Intended Message Versus Message Received in Hypothetical Physician Risk Communications: Exploring the Gap

We examined the risk perception that is derived from hypothetical physician risk communications. Subjects (n= 217) completed a questionnaire on the Web for $3. Subjects were presented with four hypothetical cancer risk scenarios that included a physician risk communication in one of three risk communication formats: verbal only, verbal plus numeric probability as a percent, and verbal plus numeric probability as a fraction. In each scenario, subjects were asked to imagine themselves as the patient described and to state their perceived personal susceptibility to the cancer (i.e., risk perception) on a 0 to 100 scale, as well as responses to other measures. Subjects' risk perceptions were highly variable, spanning nearly the entire probability scale for each scenario, and the degree of variation was only slightly less in the risk communication formats in which a numeric statement of risk was provided. Subjects were more likely to overestimate than underestimate their risk relative to the stated risk in the numeric versions, and overestimation was associated with the belief that the physician minimized the risk so they wouldn't worry, innumeracy, and worry, as well as decisions about testing for the cancer. These results demonstrate significant gaps between the intended message and the message received in physician risk communications. Implications for medical decisions, patient distress, and future research are discussed.     

Risk Perception in the U.K. Oil and Gas Production Industry: Are Expert Loss‐Prevention Managers' Perceptions Different From Those of Members of the Public?

This article investigates potential differences in risk perception between experts (loss-prevention managers in the U.K. oil and gas production industry) and nonexperts (managers and students). Extant research on expert versus nonexpert perceptions of risk is reviewed, followed by the present study concerning risk perceptions of seven pen-picture scenarios involving the occurrence of hazardous events in the U.K. oil and gas production industry. In contrast to many of the earlier studies of expert versus nonexpert perceptions of risk, the present analysis concludes that experts did not judge the overall riskiness of the portrayed hazardous events as less risky than the nonexperts. Nevertheless, the experts believe more strongly than our nonexperts that the risks portrayed in the scenarios pose little threat to future generations, are more precisely known, and are relatively controllable. Use of multiple regression analysis to help uncover the basis of overall riskiness assessments for expert and lay respondents was inconclusive, however. Finally, little evidence was found that nonexperts were any more heterogeneous in their risk perceptions than experts. It may be that the nature of the risks assessed in the present study may account for the general lack of clear expert versus nonexpert differences in overall perceptions of the riskiness of hazardous events in the North Sea. Earlier findings of strong expert versus nonexpert differences in risk perception assessed hazards of major public concern. It is inferred that using such extreme hazards may have resulted in an exaggerated view of differences in expert versus public (nonexpert) perception of risk.     

Priorities in Information Desire about Unknown Risks

Research on risk perception aims to explain how people perceive risks in order to better communicate about them. Most of this research has tended to view people as passive risk perceivers. However, if confronted with an unknown risk, people can also actively seek information. The main purpose of this study was to investigate what kind of risk information people desire when confronted with an unknown risk and how this desire for information relates to the main dimensions underlying risk perception. Nine focus-group interviews were conducted. The main results of the focus groups were backed up by a paper-and-pencil questionnaire that was distributed among a random sample of 500 households in the Netherlands. Overall, people desire information with which they can determine the personal relevance of the risk confronting them. This pattern is similar to appraisal steps described by health behavior models. The focus-group results provide a dynamic picture of the way risk aspects might interact to create a final risk judgment.     

Technical and Democratic Values in Risk Analysis1

So, we can argue that the lay public are not fools in their attitudes about risk. That nonexperts should show more concern over hazardous waste facilities in their neighborhoods than radon levels in their homes is not a sign of irrationality (because aggregate and individual risks are greater from the radon), but simply a sign that nonexperts are working from a different set of criteria. These criteria are incorporated in what I call the democratic model. The democratic model evaluates risk based on its social and political consequences, such as possible disruption in the social fabric or a loss of communality. Lay criteria for assessing the impact of risk decisions are not explicit, like the those of the risk analyst, but are embedded in cultural values. Similarly, lay evaluations of risk incorporate substantive and procedural democratic values, such as the acceptability of processes for making decisions, the ethics of the distribution of risk, and the capacity to control a source of risk in the community's interests. Finally, the democratic model relates judgments about risks to the competence (Can we trust them?) and the legitimacy (Should we trust them?) of the social institutions that impose and control those risks. The public's judgments about risk are not inferior, but different, and arguably richer than those of the experts.     

