Union commitment and membership support for political action: An exploratory analysis

Union political activity has always been controversial, even among union members. Research has shown that a sizable minority of union members question the propriety of union political involvement and disagree with union leaders on public policy issues. It has also shown, however, that union members’ commitment to the union may be positively associated with members’ political support. This study extends this research by statistically estimating the relationship between union commitment and members’ support for their national union’s political involvement. Based on the questionnaire responses of several hundred local union members, the findings support a positive relationship between union commitment and political support. The authors wish to thank John Delaney and Cynthia Fisher and an anonymous referee for their comments on an earlier draft of the paper. They also wish to thank the numerous union participants in the study.     

The power and pay of international union officials

Secondary data are used to examine the relationship between the power of international union presidents and their pay. The analysis supported the hypotheses that (1) power and pay were positively related and (2) the relationship is more pronounced in unions that are larger and are less effective in bargaining as well as during periods characterized by conflict over the president’s role. While highlighting the political dimensions of union organizations, the data also support previous studies that found international union officers’ salaries to have a “rational” basis in the union’s bargaining effectiveness. I am indebted to Gabriella Belli for help with a number of statistical issues.     

The different meanings of corruption in the context of the Teamsters Union

Conclusion  TDU’s poor showing in the conventions misrepresented the attitudes of the union’s membership. This fact became clear after the government reached a court-monitored settlement to its RICO suit of the union. The settlement changed the political dynamics within the union, most importantly by providing for the direct election of national leadership. The new rules, combined with a factional split among the incumbents, allowed an insurgent slate, supported by TDU, to win the election in 1991. With a plurality of the membership’s votes, Ron Carey, a self-proclaimed reformer, became president of the union. I thank Bruce Kaufman, John Remington, Catherine Rios, Leah Vosko, Clifford Doerksen, and Robert Gregg for their help in reading this work and their many useful comments and suggestions.     

Union and management policy influences on grievance initiation

This research evaluates potential determinants of grievance activity by testing a model based on the work of Slichter, Healy, and Livernash. Results indicate that formal grievance rates are associated with management’s performance and disciplinary standards for its employees, union rivalry, and union policies toward grievance activity. Several commonly held beliefs about determinants of grievance rates, however, are not subtantiated by this cross-sectional survey.     

Eternal legitimacy of New Zealand trade unions: An update

This paper examines the current state of play in New Zealand’s industrial relations policy following the first general election under a system of proportional representation. The implications of the new Coalition Government’s policy statements are examined in light of the current outcomes under the Employment Contracts Act. It is concluded that radical reforms, and therefore radical changes, are unlikely. With the exception of the role of the Employment Court, institutional arrangements and bargaining outcomes under the Employment Contracts Act have become reasonably stable and are unlikely to be radically altered. The role of the Employment Court and to a lesser extent the Employment Tribunal is under threat and a more gradual move towards further liberalization of the labor market through changes to personal grievance procedures and bargaining process requirements cannot be ruled out. This research was funded by a grant from Public Good Science Fund administered by the Foundation for Research, Science and Technology (FRST Contract: VUW F514).     

Local union leaders’ satisfaction with grievance procedures

We develop a model of local union leaders’ satisfaction with their grievance proce-dures drawing from the job characteristics model and agency theory. The model is tested with OLS regression and LISREL estimates based on a survey of local union leaders in British Columbia. Results show that local union leaders are more satisfied with their grievance procedures when local officials have more autonomy in decision making; their local size is smaller; the grievance filing rate is low; grievance issues are perceived as important; the grievance resolution rate is high; a greater propor-tion of grievances are settled in the early steps; and the union success rate is high. In addition, grievance procedure satisfaction is multifaceted and each facet has its own unique variance and a different combination of significant predictors. This research was supported by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. We thank Dev Jennings for his helpful comments on an earlier version.     

