Justice,liberty, unanimity and the axioms of identity

Two new justice constraints on liberal rights and the Pareto rule are proposed and analysed. Each resolves both Sen and Gibbard paradoxes. The first, following Hammond, requires no axiom of identity. The second, following Sen and Suppes, resolves Sen Paradoxes for two rights, but requires the axiom of complete identity to resolve Gibbard paradoxes and Sen Paradoxes with three or more rights. This second constraint therefore turns social conflicts over rights into disagreements about interpersonal and intersituational comparisons. By itself it solves the majoritarian paradox and the all-but-one-person-is-decisive paradox.     

On some suggestions for having non-binary social choice functions

The various paradoxes of social choice uncovered by Arrow [1], Sen [10] and others have led some writers to question the basic assumption of a binary social choice function underlying most of these paradoxes. Schwartz [8], for example, proves an important theorem which may be considered to be a generalization of the famous paradox of Arrow, and then lays the blame for this paradox on the assumption of a binary social choice function. He then proceeds to define a type of choice functions which, like binary choice functions, define the best elements in sets of more than two alternatives on the basis of binary comparisons, but which, as he claims, have an advantage over binary choice functions, in so far as they always ensure the existence of best elements for sets of more than two alternatives irrespective of the results of binary comparisons. The purpose of this paper is to show that even a considerable weakening of the assumption of a binary social choice function does not go very far towards solving some of the paradoxes under consideration, and that if replacing the requirement of a binary social choice function by a Schwartz type social choice function solves these paradoxes, it does so only by violating the universally acceptable value judgment that in choosing from a set of alternatives, society should never choose an alternative which is Pareto inoptimal in that set (i.e., the socially best alternatives in a set should always be Pareto optimal). This argument is substantiated with the help of an extended version of Sen's [10] paradox of a Paretian liberal, and thus a by-product of our analysis is a generalization of the theorem of Sen [10]. The argument itself, however, is more general and applies also to the impossibility result proved by Schwartz [8].We are extremely grateful to Amartya Sen for his helpful comments.

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The impossibility of a paretian loyalist

Amartya Sen has argued the impossibility of the Paretian liberal. While his abstract argument is compelling, the concrete significance of the conclusion is in some doubt. This is because it is not clear how important liberalism in his sense is; in particular it is not clear that the sort of liberalism required for the impossibility result is a compelling variety. We show that even if the argument cannot be used to establish the inconsistency of Paretianism and common-or-garden liberalism, it can be adapted to prove a parallel impossibility. This is the impossibility of combining the Pareto criterion with a loyalty constraint involving certain claim-rights rather than liberty-rights. The impossibility of the Paretian loyalist is of interest in itself but it is also interesting for the light it throws on the source of Sen-style impossibilities.     

The impossibility of the Paretian liberal and its relevance to welfare economics

The purpose of this study is to analyse the implications of Sen's impossibility result, the liberal paradox, for orthodox welfare economics. Because the rather special format of social choice theory makes it a little difficult to be sure of the relevance of this result, the whole dilemma is posed here in terms of a rather informal analysis of information al patterns.On the one hand, it is argued that the traditional approach to welfare economics, including both utilitarianism and Paretian ordinalism, contains severe informational constraints eliminating the use of all kinds of independent non-utility information in the social evaluation process. This property, called welfarism, is also present in the weak Pareto principle, which conflicts with even minimal requirements of personal liberty according to Sen's result.On the other hand, it is argued that there is in fact little to be resolved in this problem in spite of several attempts to circumvent the conflict. These studies are argued to be mainly ad hoc solutions to the formal problem and relevant only to the extent they indicate how severe restrictions are needed to avoid the paradox. The analogy with the prisoner's dilemma does not work either. Since liberal values are intrinsically non-welfaristic, the liberal paradox can be interpreted as only one, but a rather powerful, example of the informational deficiency of the orthodox approach.Finally, it is argued that the liberal paradox has striking implications for both the concept of preference and social optimum as well as empirical research on social welfare. This means that if the impossibility is to be taken seriously we need to revalue both the status of utility information and the role of the Pareto principle in social welfare analysis.The author is grateful to Professor Amartya Sen and Matti Tuomala for helpful comments and suggestions.     