Efficacy,Action, and Support for Reducing Climate Change Risks

A growing body of research demonstrates that believing action to reduce the risks of climate change is both possible (self‐efficacy) and effective (response efficacy) is essential to motivate and sustain risk mitigation efforts. Despite this potentially critical role of efficacy beliefs, measures and their use vary wildly in climate change risk perception and communication research, making it hard to compare and learn from efficacy studies. To address this problem and advance our understanding of efficacy beliefs, this article makes three contributions. First, we present a theoretically motivated approach to measuring climate change mitigation efficacy, in light of diverse proposed, perceived, and previously researched strategies. Second, we test this in two national survey samples (Amazon's Mechanical Turk N = 405, GfK Knowledge Panel N = 1,820), demonstrating largely coherent beliefs by level of action and discrimination between types of efficacy. Four additive efficacy scales emerge: personal self‐efficacy, personal response efficacy, government and collective self‐efficacy, and government and collective response efficacy. Third, we employ the resulting efficacy scales in mediation models to test how well efficacy beliefs predict climate change policy support, controlling for specific knowledge, risk perceptions, and ideology, and allowing for mediation by concern. Concern fully mediates the relatively strong effects of perceived risk on policy support, but only partly mediates efficacy beliefs. Stronger government and collective response efficacy beliefs and personal self‐efficacy beliefs are both directly and indirectly associated with greater support for reducing the risks of climate change, even after controlling for ideology and causal beliefs about climate change.     

Parenthood and Worrying About Climate Change: The Limitations of Previous Approaches

The present study considers the correlation between parenthood and worry about the consequences of climate change. Two approaches to gauging people's perceptions of the risks of climate change are compared: the classic approach, which measures risk perception, and the emotion‐based approach, which measures feelings toward a risk object. The empirical material is based on a questionnaire‐based survey of 3,529 people in Sweden, of whom 1,376 answered, giving a response rate of 39%. The results show that the correlation of parenthood and climate risk is significant when the emotional aspect is raised, but not when respondents were asked to do cognitive estimates of risk. Parenthood proves significant in all three questions that measure feelings, demonstrating that it is a determinant that serves to increase worry about climate change.     

Risk Perception by Offshore Oil Personnel During Bad Weather Conditions

This article presents the results of analyses of employee subjective risk assessments caused by platform movements on an offshore oil installation in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea. The results are based on a self-completion questionnaire survey conducted among 179 respondents covering three shifts on the platform. The data collection was carried out during the spring of 1994. A minority expressed worry due to platform movements. A greater proportion of the personnel stated worry about the construction of the platform. The personnel were more unsafe when they assessed their own safety attitudes with regard to specific potentially hazardous consequences of platform movements. Two approaches aimed at modeling worry and concern caused by platform movements were tested. The models were the mental imagery approach and the rationalistic approach. The rationalistic and mental imagery models fitted equally well. Implications of the results for risk communication are discussed.     

