Unanimity and Resource Monotonicity

In the context of indivisible public objects problems (e.g., candidate selection or qualification) with “separable” preferences, unanimity rule accepts each object if and only if the object is in everyone’s top set. We establish two axiomatizations of unanimity rule. The main axiom is resource monotonicity, saying that resource increase should affect all agents in the same direction. This axiom is considered in combination with simple Pareto (there is no Pareto improvement by addition or subtraction of a single object), independence of irrelevant alternatives, and either path independence or strategy-proofness.     

Does Learning Diminish Violations of Independence, Coalescing and Monotonicity?

Violations of expected utility theory are sometimes attributed to imprecise preferences interacting with a lack of learning opportunity in the experimental laboratory. This paper reports an experimental test of whether a learning opportunity which engenders accurate probability assessments, by enhancing understanding of the meaning of stated probability information, causes anomalous behaviour to diminish. The data show that whilst in some cases expected utility maximising behaviour increases with the learning opportunity, so too do systematic violations. Therefore, there should be no presumption that anomalous behaviour under risk is transient and that discovered preferences will be appropriately described by expected utility theory.     

Better May be Worse: Some Monotonicity Results and Paradoxes in Discrete Choice Under Uncertainty

It is not unusual in real-life that one has to choose among finitely many alternatives when the merit of each alternative is not perfectly known. Instead of observing the actual utilities of the alternatives at hand, one typically observes more or less precise signals that are positively correlated with these utilities. In addition, the decision-maker may, at some cost or disutility of effort, choose to increase the precision of these signals, for example by way of a careful study or the hiring of expertise. We here develop a model of such decision problems. We begin by showing that a version of the monotone likelihood-ratio property is sufficient, and also essentially necessary, for the optimality of the heuristic decision rule to always choose the alternative with the highest signal. Second, we show that it is not always advantageous to face alternatives with higher utilities, a non-monotonicity result that holds even if the decision-maker optimally chooses the signal precision. We finally establish an operational first-order condition for the optimal precision level in a canonical class of decision-problems, and we show that the optimal precision level may be discontinuous in the precision cost.     

Postulates and paradoxes of relative voting power — A critical re-appraisal

This paper re-evaluates the problem of measuring thea priori relative voting power of a voter in an assembly. We propose several new intuitively compelling postualtes that any reasonable index of voting power ought to satisfy. At the same time we argue that most of the paradoxes of voting power discussed in the literature are paradoxical only in a weak sense, if at all. This leaves three crippling paradoxes — the well-known paradox ofweighted voting, and two new ones presented here: thebloc anddonation paradoxes. We evaluate the four main relative power indices discussed in the literature with respect to these three severe paradoxes. The Shapley-Shubik index is seen to be immune to all three paradoxes, while the Deegan-Packel index is vulnerable to all three. The Banzhaf and the Johnston indices are demonstrably immune to the paradox of weighted voting. However, they are shown to suffer from both the bloc and the donation paradoxes. We argue that this seriously undermines these indices in a hitherto unsuspected way. Several other theoretical issues relating to voting power are discussed.     

Constrained Monotonicity and the Measurement of Power

In this paper we will discuss constraints on the number of (non-dummy) players and on the distribution of votes such that local monotonicity is satisfied for the Public Good Index. These results are compared to properties which are related to constraints on the redistribution of votes (such as implied by global monotonicity). The discussion shows that monotonicity is not a straightforward criterion of classification for power measures. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Monotonicity of power in games with a priori unions

Power indices are commonly required to assign at least as much power to a player endowed with some given voting weight as to any player of the same game with smaller weight. This local monotonicity and a related global property however are frequently and for good reasons violated when indices take account of a priori unions amongst subsets of players (reflecting, e.g., ideological proximity). This paper introduces adaptations of the conventional monotonicity notions that are suitable for voting games with an exogenous coalition structure. A taxonomy of old and new monotonicity concepts is provided, and different coalitional versions of the Banzhaf and Shapley–Shubik power indices are compared accordingly.      

Aggregation of decomposable measures with application to utility theory

This paper investigates the eventwise aggregations of decomposable measures preserving the same decomposable property. These operations are obtained by solving a functional equation closely related to the bisymmetry property. Known results for probability as well as possibility measures can be derived as particular cases of our approach. In addition, the unicity of weighted consensus functions is proved in the Archimedean case. An extension of Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory is outlined, where probabilities are changed into decomposable measures.Supported in part by OTKA (National Scientific Research Fund, Hungary) I/6-14144, and by the Foundation for Hungarian Higher Education and Research 615/94.     

