Is it ever safe to vote strategically?

There are many situations in which mis-coordinated strategic voting can leave strategic voters worse off than they would have been had they not tried to strategise. We analyse the simplest of such scenarios, in which a set of strategic voters all have the same sincere preferences and all contemplate casting the same strategic vote, while all other voters are not strategic. Most mis-coordinations in this framework can be classified as instances of either strategic overshooting (too many voted strategically) or strategic undershooting (too few). If mis-coordination can result in strategic voters ending up worse off than they would have been had they all just voted sincerely, we call the strategic vote unsafe. We show that under every onto and non-dictatorial social choice rule there exist circumstances where a voter has an incentive to cast a safe strategic vote. We extend the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem by proving that every onto and non-dictatorial social choice rule can be individually manipulated by a voter casting a safe strategic vote.     

Voting rules and election outcomes: When does the true majority win?

Majority-in-unit (MIU) and method of majority decision (MMD) voting rules are investigated to determine their impact on the outcome of union elections. A theoretical foundation is established to explain why voters may rationally choose not to vote in these settings. Numerical simulations are employed to compute the probability that the population majority wins the election. The results for these two methods are compared to see which one is most likely to award the election to the true population majority.     

An extension of McGarvey’s theorem from the perspective of the plurality collective choice mechanism

In 1953, David McGarvey showed that if the number of voters is unrestricted, then the set of outputs obtained from majority rule is a very general class of binary relations. We will present an extension of McGarvey’s Theorem based on the plurality collective choice mechanism.     

The power of a collectivity to act in weighted voting games with many small voters

We analyze the propensity to approve a random proposal of a large committee that makes decisions by weighted voting. The approach is a generalized version of James Coleman’s “power of a collectivity to act”. Throughout the paper it is assumed that the voters are of two kinds: a fixed (possibly empty) set of “major” (big) voters with fixed weights, and an ever-increasing number of “minor” (small) voters, whose total weight is also fixed, but where each individual’s weight becomes negligible. As our main result, we obtain that asymptotically many minor voters act like a modification of the quota for the vote among major voters. The paper estimates the rate of convergence which turns out to be very high if the weight distribution among the small voters is not too skewed. The results obtained are illustrated by evaluating the decision rules for the Council of Ministers of the EU for various scenarios of EU enlargement. I wish to thank Matthew Braham, Sidartha Gordon, Maurice Koster, Moshé Machover, Guillermo Owen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

The probability of majority rule instability in the 2D euclidean model with an even number of voters

The classic instability theorems of Euclidean voting theory definitively treat all cases except that of an even number of voters in two dimensions. For that case, all that has been known is that the set of stable configurations is neither measure 0 nor measure 1. We prove that instability occurs with probability converging rapidly to 1 as the population increases.     

How to choose a non-controversial list with k names

Barberà and Coelho (WP 264, CREA-Barcelona Economics, 2007) documented six screening rules associated with the rule of k names that are used by diferent institutions around the world. Here, we study whether these screening rules satisfy stability. A set is said to be a weak Condorcet set à la Gehrlein (Math Soc Sci 10:199–209) if no candidate in this set can be defeated by any candidate from outside the set on the basis of simple majority rule. We say that a screening rule is stable if it always selects a weak Condorcet set whenever such set exists. We show that all of the six procedures which are used in reality do violate stability if the voters do not act strategically. We then show that there are screening rules which satisfy stability. Finally, we provide two results that can explain the widespread use of unstable screening rules.     

WHY THE SOCIAL INSURANCE BUDGET IS TOO LARGE IN A DEMOCRACY

This paper develops a majority voting model to analyze the determination of taxes and transfers in a system of pay-as-yougo social insurance. The major implication is that the equilibrium size of the system is too large if votes are fully aware of the consequences of the policy. In addition, it seems likely that voters are rationally ignorant of a large portion of the cost of social insurance due to the hidden nature of the employer contribution and to the effect of the system on capital accumulatoin. This fiscal illusion works to exacerbate the overexpansion of the social insurance system.     

Alternate Definitions of the Uncovered Set and Their Implications

Different definitions of the uncovered set are commonly, and often interchangeably, used in the literature. If we assume individual preferences are strict over all alternatives, these definitions are equivalent. However, if one or more voters are indifferent between alternatives these definitions may not yield the same uncovered set. This note examines how these definitions differ in a distributive setting, where each voter can be indifferent between any number of alternatives. I show that, defined one way, the uncovered set is equal to the set of Pareto allocations that give over half the voters a strictly positive payoff, while alternate definitions yield an uncovered set that is equal to the entire Pareto set. These results highlight a small error in Epstein (Soc Choice Welf 15, 81–93, 1998) in which the author characterizes the uncovered set for a different definition of covering than claimed.     