Communicating uncertainty in national security intelligence: Expert and nonexpert interpretations of and preferences for verbal and numeric formats

Organizations in several domains including national security intelligence communicate judgments under uncertainty using verbal probabilities (e.g., likely) instead of numeric probabilities (e.g., 75% chance), despite research indicating that the former have variable meanings across individuals. In the intelligence domain, uncertainty is also communicated using terms such as low, moderate, or high to describe the analyst's confidence level. However, little research has examined how intelligence professionals interpret these terms and whether they prefer them to numeric uncertainty quantifiers. In two experiments (N = 481 and 624, respectively), uncertainty communication preferences of expert (n = 41 intelligence analysts in Experiment 1) and nonexpert intelligence consumers were elicited. We examined which format participants judged to be more informative and simpler to process. We further tested whether participants treated verbal probability and confidence terms as independent constructs and whether participants provided coherent numeric probability translations of verbal probabilities. Results showed that although most nonexperts favored the numeric format, experts were about equally split, and most participants in both samples regarded the numeric format as more informative. Experts and nonexperts consistently conflated probability and confidence. For instance, confidence intervals inferred from verbal confidence terms had a greater effect on the location of the estimate than the width of the estimate, contrary to normative expectation. Approximately one-fourth of experts and over one-half of nonexperts provided incoherent numeric probability translations for the terms likely and unlikely when the elicitation of best estimates and lower and upper bounds were briefly spaced by intervening tasks.     

Knowledge,Risk Perceptions,and Xenophobic Attitudes: Evidence from Italy During the Ebola Outbreak

The purposes of the current study were twofold: (1) to investigate affective and cognitive responses and social‐contextual factors related to Ebola and their intercorrelations in a developed country without widespread Ebola transmission; and (2) to examine the relationships among risk perception of Ebola, levels of knowledge about Ebola, and (blatant and subtle) prejudice toward African immigrants. Between January 2015 and March 2015, an anonymous cross‐sectional survey was conducted among a convenience sample of 486 Italian adults. Results showed that most participants were not particularly concerned about Ebola and did not feel at risk of acquiring the virus. Cognitive dimensions of risk perception of Ebola (i.e., perceived severity of illness, perceived personal impact, perceived coping efficacy, and likelihood of infection), affective response (or worry) to Ebola, and social‐contextual factors (i.e., perceived preparedness of institutions, family members’ and friends’ levels of worry) were interrelated. Prejudice toward African immigrants was positively related to risk perception of Ebola and negatively related to levels of knowledge about Ebola even when controlling for sociodemographic variables including political preference.     

What Risks Are People Concerned About

An unusual questionnaire was used to explore what risks concern laypeople. It asked respondents to list, in their own words, as many risks of personal concern as they could. They then selected the five risks of greatest concern and answered a set of specific questions about each. A coding scheme was developed for categorizing these responses and was shown to have good reliability. The questionnaire was administered to a heterogeneous convenience sample of subjects. They reported a very broad range of risks of concern, which differed in plausible ways as a function of their gender and age. Females and student-age subjects were generally more concerned about the environment, whereas males and older subjects were more likely to mention health and safety risks. Both the extent of the risk-reduction actions that they reported and their expressed willingness to pay for future risk reductions were greater for risk that presented a direct personal threat (e.g., health risks) than for risks that posed a diffuse threat to the environment or to people in general (e.g., pollution). Respondents perceived themselves as bearing primary responsibility for managing threats to their own health, but generally saw government as bearing a heavier responsibility for managing environmental risks (especially for pollutants) and war. The questionnaire instrument and coding structure developed for this work are well-suited to a variety of future research applications. They provide a way to identify the risks that concern lay groups, as well as to track the evolution of those concerns over time.     

Worry and Risk Perception

Risk perception is sometimes measured by means of judgments about worry, sometimes as perceived risk more directly. However, perceived level of risk calls for a more intellectual judgment and worry tends to refer to emotional reactions. These two are therefore not the same and need not be strongly correlated. Results reported here show that perceived risk and worry are indeed weakly correlated, both for generalized worry and for more specific measures of worry matched with the same hazard as risk ratings. A distinction is suggested between cognitive, abstract hazards and concrete, sensory hazards, with implications for the worry-perceived risk relationship. It was furthermore found by means of cluster analysis that there were groups of subject displaying different dynamics of risk and worry.     