Sen and Aristotle on Wellbeing

A significant body of research and analysis concerning wellbeing has emerged across a number of social research disciplines, yet the concept of wellbeing does not admit of any unified meaning. Philosophical accounts of wellbeing are traditionally divided into three categories: hedonistic, desire‐satisfaction and objective list theories, reflecting longstanding doctrinal divisions in normative ethics. Rejecting the foundational monism associated with these approaches, Amartya Sen has proposed a pluralist ‘capabilities’ approach to personal wellbeing based on freedom of choice and the Aristotelian notion of a ‘function’. Recent Australian wellbeing research also shows promising signs of moving beyond reductive income‐based metrics towards plural indicators of poverty and social disadvantage. This paper reprises Aristotle's distinctive account of perfect wellbeing (eudaimonia) in the Nicomachean Ethics and investigates Sen's approach in its light, suggesting that future Australian research in the spirit of Sen's pluralism may benefit from Aristotelian insights into the ‘thickness’ of freedom implicated in personal wellbeing.     

The independence condition in the theory of social choice

Arrow's theorem is really a theorem about the independence condition. In order to show the very crucial role that this condition plays, the theorem is proved in a refined version, where the use of the Pareto condition is almost avoided.A distinction is made between group preference functions and group decision functions, yielding respectively preference relations and optimal subsets as values. Arrow's theorem is about the first kind, but some ambiguities and mistakes in his book are explained if we assume that he was really thinking of decision functions. The trouble then is that it is not clear how to formulate the independence condition for decision functions. Therefore the next step is to analyse Arrow's argument for accepting the independence condition.The most frequent ambiguity depends on an interpretation of A as the set of all conceivable alternatives, while the variable subset B is the set of all feasible or available alternatives. He then argues that preferences between alternatives that are not feasible shall not influence the choice from the set of available alternatives. But even if this principle is accepted, it only forces us to require independence with respect to some specific set B and not to every B simultaneously. Therefore the independence condition cannot be accepted on these grounds.Another argument is about an election where one of the candidates dies. On one interpretation this argument can be taken to support an independence requirement which leads to a contradiction. On another interpretation it is a condition about connexions between choices from different sets.The so-called problem of binary choice is found to be different from the independence problem and it plays no essential role in Arrow's impossibility result. Other impossibility results by Sen, Batra and Pattanaik and by Schwartz are of a different character.In the last section, several weaker independence conditions are presented. Their relations to Arrow's condition are stated and the arguments supporting them are discussed.     

Nozick on Sen: A misunderstanding

This discussion examines Robert Nozick's claim inAnarchy, State, and Utopia (New York 1974) that his entitlement theory of justice avoids the paradox of collective choice shown by A. K. Sen inCollective Choice and Social Welfare (San Francisco 1970). Nozick argues his system is a stable principle of distributive justice. The author shows Nozick's principle of justice in transfer qualifies as a social decision function in Sen's sense because it is a collective choice rule and meets necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a choice function. Next the author demonstrates Nozick's principle of justice in transfer requkes Sen's conditions of unrestricted domain, the Pareto principle, and liberalism which are the conditions of the Sen paradox Nozick claims to avoid. Thus, Nozick's principle of justice in transfer is shown not to be a stable principle of distributive justice.     

Comparing uncertainty aversion towards different sources

In this article, we discuss some aspects of Eliaz and Ok ’s (Games Econ Behav 56:61–86, 2006) choice theoretical foundations of incomplete preferences. Our aim is to clarify some aspects of their regularity condition for preorders, showing that, as far as rationalization of a choice correspondence alone is concerned, no further restriction is imposed by requiring the preorder to be regular. However, if one is also interested in capturing other observable aspects of the individual’s choice procedure, such as Eliaz and Ok’s notion of c-incomparability or the notion of behavioral indifference introduced in this paper, then the only option is to use a regular preorder. We also argue that their weak axiom of revealed non-inferiority (WARNI) is too strong a property if our aim is to characterize the rationalizability of a choice correspondence by a (possibly incomplete) preorder. Finally, as we have mentioned above, we introduce the notion of behavioral indifference and argue, not only that Eliaz and Ok’s notion of c-incomparability (observable incomparability) can be derived from it, but also that it has a wider range of applicability than their notion of observable incomparability.     

