市场获得与中国劳动力迁徙的边界效应

本研究纳入新经济地理的新型要素——市场获得。试图建立影响劳动力迁徙动力机制的新坐标。利用1998-2008年期间中国劳动力跨区域流动样本数据,本文经验验证了“市场获得一要素报酬一迁徙”的倒“U”关联机制,发现我国早期市场获得对劳动力由外围区向中心区迁徙的贡献显著,并决定了“中心一外围”的地区竞争格局。内部二元经济结构走向“刘易斯拐点”。进而“人口红利”消退,这均迫使“市场获得一迁徙”正向关联机制趋于弱化;研究估算出我国劳动力要素跨区域迁徙的隐性壁垒（边界效应值）为3．94;且边界效应由东向西呈现出阶梯型上升的区域差异态势：劳动力要素市场呈现出中心区相对开放,外围区相对闭塞的局面,而引力型政策和保障性政策分别成为了劳动力跨区域迁徙的拉力和阻力。政府的配套政策应该保障自由市场和生产要素跨区域有效配置,在实现我国区域“中心一外围”格局走向均衡化发展的同时,继续维护中国工业生产的要素竞争力。     

中国独生子女家庭与二孩家庭生育模式百年模拟与选择

不少人对中国的独生子女政策可能造成家庭负担过重忧心忡忡。通过独生子女家庭和“二孩加间隔”家庭未来百年发展变化模拟评价后认为：如果生育模式选择得当,独生子女家庭“四、二、二” 负担结构有可能基本避免,未来独生子女家庭的负担,也不会比历史上经历过的较重的负担更重。生育模式选择不当,生二个孩子,并不能保证比生一个孩子负担轻。从百年人口对资源环境和杜会经济发展的压力看,“二孩加间隔” 的政策无论如何组合和选择,所形成的人口压力都要显著大于独生子女政策,而独生子女家庭的生育模式如果选择得当,它的家庭负担不见得比生育模式选择不当的二孩家庭重多少。因此,政府应坚持稳定现行生育政策,坚持提倡一对夫妇只生一个孩子;同时应按最优生育模式,对生育年龄和间隔进行适当的调整。     

宜兴市的妇女婚姻生育考察报告

新近发表的《中国的人权状况》把我国计划生育政策明确概括为“两个提倡”和“一个照顾”,即“提倡晚婚晚育,少生优生;提倡一对夫妇只生育一个孩子,照顾到农村中某些群众的实际困难,允许间隔几年后生第二个孩子”。这一概括较之只讲“提倡一对夫妇只生育一个孩子”要全面得多,也是对海外有人把我国的计划生育政策称为“一孩家庭政策(One-Child Family Policy)”的一个必要纠正。实际上,我国一直在贯彻执行上述“两个提倡”和“一个照顾”的政策。这一政策的执行效果如何,是人们普遍关心的事情。我们     

日本生育水平变化分析

日本作为少子老龄化最典型的国家其生育水平的变化非常具有代表性。本文使用"寇尔生育指数模型"分析二战以后日本生育水平的变化,探讨其未来的发展变化趋势。二战后,1947年日本总和生育率达到最高值4.54;之后生育水平不断下降,2005年达到最低值1.26;近年来日本生育水平缓慢提高,2014年总和生育率回升到1.42。日本生育水平下降的主要原因是婚内生育率下降及结婚率的降低。婚内生育率不断下降是由于生育观念转变导致的婚内生育意愿下降造成的,生育不再以传宗接代为目的,也不再是妻子必须履行的义务。结婚率的降低则是因为越来越多的女性参加工作,不愿过早结婚生子。婚内生育率与结婚率变化在生育水平下降的不同阶段表现不同,早期婚内生育率下降是导致总和生育率下降的主要原因,而结婚率的变化仅起到辅助作用;中期结婚率的下降成为总和生育率持续下降的主要诱因,而婚内生育率水平则保持相对稳定的水平。进入21世纪以来,日本生育水平有所回升的主要原因是婚内生育水平缓慢提高,结婚率下降对生育水平的消极作用也几乎释放完毕。未来日本在结婚率保持相对稳定的情况下,要想进一步提高总和生育水平就必须提高婚内生育率。政府必须在降低育儿成本、提高生育家庭的补助等方面制定相关政策,引导家庭多生育子女。     