Worry Over Technological Activities and Life Concerns

A common mental response to risk is worry. Though generally associated with fear and anxiety, worry is primarily a cognitive activity that can, under some circumstances, be beneficial for developing coping strategies to deal with stressful events. The present study reports an assessment of worry done both before and after the reactor accident at Three Mile Island (TMI). Worries over nuclear risks were assessed in the context of central life concerns such as financial, physical, and interpersonal well-being. The TMI incident elevated nuclear energy worries to a level near those of central life concerns. The productive value of worry is discussed in terms of its relationship with opportunities for personal control.     

Improving Risk Communication in Government: Research Priorities

Despite the increased interest in risk communication among government agencies, there is evidence that agencies'risk communication practices lag. We conducted a study to explore which risk communication research would be most important to improve government agencies'risk communication practices. Qualitative interviews and a survey of 145 risk communication experts based in academic institutions and government agencies explored how important research on each of 48 topics would be to improving agencies'risk communication efforts. Respondents identified topics within three areas as priorities for further research: 1) involving communities in agency decisionmaking; 2) communicating with communities of different races, ethnic backgrounds, and incomes; and 3) evaluating risk communication. Both practitioners and researchers responded to additional statements about agencies'risk communication practices with reservations about staff and managers'commitment to effective communication about environmental issues. We discuss the implications of these findings.     

Accidents and Unpleasant Incidents: Worry in Transport and Prediction of Travel Behavior

Worry on nine different means of transport was measured in a Norwegian sample of 853 respondents. The main aim of the study was to investigate differences in worry about accidents and worry about unpleasant incidents, and how these two sorts of worry relate to various means of transport as well as transport behavior. Factor analyses of worry about accidents suggested a division between rail transport, road transport, and nonmotorized transport, whereas analyses of worry about unpleasant incidents suggested a division between transport modes where you interact with other people and "private" transport modes. Moreover, mean ratings of worry showed that respondents worried more about accidents than unpleasant incidents on private transport modes, and more about unpleasant incidents than accidents on public transport modes. Support for the distinction between worry about accidents and unpleasant incidents was also found when investigating relationships between both types of worry and behavioral adaptations: worry about accidents was more important than worry about unpleasant incidents in relation to behavioral adaptations on private means of transport, whereas the opposite was true for public means of transport. Finally, predictors of worry were investigated. The models of worry about accidents and worry about unpleasant incidents differed as to what predictors turned out significant. Knowledge about peoples' worries on different means of transport is important with regard to understanding and influencing transport and travel behavior, as well as attending to commuters' welfare.     

Perceived inequity, communal orientation and burnout: The role of helping models

A large amount of empirical evidence has shown that professional helpers who perceive inequity in their relationships with their clients experience burnout. However, in such a situation, communal orientation (a desire to give benefits in response to the perceived needs of others), has been found to buffer burnout. In the present study, this buffering effect was investigated from the perspective of helping models. French nurses ( n =60) and social workers ( n =68) completed a questionnaire designed to evaluate perceived inequity, communal orientation and burnout. The results showed that, as expected, the buffering effect of communal orientation greatly depends on the helping model. Among professionals who endorsed a medical model of helping (wherein recipients are expected to be relatively passive to get better), those high on communal orientation experienced a low level of burnout when they perceived inequity. However, among professionals with a compensatory helping model (wherein recipients are expected to be active to get better), not only had perceived imbalance no buffering effect but also it reduced personal accomplishment. It was speculated that with a medical model, a perceived imbalance in the relationships does not hinder the desire to respond to the perceived needs of others. However, within a compensatory model, a perceived imbalance probably impedes the self efficacy of professionals high in communal orientation, that is who desire to respond to the perceived needs of others.     

