The Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi-Report: Old Wine in New Skins? Views from a Social Indicators Perspective

The recently published report by the “Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress” is being discussed and commented from the point of view of social indicators research, which addresses issues of the measurement of well-being and social progress since the 1960s. Some of the recommendations made by the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi—Report thus seem to be well known and all but new and innovative from a social indicators perspective. It is also argued that the report ignores some of the available approaches, instruments and ongoing activities to measure and monitor well-being and the quality of life, which go well beyond GDP, such as e.g. social reports. The Commission’s report is nevertheless considered a major step forward towards a considerably improved measurement of well-being and social progress.     

Beyond GDP: Classifying Alternative Measures for Progress

Both the potential pitfalls of macro-economic policies focused on stimulating economic growth and the problems involved in using GDP as a measure of well-being or economic welfare have long been recognized by economists and researchers from other social sciences. Therefore, it is no surprise that alternative measures for policy-making have been developed and promoted since the early 1970s. Over the past 5?years, the development of these measures has gained momentum both politically and academically. However, most research efforts concentrate on the development and promotion of individual indicators, while paying less attention to the wide range of indicators already available and to theoretical insights. As a result, few classification schemes of alternative measures exist today to help policy-makers in selecting a proper set of indicators. This paper first looks into the different classification schemes available in the literature and outlines the weaknesses in each of these. Afterwards, an alternative classification scheme is introduced that draws on the notions of well-being, economic welfare and sustainability. A further sub-categorization is built on the different approaches that are used to quantitatively capture the notions. By focusing on the underlying concepts that the different measures aim to quantify, the alternative classification scheme overcomes the drawbacks of the existing schemes. Finally, 23 alternative measures for policy-making are reviewed and organized into the newly developed classification scheme.     

R. F. Harrod on Reviving the Birth Rate

Continuing below‐replacement fertility and projected declines in population size are demographic features of many European countries and Japan. They are variously met with complacent acceptance, calls for higher rates of immigration, or—often last and least—proposals for increasing the birth rate. Fertility was also low in the 1930s, and some of the policy debate from that period resonates today. In England and Wales, fertility then had been declining for half a century. Over the decade 1931–40, it averaged 1.8 children per woman—moreover, with net emigration. Worries over this situation and its likely consequences led to the setting up in 1944 of a Royal Commission on Population, charged with considering “what measures, if any, should be taken in the national interest to influence the future trend in population.” In a memorandum submitted to the Commission in that year, the economist R. F. Harrod set out a detailed proposal to encourage childbearing through a scheme of family endowments. Part of the introductory section of Harrod's submission, arguing the case for state intervention and for material rather than ‘spiritual’ measures, is reproduced below. An evident problem in offering economic incentives for childbearing is that, to induce a given behavioral change, well‐off families would require much larger incentives than the poor. Hence child endowments that aspire to effectiveness across the income distribution have to be skewed toward the upper end. Harrod argues that this is as it should be, that policy should establish neutrality between large and small family sizes, and that this is a conceptually separate issue from poverty alleviation. ‘We should seek a re‐distribution of national income favourable to the parents of larger families and the plan should be put into effect whether or not another re‐distribution as between rich and poor is proceeding at the same time.’ He remarks on the implausibility of the government's being able to ‘talk up’ fertility— thereby generating some kind of costless ideational change, a ‘spiritual aufklärung.’ Later pans of the submission not reprinted here cover the specific details of the proposal. The proposed annual benefit per child (intended for every child after the second, with half‐rates payable for the second child) is paid for 18 years. It is substantial and increases with the child's age—at ages 13–18, for most of the income range it amounts to 20–30 percent of the father's income (or mother's, if hers is higher). Harrod also discusses further the rationale for making the endowments (and the compulsory contributions—a flat 5 percent of income—that finance them) proportional to income. To make his case Harrod draws on the dysgenic and population‐quality arguments popular at the time: worry about ‘race decline’ and ‘a general lowering of standards and of efficiency if the parents who are best equipped in experience, knowledge and culture are relatively infertile.’ In the event, the Commission recommended a flat schedule of family allowances, together with tax exemptions for dependent children calculated to provide some income‐based benefit. These were justified on population as well as equity and welfare grounds, ‘since the handicaps of parenthood have played a large part in the fall of average family size below replacement level.‘ Population quality issues—the subject of several other submissions—were sidestepped by calling for further research. By the time the Commission's report was finally published, in 1949, the baby boom was well underway: average fertility over 1946–50 was 2.4. Roy Forbes Harrod (1900–78) was one of the foremost economists of his day. His career was largely spent at Christ Church College, Oxford. A student and sometime colleague of Keynes, his best‐known early work was centered on identifying a dynamic equilibrium growth path for the economy—building on Keynes's static equilibrium analysis. As stylized (by others), this came to be called the Harrod‐Domar growth model, a formulation basic to growth theory. Harrod was editor of the Economic Journal for the period 1945–66. He was active in politics and as an economic adviser to both Labour and Conservative governments. He was knighted in 1959. The extract is reprinted from volume 5 of the Papers of the Royal Commission on Population (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1950), pp. 80–85.     

