to the age-pattern of fertility used. The statement that the United States stable equivalent increased by 11 percent between 1960 and 1965 holds irrespective of whether the 1960 or the 1965 age-specific fertility and mortality rates are used as standard.     

A summary analysis of the 3rd inquiry

20 ESCAP member countries responded to the "Third Population Inquiry among Governments: Population policies in the context of development in 1976." The questionnaire sent to the member countries covered economic and social development and population growth, mortality, fertility and family formation, population distribution and internal migration, international migration, population data collection and research, training, and institutional arrangements for the formulation of population policies within development. Most of the governments in the ESCAP region that responded indicate that the present rate of population growth constrains their social and economic development. Among the governments that consider the present rate of population growth to constrain economic and social development, 13 countries regarded the most appropriate response to the constraint would include an adjustment of both socioeconomic and demographic factors. 11 of the governments regarded their present levels of average life expectancy at birth "acceptable" and 7 identified their levels as "unacceptable." Most of the governments who responded consider that, in general, their present level of fertility is too high and constrains family well-being. Internal migration and population distribution are coming to be seen as concerns for government population policy. The most popular approaches to distributing economic and social activities are rural development, urban and regional development and industrial dispersion. There was much less concern among the governments returning the questionnaire about the effect of international migration than internal migration on social and economic development.     

Age structure,growth, attrition and accession: A new synthesis

This paper shows that each equation describing relationships among demographic parameters in a stable population is a special case of a similar and equally simple equation that applies to any closed population and demonstrates some implications of these new equations for demographic theory and practice. Much of formal demography deals with functions that pertain to individuals passing through life, or to a stationary population in which births of individuals are evenly distributed over time. These functions include life expectancy, probabilities of survival, net and gross reproduction rates, expected years spent in various states and the probability that certain events will occur in the course of life. The stable population model permits the translation of population structure or processes in a more general type of population, with constant growth rates, back into equivalent populations for a stationary population. The method for translation developed in this paper, requiring only a set of age-specific growth rates is even more general, applying to any population. Age specific growth rates may also be useful for performing reverse translations, between a population's life table and its birth rate or its age distribution. Tables of numbers of females by single years of age in Sweden are used to illustrate applications. Tables summarize the basic relations among certain functions in a stationary population, a stable population and any population. Applications of new equations, particularly to demographic estimation of mortality, fertility and migration, from incomplete data, are described. Some other applications include; the 2 sex problem, increment decrement tables, convergence of population to its stable form, and cyclical changes in vital rates. Stable population models will continue to demonstrate long term implications of changes in mortality and fertility. However, in demographic estimation and measurement, new procedures will support most of those based on stable assumptions.     

Political demography: Powerful trends under-attended by demographic science

The interconnections between politics and the dramatic demographic changes under way around the world have been neglected by the two research disciplines that could contribute most to their understanding: demography and political science. Instead, this area of ‘political demography’ has largely been ceded to political activists, pundits, and journalists, leading often to exaggerated or garbled interpretation. The terrain includes some of the most politically sensitive and contested issues: alleged demographically determined shifts in the international balance of power; low fertility, population decline, and demographic ageing; international migration; change in national identity; and compositional shifts in politically sensitive social categories and human rights. Meanwhile many governments and non-governmental actors have actively pursued varieties of ‘strategic demography’, deploying fertility, mortality, or migration as instruments of domestic or international policy. Political scientists and demographers could and should use their knowledge and analytic techniques to improve understanding and to moderate excessive claims and fears on these topics.     

The roles of individuals' socioeconomic characteristics and the government family planning program in China's fertility decline

This paper explores answers to the following two questions: first, did individuals' socioeconomic characteristics play any role in the rapid fertility decline that occurred in China during the 1970's? Secondly, if the rapid fertility decline during the 1970s is mostly a result of the government policy, as many have perceived, to what extent was the government policy effective? Using the 1982 Chinese 1/1000 fertility survey data for Hebei province of China, this paper examines variation in fertility among women of two age cohorts by linking their fertility outcome with their socioeconomic background and earlier reproductive experiences. In addition, this paper assesses the effect of government policy by comparing the determinants of fertility outcome between two cohorts of women and by studying the factors affecting their current contraceptive use. The findings reveal that the individual's socioeconomic background was important in explaining earlier fertility variation. Government policy, although powerful enough to override most of the effect of socioeconomic factors on fertility, was not able to eliminate differences in contraceptive behavior among Chinese women.     

Crossovers that link populations with the same vital rates

"In this paper, we consider crossovers of demographic density distributions from...populations that have the same fertility and mortality rates. We focus on observed populations and their associated stationary and stable models, and on proportional distributions of persons, births, deaths and reproductive values....Three different populations were selected to represent a range of demographic behavior. Those populations are Japan 1963, a low mortality, low fertility population; Togo 1961, a high mortality, high fertility population; and the United States 1919-1921, a population whose fertility and mortality are intermediate."