Public goods and Arrovian social choice

A social welfare function satisfying Arrow's independence axiom is constant or authoritarian if it generates continuous and transitive social preferences over the space of allocations of public and private goods, and individual preferences have the classical economic properties. The social welfare function will be oligarchial if it generates continuous and quasitransitive social preferences and satisfies a weak version of the Pareto criterion in addition to the independence axiom.This work was supported by the National Sciences Foundation grant no. SES 9007953. I am grateful to anonymous referees whose suggestions led to several substantial improvements.     

Fuzzy preferences and Arrow-type problems in social choice

There are alternative ways of decomposing a given fuzzy weak preference relation into its antisymmetric and symmetric components. In this paper I have provided support to one among these alternative specifications. It is shown that on this specification the fuzzy analogue of the General Possibility Theorem is valid even when the transitivity restrictions on the individual and the social preference relations are relatively weak. In the special case where the individual preference relations are exact but the social preference relation is permitted to be fuzzy it is possible to distinguish between different degrees of power of the dictator. This power increases with the strength of the transitivity requirement.For comments on an earlier version of the paper I am indebted to an anonymous referee, an anonymous member of the Board of Editors and to participants in the 1991 Annual Conference of the Indian Econometric Society at North Bengal University, India. However, I retain sole responsibility for any error(s) that the paper may contain.     

Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes

Let A be a set of alternatives whose power set is . Elements of are interpreted as non-resolute outcomes. We consider the aggregation of preference profiles over into a (social) preference over . In case we allow individuals to have any complete and transitive preference over , Arrow’s impossibility theorem naturally applies. However, the Arrovian impossibility prevails, even when the set of admissible preferences over is severely restricted. In fact, we identify a mild “regularity” condition which ensures the dictatoriality of a domain. Regularity is compatible with almost all standard extension axioms of the literature. Thus, we interpret our results as the strong prevalence of Arrow’s impossibility theorem in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes. This paper is part of a project entitled “Social Perception—A Social Choice Perspective”, supported by Istanbul Bilgi University Research Fund. It has been completed while Remzi Sanver was visiting Ecole Polytechnique, Paris. We are grateful to both institutions. We thank Nick Baigent, two anonymous referees and an anonymous associate editor for their valuable comments.     

Reference functions and possibility theorems for cardinal social choice problems

 In this paper, we provide axiomatic foundations for social choice rules on a domain of convex and comprehensive social choice problems when agents have cardinal utility functions. We translate the axioms of three well known approaches in bargaining theory (Nash 1950; Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975; Kalai 1977) to the domain of social choice problems and provide an impossibility result for each. We then introduce the concept of a reference function which, for each social choice set, selects a point from which relative gains are measured. By restricting the invariance and comparison axioms so that they only apply to sets with the same reference point, we obtain characterizations of social choice rules that are natural analogues of the bargaining theory solutions. Received: 8 August 1994/Accepted: 12 February 1996     

On continuity of Arrovian social welfare functions

We study continuity properties of Arrovian social welfare functions in the infinite population framework. We show that continuous welfare functions satisfying unanimity and independence of irrelevant alternatives are dictatorial. Weak anonymity is shown to be incompatible with continuity and unanimity: every continuous weakly anonymous social welfare function must be a constant function.     

Invariance axioms for preferences: applications to social choice theory

I investigate the role played by the combination of two invariance axioms for preferences in utility theory; namely, those of zero-independence and scale-independence, respectively. I provide a characterization of the preference relations on ${\mathbb{R}^{n}}$ that satisfy these two axioms as those which are either trivial, or what I call a two-serial total preorder on ${\mathbb{R}^{n}}$ . This result is then applied in social choice theory to characterize those social welfare functions that satisfy IIA and PI. Other characterizations involving the usual Pareto concepts are also provided.     

The core of social choice problems with monotone preferences and a feasibility constraint

We consider collective choice with agents possessing strictly monotone, strictly convex and continuous preferences over a compact and convex constraint set contained in ₊^k . If it is non-empty the core will lie on the efficient boundary of the constraint set and any policy not in the core is beaten by some policy on the efficient boundary. It is possible to translate the collective choice problem on this efficient boundary to another social choice problem on a compact and convex subset of ₊^c (c<k) with strictly convex and continuous preferences. In this setting the dimensionality results in Banks (1995) and Saari (1997) apply to the dimensionality of the boundary of the constraint set (which is lower than the dimensionality of the choice space by at least one). If the constraint set is not convex then the translated lower dimensional problem does not necessarily involve strict convexity of preferences but the dimensionality of the problem is still lower. Broadly, the results show that the homogeneity afforded by strict monotonicity of preferences and a compact constraint set makes generic core emptyness slightly less common. One example of the results is that if preferences are strictly monotone and convex on ² then choice on a compact and convex constraint exhibits a version of the median voter theorem.I thank Donald Saari for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.     

