Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case

This paper extends the revelation principle to environments in which the mechanism designer cannot fully commit to the outcome induced by the mechanism. We show that he may optimally use a direct mechanism under which truthful revelation is an optimal strategy for the agent. In contrast with the conventional revelation principle, however, the agent may not use this strategy with probability one. Our results apply to contracting problems between a principal and a single agent. By reducing such problems to well‐defined programming problems they provide a basic tool for studying imperfect commitment.     

证券市场流动性与交易者群体变动的混沌研究

从证券市场微观结构角度,利用交易者群体可变的动态模型,分别在确定与不确定性金 融环境下,研究离散交易状态下市场的形成过程,并分析了交易者群体变动的混沌条件. 结果 表明,市场流动性的最低标准是买卖双方的交易者群体要有一个恰当的比例,市场达到稳定流 动性的时间与描述离开股市交易者的参数有关,通过交易制度对交易者群体参数的影响,可实 现对市场过程的控制,最后给出仿真计算.     

Strategic Grading in the Product Acquisition Process of a Reverse Supply Chain

Most recommerce providers have moved to a quality‐dependent process for the acquisition of used products. They acquire the products via websites at which product holders submit upfront quality statements and receive quality‐dependent acquisition prices for their used devices. Motivated by this development of reverse logistics practice, the aim of this study is to analyze the product assessment process of a recommerce provider in detail. To this end, we first propose a sequential bargaining model with complete information which captures the individual behavior of the recommerce provider and the product holder. We determine the optimal strategies of the product holder and the recommerce provider in this game. We find that the resulting strategies lead to an efficient allocation, although the recommerce provider can absorb most of the bargaining potential due to his last mover advantage. In a second step, we relax the assumption of complete information and include uncertainty about the product holder's valuation of the product. We show the trade‐off underlying the recommerce provider's optimal counteroffer decision and analyze the optimal strategy, using a logistic regression approach on a real‐life dataset of nearly 6,000 product submissions. The results reveal a significant improvement potential, compared to the currently applied strategy.     

电力市场中关于直购电力价格的讨价还价博弈模型

运用鲁宾斯坦的轮流出价讨价还价模型的思想,构造发电公司与大用户之间关于直购电力价格的不完全信息轮流出价的讨价还价博弈模型,求解模型并对所得的结果进行分析,得出双方达成协议主要取决于双方的“谈判成本”以及它们关于对方实时电力价格预期的估计。最后提出应提高实时电力市场透明度的政策建议。文中的模型及其结论同样也适用于发电公司和配电公司之间的讨价还价博弈。     

A note on ‘a strategy for optimal equipment replacement’

A recent article in this journal outlined strategies for the replacement of components and sub-assemblies when considering hazard rates and for capital intensive equipment when considering influences such as increasing maintenance costs, inflation, discount rates, and depreciation. We expand upon this second analysis, concerning the replacement of capital intensive equipment with net present value (NPV) analysis, by guaranteeing that all feasible options are evaluated when determining the optimal strategy. This requires assumptions about future challengers (potential replacement equipment over time) and the time horizon for analysis. We illustrate different solution approaches based on the given assumptions.     

实报还是谎报——双边信息激励与供应链效率

探讨了双边不对称信息下供应链信息真实分享和谎报对效率的影响。首先,给出完全信息下的最优商品交易量和供应链利润作为比较基准。其次,构建双方信息真实分享的激励模型。研究发现激励双方信息真实共享所需的信息租金降低交易量和供应链利润。再次,构建允许信息谎报的交易量谈判模型。研究发现,供销双方都偏好高报自己的信息类型。个体谎报信息的幅度随着谈判力增加而减小。拥有绝对谈判力的一方不会谎报信息。供应链效率与谎报信息的幅度、成本上界以及销售价格相关。最后,通过数值算例对实报信息和谎报信息下交易量、供应链个体利润及效率进行对比分析。研究结果为管理实践提供一定的洞见:供应链企业是否激励双边信息分享可根据双方成本大小进行选择。     

水平竞争条件下的供应链信息泄露策略

本文探讨非对称信息下,制造商针对议价能力不同的大型及小型零售商分别采用了收益共享、批发价合约时,大型零售商的市场信息被制造商泄露给竞争对手,从而对供应链产生的影响。通过对比有无信息泄露下各方成员的博弈过程,分析供应链信息泄露的原理;进而在制造商总是会泄露信息的前提下,构建基于信号传递的信息泄露下供应链成员决策模型,分别讨论分离均衡与混同均衡两种情形下,零售商的订货策略及其相应的收益。在此基础上进一步做出扩展,制造商有主动权以选择是否泄露信息的情况,对比分析零售商的策略选择问题。经过分析发现,出于自身利益的角度,制造商总是会泄露信息,从而导致供应链的整体利润下滑。对此,大型零售商的订货策略选择与市场需求的波动程度有关：波动较小则选择混同均衡;波动较大则选择分离均衡。特别地,当市场需求为低时,大型零售商的最优订货量会向下扭曲,即支付一定的“信息租金”作为应对信息泄露的代价。     

