TRACKING CUSTOMER SEARCH TO PRICE DISCRIMINATE

The electronic technologies of the Internet make it possible for sellers to track potential customers and discriminate between the informed and uninformed. In this article, we report an experiment that investigates the market impact of firms tracking customers and offering discriminatory prices based on search history. We find that consumers, on average, face the same prices when sellers have the ability to track customers and price discriminate as when sellers post a single price for all buyers. However, informed buyers receive lower prices when sellers can detect buyer search, whereas uninformed buyers receive lower prices when firms cannot track customers. (JEL D43 , L13 , C92 )     

ADVANCE PRODUCTION,INVENTORIES, AND MARKET POWER: AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION

We report an experiment that assesses the effects of alterations in production conditions and product durability on market power in Bertrand‐Edgeworth duopolies. Static equilibrium analysis predicts that advance (rather than “to demand”) production raises prices, but does not affect profits. The further addition of a simple inventory option causes prices to fall and seller earnings to increase. Contrary to these predictions, we observe similar prices in baseline and advance production treatments, but lower profits given advance production. An inventory option reduces both prices and earnings. Results are driven by the treatments' effects on sellers' capacities to tacitly collude. (JEL C9, D4, L4)     

ARBITRAGE ACROSS BORDERS: WHY ITUNES GIFT CARDS SELL ABOVE FACE VALUE ON EBAY

This paper is one of the first to explore international price differences and arbitrage opportunities in the market for downloadable content, by linking the sale of iTunes gift cards above face value on eBay to the arbitrage of iTunes' products (which include downloadable music and videos). This paper shows that iTunes gift cards targeted to non‐U.S. buyers tend to sell for higher prices, controlling for seller reputation, shipping costs, and other variables. Information about the buyers' countries allows us to see whether it is the U.S. store's greater product availability or its lower prices that buyers are interested in. (JEL D40, L10, F10)     

A LABORATORY STUDY OF DUOPOLY PRICE COMPETITION WITH PATIENT BUYERS

This article reports a duopoly experiment in which sellers compete to sell to a potentially patient buyer. Each period sellers simultaneously post prices and the buyer costlessly observes either one or both prices. The buyer can then either accept an observed price or reject all offers. Following a rejection, sellers may have an opportunity to post prices again in another round. We study how the duopolists' pricing behavior responds to changes in the likelihood of the buyer observing multiple prices, γ, and the probability of continuing to another round, δ. The unique stationary equilibrium features mixed strategies. Consistent with the equilibrium, observed prices are decreasing in γ and δ. Contrary to the equilibrium, however, buyers sometimes reject profitable price offers, and average prices are lower than predicted when only one round of offers is possible and higher than predicted in the multiple‐round game. (JEL D43, D83, L13)     

Hospital pricing: cost shifting and competition

The issue of cost shifting has taken on enormous policy implications. It is estimated that unsponsored and undercompensated hospital costs--one measure of cost shifting--has totaled $21.5 billion in 1991. The health services research literature indicates that hospitals set different prices for different payers. However, the empirical evidence on hospitals' ability to raise prices to one payer to make up for unsponsored care or lower payments by other payers is mixed at best. No study has concluded that hospitals have raised prices to fully adjust for such actions. The extent of cost shifting is limited by the market. When a hospital has market power, it is able to set prices above marginal costs. However, when a buyer has enough patient/subscribers and a willingness to direct them to particular providers based on price considerations, hospitals have less flexibility in raising prices above costs. Thus, the extent of cost shifting is limited by the market. Cost shifting is not as easy as it may have been in the past because the nature of hospital and insurer competition has changed radically in the last decade. While hospital quality, services, and amenities still matter, some buyers are increasingly concerned about the price they pay. Evidence from studies of PPO and HMO negotiations with hospitals suggests that hospitals' market power is eroding, at least in some areas. In areas with relatively few hospital competitors and little PPO or HMO activity, Medicaid and Medicare price reductions and uncompensated care burdens will be partially absorbed by higher prices paid by private payers. In more price sensitive markets and in markets in which prices to private payers have risen to those commensurate with the market power of local hospitals, such cost shifting will not occur. A market-based approach in hospital pricing requires an explicit policy for the uninsured. In a competitive market, a hospital that traditionally cared for the uninsured by spending some of its profits on them will be unable to do so, at least to the same extent as it did in the past. Increased competition in health care without consideration of the uninsured will decrease the uninsured's access to care.     