An experiment on coordination in multi-candidate elections: The importance of polls and election histories

Do polls simply measure intended voter behavior or can they affect it and, thus, change election outcomes? Do candidate ballot positions or the results of previous elections affect voter behavior? We conduct several series of experimental, three-candidate elections and use the data to provide answers to these questions. In these elections, we pay subjects conditionally on election outcomes to create electorates with publicly known preferences. A majority (but less than two-thirds) of the voters are split in their preferences between two similar candidates, while a minority (but plurality) favor a third, dissimilar candidate. If all voters voted sincerely, the third candidate — a Condorcet loser — would win the elections. We find that pre-election polls significantly reduce the frequency with which the Condorcet loser wins. Further, the winning candidate is usually the majority candidate who is listed first on the poll and election ballots. The evidence also shows that a shared history enables majority voters to coordinate on one of their favored candidates in sequences of identical elections. With polls, majority-preferred candidates often alternate as election winners.     

May’s Theorem with an infinite population

In this paper, we investigate majority rule with an infinite number of voters. We use an axiomatic approach and attempt to extend Mays Theorem characterizing majority rule to an infinite population. The analysis hinges on correctly generalizing the anonymity condition and we consider three different versions. We settle on bounded anonymity as the appropriate form for this condition and are able to use the notion of asymptotic density to measure the size of almost all sets of voters. With this technique, we define density q-rules and show that these rules are characterized by neutrality, monotonicity, and bounded anonymity on almost all sets. Although we are unable to provide a complete characterization applying to all possible sets of voters, we construct an example showing that our result is the best possible. Finally, we show that strengthening monotonicity to density positive responsiveness characterizes density majority rule on almost all sets.My thanks to John Duggan for useful discussions. I also thank Milo Ziman and the participants of the Workshop on the Density Concept held at Comenius University, Bratislava, Slovakia.     

STATE LIQUOR LICENSING, IMPLICIT CONTRACTING, AND DRY/WET COUNTIES

Local option liquor laws are generally interpreted as granting voters the right to choose between allowing and prohibiting alcoholic beverage sales. This paper argues that the real choice confronting voters is between legal sales according to state-prescribed rules and illegal sales according to an informal set of locally-determined rules. Given this choice, rational voters will choose the option with the lower relative price. State laws restricting the number of licenses that can be issued in legally wet jurisdictions prove to be more powerful than religious preferences in explaining the pattern of dry counties.     

The plurality majority converse under single peakedness

The plurality majority converse (PMC), the strongest possible instance of a plurality majority disagreement, is studied in the context of single peakedness. After sharpening some of the notions of unfolding theory we construct PMCs for the case where all voters' preference orders are single peaked on a common ordering of the political parties contesting in an election. A PMC then appears to result from a particular distribution of the voters' preference orders in which the political center has been dissolved towards the extremes. The possibility of a PMC in some of the elections in Weimar Germany is examined. Elections that avoid plurality majority disagreements by having voters choose one of a constrained set of preference orders over the contesting parties are discussed.     

SYMMETRIC SCORING RULES AND A NEW CHARACTERIZATION OF THE BORDA COUNT

Young developed a classic axiomatization of the Borda rule almost 50 years ago. He proved it is the only voting rule satisfying the normative properties of decisiveness, neutrality, reinforcement, faithfulness and cancellation. Often overlooked is that the uniqueness of Borda applies only to variable populations. We present a different set of properties which only Borda satisfies when both the set of voters and the set of alternatives can vary. It is also shown Borda is the only scoring rule which will satisfy all of the new properties when the number of voters stays fixed. (JEL D71, D02, H00)     

Old Voters on New Dimensions: Why Do Voters Vote for Pensioners’ Parties? The Case of the Netherlands

This article analyzes the electoral support of the Dutch pensioners’ party 50Plus. Due to its open electoral system and aging population, the Netherlands is a key case to study pensioners’ parties. Our study shows that this pensioners’ party appeals to voters who are characterized by their age and their dependence on the welfare state as well as their policy positions on new lines of political conflict. In particular, their position on the new economic dimension (which concerns welfare state reform) and the new cultural dimension (which concerns immigration and EU integration) is distinct. Moreover, even when the majority of voters for this new party once supported the larger mainstream parties, they are now dissatisfied with the established politics. With rapidly aging populations across established democracies, this study is not just relevant for those studying pensioners’ parties, but rather gives an important insight into the electoral dynamics and popular support for mainstream politics, the welfare state, and social security.     