产品异质性、成本差异与不完全议价能力企业技术许可

建立了包含产品异质性、研发溢出、企业吸收能力、创新规模、创新后企业间成本差异以及创新企业的讨价还价能力等现有文献中多数可量化参数的多阶段博弈模型,力图统一关于创新企业技术许可而出现的多样性结论.研究结论表明:1)当创新后企业间成本差异足够大时,创新企业存在垄断的可能性,但这种可能性可能被产品间足够大的异质程度所打破;2)创新企业讨价还价能力的作用不仅在于"数量"(许可得益大小)上的获得,更在于"质量"(许可方式)上的选择.3)R&D溢出、吸收能力以及创新规模通过对创新后企业间的成本差异起作用,间接地对企业的技术许可行为产生影响;4)创新企业的讨价还价能力并非在所有由成本差异和产品替代程度所构成的区域内都对技术许可方式的选择产生影响.在创新后企业间成本差异较小时,不管创新企业的讨价还价能力和企业间产品替代程度如何,产量提成许可总是最优;而在成本差异和产品替代程度都较大时,固定费许可最优.但在某些特定的区域内,最优的技术许可方式随着创新企业讨价还价能力的增强从产量提成许可转向固定费许可.     

Optimal Offer Strategies in Mergers and Acquisitions*

This paper models the corporate takeover process as a bargaining game under certainty. During the takeover process, an acquirer is generally uncertain about the minimum price the target shareholders will accept. Normally, a takeover is concluded after a sequence of offers have been made. This paper derives optimal offer strategies for the buyer at each stage of this bargaining game under uncertainty. Uncertainty about the target's minimum acceptable price is represented by a probability distribution. Optimal offer strategies depend on the probability distribution of the minimum acceptable price, which can change during the offer process.     

Bargaining,Reputation, and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts

Consider a two‐person intertemporal bargaining problem in which players choose actions and offers each period, and collect payoffs (as a function of that period's actions) while bargaining proceeds. This can alternatively be viewed as an infinitely repeated game wherein players can offer one another enforceable contracts that govern play for the rest of the game. Theory is silent with regard to how the surplus is likely to be split, because a folk theorem applies. Perturbing such a game with a rich set of behavioral types for each player yields a specific asymptotic prediction for how the surplus will be divided, as the perturbation probabilities approach zero. Behavioral types may follow nonstationary strategies and respond to the opponent's play. In equilibrium, rational players initially choose a behavioral type to imitate and a war of attrition ensues. How much should a player try to get and how should she behave while waiting for the resolution of bargaining? In both respects she should build her strategy around the advice given by the “Nash bargaining with threats” (NBWT) theory developed for two‐stage games. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, she can guarantee herself virtually her NBWT payoff by imitating a behavioral type with the following simple strategy: in every period, ask for (and accept nothing less than) that player's NBWT share and, while waiting for the other side to concede, take the action Nash recommends as a threat in his two‐stage game. The results suggest that there are forces at work in some dynamic games that favor certain payoffs over all others. This is in stark contrast to the classic folk theorems, to the further folk theorems established for repeated games with two‐sided reputational perturbations, and to the permissive results obtained in the literature on bargaining with payoffs as you go.     

Coopetitive Buyer–Supplier Relationship: An Investigation of Bargaining Power,Relational Context,and Investment Strategies

This study proposes an analytical approach combined with a behavioral experiment for a joint examination of the competitive and cooperative (i.e., coopetitive) relationship between a buyer and a supplier. Specifically, the article considers the scenario in which the buyer and the supplier invest in strategic capabilities to increase their relative bargaining power. The article examines how dynamic investments in strategic assets are influenced by the locus of bargaining power and by the underlying context (synergistic vs. adversarial) of the interfirm relationship. The dynamic evolution of bargaining power is also examined. A dynamic game model is considered to examine the evolution of investment strategies in critical resources and to investigate the issues of bargaining power in a buyer–supplier dyad. Equilibrium expressions for the investment strategies of the buyer and the supplier are presented and their implications for buyer–supplier relationships are examined. The behavioral experiment complements the analytical model and examines the correspondence between optimal behavior suggested by the analytical model and the boundedly rational behavior of decision makers in an experimental context. The results from the model and behavioral experiments suggest that the strategies are a function of the risk‐adjusted returns obtained from investments. The experiment shows that, in a synergistic relational context when the buyer maintains bargaining power, the investment shifts of the buyer and the supplier accord well with theoretical predictions. In an adversarial relational context, the results of the experimental study do not correspond well with that predicted by the theoretical model. The implications of the results are discussed and directions for future research are presented.     