The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences

The vulnerability of a social choice function to coalitional manipulation of preferences is defined as the proportion of voting situations in which the social choice function can be manipulated by a coalition of individuals. In this paper, we provide exact relations giving the vulnerability of four specific social choice functions (plurality rule, anti-plurality rule, plurality with runoff, anti-plurality with runoff) in three-alternative elections. Plurality with runoff appears to be less vulnerable than the other three rules.     

A fundamental structure of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with restricted preferences over alternatives

I prove that under each strategy-proof and unanimous social choice correspondence, there is at least one agent who is decisive. Because the result is established on a weak requirement on preferences over sets, the existence of a decisive agent is an underlying feature of most strategy-proof and unanimous social choice correspondences. Moreover, I consider a restriction on the space of preferences over alternatives. I prove that circular sets of preferences over alternatives are sufficient for the existence of a decisive agent.     

Extended preferences and freedom of choice

The common choice theory in economics is based on the assumption that an individual is defined in terms of a binary preference relation. This preference relation is defined over alternatives without taking into account menu dependence and, in particular, freedom of choice or, more generally, the set that contains the alternatives. In this study we clarify the nature and the significance of freedom of choice which may positively or negatively affect the individual's welfare. Our proposed extended preference relation of the individual takes into account both the particular alternative and the opportunity set that he faces. This extended relation does not induce ranking of opportunity sets. Its restriction to a particular opportunity set is the paradigmatic preference relation and it can capture the dependence of preferences on freedom of choice. Our main result establishes the inconsistency between dependence of extended preferences on freedom of choice and the existence of a utility that represents the paradigmatic preference relation and any of its restrictions. Received: 30 December 1997/Accepted: 6 September 1999     

Social choice with analytic preferences

Arrow's axioms for social welfare functions are shown to be inconsistent when the set of alternatives is the nonnegative orthant in a multidimensional Euclidean space and preferences are assumed to be either the set of analytic classical economic preferences or the set of Euclidean spatial preferences. When either of these preference domains is combined with an agenda domain consisting of compact sets with nonempty interiors, strengthened versions of the Arrovian social choice correspondence axioms are shown to be consistent. To help establish the economic possibility theorem, an ordinal version of the Analytic Continuation Principle is developed. Received: 4 July 2000/Accepted: 2 April 2001     

Social choice with procedural preferences

Participants in an aggregation procedure have preferences not only over outcomes but also over procedural features (such as preferring consensus, preferring to be in the majority, preferring not having to compromise, etc.) Such procedural preferences can be expressed in a framework that, contrary to the traditional Arrovian framework, has voting patterns rather than outcomes as comparison classes. The extended framework helps us to resolve several of the puzzles of social choice theory. The (more or less anti-democratic) political conclusions that some author have been willing to draw from results in the Arrovian framework are shown to rely on formal restrictions that are present in that framework but not in the extended framework that is presented here.     

Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems

Since Kenneth Arrow showed the general possibility theorem, a number of social choice theorists have provided alternative proofs of it. In a recent article, Geanakoplos (Econ Theory 26:211–215, 2005) has constructed a new proof of the theorem. The present article provides alternative proofs of various Arrovian impossibility results from the 1960s to the 1970s by utilizing Geanakoplos’s method. We prove semi-order impossibility theorems, the quasi-transitive veto theorem, the quasi-transitive dictatorship theorem, the triple acyclic veto theorem, and the impossibility theorem without the Pareto principle.     

Assent-maximizing social choice

We take a decision theoretic approach to the classic social choice problem, using data on the frequency of choice problems to compute social choice functions. We define a family of social choice rules that depend on the population’s preferences and on the probability distribution over the sets of feasible alternatives that the society will face. Our methods generalize the well-known Kemeny Rule. In the Kemeny Rule, it is known a priori that the subset of feasible alternatives will be a pair. We define a distinct social choice function for each distribution over the feasible subsets. Our rules can be interpreted as distance minimization—selecting the order closest to the population’s preferences, using a metric on the orders that reflects the distribution over the possible feasible sets. The distance is the probability that two orders will disagree about the optimal choice from a randomly selected available set. We provide an algorithmic method to compute these metrics in the case where the probability of a given feasible set is a function only of its cardinality.     

