INVESTMENT AND THE NOMINAL INTEREST RATE: THE VARIABLE VELOCITY CASE

Models treating money either as a consumer good or as a producer good are encompassed by a model in which both households and firms use money as a buffer between receipts and expenditures. A rise in nominal interest rates increases resources devoted to intermediation, while discouraging purchases financed from accumulated cash. If investment is financed from contemporaneous earnings, there is a tendency to substitute out of consumption and into investment when interest rates are high. Greater resources devoted to intermediation generate a negative wealth effect. The net impact on investment is ambiguous.     

The political viability of a negative income tax

This paper offers three propositions relating to the political viability of the negative income tax. One, despite its work disincentive, a majority of households would support a linear income tax that makes cash payments to low income households. However two, when government consumption is sufficiently high, a majority would favor a proportional tax over such a tax. Three, under certain conditions, a majority of households will prefer public provision of a private good or an in-kind transfer to a negative income tax. These latter two propositions offer an explanation for the public's apparent distaste for widespread cash transfers. Received: 17 September 1999/Accepted: 21 April 2000     

A RESPECIFIED TAX-ADJUSTED FISHER RELATION

How much will a 1% increase in expected inflation increase nominal interest rates? Irving Fisher's famous equation implies that nominal interest rates will rise in proportion to an increase in expected inflation. Darby and Feldstein, correcting the Fisher equation for taxation, predict a nominal interest rate increase of [1/(1 - T)]% where T is the marginal tax rate: i.e., if T =3, then a 1 % increase in expected inflation should cause a 1.4 % rise in interest rates. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that the rise in interest rates is much smaller than the Darby/Feldstein prediction. Estimates are around 9, varying mostly between 5 and 1.15, which is much closer to Fisher's original prediction. It is important to know the size of the interest rate response to inflation expectations in a world in which inflation and interest rates are volatile and in which tax laws are designed to influence savings and investment through interest rates. In this paper we attempt to close the gap between theorized and estimated effects of inflation by incorporating into the Fisher equation two important aspects of the U.S. tax code: historic cost depreciation and the lower tax rate on capital gains. Our model shows that the effect of expected inflation on interest rates is dampened by the lower benefits from depreciation deductions arid the capital gains tax. Our corrected Fisher equation predicts a 1.12 % nominal interest rate increase, rather than the 1.4 % increase implied by the Darby/Feldstein model. The, our model closes about 56 % of the gap between theory and empirical evidence. The remainder could be closed by additional refinements in the model or better empirical modeling.     

TAX EFFECTS, PRICE EXPECTATIONS AND THE NOMINAL RATE OF INTEREST

This paper investigates the relationship between price expectations, income taxes and the nominal rate of interest in Canada. Our primary approach was to utilize the rational expectations hypothesis to create a synthetic price expectations series and to apply this series to four models of the determination of the nominal rate of interest; the Yohe-Karnovsky model, the Carr-Smith model, the Feldstein-Eckstein model and the Jenkins-Lim model. The analysis is inconclusive with respect to the Darby hypothesis that income tax considerations will cause the nominal rate of interest to increase by more than the increase in the expected rate of inflation.     

Decision heuristics and tax perception – An analysis of a tax-cut-cum-base-broadening policy

In this paper, both a conjoint analysis and a lab experiment are conducted to analyze the influence of changes in the tax rate and the tax base on the perceived tax burden. Our results show that the majority of individuals do not make rational tax decisions based on the actual tax burden but rather use simple decision heuristics. This leads to an irrationally high impact of changes in nominal tax rates on the perceived tax burden. Taxpayers favor tax options that apply a lower tax rate on their gross income over a higher tax rate applied on their net income despite the lower actual tax burden of the latter option. This result suggests that politicians could combine increasing fiscal revenues and decreasing subjects’ tax perception. Furthermore, overestimation of tax rate changes increases considerably when information on tax rate is considered first (framing effect).     

THE FINANCIAL AND TAX EFFECTS OF MONETARY POLICY ON INTEREST RATES

Standard analysis of monetary policy effects on interest rates in terms of liquidity, income, and expectations effects is incomplete. After a change in monetary policy, substitution among securities will increase as time elapses and so reduce or eliminate financial effects caused by short-run financial market segmentation. Also, the standard expectations effect omits the transfer of income tax liability on that part of the interest payment representing a return of real capital. So a 1 percentage point increase in the expected inflation rate should increase the nominal interest rate by 1/(1 —τ) percentage points, τ being the marginal tax rate.     