Public Policy and Inequalities of Choice and Autonomy

Choice by service users has been promoted in social policy across many developed welfare states, often on the grounds that it will incentivize providers to enhance quality and efficiency. But this instrumental motivation for the promotion of choice overlooks the possibility that choice, understood in the deeper sense of autonomy, has intrinsic value, as suggested by egalitarian and capability‐based theories of social justice. This article argues that the narrow motivation of choice policies leads to a focus on services rather than outcomes for individuals and fails to address deep‐seated inequalities in the opportunities people have for real autonomy. We test this concept using newly collected data for the UK. Our empirical findings indicate that disabled people are more likely to experience constrained autonomy in all respects, while being from a low socio‐economic group and/or lacking educational qualifications is a risk factor across several components. We conclude that improving the ‘choice’ agenda for policy requires: (1) adopting a more sophisticated concept of ‘choice’ such as the conceptualization of ‘choice as autonomy’ outlined here; (2) developing a better understanding of existing inequalities in autonomy, such as we begin to explore in our empirical results; and (3) tackling these inequalities through, for example, the removal of obstacles to active decision‐making by providing effective support and advocacy, especially for disabled people, and addressing the major structural barriers – poverty, ill health and geographical inequality – which place significant restrictions on the autonomy of those who are already disadvantaged.     

论林森的治国理念

林森的建国理念以孙中山的三民主义为内核，并随时局变化而丰富发展。他一生坚持在和平奋斗中谋求自存共存，坚决捍卫国家独立主权，同时主张承担建设世界大同的责任。在实践中，他积极倡导推行地方自治建设，以实现法治民权；强调经济建设的重要性，以解决民生问题。尤为可贵的是，他已敏锐地看出，科学和教育是建设国家的基础，故极为重视教育对人才的培养，并以身作则支持科学和教育事业。     

The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation

Standard impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation over logically connected propositions either use a controversial systematicity condition or apply only to agendas of propositions with rich logical connections. Are there any serious impossibilities without these restrictions? We prove an impossibility theorem without requiring systematicity that applies to most standard agendas: Every judgment aggregation function (with rational inputs and outputs) satisfying a condition called unbiasedness is dictatorial (or effectively dictatorial if we remove one of the agenda conditions). Our agenda conditions are tight. When applied illustratively to (strict) preference aggregation represented in our model, the result implies that every unbiased social welfare function with universal domain is effectively dictatorial.     

The doctrinal paradox, the discursive dilemma, and logical aggregation theory

Judgment aggregation theory, or rather, as we conceive of it here, logical aggregation theory generalizes social choice theory by having the aggregation rule bear on judgments of all kinds instead of merely preference judgments. It derives from Kornhauser and Sager??s doctrinal paradox and List and Pettit??s discursive dilemma, two problems that we distinguish emphatically here. The current theory has developed from the discursive dilemma, rather than the doctrinal paradox, and the final objective of the paper is to give the latter its own theoretical development along the line of recent work by Dietrich and Mongin. However, the paper also aims at reviewing logical aggregation theory as such, and it covers impossibility theorems by Dietrich, Dietrich and List, Dokow and Holzman, List and Pettit, Mongin, Nehring and Puppe, Pauly and van Hees, providing a uniform logical framework in which they can be compared with each other. The review goes through three historical stages: the initial paradox and dilemma, the scattered early results on the independence axiom, and the so-called canonical theorem, a collective achievement that provided the theory with its specific method of analysis. The paper goes some way towards philosophical logic, first by briefly connecting the aggregative framework of judgment with the modern philosophy of judgment, and second by thoroughly discussing and axiomatizing the ??general logic?? built in this framework.     

The Psychological Subject and Harré's Social Psychology: An Analysis of a Constructionist Case

Taking Rom Harré's social constructionism as a focus we point to and discuss the issue of the a priori psychological subject in social constructionist theory. While Harré indicates that interacting, intending beings are necessary for conversation to occur, he assumes that the primary human reality is conversation and that psychological life emerges from this social domain. Nevertheless, we argue that a fundamental and agentive psychological subject is implicit to his constructionist works. Our critical analyses focus upon Harré's understandings of persons, human development and human agency. Our intention is neither to suggest that this latent entity must be understood in a Cartesian sense nor is it to ask for an explicit accounting of an autonomous agent. Rather, our claim is simply that psychological subjectivity is reflexively entailed in Harré's human psychology. We suggest that this pertains more generally to social constructionist theory.     

Making Sen’s capability approach operational: a random scale framework

Amartya Sen has developed the so-called capability approach to meet the criticism that income alone may be insufficient as a measure of economic inequality. This is because knowledge about people’s income does not tell us what they are able to acquire with that income. For example, people with the same income may not have the same access to health and transportation services, schools and opportunities in the labor market. Recently, there has been growing interest in empirical studies based on the capability approach. Most of these, however, are only loosely related to quantitative behavioral theory, at least in a concrete and empirically operational way. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the theory of random scale (utility) models offers a powerful theoretical and empirical framework for representing and accounting for key aspects of Sen’s theory.     