Predicting the decisions to vote and support unions in certification elections: An integrated perspective

This article develops and empirically tests a model of the dual decision-making process employees undergo to guide their behavior during organizing campaigns and elections. The model combines principles of risk-aversion theory with more traditional views that election decisions stem from cost-benefit analyses of union representation. Previous research lacks this integrated approach to the study of election behavior. Regression analyses on a sample of approximately 16,000 certification elections strongly supported the use of risk-aversion theory to predict employees’ willingness to formally participate in elections. Furthermore, we found that time exhibited a statistically significant, negative relationship with voting participation rates, the percentage of union votes, and union victories. The results also indicated that a saturation effect may exist for delays in the election process. Financial support for this research was provided by the Syracuse University Research Fund. The authors wish to thank two anonymous reviewers for helpful suggestions that significantly improved the paper.     

Voting in an Officer Election: Testing a model in a multi-site local

We test a model based on social exchange theory to explain the patterns of membership voting in a local union officer election. Survey data from members and stewards aggregated by 55 voting units, when combined with the control variable, explained 46 percent of the variance in the incumbent president's re-election. A greater percentage of member votes for the incumbent president were related to higher union loyalty, higher confidence in the grievance procedure, better union-management relations, and more positive perceptions of the union contract, findings that support our model of membership voting.     

Unions,politics, and protectionism

Conventional models of labor relations emphasize “business unionism,” that is, collective bargaining activities and outcomes. We argue that a more realistic model of behavior incorporates the union’s role as an agent of redistribution that seeks to benefit some members and union leaders primarily at the expense of other members, nonunion employees, and consumers. Union power to redistribute wealth is obtained from the special privileges that labor organizations obtain from government. This paper demonstrates how, as political entities, unions and their employers attempt to secure government-sanctioned wealth transfers through protectionism. The authors gratefully acknowledge research support provided by the Sarah Scaife Foundation and the Earhart Foundation.     

Unions in the 2000 election: A strategic-choice perspective

In the 2000 elections, organized labor mounted a“massive“ political effort. The AFL-CIO spearheaded a program that emphasized both grassroots and“checkbook” politics. Labor 2000, however, represented much more than an attempt to influence elections. Political action, dedicated to a“Working Families Agenda“ became a strategy of choice to elect candidates, influence lawmakers, mobilize union members, and recruit workers into the labor movement. In this paper, I examine Labor 2000 from a strategic-choice perspective. Specifically, I look at the scope and variety of labor's political effort; how labor allocated its political resources; the degree of competition it faced; and the election outcomes. In addition, I examine the effort in terms of its potential for transforming unions. Data from a variety of sources, some of which have not been previously used, are examined to put Labor 2000 into perspective as a strategy. The results indicate that labor did have some success in mobilizing union members politically. However, labor's impact proved insufficient to achieve immediate national election goals. Questions remain about the wisdom of political action as a strategy of choice, especially in terms of its viability as an instrument for institutional revival.     

An empirical analysis of union election outcomes in the electric utility industry

Unions in the electric utility industry consistently won a greater percentage of elections between 1970 and 1989 than did unions in other industries. Several factors significantly affected union victory rates at electric utilities: when the election was held, the union involved, the size of the utility, the percent of the state’s labor force unionized, the number of eligible voters, whether the election involved multiple-unions, and whether the election was Regional- or Board-directed.     

Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment

Proponents of Approval Voting argue that this electoral rule leads to more centrist outcomes compared to Plurality Voting. This claim has been substantiated by scholarly work using spatial models of political competition. We revisit this issue in the context of a model of political competition in which (1) candidates are policy-motivated; (2) candidacy decisions are endogenous; and (3) candidates can credibly commit to implementing any policy. Under these assumptions we find the opposite to be true – Plurality Voting yields convergence to the median voter’s ideal policy but Approval Voting may not. We argue that this result is driven by the differential incentives for candidate entry under the two voting rules. Our results suggest that whether Approval Voting yields more centrist outcomes vis-á-vis Plurality Voting depends on the possibility of policy commitment on the part of the candidates. In an election held under PV each citizen is given one vote he can cast for one (and only one) candidate, and the candidate who gets the most votes wins the election.     