供应链中具有产能限制的竞争企业中的信息共享研究

本文研究由一个供货商和两个制造商组成的二级供应链中，制造商之间的横向信息共享策略和供应商的定价问题。在模型中，上游供应商同时为下游两家制造商提供价格相同的原材料，下游制造商生产具有替代性的商品进行数量竞争，并受到相同的产能限制。以Cournot博弈为研究手段，求解了制造商的均衡订货决策和信息共享策略，分析比较了在不同的信息共享策略下制造商的利润、供应商的利润和批发价格。本文在研究制造商的信息共享策略时考虑了上游供应商的批发价格的影响。研究表明，当均衡解受到产能约束时，制造商的信息共享策略会反向。在某些情况下，完全信息共享和完全信息不共享都可能成为博弈的占优策略。上游供应商通过调整批发价格可以影响制造商的信息共享决策。该模型为上游供应商提供了一种最优定价策略，也为下游制造商提供了求解自身最优订货量和信息共享决策的方法。     

基于网络效应与不完全信息的垄断企业R&D阻挠行为

本文构建了不完全信息静态博弈模型,研究基于产品网络效应的垄断企业,面临潜在进入与现实的进入威胁情况下的R&D最优阻挠行为.研究结论表明:在面临潜在进入威胁的情况下,如果R&D行为是一种开创性发现或发明时,垄断企业采用不阻挠战略;如果R&D行为是一种渐进式创新行为时,垄断企业采用提前阻挠战略是最优的;而不同程度的潜在进入威胁引致的阻挠策略是存在区别的,当垄断企业认为进入者进入概率很大时,其最优阻挠行为是快速阻挠;当垄断企业认为进入者进入概率很小时,其最优阻挠行为是慢速阻挠.在现实进入发生的情况下,无论进入者进入市场的推出产品的方式是快还是慢,垄断企业最优阻挠战略是采用慢速阻挠战略.同时,通过数字模拟分析,验证了上述结论;并讨论了产品网络效应强度与垄断企业选择不同R&D阻挠行为的关系.     

Value of and Interaction between Production Postponement and Information Sharing Strategies for Supply Chain Firms

We analyze the value of and interaction between production postponement and information sharing, which are two distinct strategies to reduce manufacturers’ uncertainty about demand. In both single‐level and two‐level supply chains, from the manufacturer's perspective, while information sharing is always valuable, production postponement can sometimes be detrimental. Furthermore, the value of production postponement is not merely driven by savings in inventory holding cost as postponement enables the manufacturer to avoid both excess and shortfall in production. We find that production postponement and information sharing strategies may substitute, complement, or conflict with each other, depending on the extent of the increase in the unit production cost when production is postponed. In a two‐level supply chain, from the retailer's perspective, information sharing and production postponement can be beneficial or detrimental. When information sharing is beneficial to the retailer, the retailer always shares her demand information with the manufacturer voluntarily. In addition, this voluntary information sharing is truthful because inflated or deflated demand information hurts the retailer through a higher wholesale price or a stock‐out. However, the retailer never shares her demand information voluntarily if the manufacturer has already adopted production postponement because production postponement and information sharing strategies always conflict with each other. Even when the retailer does not benefit from information sharing, we show that the manufacturer can always design an incentive mechanism to induce the retailer to share the demand information, irrespective of whether the manufacturer has already implemented production postponement or not. The above findings underscore the need for a careful assessment of demand uncertainty‐reduction strategies before the supply chain players embark upon them.     

Bargaining within the Supply Chain and Its Implications in an Industry

Our main objective is to investigate the influence of the bargaining power within a chain on its industry. As a building block, we first discuss the implications of bargaining within a single chain by considering an asymmetric Nash bargaining over the wholesale price (BW). We show that both Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) and vertical integration (VI) strategies are special cases of the BW contract. We then develop the Nash equilibrium in an industry with two supply chains that use BW. We identify the profit‐maximizing (coordinating) bargaining power within this industry. We show that when a chain is not monopolistic, VI does not coordinate the chain and that the MS contract, where the manufacturer has all the bargaining power, is coordinating when competition is intense. We find that the main determinant of the equilibrium in mature industries is to respond well to the actions of the competing chain rather than to directly maximize the profit of each chain. That is, the equilibrium does not necessarily maximize the profit of the entire industry. While a coordination of the industry could then increase the profitability of both chains, such a coordination is likely against antitrust law. Moreover, if one chain cannot change its actions, the other chain may unilaterally improve its profitability by deviating from the equilibrium. Our results lead to several predictions supported by empirical findings, such as that in competitive industries chains will work “close to” the MS contract.     