The Perceived Health Risks of Indoor Radon Gas and Overhead Powerlines: A Comparative Multilevel Approach

Radon and overhead powerlines are two radiation risk cases that have raised varying levels of concern among the general public and experts. Despite both involving radiation—a typically feared and unseen health hazard—individuals' perceptions of the two risk cases may invoke rather different factors. We examined individual and geographic-contextual factors influencing public perceptions of the health risks of indoor radon gas and overhead powerlines in a comparative research design, utilizing a postal questionnaire with 1,528 members of the general public (response rate 28%) and multilevel modeling techniques. This study found that beliefs about the two risk cases mainly differed according to the level of "exposure"—defined here in terms of spatial proximity. We argue that there are two alternative explanations for this pattern of findings: that risk perception itself varies directly with proximity, or that risk is more salient to concerned people in the exposed areas. We also found that while people living in high radon areas are more concerned about the risks of indoor radon gas, they find these risks more acceptable and have more trust in authorities. These results might reflect the positive effects of successive radon campaigns in high radon areas, which may have raised awareness and concern, and at the same time may have helped to increase trust by showing that the government takes the health risks of indoor radon gas seriously, suggesting that genuine risk communication initiatives may have positive impacts on trust in risk management institutions.     

Risk perception and the economic crisis: a longitudinal study of the trajectory of perceived risk

We conducted a longitudinal survey of public response to the economic crisis to understand the trajectory of risk perception amidst an ongoing crisis. A nation-wide panel responded to seven surveys beginning in late September 2008 at the peak of the crisis and concluded in October 2009. At least 600 respondents participated in each survey, with 413 completing all seven surveys. Our online survey focused on perceptions of risk (savings, investments, retirement, job), negative emotions toward the financial crisis (sadness, anxiety, fear, anger, worry, stress), confidence in national leaders to manage the crisis (President Obama, Congress, Treasury Secretary, business leaders), and belief in one's ability to realize personal objectives despite the crisis. We employed latent growth curve modeling to analyze change in risk perception throughout the crisis. Our results suggest that, in general, people's perceptions of risk appear to decrease most rapidly during the initial phase of a crisis and then begin to level off. Negative emotion about the crisis was the most predictive of increased risk perception, supporting the notion of risk as feelings. Belief in one's ability to realize personal objectives was also predictive. Confidence in national leaders, however, was not predictive of perceived risk. Finally, our results demonstrate that groups may experience a crisis differently depending on a combination of personal characteristics such as gender, income, numeracy, and political attitude. Risk management and communication should work in sync with these mechanisms and differences across groups.     

Value of Statistical Life and Cause of Accident: A Choice Experiment

The purpose of this study is to compare the value of statistical life (VSL) estimates for traffic, drowning, and fire accidents. Using a choice experiment in a mail survey of 5,000 Swedish respondents we estimated the willingness to pay for risk reductions in the three accidents. In the experiment respondents were asked a series of questions, whether they would choose risk reducing investments where type of accident, cost of the investment, the risk reduction acquired, and the baseline risk varied between questions. The VSLs for fire and drowning accidents were found to be about 1/3 lower than that for traffic accidents. Although respondents worry more about traffic accidents, this alone cannot explain the difference in VSL estimates. The difference between fire and drowning accidents was not found to be statistically significant.     

Morality and Nuclear Energy: Perceptions of Risks and Benefits,Personal Norms,and Willingness to Take Action Related to Nuclear Energy

We examined factors underlying people's willingness to take action in favor of or against nuclear energy from a moral perspective. We conducted a questionnaire study among a sample of the Dutch population (N = 123). As expected, perceptions of risks and benefits were related to personal norms (PN), that is, feelings of moral obligation toward taking action in favor of or against nuclear energy. In turn, PN predicted willingness to take action. Furthermore, PN mediated the relationships between perceptions of risk and benefits and willingness to take action. In line with our hypothesis, beliefs about the risks and benefits of nuclear energy were less powerful in explaining PN for supporters compared to PN of opponents. Also, beliefs on risks and benefits and PN explained significantly more variance in willingness to take action of opponents than of supporters. Our results suggest that a moral framework is useful to explain willingness to take action in favor of and against nuclear energy, and that people are more likely to protest in favor of or against nuclear energy when PN are strong.