Unionism and voter turnout

Conventional wisdom suggests that union members and their families are more politically active, and more likely to vote, than nonmembers. This study presents, to our knowledge, the first systematic empirical examination of that conventional wisdom. Results suggest that union members are more likely than nonmembers to vote in a general election, and that union campaign efforts increase voter turnout generally. There is no evidence, however, that union family members are more likely to vote than nonmembers, or that union status affects an individual’s likelihood of voting in a primary election. The authors wish to thank Robert Perloff, Donna Sockell, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. This study was partially supported by a Columbia University Graduate School of Business Faculty Research Fellowship and a Faculty Research Grant from the University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Business.     

Outsourcing and union power

The outsourcing of union work and jobs either diffuses or diminishes union membership, depending on perspective and situation. The correlation of trends in union membership to trends in union power, while less than perfect, has until recently been relatively strong over the past sixteen years. The fact that as diverse a sample of unions as AFSCME, SEIU, and UAW have chosen to make outsourcing a prominent labor/public relations issue suggests that the correlation continues to be perceived by the union movement to be significant, notwithstanding the efforts of the “new” leadership of the AFL-CIO to break that link with respect to union political power by “taxing” member unions and their members to contribute both money and militancy to the 1996 election cycle. Although outsourcing may lead only to the diffusion of union membership either within or between unions, as opposed to the diminution of union membership, this fact has not received a great deal of attention. The net effect on total union membership of outsourcing from one union employer to another union employer is unclear, although the effect on the membership of the union at the outsourcing employer is not. The redistribution of membership within a union as a result of outsourcing is likely to have little immediate impact on union power. However, as even the best case scenario presented above suggests, it may have significant long-run deleterious effects on union bargaining power by taking labor out of a sheltered market and putting it into potentially competitive market. This is particularly likely to be the case when outsourcing (1) places the outsourced work into a different industry or wage contour and (2) creates the possibility of moving from sole-source to multiplesource supplier arrangements. The redistribution of membership between unions as a result of outsourcing is unlikely to have a major impact on union power broadly defined. It can have, however, serious deleterious effects in terms of the power of an individual union, as suggested in my “competitive case” scenario. The fact that one union’s losses due to outsourcing may be another union’s gain is of little consolation to the losing union. That act, in and of itself, may make the threat of outsourcing a potential union “Achilles heel” at the bargaining table by placing it into competition with some other, perhaps unknown, union as well as possibly nonunion competition. The most obvious threat to union power comes from outsourcing that diminishes union membership overall by transferring jobs from union to nonunion employers. The willingness and ability of employers to move work/jobs entirely out of the orbit of union control constitutes, in terms of power and particularly union bargaining power, a revisitation of the phenomenon of the “runaway shop.” It may also be viewed as a proactive form of hiring permanent replacements for (potentially) striking workers. The union options in dealing with such a challenge are to endeavor to preclude outsourcing through legislation or collective bargaining or to chase the work by organizing the unorganized, hopefully with the help of the unionized outsourcing employer. Neither option may be easy, but as the 1996 auto industry negotiations suggest, the former may be less difficult than the latter. The possibility that outsourcing from union to nonunion employer may provide unions with the power to organize from the top (outsourcer) down (outsourcee) cannot be entirely ignored as the issue of supplier “neutrality” reportedly was raised in the 1996 auto negotiations. The adverse effects of outsourcing on union political and financial power, by virtue of its impact on the level or distribution of union membership, can and may well be offset by an increase in union activism—as measured by dues levels, merger activity, organizing commitment, and political action. The adverse effects of outsourcing on union bargaining power are more problematical from the union standpoint. The effect of outsourcing, whatever its rationale or scenario, appears to be to put union labor back into competition. Thus, outsourcing constitutes yet another challenge to the labor movement in its ongoing and seemingly increasingly unsuccessful battle to take and keep U.S. union labor out of competition by proving itself able and willing to organize to the extent of the market and standardizing wages in that market.     

Protective service unions’ political activities and department expenditures

This paper examines how police and firefighter unions’ political activities influence departmental expenditures. Unlike prior research, we measure unions’ political activity independently of union bargaining power. Results indicate that a protective service union’s electoral activities positively affect departmental expenditures, and these effects are attributable to union political power rather than multilateral collective bargaining power. The authors thank Steve Blumenfeld, Wally Hendricks, Asghar Zardkoohi, and an anonymous referee for their excellent comments and suggestions.     