Egalitarian-equivalence and the Pareto principle for social preferences

The Pareto principle is often in conflict with the equity criteria in construction of social preferences: there exist two allocations x and y such that x Pareto dominates y, but y is an equitable allocation whereas x is not. The efficiency-first principle requires to rank an allocation x higher than y if (i) x Pareto dominates y or (ii) x and y are Pareto-noncomparable and x is equitable whereas y is not. The equity-first principle reverses the order of application of the two criteria. Adopting egalitarian-equivalence as the notion of equity, we examine rationality of the social preference functions based on the efficiency-first or the equity-first principle. The degrees of rationality vary widely depending on which principle is adopted, and depending on the range of egalitarian-reference bundles. We show several impossibility and possibility results as well as a characterization of the social preference function introduced by Pazner and Schmeidler (1978). We also identify the sets of maximal elements of the social preference relations in the set of feasible allocations. The results are contrasted with those in the case where no-envy is the notion of equity.This paper is a much extended version of a part of Tadenuma (1998). The author is grateful to Marc Fleurbaey, Serge-Chiristophe Kolm, Kotaro Suzumura, and William Thomson for helpful comments on the earlier version of the paper. ‘‘Financial support from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan for the 21st Century Center of Excellence Project on the Normative Evaluation and Social Choice of Contemporary Economic Systems is gratefully acknowledged’’.     

Moral sentiments and social choice

We examine the implications, for social choice, of individuals having an intrinsic sense of fairness. Taking the viewpoint that social justice reflects the moral attitudes of the constituent members, we analyze the effect of the intensity of the individual sense of fairness on the solution of Nash bargaining over random allocation procedures. We use a stylized model of university admission policies to illustrate our approach. We show that even if social policies are ultimately determined by the bargaining power of the different groups, a society whose members have a common notion of fairness tends to implement fairer admission policies when the intensity of the sense of fairness of individual members increases. While working on the research that is summarized in this paper the authors visited several institutions. Edi Karni visited the Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University and GRID, at Ecole Normale Superieur de Cachan. Zvi Safra visited CERMCEM and EUREQua, at the University of Paris I and LIP6, at the University of Paris 6. The hospitality of these institutions is gratefully acknowledged. We are also grateful to the editor and two anonymous referees for their very useful comments and suggestions. Zvi Safra thanks The Israel Science Foudation (grant 1299/05) for its support.     

Public information and social choice

We examine the value of public information when a society uses a social choice rule to decide among a set of outcomes. We require that a social choice function satisfies unrestricted domain, non-decisiveness and the Pareto principle. We show that there exist payoff structures for every social choice function, such that an arbitrary subset of voters is worse off by public information. We apply the proposition to collective information acquisition and to irreversible investments. Received: 2 June 1997/Accepted: 30 September 1998     

Multi-profile intergenerational social choice

In an infinite-horizon setting, Ferejohn and Page showed that any social welfare function satisfying Arrow’s axioms and stationarity must be a dictatorship of the first generation. Packel strengthened this result by proving that no collective choice rule generating complete social preferences can satisfy unlimited domain, weak Pareto and stationarity. We prove that this impossibility survives under a domain restriction and without completeness. We propose an alternative stationarity axiom and show that a social welfare function on a specific domain satisfies this modified version and some standard social choice axioms if and only if it is a chronological dictatorship.     

Self-selective social choice functions

It is not uncommon that a society facing a choice problem has also to choose the choice rule itself. In such situations, when information about voters’ preferences is complete, the voters’ preferences on alternatives induce voters’ preferences over the set of available voting rules. Such a setting immediately gives rise to a natural question concerning consistency between these two levels of choice. If a choice rule employed to resolve the society’s original choice problem does not choose itself, when it is also used for choosing the choice rule, then this phenomenon can be regarded as inconsistency of this choice rule as it rejects itself according to its own rationale. Koray (Econometrica 68: 981–995, 2000) proved that the only neutral, unanimous universally self-selective social choice functions are the dictatorial ones. Here we introduce to our society a constitution, which rules out inefficient social choice rules. When inefficient social choice rules become unavailable for comparison, the property of self-selectivity becomes more interesting and we show that some non-trivial self-selective social choice functions do exist. Under certain assumptions on the constitution we describe all of them.