Globalization and Inequality: A Norwegian Report

Is global inequality increasing? Some authoritative voices—for example, from the United Nations Development Programme—assert unequivocally that it is, and have carried popular belief with them. Others see a more nuanced and on balance a positive picture. Any attempt to answer the question must grapple with many conceptual and measurement difficulties. These are not wholly eliminated even if the inequality in question is narrowed to that among the per capita incomes of countries, ignoring intracountry differences in income. Disagreement about the empirical record has not impeded argument over causes. Globalization—the expansion of trade, investment, and technology flows among states that is making for a more integrated world economy—is invoked on both sides: seen by some as further marginalizing the world's poor, by others as offering a route out of poverty. The starkly different positions surface in the heated debates that have surrounded the World Trade Organization and the proposal for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment. The nature of trends in international inequality and the role in them of globalization are explored in a recent report issued by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Globalisation and Inequality: World Income Distribution and Living Standards, 1960–1998 (October 2000), the summary from which is reproduced below. The report finds that global inequality between countries has decreased over the last four decades. Globalization may or may not have contributed to that outcome, but at least does not appear to work against it. In sum, “not everything has turned out badly; in fact there has—in spite of the setbacks in some regions and in spite of population growth—been considerable global progress during the last decades.” Given the chosen focus on inequality, there is little discussion in the report of that other dimension of global progress: changes in absolute income levels. But in assessing the implications of development for human welfare, the issue of economic growth and its relationship to globalization is clearly pertinent. Footnote 4 offers a passing glimpse of that dimension, referring to changes in absolute poverty. The World Bank's World Development Report 2000/2001 estimates that the number of people in absolute poverty (living on less than $1 a day) changed little between 1987 and 1998: it went from 1.18 billion to 1.20 billion. As the population grew, this meant a modest reduction in the proportion in absolute poverty in the world population (excluding the rich countries): from 28.3 percent to 24.0 percent. But in the East Asia and Pacific region—a region characterized by both rapid overall economic growth and increasing integration into the global economy—the number of poor dropped from 418 million to 278 million during the same period, with the proportion dropping from 26.6 percent to 15.3 percent. The report was commissioned from the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), and prepared by Ame Melchior, Kjetil Telle. and Henrik Wiig. It is available online both in its English version and in its original (and longer) Norwegian version—the former at http://odin.dep.no/ud/engelsk/publ/rapporter/index‐b‐n‐a.html , the latter through the Ministry's parallel Norwegian‐language site.     