Congressional support for unions’ positions across diverse legislation

Organized labor has become increasingly active in national politics. This development has encouraged research into union political activities, particularly in the area of legislative politics. But little research has been published on the basis of congressional support for union positions on diverse public policy items. This paper has examined the correlates of congressional support for unions’ positions across 33 roll-call votes taken in the first session of the 98th Congress. Empirical analyses suggest that certain factors, such as legislators’ party affiliation and constituents’ ideology, are consistent correlates of such support across diverse legislation. The authors wish to thank John Delaney and Jack Fiorito for their generous comments on a previous version of the paper. They also wish to thank the union lobbyists who granted interviews. A Faculty Research Grant from the Graduate School of Business, University of Pittsburgh, provided partial support.     

Union decline: A view from Canada

Important changes are occurring in the Canadian unions’ political and economic environments. This paper argues that such changes may be detrimental to Canadian trade unions, given their structural and institutional situation. To support this argument, private-sector union and nonunion firms in Alberta are compared. This comparison uncovers some structural (union members’ employment patterns and union firm characteristics) and institutional (union services) attributes of unions. Combined with the politico-economic environments that Alberta unions have faced since the early 1980s, these attributes have led to a decline in union membership. Because these attributes are shared by many other Canadian unions, those unions may increasingly confront some of the same hardships currently plaguing their Alberta counterparts. I am indebted to Brian Bemmels, Alan Murray, and John G. Fricke for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper, and to Mike Jones for his research assistance.     

Determinants of the decertification process: Evidence from employer-initiated elections

There have been relatively few studies on why workers choose to decertify a union as their bargaining unit and virtually no empirical studies on the outcomes of employer-initiated representation elections. Using data from the NLRB monthly election reports (1977–1981), we attempt to analyze the factors that seem to influence the outcomes of employer-initiated representation elections with an incumbent union. Variables in our analysis include size of the election unit, region, industrial classification, type of incumbent union, and the state of the local economy. While the data show a concentration of elections on the West Coast, there is no significant difference in the ability of unions there to “win” decertification elections.     

The internal union political imperative for UAW pattern bargaining

Like many industrial unions, the UAW places great emphasis on pattern-following contract settlements. However, research on the rationales for pattern bargaining has been scarce, and evidence testing these rationales has been absent. The usual rationale for pattern bargaining is to take wages out of competition. However, this paper presents evidence of important internal union political reasons for pattern bargaining. If intra-union wage comparisons cause union members to feel unfairly treated, elected leaders will be challenged. Thus, the UAW leadership pursues pattern bargaining to minimize political conflicts and maintain stability. Unless you know where you came from you don’t have the sense of direction that will lead you to the goals you seek. Walter P. Reuther That word “solidarity” isn’t rhetoric. For a union, it’s everything. Bob White Helpful comments by the Editor and an anonymous referee and financial support from the Jacob K. Javits Fellows Program, the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, and the Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University, are gratefully acknowledged. Walter P. Reuther collection, Box 98-2, Walter P. Reuther Library of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University (WSU). Walter P. Reuther was UAW President from 1946 to 1970. White (1987, p. 51). Bob White was Director of the UAW Canadian Region from 1978 to 1985 and has been President of the National Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of Canada (CAW) since 1985.     

Talking Turkey: Effects of Family Discussions About the 2016 Election over the Thanksgiving Holiday

Four hundred and seventy-nine undergraduates reported on family discussions about the 2016 election that occurred over that same year’s Thanksgiving break. Family Communication Patterns Theory was used to predict the perceived outcomes of such discussion on family members. Higher conversation orientation predicted a more positive perceived effect of political talk on family closeness. Perceived similarity of political views partially moderated the relationship between conformity orientation and perceived effect of political talk on family closeness. Reported stress levels since the election were negatively predicted by the perceived (positive) effect of political talk on family closeness. Practical and theoretical implications for families and political socialization processes are discussed.