劳动力市场“退出援助”方式与政策探析

做好困难群体的再就业工作,并不意味着人人都能重新上岗。由于某些原因,现有劳动力人口中的一部分目前仍滞留各地再就业中心的大龄下岗困难职工,将可能永远无法再回到社会主导产业中去,或找到稳定的就业机会。所以,可否考虑在利用“积极劳动力市场政策”提供岗位援助,为其创造“边缘性”就业机会的同时;利用“消极劳动力市场政策”提供保障援助,重点做好社会保险的接续工作,帮助这部分特殊就业困难群体逐渐、直至完全退出劳动力市场就业竞争,实现“下岗”向“退休”的平稳过渡。     

三元劳动力市场分割与“新失业群体”失业——基于辽宁的调查

本文主要从辽宁省基本社会特质入手,从制度的角度展开“新失业群体”存在的根源分析。主要是从东北老工业基地特有的三元劳动力市场分割的视角来分析“新失业群体”何以在辽宁省特别突出。即由于劳动力市场三元分割,使得“新失业群体”在不同劳动力市场之间的职业流动发生障碍,导致了“新失业群体”的失业。     

北京城市家庭生命周期的变化

家庭生命周期与家庭成员特别是女性成员的生命周期紧密相联。本文根据1991年对北京城市婚姻家庭的调查,从妇女婚后的生命历程入手,探视北京现代城市家庭生命周期的变化趋势。 一、采用的方法 家庭生命周期有着明显的阶段性。在通常情况下家庭生命周期可划分为六个阶段。第一阶段(Ⅰ)为家庭形成阶段,即从妇女初婚到初育的时期:第二阶段(Ⅱ)为家庭扩展阶段,即从妇女初育到生育最后一个孩子的时间,这段时间也称平均生育期长度;第三阶段(Ⅲ)为扩展完成阶段(或称继续抚养期),即从母亲生最后一个孩子到第一个孩子因结婚或工作等原因离开家庭为止;第四阶段(Ⅳ)为家庭收缩阶段,即从第一个孩子离家到最后一个孩子离家;第五阶段(Ⅴ)为家庭“空巢”阶段,即从最后一个孩子离家到配偶一方死亡;第六阶段(Ⅵ)为家庭消亡阶段,即从配偶一方死亡到配偶双方死亡。     

我国省际投资水平与农村劳动力流动的实证分析——兼论实施西部大开发战略中的劳动力市场配置

在借鉴国内外相关研究文献基础上，本文建立了影响省际农村劳动力流动规模的理论框架，并利用最新统计数据对其进行了实证分析。研究结果发现，西部地区主要是农村劳动力的输出地区，造成这种状况的原因是这一地区农民收入水平低、省际投资力度小及政策开放程度滞后等因素，因此在实施西部大开发战略中需要通过政策引导来促进西部地区农村劳动力市场的区域合理配置。     

农村外出劳动力回流迁移的影响因素和回流效应

文章分析农村外出劳动力回流迁移的影响因素.农村外出劳动力在城市就业、经济收入和社会保障的排斥影响他们的回流,同时回流迁移也受到家庭生活、家庭劳动力状况、家庭农业活动和农地状况等因素的影响.外出劳动力的回流迁移是“被动回流”和“主动回流”相结合的过程、是个体决策和家庭决策的综合过程.文章提出劳动力回流迁移具有“回流效应”,回流带来人力资本的补偿、促进流出地非农经济的发展和带来创业的增长.劳动力回流作为城镇化过程中内生的逆迁移流,构成乡城迁移和劳动力市场平衡的补充机制,与乡城迁移一起促进城镇化和城乡平衡发展.文章提出在城镇化过程中需要支持“迁移效应”和“回流效应”机制共同发挥作用.     