The Relative Irrelevance of Candidate Sex

Abstract

This study tests the relevance of candidate sex to electoral contests. We predict that voters, in general, will use issue or party cues to select between candidates and not the sex of the candidate. This will not hold under two conditions: party or issue cues are unavailable or candidate sex is likely to be particularly salient to the voter. Data were collected from a random sample of registered voters who were presented with hypothetical elections featuring candidates who were systematically varied by party, position on abortion, and sex. The results are consistent with the line of research that suggests that the majority of voters do not use candidate sex as a cue for choice, but candidate sex does affect choice among those for whom gender equality issues are particularly salient. Although generally irrelevant, candidate sex can have significant implications for the outcome of particular contests.     

The optimal majority with an endogenous status quo

Using the voting procedure proposed by Baron (1996), the consequences are examined of changing the majority required to change legislation. When the majority required is greater than fifty percent, and when voters behave strategically, the first policy proposed (on a stationary equilibrium path) is never defeated subsequently. Which policy gets proposed first depends on which voter gets to make the first proposal. But increasing the required majority induces a mean–preserving spread on the distribution of these policies, if voters' types are distributed symmetrically. Thus before the voting procedure begins, voters would prefer unanimously to see the required majority reduced. I would like to thank an anonymous referee, and an associate editor of this journal, for very helpful comments.     

Ensuring every candidate wins under positional voting

Given a fixed set of voter preferences, different candidates may win outright given different scoring rules. We investigate how many voters are able to allow all n candidates to win for some scoring rule. We will say that these voters impose a disordering on these candidates. The minimum number of voters it takes to impose a disordering on three candidates is nine. For four candidates, six voters are necessary, for five candidates, four voters are necessary, and it takes only three voters to disorder nine candidates. In general, we prove that m voters can disorder n candidates when m and n are both greater than or equal to three, except when m = 3 and n ≤ 8, when n = 3 and m ≤ 8, and when n = 4 and m = 4 or 5.     

Information efficiency and majority decisions

The analysis is concerned with the characterization of equilibria of a two-stage voting game involving private information acquisition. Rational ignorance and information efficiency are identified. It turns out that information efficiency is not always desirable. By restricting the payoff domain, we are able to characterize completely the set of equilibria. In this case, information acquisition by few voters benefits a majority, or even the whole community. Economic Literature Classification Number D70, D71, D80.The author would like to thank Peter Bernholz, MartinHellwig, Tilman Börgers, Harald Nedwed and a referee for helpful comments and suggestions.     

VOTING FOR INCOME‐IMMISERIZING REDISTRIBUTION IN THE MELTZER–RICHARD MODEL

This paper argues that income received via redistributive transfers, unlike labor income, requires no direct sacrifice of leisure; this makes it attractive to many voters even if it leaves them poorer. This point is made within the classic Meltzer and Richard (1981) model wherein heterogeneous voters evaluate an income‐redistribution program that finances a lump‐sum transfer to all via a distorting income tax. The political‐equilibrium policy under majority rule is the tax most preferred, utility‐wise, by the median voter. Ironically, this voter, and many poorer voters, may support a redistribution policy that leaves them poorer in income terms but with higher utility. (JEL H2, E6, D72)     

The Undeserving Rich: “Moral Values” and the White Working Class1

White working‐class citizens who vote for the Republican Party have been fodder for much political discussion and speculation recently, and a debate has arisen about the role that “moral values” played in the political decision making of this segment of voters. In this article, we defend a version of the moral values claim. We show that although the Republicans’ policies are unpopular, they are bundled with an overarching moral framework that is extremely resonant to this set of voters, and we use in‐depth interviews to uncover this framework. A key feature of this framework, on which in the 2004 presidential election George W. Bush scored high and John Kerry scored low, is the appropriate attitude to wealth, which serves as an indicator for a candidate’s general moral philosophy and as a heuristic about whether the candidate will govern with working‐class voters’ interests in mind. National Election Studies data support the argument that this was a key influence on the voting decision in 2004, even controlling for voters’ partisan identification.