MONEY MATTERS:

This study examined the significance of earnings ratios, for the division of family work and gender-role attitudes among 136 physician couples in Israel. Consistent with resource theory, 'moderns' (both earned the same) and 'innovatives' (wives earned more than the husbands) had a more egalitarian division of labor in the home and gender-role ideology than 'conventionals' (the husbands earned more than the wives). A discriminant analysis revealed that the three groups of men were distinguished primarily by their behavior in the family - the lower their relative earnings, the greater their participation in child-care and housework - and by the relative importance they attributed to their wives' career success. The three groups of women were distinguished by their attitudes - women who earned less than their husbands had more traditional gender-role attitudes and attributed lesser importance to their own career success than to that of their husbands', but were more satisfied with their ability to combine family and work than women who earned the same or more. The innovative couples combined a strong joint commitment to both their work and their children.     

FAMILY SIZE IDEALS OF CANADIANS: A METHODOLOGICAL NOTE*

A partir de données recueillies par le sondage d'opinion Canadian Gallup sur le nombre d'enfants par famille considéré comme idéal, cet article suggère que la moyenne de 4.2 enfants par famille, statistique de 1960 fréquemment citée, est faussement exagérée. L'auteur compare les données du sondage de 1960 à celle d'un sondage antérieur (1957). Elle compare aussi les données de récents sondages canadien et américain sur la dimension idéale de la famille. Using data from Canadian Gallup Poll questions on the number of children considered ideal, this paper suggests that the frequently cited 1960 figure of 4.2 children is erroneously inflated. The discussion compares responses in 1960 to responses of an earlier 1957 poll. Comparisons are also made between American and Canadian responses to recent questions on ideal family size.     

BEQUEST RECEIPT AND FAMILY SIZE EFFECTS

This article tests the connection between credit constraints and negative family size effects on child earnings using bequest receipt to signal access to credit markets. The dominant economic model of fertility predicts a negative relationship between family size and child achievement. In the model, limits on borrowing create this quality-quantity trade-off. This article tests for the relevance of credit constraints using Panel Study of Income Dynamics data to compare family size effects across groups defined by bequest receipt. Contrary to the credit constraints explanation, those receiving large bequests exhibit large family size effects, while those not receiving bequests show little to no effect . ( JEL J13, D1, I2)     

PRICE ADJUSTMENT POLICIES AND FIRM SIZE

A number of U.S. State Departments of Transportation have adopted a price adjustment policy designed to limit cost fluctuations of oil‐based inputs in government procurement. Similar policies are common in defense contracting, and have been used to offset financial losses of health insurance companies in Medicare and the Affordable Care Act. We show that while all bidders submit lower bids after the policy is introduced, the extent of bid reduction diminishes with firm size. Small new firms are able to compete more frequently, promoting auction competition and efficiency. (JEL H4, H57, D44)     

STUDYING THE EFFECTS OF HOUSEHOLD AND FIRM CREDIT ON THE TRADE BALANCE: THE COMPOSITION OF FUNDS MATTERS

In this article, we focus on distinguishing between household and corporate sector credit and investigate the effects these two types of credit have on the trade balance. A higher level of private credit indicates better developed financial markets and easier credit access for businesses and households. Yet, both types of borrowers vary in terms of the use of credit. Our model and empirical analysis suggest that the composition of credit does matter for the trade balance: lending to consumers has a negative effect on net exports, while firm loans contribute to a rise in net exports . ( JEL F32, F41, G21)     

BETA, FIRM SIZE, and CONCENTRATION

The asset beta of a firm is defined as the uncertainty about the firm's future value scaled by its current value. Empirically, beta is negatively related to a firm's size and concentration in its major product market. This relation has been interpreted as evidence that monopoly power affects beta. This paper shows that this empirical result is also consistent with competitive product markets where greater firm size and concentration are due to greater efficiency in production. Thus, the correlation between beta, firm size and concentration is not prima facie evidence of widespread monopoly power.     

EMPLOYMENT AND OUTPUT EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING: IS GOVERNMENT SIZE IMPORTANT?