欧盟劳动力税收和救济金制度改革及其影响

欧洲传统的福利制度造成了贫困陷阱和财政陷阱的产生,为了增加劳动力供给和鼓励就业,欧盟对劳动力税收和救济金制度进行了全面的改革。欧盟主要针对失业保险制度和社会救济金政策、最低工资政策、提前退休制度、个人所得税和社会保险税减免政策以及对有孩子家庭的激励政策等方面进行了改革。对改革的成效分析可以清楚地看到改革对劳动力供给和需求所带来的影响和效果。     

Demography,Culture, and Policy: Understanding Japan's Low Fertility

Insights into the causes of Japan's prolonged and sharp fall in total fertility rate come from comparing Japan with France. The two countries share dirigiste administrative approaches, family policy reform undertaken under the auspices of pragmatic right wing parties and justified on pronatalist grounds, and involvement of demographic experts in crafting and shepherding such policies. But the countries differ with respect to their total fertility rates (France 1.98, Japan 1.29) and the effectiveness of their family policies. Thus comparing them can help identify areas of divergence that might explain these differences and assist in the project of theory building. Several salient explanations are rooted in Japan's labor market: it exacts high opportunity costs from parents who interrupt their careers to raise children, keeps ideal workers from having much time for their families, assumes and reinforces a traditional gender ideology, and hires few young workers into good jobs.     

Comparative study on population transition in Japan and in Europe]

Over 6,000,000 Japanese military personnel and their families returned to Japan after WWII. Within 5 years, Japan's population increased by 11,000,000. However, within 10 years of Japan's 1949 removal of restrictions on abortions and sterilization, her birth rate dropped by half. At the same time, her economy stabilized and prospered. Japan's population had made the transition from a traditional pattern of reproduction to a modern pattern. Demographers saw it as unique, calling it a "population revolution." In reality, however, Japan's "population revolution" was not unique; it belonged to the same category as Europe's population transition. The birth rate in both Europe and Japan 1st reached a peak in the 1920s before declining rapidly through the decades to the 1960s. Japan's mortality rate showed a steady decline from 1860-80, when it began a sharp decline to the 1960s. In Europe, the mortality rate remained relatively level from 1860-1900, when its rapid decline began. While Japan's population transition was very similar to Europe's, it took less time for Japan, in large part because the Japanese government played a dominant role in its nation's industrialization. Once Japan became an industrialized and capitalistic nation, birth rates began to decline. But other factors contributed to this phenomenon as well: high literacy, urbanization, modern life styles, widespread knowledge of birth control, a strong government population policy, and an attitude that fewer births was better.     

日本和法国的少子化对策及启示

日本和法国同为发达国家,第二次世界大战结束以后都出现了比较严重的少子化问题,尽管导致两国少子化的原因不尽相同,但两国都为扭转少子化趋势推出了诸多举措。法国少子化对策的特点主要包括三个方面,一是推出了名目繁多的家庭补贴制度;二是积极创建工作育儿两不误的环境;三是在总和生育率尚处于并不太低的水平时就及早推出了各种举措。反观日本,日本政府自20世纪90年代中期以后陆续推出了诸多举措,但收效甚微,重要原因在于日本在总和生育率已降至很低水平时才调整人口政策并且日本少子化对策的力度远远不及法国。法国少子化对策取得了明显成效,其中最为重要的原因在于政府、企业、劳动者的紧密配合,举国一致为此付出努力。可见,要想从“低生育率陷阱”中摆脱出来,需要政府及社会各界及早深刻认识少子化的消极影响,举国一致付出艰辛努力,政府、企业、社会形成合力共同应对。     