MONETARY POLICY AND ENDOWMENT RISK IN A LIMITED PARTICIPATION MODEL

A limited participation model is constructed to study the risk‐sharing role of monetary policy. A fraction of households exchange money for interest‐bearing government nominal bonds in the asset market and the government injects money through open market operations. In equilibrium, money is nonneutral and monetary policy redistributes consumption across households. Without idiosyncratic endowment risk, monetary policy becomes a perfect risk‐sharing tool, but with idiosyncratic endowment risk, it is not. The Friedman rule is not optimal in general. (JEL E4, E5)     

Financial Sophistication and Housing Leverage Among Older Households

Increasing mortgage debt among older households has been cited as evidence of financial distress caused by low financial knowledge, poor lending practices, and an increased appetite for debt. This paper investigates whether housing leverage among older households is related to financial sophistication, tax effects, and a desire to increase portfolio allocation to risky assets. Results indicate a time trend in low housing leverage, but no trend in high housing leverage. While housing leverage increases with liquidity constraints, it also increases with financial sophistication, and tax and portfolio incentives are strongly related to high housing leverage. The incentive to borrow against home value created by the deductibility of mortgage interest appears to encourage greater housing leverage and vulnerability to housing price shocks.     

COSTLY INTERMEDIATION AND CONSUMPTION SMOOTHING

This paper studies quantitatively how intermediation costs affect household consumption loans and welfare. Agents face uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks to labor productivity in a production economy with costly financial intermediation and a borrowing limit. Reducing intermediation costs has two effects: (1) For a given decrease in the interest rate on borrowing, agents' ability to smooth consumption over time improves. (2) The demand for loans increases, which increases the interest rate. The net welfare gain of reducing intermediation costs from 3.927% (U.S. level) to 1% is about 1.14% of equivalent consumption in the baseline economy for an endogenous interest rate and 1.90% for an exogenous interest rate. The gains are distributed unevenly: households at the bottom wealth decile improve welfare by 3.96% and 5.86% of equivalent consumption, while those at the top decile have welfare gains of 0.35% and 0.2%, respectively. Sufficiently high intermediation costs eliminate borrowing and hence the welfare gain of reducing costs is not substantial. The welfare analysis includes transitional dynamics between steady states. (JEL D91, E60, G38)     

WHY DO GOVERNMENTS END UP WITH DEBT? SHORT‐RUN EFFECTS MATTER

This paper reconsiders the impact of public debt in an economy with heterogeneous households and incomplete markets to emphasize the short‐run effects of an increase in public debt. As compared to models that rest on steady‐state analysis, we show that the welfare gains of a public debt increase are substantially higher when transitional dynamics are accounted for. The additional debt issue allows for a temporary reduction in the income tax rate, which stimulates labor supply and generates an overshooting of the interest rate. The short‐run gains create a temptation to deviate toward higher levels of debt. Debt increases continue to generate welfare gains even when debt is considerably higher than its long‐run optimal level. (JEL E60, H60)     

FORWARD GUIDANCE AND THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY

This paper analyzes forward guidance in a nonlinear model with a zero lower bound (ZLB) on the nominal interest rate. Forward guidance is modeled with news shocks to the monetary policy rule, which capture innovations in expectations from central bank communication about future policy rates. Whereas most studies use quasi‐linear models that disregard the expectational effects of hitting the ZLB, we show how the effectiveness of forward guidance nonlinearly depends on the state of the economy, the speed of the recovery, the degree of uncertainty, the policy shock size, and the forward guidance horizon when households account for the ZLB. (JEL E43, E58, E61)     

THE OPTIMAL TAXATION OF ASSET INCOME WHEN GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION IS ENDOGENOUS: THEORY,ESTIMATION AND WELFARE

This paper derives the Ramsey optimal fiscal policy for taxing asset income in a model where government expenditure is a function of net output or the inputs that produce it. Extending work by Kenneth L. Judd, I demonstrate that the canonical result that the optimal tax on capital income is zero in the medium to long term is a special case of a more general model. Employing a vector error correction model to estimate the relationship between government consumption and net output or the factor inputs that generate it for the United States between 1948Q1 and 2015Q4, I demonstrate that this special case is empirically implausible, and show how a cointegrating vector can be used to determine the optimal tax schedule. I simulate a version of the model using the empirical estimates to measure the welfare implications of changing the tax rate on asset income, and contrast these results with those generated in a version of the model where government consumption is purely exogenous. The shifting pattern of welfare measurements confirms the theoretical results. I calculate that the prevailing effective tax rate on net asset income in the United States between 1970 and 2014 averaged 0.449. Hence abolishing the tax completely does generate welfare improvements, though only by the equivalent of between 1.103% and 1.616% permanent increase in consumption—well under half the implied welfare benefit when the endogeneity of the government consumption is ignored. The maximum welfare improvement from shifting part of the burden of tax from capital to labor is the equivalent of a permanent increase in consumption of between only 1.491% and 1.858%, and is attained when the tax rate on asset income is lowered to between 0.148 and 0.186. Allowing the tax rate to vary over time raises the maximum welfare benefit to 1.865%. All the results are very robust to a wide range of elasticities of labor supply. (JEL E62, H21, H50)     

OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY AND IMPERFECT FINANCIAL MARKETS: A CASE FOR NEGATIVE NOMINAL INTEREST RATES?