Ask Prices, Offers, and Time to Sale in an Online Exchange

By examining an online computer exchange, we find that sellers who place higher nonbinding ask prices have higher outstanding offers and remain on the exchange longer, suggesting a willingness to hold out for higher offers. Additionally, higher ask prices deter buyers from making offers. The results are stronger in thinner market segments, suggesting that gains from waiting for a high price are greater when buyers' tastes are idiosyncratic. These relationships are consistent with models in which buyers engage in costly search and suggest that online exchanges may not eliminate the frictions related to bilateral transactions.     

REPUTATION,PRICE, AND DEATH: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF ART PRICE FORMATION

We analyze how an artist's death influences the market prices of her works of art. Death has two opposing effects on art prices. By irrevocably restricting the artist's oeuvre, prices, ceteris paribus, increase when the artist dies. On the other hand, an untimely death may well frustrate the collectors' hopes of owning artwork that will, as the artist's career progresses, become generally known and appreciated. By frustrating expected future name recognition, death impacts negatively on art prices. In conjunction, these two channels of influence give rise to a hump‐shaped relationship between age at death and death‐induced price changes. Using transactions from fine art auctions, we show that the empirically identified death effects indeed conform to our theoretical predictions. We derive our results from hedonic art price regressions, making use of a dataset which exceeds the sample size of traditional studies in cultural economics by an order of magnitude. (JEL Z11, J24, G12)     

MARKET POWER IN ORAL DOUBLE AUCTIONS

This paper reports the results of a series of oral-double-auction experiments in which some traders possess market power. A market is set up in which the configuration of the supply and demand curves leads to an asymmetry between buyers and sellers in their abilities to influence transactions prices. This market structure does not always lead to convergence to the competitive equilibrium price despite the competitive nature of the oral-double-auction institution. The nonconvergence occurs most frequently in the experiments involving experienced subjects.     

RATIONING BY SELLER'S PREFERENCE AND PACIAL PRICE DISCRIMINATION

This paper investigates the behavior of a seller who has a preference for a certain group of customers. The seller maintains stable prices over time and supplements price rationing with a nonprice rationing. In this situation the preferred buyers would have priority over nonpreferred buyers in purchasing the commodity, and if the latter purchase the commodity they may be paying higher prices. It is proposed here that the premium paid by the nonpreferred buyers is a necessary bribe to induce the seller to forego his search for the preferred buyers.     

A THEORY OF BILATERAL OLIGOPOLY

In horizontal mergers, concentration is often measured with the Hirschman–Herfindahl Index (HHI). This index yields the price–cost margins in Cournot competition. In many modern merger cases, both buyers and sellers have market power, and indeed, the buyers and sellers may be the same set of firms. In such cases, the HHI is inapplicable. We develop an alternative theory that has similar data requirements as the HHI, applies to intermediate good industries with arbitrary numbers of firms on both sides, and specializes to the HHI when buyers have no market power. The more inelastic is the downstream demand, the more captive production and consumption (not traded in the intermediate market) affects price–cost margins. The analysis is applied to the merger of the gasoline refining and retail assets of Exxon and Mobil in the western United States. (JEL L13, L41)     

AUCTIONS WITH RESALE OPPORTUNITIES: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

We study first price asymmetric private value auctions with resale opportunities presented in seller's and buyer's markets. We offer experimental evidence on bidding behavior, prices, and resource allocation. Building upon the Hafalir and Krishna (2008) model, we find that bidders will bid higher in an auction if the resale market is a seller's market than a buyer's market. There is a price/revenue‐efficiency trade‐off established theoretically between these two resale regimes. In equilibrium, however, final efficiency is high irrespective of the resale market structure. Evidence of bid symmetrization and higher final efficiency is found in the buyer‐advantaged resale case. (JEL D44, C92)     

House price volatility in China: Demand versus supply

This paper studies the transmission mechanisms that underlie China's house price fluctuations using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. The model is estimated with Bayesian methods, which accounts well for business cycle properties of the housing market. Results show that shocks to housing productivity and the government land supply to housing developers are the primary contributors to house price volatility, accounting for 37% of house price volatility in the short run and 32% in the long run. The importance of housing valuation shocks and shocks to migration only increases in models without the supply side of the housing market.     

Automated Pricing Rules in Electronic Posted Offer Markets

Internet markets are heralded as enhancing efficiency by providing buyers and sellers with an abundance of information. In these electronic markets, firms have the opportunity to employ "pricebots," computerized algorithms that automatically adjust prices to prevailing market conditions. This article uses laboratory methods to examine the potential market impact of the endogenous selection of three automated pricing algorithms: undercutting, low-price matching, and trigger pricing. We find that the undercutting algorithm leads to prices similar to the game-theoretic prediction. Low-price matching generates significantly higher prices, and trigger pricing results in market prices below the game-theoretic prediction.     