The Decline of marital fertility in Japan

Summary Studies concerning the demographic history of Tokuwara and Meiji Japan suggest that fertility rose substantially before declining during the twentieth century. Were the motivations and circumstances which held down natality during the feudal period similar to those which account for the modern fertility decline and the low birth rate obtaining in the Japan of to-day? The thesis of this paper is that the pre-modern situation was fundamentally different from the modern one. During the Tokugawa era infanticide and abortion were used, independently of parity, to eliminate weak offspring whose chances of survival were deemed poor. Desired natality generally exceeded natural fertility. With the rise of income per head during the Meiji period the population's need for these desparate practices vanished. To-day parity-specific control characterizes fertility. Parityspecific control was diffused throughout Japan in response to declining desired fertility. Desired fertility fell significantly below natural fertility sometime during the late nineteenth or early twentieth century and the wish to reduce actual fertility to the desired level stimulated the adoption of parity-specific control. The speed of decline in marital fertility was partially governed by official policies toward contraception and abortion, contraception and abortion.     

Fertility trends in Europe since the second world war

Abstract Before discussing the movements in fertility in Europe since World War II, it is necessary to consider, both as a background and a yardstick for measurement, the general situation around the mid-1930's. This period has been chosen for several reasons. First, it was at about this time that the crude birth rates and other period indices of fertility in most Western and North-Western countries of Europe reached their lowest points. The decline initiated in the 1870's and 1880's had proceeded without interruption except for the years immediately after World War I, and had gathered momentum in the 1920's. Only in France, in which the birth rate had been falling throughout the 19th century, did there appear to be some approach to stabilization. Secondly, pro-natalist policies began to expand in France, Belgium and Italy, and were initiated in Germany with the Nazi takeover. The very expansion of such policies reinforced the feeling of impending depopulation in other Western countries, a feeling made more intense by the increasingly frequent use of period net reproduction rates as indicators of national 'vitality' ('true' rates of natural increase were much less frequently cited: they required more elaborate computations and appeared to be less striking). Such rates were regarded as sophisticated and meaningful measures of replacement tendencies and they were given a semi-official status by inclusion in the League of Nations Statistical Yearbooks. The apparent implications of these rates were made even more sharply visible by the publication of population projections constructed on a component basis, and using essentially the same approach as that embodied in net reproduction rates - that is, with fertility measured in terms of age-specific fertility rates, and with no regard paid to nuptiality. Thirdly, the early thirties saw the great economic depression, with its correlate of mass unemployment, and offering a natural economic explanation for at least part of the apparent demographic depression.     

Values and fertility change in Japan

This paper analyses how value change and economic and social change have jointly affected fertility in Japan since 1950, and especially since 1973 when fertility resumed declining after some 15 years at near-replacement level. The resumption of fertility decline since 1973 has been driven primarily by underlying economic and social changes. Value change has tended to lag behind fertility change, and this lag has tended to be larger in Japan than in other advanced nations, primarily because underlying economic and social conditions have evolved more rapidly in Japan, and because it takes time for values to adjust to changes in underlying conditions. Because of Japan's high degree of cultural homogeneity, values tend to be widely and quickly shared, so that under certain conditions value change tends to occur in spurts. In Japan, many of the more important value changes affecting fertility in recent decades are bound up with major educational and job gains by women, which have led to greater economic independence and more emphasis on values of individualism and equality between the sexes.     

World fertility and the women's situation]

In 1981, total number of childbearing women in the world reached 9.8 hundred million. Their socioeconomic status and fertility level are very important data for the study of women's liberation and population control. Facing limited natural resources and a constant growing demand, many nations are studying how to control the population growth and achieve a "zero population growth." In nations with a high GNP, such as Switzerland, West Germany, and France, fertility is low. On the contrary, countries in central and south Asia and most parts of Africa are the poorest economically, and their fertility rate has remained very high. Another factor which is related to the fertility level is the degree of women's participation in the labor market. In Europe and North America, the percentage of women's participation in economic activities is high, and fertility is low. In Latin America and Africa, fertility is high, and the percentage of women's participation in economic labor is low. From the above, we may conclude that promotion of women's participation in the labor market and better employment conditions will reduce fertility. Another 2 factors related to fertility are marriage age and birth control rate. Late marriage and the extensive use of birth control measures are effective methods for reducing fertility. All the above mentioned factors are closely related to the woman's educational background. If women receive a better education and find better employment opportunities, delay their marriage age, and take birth control measures, fertility will be reduced and the population growth will be under control.     