An investigation of defamilization/familization measures to assist women to save pension income and strengthen the adult worker model—The case of Hong Kong

This paper examines the use of defamilization and familization measures to develop an analytical framework to inform the search for ways to improve women's opportunities to accumulate pension income. This framework is associated with the use of the adult worker model. Three main analytical tasks are presented. Firstly, we discuss different interpretations of what defamilization entails. Based on these different views, two types of defamilization measures utilized by the government are identified: care‐focused and economic defamilization. Secondly, with reference to different definitions of the adult worker model, we develop a framework for identifying ways to make the provision of the government's defamilization measures and its alternatives (care‐focused and economic familization measures) more effective in assisting women to accumulate pension income. Thirdly, using the case of Hong Kong, we demonstrate the application of this analytical framework.     

Ordinal equivalence of power notions in voting games

In this paper, we are concerned with the preorderings (SS) and (BC) induced in the set of players of a simple game by the Shapley–Shubik and the Banzhaf–Coleman's indices, respectively. Our main result is a generalization of Tomiyama's 1987 result on ordinal power equivalence in simple games; more precisely, we obtain a characterization of the simple games for which the (SS) and the (BC) preorderings coincide with the desirability preordering (T), a concept introduced by Isbell (1958), and recently reconsidered by Taylor (1995): this happens if and only if the game is swap robust, a concept introduced by Taylor and Zwicker (1993). Since any weighted majority game is swap robust, our result is therefore a generalization of Tomiyama's. Other results obtained in this paper say that the desirability relation keeps itself in all the veto-holder extensions of any simple game, and so does the (SS) preordering in all the veto-holder extensions of any swap robust simple game.     

The Bicameral Postulates and Indices of a Priori Voting Power

If K is an index of relative voting power for simple voting games, the bicameral postulate requires that the distribution of K -power within a voting assembly, as measured by the ratios of the powers of the voters, be independent of whether the assembly is viewed as a separate legislature or as one chamber of a bicameral system, provided that there are no voters common to both chambers. We argue that a reasonable index – if it is to be used as a tool for analysing abstract, uninhabited decision rules – should satisfy this postulate. We show that, among known indices, only the Banzhaf measure does so. Moreover, the Shapley–Shubik, Deegan–Packel and Johnston indices sometimes witness a reversal under these circumstances, with voter x less powerful than y when measured in the simple voting game G₁ , but more powerful than y when G₁ is bicamerally joined with a second chamber G₂ . Thus these three indices violate a weaker, and correspondingly more compelling, form of the bicameral postulate. It is also shown that these indices are not always co-monotonic with the Banzhaf index and that as a result they infringe another intuitively plausible condition – the price monotonicity condition. We discuss implications of these findings, in light of recent work showing that only the Shapley–Shubik index, among known measures, satisfies another compelling principle known as the bloc postulate. We also propose a distinction between two separate aspects of voting power: power as share in a fixed purse (P-power) and power as influence (I-power).     

Bandwagon Effects and Two-Party Majority Voting

Empirical studies of voting behavior provide evidence of bandwagon effects. Some voters, believing that a particular candidate will win, vote for this candidate even though they prefer the alternative. This paper provides a non-expected utility explanation of such behavior by positing that voters may be averse to the uncertainty associated with an election.     

Oslo +20: Reassessing the role of confidence building measures

Confidence building measures (CBMs) have long been employed as a tool for both conflict reduction and resolution. What started as a Cold War phenomena, CBMs have routinely been employed to deal with a myriad of conflicts in a variety of locations. In the Middle East, CBMs have been integral parts of both formal treaties and disarmament agreements between Israel and the Arab states. The 20th anniversary of the Oslo Accords provides a good opportunity to reassess the role of CBMs in the Oslo process. During the initial stages of negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians, much emphasis was placed on the role and importance of CBMs. These CBMs were unsuccessful, however, because there was neither a strong foundation for negotiations, nor a real commitment on the part of the leaderships of both parties to implement and support the measures.     

Binary Relations: Finite Characterizations and Computational Complexity

A characterization of a property of binary relations is of finite type if it is stated in terms of ordered T-tuples of alternatives for some positive integer T. The concept was introduced informally by Knoblauch (2005). We give a clear, complete definition below. We prove that a characterization of finite type can be used to determine in polynomial time whether a binary relation over a finite set has the property characterized. We also prove a simple but useful nonexistence theorem and apply it to three examples.      