PRICING UNDER FEDERAL MILK MARKET REGULATION

Federal milk market regulation sets the wholesale price of most fluid milk in this country. This paper explores the purposes served by price-setting procedures under regulation and their quantitative impact. The institutional and theoretical background is provided, and an econometric model of a regulated milk market is estimated. The latter demonstrates that actual prices are consistent with those which would maximize producer benefit in 1960 and 1970, and that regulation produces quite substantial effects on prices and quantities within markets, on price patterns among markets, and on income distribution and economic efficiency.     

Do buyers and sellers evaluate air pollution reduction differently? Experimental evidence from China

This paper is the first study to investigate the good dealness account of the endowment effect in non-market goods. We designed a within-subjects experiment to measure the value of air pollution reduction through the evaluation of a market good, PM 2.5 filters. We divided the subjects into buyers and sellers and asked them to trade four PM 2.5 filters using the Becker–DeGroot–Marschak auction under two treatments: a) a drop in air quality, which served to increase the market price of the filters; and b) the receipt of information on the relationship between death rates and air pollution, which served to increase the intrinsic value of the filters. Our results show that buyers’ willingness to pay for pollution reduction did not increase when air pollution worsened but did increase when informed of the possibility of health damage from air pollution. Sellers’ willingness to accept for air quality deterioration increased when pollution worsened but remained the same upon receiving information about health damage. We conclude that sellers are more sensitive to changes in market price, while buyers are more sensitive to changes in intrinsic value. Our findings support the theory of seeking a good deal in explaining the endowment effect.     

BUYERS' STRATEGIES, ENTRY BARRIERS, and COMPETITION

In markets where sellers have customer-specific investments, and buyers can make credible, but costly, commitments to switch suppliers, buyers' strategies attenuate the market power of sellers. Furthermore, since current prices and a buyer's decision to switch suppliers are related, limit pricing becomes an equilibrium. Limit prices increase with the time it takes a buyer to switch suppliers, and with buyers' switching costs, but fall with the level of sunk investments. Thus, sunk investments may restrain the sellers' ability to exert market power. The paper questions, then, the standard inverse relationship between market performance and sunk investments.     

THE SWINGS OF U.S. INFLATION AND THE GIBSON PARADOX

In recent business cycles, U.S. inflation has experienced a reduction of volatility and a severe weakening in the correlation to the nominal interest rate (Gibson paradox). We examine these facts in an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with money. Our findings point at a flatter New Keynesian Phillips Curve (higher price stickiness) and a lower persistence of markup shocks as the main explanatory factors. In addition, a higher interest‐rate elasticity of money demand, an increasing role of demand‐side shocks, and a less systematic behavior of Fed's monetary policy also account for the recent patterns of U.S. inflation dynamics. (JEL E32, E47)     

Vertrauen und Reputationseffekte bei Internet-Auktionen

In internet auctions the exchange between two anonymous actors corresponds to a one-shot prisoner’s-dilemma-like situation. In such a situation there is a high risk that both actors will cheat and that the market will collapse. The solution to attaining mutual cooperation is the simple and very efficient institution of a public rating system. By this institution sellers have an incentive to invest in reputation in order to enhance future chances of business. Using data from about 200 auctions of mobile phones we analyse the effects of the reputation system by empirical methods. In general the analysis of non-obtrusive data from auctions may help to gain a deeper understanding of basic social processes of exchange, reputation, trust, and cooperation and of the impact of institutions on the efficiency of markets. In this study we report empirical estimations of the effects of reputation on characteristics of transactions like the probability of a successful deal, the mode of payment, and the largest bid or auction price. Particularly, we ask whether sellers receive a “premium” for reputation. Results show that buyers are ready to pay higher prices for reputation to diminish the risk of exploitation. On the other hand, sellers protect themselves against cheating by choosing of a proper mode of payment. Simple institutional settings lead to cooperation, relatively rare events of fraud, and efficient markets despite the risk of mutual opportunistic behavior.     

Demand cross elasticity without substitutability: An experiment

We study a market in which goods are produced under low marginal costs with a poor degree of substitutability among products. In this environment we ran an experiment to explain why prices are interdependent even when preferences are independent. We compare our results to previous theoretical and laboratory experimental literature on price fairness. We find that even in the absence of interaction among subjects, price fairness/unfairness does play a major role in the decision to accept or reject a deal. Subjects tend to be more resistant to a price increase and reject a deal when the preferred product is not referenced to price increases of not substitute products, if these products are considered to be a benchmark for fair conduct. Thus demand cross elasticity can arise between products that are not substitutes. This result has important implications for antitrust policy. In delineating a market perimeter, fairness concerns suggest that products that are similar but not interchangeable should be included in the relevant antitrust market.