Alvin Hansen on Economic Progress and Declining Population Growth

The driving forces of economic growth, according to the mainstream of classical economic thinking, are threefold: technological innovations, the opening up of new territories and discovery of new resources, and increase in population. In interaction, in an entrepreneurial market economy, these forces generate growth not only in the aggregate but also per capita. Evidence of their power was seen in the long stretch of rising living standards in the West over the nineteenth century, despite the ups and downs of the business cycle. However, the economic experience of the interwar years, and in particular the Great Depression of the 1930s, suggested that the forces were largely spent and hence that future economic prospects were gravely imperiled. The Keynesian revolution in economics was a response to the evident malfunctioning of the capitalist economic system, although the policy recipes it offered (for increasing demand and investment to levels capable of generating an equilibrium consistent with full employment of productive resources, especially labor) by no means commanded unanimity. The most prominent American contributor to and spokesman for the new line of economic analysis—often called “the American Keynes”—was Alvin H. Hansen (1887–1975), who took up his professorship of political economy at Harvard in 1937, just after the appearance of Keynes's General Theory. In that post, which he held until his retirement in 1956, he was one of the most influential economists of the era as a theorist, policy adviser, and teacher. Hansen interpreted the economic problems of the 1930s not just as the manifestation of a particularly sharp cyclical downturn, but as evidence of secular stagnation caused by the closing of the economic frontier, sluggishness in technological innovation, and, not least, “a drastic decline in population growth.” This “stagnation thesis” is most succinctly set out in his presidential address to the American Economic Association, delivered in Detroit, 28 December 1938, under the title Economic Progress and Declining Population Growth. The address is re‐produced below from the March 1939 issue of the American Economic Review. (The opening paragraphs of the address, and two paragraphs, immediately preceding the closing paragraph, in which Hansen discusses changes in US national income in the 1930s, have been omitted.) Hansen's analysis of the effects of declining population growth in many ways echoes the thesis set out by Keynes in his seminal Galton Lecture delivered to the Eugenics Society in 1937 (reprinted in the Archives section of PDR 4, no. 3): a demographic slowdown decreases opportunities for profitable investments and increases levels of attempted saving, hence pushes the economy toward a low‐growth equilibrium at which resources are underutilized and unemployment is high. Hansen puts special emphasis on demographically induced shifts in the composition of output. He suggests that, beyond its direct positive effect on investment and output, population growth also has an indirect enhancing effect on these factors by facilitating technological progress–contrary to the “older Malthusian view.” In his policy proposals Hansen was more interventionist than Keynes, advocating a more intrusive government role in the economy as a possible means of escaping the vicious cycle of low demand and high unemployment. As to government action to reverse demographic trends seen as deleterious, neither Keynes nor Hansen argued for policies to increase fertility, presumably because they saw them as both inappropriate and, in comparison to remedial economic policy measures, inefficient or unfeasible. The demands of the war economy in the years following Hansen's address took care of the employment problem, and the immediate postwar decades brought the stimuli of pent‐up consumer demand, an outpouring of technological innovations, a reopening of the economic frontier produced by a more liberal trade regime, and, also, an acceleration of population growth. The result was rapid overall economic growth and increasing levels of per capita income. Keynesian demand management played some role in this economic success story: by the end of the 1960s even US President Richard Nixon pronounced himself a Keynesian. But it offered no remedy for the stagflation that eventually followed. The growth‐promoting recipes favored in the last decades of the century (especially in the most successful developing economies) were anything but Keynesian: limited government, fiscal restraint, and globalization. Yet recent and anticipated demographic trends, especially in Europe—notably fertility decline and population aging—make Hansen, once again, interesting reading. Commitments of the modern welfare state for health care, retirement pensions, and job security command wide approval, but they have boosted governments' weight in the economy and made labor markets inflexible, unemployment high, and retirement early—developments that may increasingly impose a brake on economic growth and on improvements of living standards. Reform measures to ease these burdens are, in principle, straightforward, but their immediate social costs are heavy and their rewards are delayed, hence resistance to reform is strong and growing. This is likely to stimulate the search for alternative policies that offer politically more palatable tradeoffs—some of which may turn out to have an unmistakably Hansenian flavor. As to future population trends, Hansen, despite his reference to a “drastic decline in population growth” based on a comparison of nineteenth‐ and twentieth‐century Western demographic change, envisaged a convergence to a stationary population or a tendency toward very slow decrease. Yet some economies are already locked into a demographic pattern that augurs sharper declines and more rapid population aging, enhancing the relevance of the issues posed by Hansen. In Germany, for example, in the absence of immigration, the population between ages 20 and 40 will decline from 21.6 million in 2005 to 16.3 million in 2025—a drop of 23 percent. Over the same time period, the population aged 60 and older will grow from 20.5 million to 25.8 million—an increase of 26 percent. Serious efforts to slow population decline and retard population aging by stimulating fertility would of course add another major burden to government budgets.     