This article studies optimal monetary policy in a model with credit frictions and money demand. We show that augmenting a standard New Keynesian model with money demand and financial frictions generates a mechanism that, in equilibrium, gives rise to optimal negative nominal interest rates. In addition, we find that the tighter credit markets are, the lower the optimal nominal policy interest rate and the more likely it is to be negative. Quantitatively, when credit constraints are binding, a standard calibration of the model generates an optimal nominal policy interest rate that is roughly ?4% annually. (JEL E31, E41, E43, E44, E52, E58)     

BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS: INCOME DISTRIBUTION,CONSUMER CREDIT,AND BUSINESS CYCLES

We introduce a macroeconomic model with heterogeneous households and an aggregate banking sector in order to analyze the impact of rising income inequality under different credit scenarios. Growing inequality produces debt‐led consumption boom dynamics when the banking sector is characterized by a lower capital requirement and a higher willingness to lend. Instead, when inequality rises but the banking sector is highly regulated, aggregate demand and output fall. Our results also yield new insights on the appropriate fiscal policy reaction to stabilize the economy: acting on the progressivity of the tax system seems more effective than a proactive countercyclical fiscal policy. (JEL C63, D31, E62, G01)     

Growth with Endogenous Risk of Biological Invasion

We model biological invasions as an unintended by-product of capital accumulation. We distinguish three spillover effects: (1) a negative production externality, (2) a negative or positive consumption externality and (3) an increase in the risk of future welfare loss. We also consider the implications when households self-protect by allocating income to reduce the potential damages from a biological invasion. An optimal output tax for production externalities is straightforward and can be augmented in the case of negative or positive spillover effects on consumer welfare. Policies to correct the effect of invasions on endogenous risk are more difficult to design.     

Family labor supply,taxation and saving in an imperfect capital market

This paper combines income and expenditure with time use data to provide a unique picture of the labor supply, household production, saving and consumption decisions of two-adult households over a life cycle defined in terms of the presence and ages of children. The study also draws on data for household borrowing and lending, direct and indirect benefits and taxes to calibrate a “family” life cycle model at the core of which is the hypothesis that households face a borrowing interest rate that rises with the amount of non-collateral based borrowing. The household members jointly choose time paths of time use, consumption and saving over their life cycle in the face of this capital market imperfection. Importantly, households are shown to differ significantly in their saving behavior in a way that depends on secondary earner labor supply, with a strong positive association between saving and the income of the second earner. The results differ sharply from those of the existing literature.     

INDETERMINACY AND VOLATILITY OF EXCHANGE RATES UNDER IMPERFECT CURRENCY SUBSTITUTION

We know that when currencies are perfect substitutes, exchange rates could become indeterminate. We show that even when currencies are less than perfect substitutes exchange rates could display volatility unrelated to economic fundamentals. With increases in currency substitution: (1) the exchange rate becomes more sensitive to changes in economic fundamentals, increasing its volatility; (2) the exchange rate could become indeterminate, and it is more likely to become so if governments pursue similar monetary policies; (3) currencies with high nominal interest rates would decline significantly and the exchange rate becomes more sensitive to changes in the supply of those currencies.     

THE CREDIT‐CHANNEL TRANSMISSION MECHANISM AND THE NONLINEAR GROWTH AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF INFLATION AND TAXES

With the credit‐channel effect driven by the central bank's open market operations, this paper's model easily gives rise to the nonlinear inflation‐growth nexus, which is evidenced by a number of cross‐country empirical studies. The threshold level of the inflation rate is found to be lower when tax rates are higher. The presence of the credit‐channel effect also provides the rationale for setting positive (and smaller than 1) tax rates on consumption, labor income, and capital income. The optimal tax rates rise as the inflation target declines. Under a fiscal policy rule where labor and capital income taxes move proportionally to each other, the optimal capital income tax rate could be higher than the optimal labor income tax rate. Under a sufficiently large central bank balance sheet, the credit‐channel effect will be so weak that inflation and all kinds of taxes are growth and welfare repressing. This provides a rationale for central banks that have implemented quantitative easing policies to shrink their balance sheets. (JEL E58, E62, O42)     

THE EFFECT OF FISCAL POLICY ON THE SHORT-RUN RELATION BETWEEN NOMINAL INTEREST RATES AND INFLATION

This paper presents a simple empirical model of the relation between the inflation rate and the nominal interest rate. We show that previous results found in the literature may be attributed to specification error and that there are natural explanations for the observed signs of previous Fisher equation estimates. Our results show that fiscal policy shocks may generate short run negative correlations between changes in inflation and changes in the nominal interest rates. These results illustrate the difficulty in discussing the relation between inflation and nominal interest rates without conditioning the analysis with specific assumptions on the course of the economy.     

Opting out of publicly provided services: A majority voting result

Our objective in this paper is to examine majority voting in an environment where both public and private alternatives coexist. We construct a model in which households are differentiated by income and have the option of choosing between publicly provided services and private services. Publicly provided services are financed through income tax revenues and made available to all citizens at zero price. Majority voting determines the tax rate. Even though preferences over tax rates are not single peaked, we provide conditions under which a majority voting equilibrium exists. We illustrate our existence result with CES preferences and a Dagum income distribution. Received: 21 December 1993 / Accepted: 2 September 1996