A procedural model of voting

The formal framework of social choice theory is generalized through the introduction of separate representations of preferences and choices. This makes it possible to treat voting as a procedure in which decisions are actually made by interacting participants, rather than as a mere mechanism for aggregation. The extended framework also allows for non-consequentialist preferences that take procedural factors into account. Concepts such as decisiveness, anonymity, neutrality, and stability are redefined for use in the new context. The formal results obtained confirm the universality of strategic voting.     

The Pareto rule and strategic voting

This paper uses a particular choice rule over sets of alternatives under the Pareto rule. Starting from the sincere situation every strategic misrevelation of preference is shown to be an improvement for all voters. The existence of an equilibrium under successive misrepresentations by sincere voters is demonstrated.     

Participatory research meets validated outcome measures: Tensions in the co‐production of social care evaluation

Funding for care service research is increasingly subject to the satisfaction of two requirements: public involvement and adoption of validated outcome tools. This study identifies competing paradigms within these requirements and reveals significant challenges faced by researchers who seek to satisfy them. The focus here is on a study co‐produced between academic researchers and people with experience of adult social care services. It examines to what extent research studies can conduct high‐quality public involvement and genuine co‐production of knowledge, whilst attempting to produce quantifiable outcome scores. Findings add to debate around how to incorporate diverse perspectives in research, which may draw on incommensurate accounts of validity and reliability. Findings also highlight constructive attempts by academic and co‐researchers to make the combination of approaches work in the field. These small scale acts of researcher agency indicate some scope to combine the two approaches in future research studies. However, conclusions foreground the importance of broader awareness of how tensions and power imbalances related to this combination of approaches play out in social policy research practice.     

A longitudinal test of the gender turnover model among U.S. House and Senate members

This study builds on previous research by examining the impact of gender when predicting roll call voting behavior in the U.S. House and the U.S. Senate over several recent congresses. In order to unearth gender effects, it employs a longitudinal design based on turnover in the membership of both the House and the Senate. Through a comparison of the voting records of members of Congress representing the same geographic territory it holds constituency constantly while allowing for gender and party to vary. It does so with models including dependent variables that measure roll call ideology and support for women's issues exhibited in the voting records of members in both institutions. The results show that male and female members in each chamber representing the same constituency amass virtually indistinguishable voting records on the liberal-conservative policy dimension. However, on votes dealing with issues of concern to women, female senators tend to be more supportive than the male senators they replace and male senators tend to be less supportive than the female senators they replace.     

Calculable Power: A Case Study of IMF Quotas and Voting Rights Reform*

Voting procedure is an important mechanism for public choice in collective bodies such as international organizations. This paper measures and compares IMF member countries’ voting power before the 2008 reform and after the 2010 reform on the basis of datasets on IMF quotas and voting rights distribution provided by IMF. Our study verifies that IMF’s quotas and voting rights reforms do help to reduce the voting power gap among member countries. The 2008 and 2010 reforms produce a greater improvement in emerging members’ voting power under the 70 percent majority rule than the 85 percent rule; the 70 percent majority rule means the United States would lose its absolute veto. Moreover, the paper disproves the underlying assumption that regards a member’s voting power as proportional to its voting rights. Countries with different amounts of voting rights can still have the same voting power.     

体系变革、战略塑造与近代日本的海权兴衰

本文提出了地缘政治学的三种研究路径:地理要素、权力政治、战略分析。针对1868年明治维新至1941年的太平洋战争这段时期,日本的海权崛起为何逐渐走向失控这个议题,提出的自变量解释是体系变革,它涵盖权力结构、地理因素与攻防平衡交互影响等;国家的战略塑造能力是中介变量,包括:战略对手的塑造、国内共识的形成、地缘学说的吸收和运用、联盟战略构成等。结合海军与陆军部门的竞争关系、国内政治与外部战略环境的交互影响、地理与历史的基础性作用、对马汉、豪斯浩弗等地缘学者的历史影响考察,以及近代日本先后针对中国、俄国(苏联)和美国进行的战略调整优劣进行评估。最后得出结论:国家的海权发展应有大战略思维,片面追求军国主义和穷兵黩武不利于国家的长远利益。     

Oligarchy for Social Choice Correspondences and Strategy-Proofness

We study the existence of a group of individuals which has some decisive power for social choice correspondences that satisfy a monotonicity property which we call modified monotonicity. And we examine the relation between modified monotonicity and strategy-proofness of social choice correspondences according to the definition by Duggan and Schwartz (2000). We will show mainly the following two results. (1) Modified monotonicity implies the existence of an oligarchy. An oligarchy is a group of individuals such that it has some decisive power (semi-decisiveness), and at least one of the most preferred alternatives of every its member is always chosen by any social choice correspondence. (2) Strategy-proofness of social choice correspondences is equivalent to modified monotonicity.