Tracking Poverty Reduction in Bhutan: Income Deprivation Alongside Deprivation in Other Sources of Happiness

This paper analyses poverty reduction in Bhutan between two points in time—2003 and 2007—from a multidimensional perspective. The measures estimated include consumption expenditure as well as other indicators which are directly (when possible) or indirectly associated to valuable functionings, namely, health, education, access to electricity, safe water, improved sanitation, enough room per person in dwelling, access to roads and land ownership. Interestingly, most of these indicators have been identified as sources of happiness in the 2007 Gross National Happiness Survey. Twelve different measures are estimated with a variety of values for the different parameters involved for robustness analysis. Also, estimates are bootstrapped creating 95 % confidence intervals. We find that over the study period there was an unambiguous reduction in multidimensional poverty regardless of the indicators’ weights, deprivation cutoffs and identification criterion of the poor. This reduction was mainly led by a reduction in the proportion of the poor which was accompanied by a reduction in the intensity of poverty among those who were less intensively poor, although not among those who were more intensively poor. Rather than accomplishing this poverty reduction by improving achievements in one or two indicators, there were significant reductions in several deprivations, especially in access to roads, electricity, water, sanitation, and education. We also find that when income alone is used to target the poor, inclusion errors are marginal but exclusion errors are sizeable. Despite Bhutan’s significant progress, challenges remain as poverty is still high in rural areas. A multidimensional measure in the lines proposed in this paper can prove useful for monitoring poverty reduction, prioritizing groups and evaluating upon investment.     

If GDP is Not the Answer,What is the Question? The Juncture of Capabilities,Institutions and Measurement in the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Report

This review essay offers an institutional critique of the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Report. The notion of human capabilities and functionings advocated by the Report demonstrates an inspirational perspective to monitor human progress in quality of life (QoL). Several measurements the Report suggested remain inadequate. The personal diary techniques have some potential as it possesses strength in recording hedonic activities, but it is relatively weak in revealing eudaimonic experiences. The Report unfortunately mixes up outcome indicators of QoL at individual level and the higher-ordered, social institutions in mapping out causal processes of human wellbeing. Future researchers can contribute by concentrating on clarifying the plausible linkage between institutions and individual wellbeing in broad sense. There is much knowledge to be gained by researchers who ask questions of “how we can change” rather than answer to “what we can measure”     

Variations in Kinship Networks Across Geographic and Social Space

This article analyzes variations in interaction with non‐coresident adult kin based on comparable cross‐national surveys conducted in 2001 in 27 countries. The two main dimensions of kin contact are considered: (1) overall levels and (2) the relative emphasis given to contacts with primary kin (parents, adult children, siblings) and secondary kin (aunts, cousins, in‐laws). Age‐adjusted variations in kin contact between countries are much greater than those within countries. These results do not confirm the commonly hypothesized existence of well‐defined family system boundaries in Europe arising from historical factors. The similarity of patterns of countries outside Europe with European countries with which they have historical ties suggests cultural factors are important in explaining interaction with kin, whereas welfare regimes appear to have little explanatory value. Within Europe, kin contact levels are more strongly related to a north/south divide than to indicators of economic development or religiosity. The findings suggest that neither of the extreme assumptions—homogenizing pressures toward a nuclear family model or persistent well‐defined groupings arising from historical contexts—can be substantiated. Rather, there is a continuum in family behaviors over a substantial range, related to a number of explanatory factors.     

Developing indicators of environmental quality: The experience of the council on environmental quality

In the late 1960s there was great interest in the U.S. environmental field for duplicating the success economists had in developing statistical indicators. This article traces the history of the development of environmental indices at the Council on Environmental Quality from initial research aimed at preparing one or at best a few indices of environmental quality to the most recent effort which aims to organize indicators showing conditions and trends on a wide variety of environmental topics. The Council intends to distribute the findings periodically. The report may be viewed as a briefing book for policymakers. Criteria used in selecting and developing indicators —relevancy, selectivity, availability of data, changes over time, statistical quality, and scope of coverage — are discussed. A key purpose of this effort is to improve the quality of data available for making national environmental policies. Appendixes included are: (1) a bibliography of works dealing with the general problems of developing, using, and evaluating environmental indicators; (2) a selection of over 100 U.S. Federal periodical reponts on specific aspects of environmental conditions; and (3) a comprehensive framework for identifying topics and selecting meaningful and useful environmental indicators to be used as the report outline.     