试论时期总和生育率、终身生育率与政策生育率的关系

通过对总和生育率(TFR)、终身生育率(CFR)与政策生育率(PFR)的概念及相关数据分析,论证总和生育率与政策生育率是完全不同的概念,不可直接比较。在特定条件下TFR、CFR和政策生育率会产生差异,在一个国家生育水平下降的历史时期,TFR必然小于当年49岁组女性的CFR;"超生率"、"未婚率"、"未育率"和"不孕率"的变化,决定了政策生育率与终身生育率的差异。借鉴日本经济与人口发展相关数据,可以相信由平均初婚年龄推迟、女性有偶率下降导致的生育水平下降很可能成为对我国人口均衡发展的最大潜在威胁。因此,当前以及今后相当的时期内,我国的政策生育率应高于1.8。     

The demographic transition in the Korean peninsula, 1910-1990: South and North Korea compared

North and South Korea have both experienced demographic transition and fertility and mortality declines. The fertility declines came later in North Korea. In 1990, the population was 43.4 million in South Korea and 21.4 million in North Korea and the age and sex compositions were similar. This evolution of population structure occurred despite differences in political systems and fertility determinants. Differences were in the fertility rate and the rate of natural increase. The total fertility rate was 2.5 children in North Korea and 1.6 in South Korea. The rate of natural increase was 18.5 per 1000 in North Korea and 9.8 in South Korea. Until 1910, the Korean peninsula was in the traditional stage characterized by high fertility and mortality. The early transitional stage came during 1910-45 under the Japanese annexation. Health and medical facilities improved and the crude birth rate rose and then declined. With the exception of the war years, population expanded as a function of births, deaths, and international migration. Poor economic conditions in rural areas acted as a push factor for south-directed migration, migration to Japan, and urban migration. Next came the chaotic stage, during 1945-60. South Korean population expanded during this period of political unrest. Repatriation and refugee migration constituted a large proportion of the population increase. Although the war brought high mortality, new medicine and disease treatment reduced the mortality rate after the war. By 1955-60, the crude death rate was 16.1 per 1000 in South Korea. The crude birth rate remained high at 42 per 1000 between 1950-55. The postwar period was characterized by the baby boom and higher fertility than the pre-war period of 1925-45. Total fertility was 6.3 by 1955-60. The late transitional stage occurred during 1960-85 with reduced fertility and continued mortality decline. By 1980-85, total fertility was 2.3 in the closed population. The restabilization stage occurred during 1985-90, and fertility declined to 1.6. In North Korea, strong population control policies precipitated fertility decline. In South Korea, the determinants were contraception, rising marriage age, and increased use of abortion concomitant with improved socioeconomic conditions.     

经济增长、生育政策与生育率——基于跨国面板数据的实证研究

文章基于不同发展水平、采取不同生育政策分布在不同地区的十个国家1970—2009年的面板数据对经济增长、生育政策与生育率之间的关系进行实证分析,对近年来部分学者提出的经济增长与生育率之间的U形关系,采取选择不同样本、加入政策变量和其他与生育率相关的重要经济指标如妇女的教育程度、城镇化率、工业化率等进行再检验,结果支持该假说,经济增长在经济发展程度整体较低的阶段与生育率呈现较高的负相关,但当经济增长达到一定程度时,收入效应取代替代效应对生育率起主要推动作用,如果再辅之以相关的激励政策和措施,生育率会出现轻微的反弹。因此,对于已采取生育控制政策的国家,可以结合经济社会发展指标权衡利弊,适时调整政策。