不对称信息下考虑产能约束的供应链合同设计

本文针对由产能约束品牌制造商和零售商组成的供应链系统,考虑市场上消费者对产品的异质性偏好,以及品牌制造商和零售商之间存在信息不对称,研究品牌制造商最优合同设计与零售商定价策略,考察产能约束与不对称信息对产品定价和供应双方合作的影响。研究发现：受到产能约束的品牌制造商有三种合同策略,即低价合同、固定价格合同以及高价合同等三种合同,在低价合同下品牌制造商可以充分利用其产能约束,而在后两种合同下产品有可能滞销;不对称信息会导致"批发价格+一次性转移支付"合同不能完美协调供应链。当品牌制造商和零售商进行信息共享谈判时,若二者在高价合同下进行合作,则品牌制造商与零售商在一定条件下可以达成信息共享谈判,实现"双赢"。     

Optimal responses to stockouts: Lateral transshipment versus emergency order policies

In the retail industry, stockouts have a significant effect on a firm׳s profitability. When a stockout takes place, retailers often apply one of two strategies to resolve the issue – placing an emergency order with their supplier or arranging a lateral transshipment with a nearby partner store. Choosing the optimal response to a stockout is complicated by customers׳ spontaneous reactions. Customers who find that a product is out of stock may choose to give up on the purchase, to wait for delivery (through emergency order or lateral transshipment), or go to a partner store to search for the product on their own. In this study, under a single-period setting with two retail stores, we investigate the optimal inventory decisions under each strategy, and conduct a comparison between lateral transshipment and emergency order options. We also analyze the effects of the customer requesting rate and switching rate on the optimal inventory decision. Through numerical analysis, the two strategies are compared in terms of inventory levels and profitability. The results suggest that in addition to the cost associated with each of these strategies, the customers׳ behavior in response to a stockout has a significant effect on the optimal decision. The emergency order strategy is a better option when more customers request deliveries or when more customers switch to another store. Extending this analysis, we also examine the combined strategy when an emergency order is placed after a transshipment fails to fulfill unmet demands, and explore the circumstances under which this strategy provides the highest additional profit for the stores. Finally, we also find that a higher requesting rate does not necessarily increase profits, particularly when there is a high customer switching rate, because requesting emergency order or transshipment reduces switching demand.     

羊群效应与内幕信息的揭示分析

本文用金融市场微观结构模型的序贯交易框架分析了证券市场上的多维不确定性怎样引起投资者的羊群交易行为。结论表明当市场上存在事件不确定和信息精度不确定时,投资者之间可能发生羊群行为,这种行为会导致内幕信息在一段时间内得不到有效揭示。做市商在发生羊群效应期间虽然只能判断出事件的存在性,而无法学习到内幕信息的好坏和精度,但他仍会继续调整资产的价格并最终结束羊群效应。     

制造商成本削减策略对风险规避型零售商信息共享策略的影响

考虑一个风险中性制造商和一个风险规避零售商构成的供应链，需求随机且受销售价格的影响。在销售季节之前，零售商对需求进行预测，获取需求信号；制造商对生产进行投资降低生产成本。基于零售商的不同信息共享策略及制造商的投资策略，考虑四种不同策略模型，分别得到最优零售价、批发价（及投资水平），并分析需求预测精确度对供应链成员决策和效用的影响。通过四种模型效用的对比分析，探讨制造商的投资策略以及零售商的风险规避态度对零售商信息共享策略的影响。研究发现，零售商共享需求信息对于制造商总是有益的，且制造商总是愿意采取成本削减策略；只有当制造商采取成本削减策略，且其投资成本系数较低时，共享需求信息对零售商才有益。最后，得到了制造商和零售商的均衡策略。     

On the Role of Outside Options in Bargaining with Obstinate Parties

The presence of obstinate types in bargaining has been shown to alter dramatically the bargaining equilibrium strategies and outcomes. This paper shows that outside options may cancel out the effect of obstinacy in bargaining. When parties have access to stationary outside options, we show that when opting out is preferable to accepting the inflexible demand of the other party, there is a unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which each party reveals himself as rational as soon as possible. A similar conclusion holds when outside options may only be available at a later date or when only one party has access to an outside option.