The efects of government spending on employment and output may depend on government size and the persistence of spending. The empirical results suggest that permanent (or persistent) changes in government consumption have a greater impact on output and employment than temporary (or cyclical) changes. This implies a negative wealth effect and reduces the stabilization potency of government spending. The findings also support the hypothesis that the output elasticity of government consumption is positive but declines with increases in government size. Using the estimated equations, I calculate the optimal government size for the representative country as around 20 percent of GDP.     

WOMEN PREFER LARGER GOVERNMENTS: GROWTH,STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION,AND GOVERNMENT SIZE

The increase in income per capita is accompanied, in virtually all countries, by two changes in economic structure: the increase in the share of government spending in gross domestic product (GDP), and the increase in female labor force participation. We argue that these two changes are causally related. We develop a growth model based on Galor and Weil (1996) where female participation in market activities, fertility, and government size, in addition to consumption and saving, is endogenously determined. Rising incomes lead to a rise in female labor force participation as the opportunity cost of staying at home and caring for the children increases. In our model, higher government spending decreases the cost of performing household chores, including, but not limited to, child rearing and child care, as in Rosen (1996) . We also use a wide cross‐section of data for developed and developing countries and show that higher market participation by women is positively and robustly associated with government size. We then investigate the causal link between participation and government size using a novel unique data set that allows the use of the relative price of productive home appliances as an instrumental variable. We find strong evidence of a causal link between female market participation and government size. This effect is robust to the country sample, time period, and a set of controls in the spirit of Rodrik (1998) . (JEL O4, E62, H11)     

A MODEL OF OPTIMAL PLANT SIZE WITH AN APPLICATION TO THE DEMAND FOR COGNITIVE ACHIEVEMENT AND FOR SCHOOL SIZE

A model of optimal plant size is developed which predicts that 1) plants experience increasing returns to in-plants inputs, 2) the relative price of plant output is greater in rural areas than in urban areas, and 3) plants are larger in urban areas than in rural areas. The model's predictions appear to be consistent with behavior in a number of consumer services (e. g., grocery, movie, and library services). These predictions are more rigorously tested and are strongly supported when demand functions for cognitive achievement and for school size are estimated. These regressions also lend support to the quality-quantity model of fertility.     

VOTING IN FIRMS: THE ROLE OF AGENDA CONTROL, SIZE AND VOTER HOMOGENEITY

Voting is a common feature of most firms. Unrestricted voting, however, can lead to unstable decision making. We find that firms make tradeoffs among collective decision making, production scale, firm structure, and voter characteristics that are consistent with efforts to economize on the costs of voting. Firm responses include agenda control, restrictions to obtain a homogeneous voting population, and limits on firm size. We consider three long-surviving producer cooperatives, representing extreme cases of collective decision making, and find that their organization is sensitive to the costs of voting and to the employment of mechanisms to constrain those costs.     

GROUP SIZE AND SOCIAL TIES IN MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS

Microfinance programs provide poor people with small loans given to jointly liable self-selected groups. Follow-up loans provide incentives to repay. We experimentally investigate the influence of those features on strategic default. Each group member invests in an individual risky project, whose outcome is known only to the individual investor. Subjects decide whether to contribute to group repayment or not. Only those with successful projects can contribute. The experiment ends if too few repay. We investigate group size and social ties effects and observe robust high repayment rates. Group lending outperforms individual lending. Self-selected groups show high but less stable contributions. (JEL C90 , H41 , I38 , O16 , Z13 )     

THE OPTIMAL GOVERNMENT SIZE: FURTHER INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE ON THE PRODUCTIVITY OF GOVERNMENT SERVICES

This paper estimates the optimal government size for several sets of economies by investigating the role of public services in the production process. I assume government services are optimally provided when their marginal product equals unity (the "Barro rule"). The empirical results suggest: (1) government services are significantly productive; (2) they are overprovided in Africa, underprovided in Asia, and optimally provided everywhere else; (3) the optimal government size is 23 percent for the average country but ranges from 14 percent for the average OECD country to 33 percent in South America; and (4) the marginal productivity of government services is negatively related to government size.