Oligarchy for Social Choice Correspondences and Strategy-Proofness

We study the existence of a group of individuals which has some decisive power for social choice correspondences that satisfy a monotonicity property which we call modified monotonicity. And we examine the relation between modified monotonicity and strategy-proofness of social choice correspondences according to the definition by Duggan and Schwartz (2000). We will show mainly the following two results. (1) Modified monotonicity implies the existence of an oligarchy. An oligarchy is a group of individuals such that it has some decisive power (semi-decisiveness), and at least one of the most preferred alternatives of every its member is always chosen by any social choice correspondence. (2) Strategy-proofness of social choice correspondences is equivalent to modified monotonicity.     

Situational Crime Prevention and its Discontents: Rational Choice Theory versus the 'Culture of Now'

The rational choice theory of crime and its cognate field of study, situational crime prevention, have exerted a considerable influence in criminal justice policy and criminology. This article argues that, while undeniably useful as a means of reducing property or acquisitive crime, rational choice‐inspired situational crime prevention initiatives are limited when it comes to offering protection against a growing number of so‐called ‘expressive crimes’. Developing this critique, the article will criticize the sociologically hollow narrative associated with rational choice theories of crime by drawing on recent research in social theory and consumer studies. It argues that the growing tendency among many young individuals to engage in certain forms of criminal decision‐making ‘strategies’ may simply be the by‐product of a series of subjectivities and emotions that reflect the material values and cultural logic associated with late modern consumerism.     

农民工随迁子女教育公平的财政实现机制探析

农民工随迁子女的教育公平是现代城市化进程中社会公平的重要内容与客观要求。教育公平主要通过教育资源的优化配置实现每个受教育者能享受到均等的教育,它包含教育机会公平、教育过程公平和教育质量公平。公共财政理论认为,教育属于准公共物品,这也是财政支持资源相对匮乏的农民工随迁子女的义务教育的理论依据。但由于其特殊性,应建立完善的政府间经费分担机制与财政监督机制。从财政支持农民工随迁子女教育公平的现状来看,教育机会公平显失、教育过程公平脆弱、教育质量公平任重道远。上述问题的根源在于农民工随迁子女财政教育经费投入不足、经费分担机制缺乏且不合理、缺乏专门的预算制度等。因此,针对上述问题,探寻完善财政实现机制,成为当前保障农民工随迁子女教育公平的必然选择。     

The effect of unconditional preferences on Sen’s paradox

Theory and Decision - Sen’s Liberal paradox describes a conflict between weak Pareto, minimal liberalism, and either transitivity or a best element over a domain of individual preferences....     

Revealed desirability: a novel instrument for social welfare

The note puts forward the idea of revealed desirability, a novel instrument, which like revealed preference is observable from choice and important for individual and social welfare. We provide the axiomatic underlying individual’s choice model, preliminary experimental results that support the idea, and an appealing allocation rule that uses the revealed desirability information along with the revealed-preference information.

     

Psychosocial and relationship-based theories for child and family social work: political philosophy, psychology and welfare practice

Psychosocial perspectives on children’s development are allied to theories that recognize the ‘self’ as essentially a social entity. The quality of relationships that children experience in their social environment have a profound effect on their socio-emotional development, personality formation and social competence. To this extent, psychosocial theories of children’s development and wellbeing can provide child and family social workers with a powerful framework within which to analyse, assess and practise. However, it is also recognized that the character of child welfare practices and policies are influenced by prevailing political climates. A simple dichotomy is described between political philosophies of the right and left; libertarianism and communitarianism; individual freedom and collective action. It is argued that the present swing to libertarian individualism has brought about major changes in the policy and practice of much child and family social work, including a preference for theories that emphasize people’s psychological independence, rationality and personal responsibility. In such a climate, child and family social work becomes more legalistic, orientated towards principles of justice rather than welfare, and towards rights and responsibilities rather than personal relationships and social competence. Psychosocial developmental theories, with their emphasis on the importance of social relationships and the emotional interconnectedness of people in community, fare less well under the rigours of psychological individualism and free-market economics. The paper concludes that if children’s psychosocial development and competence are a product of their social history, practices that psychologically ‘disembed’ people from their relationship environment are unable to consider children’s needs within a coherent, well-grounded theoretical framework. If child and family social work is premised on helping children develop social understanding and emotional wellbeing, theory and practice are best served by taking a psychosocial perspective.