The Ex-Ante Evaluation of Achieving Sustainable Development Goals

This paper describes the methodology and main results from an overall assessment on future achievement of sustainable development goals. The proposed approach consists of a model-based, looking forward composite sustainable development index—FEEM sustainability index—projected to the future. It represents a first experiment to reproduce the future dynamics of sustainable development indicators over time and worldwide and to assess future sustainability under different scenarios. The assessment presented here is relevant under different viewpoints. First, it has a very broad nature in terms of both geographical coverage and meaningfulness: it considers the multi-dimensional structure of sustainable development by combining relevant indicators belonging to economic, social and environmental pillars for the whole world. Second, the modelling framework to compute future trends of indicators relies upon a recursive-dynamic computable general equilibrium model. This is an ideal tool to look simultaneously at the development of many indicators, their potential interactions and trade-offs, and more in general to the consequences of economic development and/or policies aiming to increase performance in one or more indicators; it allows measuring the overall sustainability under alternative scenarios, across countries and over time. Finally, regarding the construction of the composite indicator, the application of fuzzy measures and Choquet integral increases substantially the model capability allowing taking into account the interactions that exist among the three main pillars of sustainability and the considered indicators.     

The Hague Forum on the Implementation of the Cairo Program of Action

To ascertain progress in the implementation of the Program of Action adopted at the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), and to discuss needed future action toward realization of the goals set by that conference, the United Nations Population Fund convened an intergovernmental Forum that met in The Hague, hosted by the government of the Netherlands, 8–12 February 1999. The Hague Forum was preceded by related meetings of nongovernmental organizations, representatives of youth groups, and of parliamentarians. Excerpts from the Report of the Hague Forum, sections V and X, with the original paragraph numbers retained, are reproduced below. The first of these sections summarizes recent positive and negative developments in the field of reproductive health and notes demographic changes that require special attention. The section on mobilization of resources—the concluding section of the Report—describes resource flows, international and domestic, for population and reproductive health programs during the last few years. Although donor funding (a key issue discussed at the Forum) has increased, it falls short of the goals specified by ICPD. The Report enumerates actions proposed for remedying deficiencies in mobilizing resources and for increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of their use.     

Social Monitoring and Reporting: A Success Story in Applied Research on Social Indicators and Quality of Life

From its beginnings research on social indicators was not primarily considered as pure, but rather applied research in terms of the regular monitoring of and reporting on quality of life. Thus, the successes—but eventually also failures—of social indicators research may first of all be visible in its most important field of application. Social monitoring and reporting activities, which can be traced back to the early 1970s provide quantitative information and empirically based analytical knowledge on well-being and progress in a single society or groups of societies to be used for different purposes, including policy making. Providing an overview over the variety of social monitoring and reporting projects emerging from social indicators research is supposed to be important with a view to form a more solid fundament for present and future discourses and initiatives in the field of measuring and monitoring well-being and progress. The article looks back to this field of applied social indicators research and—with a focus on Europe—identifies patterns and recent trends in this sort of activities. By looking forward, it finally discusses selected issues that are considered to be crucial for further improvements in this field.     

The End of the Fertility Transition in the Developed World

By the late 1990s the average period total fertility rate in the developed world had declined to 1.6, a level substantially lower than projected in the 1970s and 1980s. This article examines recent trends and patterns in fertility in the developed world with particular emphasis on the effects and implications of changes in the timing of childbearing. The main objective is to demonstrate that while fertility in these countries is indeed low, women's childbearing levels are not as low as period measures such as the total fertility rate suggest. To obtain a full understanding of the various dimensions of fertility change. several indicators are examined, including period and cohort fertility by birth order and childbearing preferences. An analysis of these indicators demonstrates that period fertility measures in many developed countries are temporarily depressed by a rise in the mean age at childbearing. The distortion of the TFR is as great as 0.4 births per woman in Italy and Spain. These effects have been present in many developed countries since the 1970s and could continue for years into the future. But tempo effects are temporary, and once the postponement of childbearing ends—as it eventually must—the corresponding fertility‐depressing effect stops, thus putting upward pressure on period fertility. Countries with very low fertility and substantial tempo effects may well experience rises in fertility in the near future if the timing of childbearing stabilizes. Even if this happens, however, it seems unlikely that fertility will rebound to the replacement level.     

Intergenerational Coresidence in Developing Countries

Newly available census microdata from IPUMS‐International are used to assess trends in intergenerational coresidence in 15 developing countries. Contrary to expectations, we find no general decline in intergenerational coresidence over the past several decades. There have been, however, significant changes in the configuration of intergenerational coresidence. Families in which a member of the older generation is household head—a configuration consistent with traditional patriarchal forms in which the older generation retains authority—are becoming more common in most of the countries. Intergenerational families headed by a member of the younger generation—the configuration one would expect if intergenerational coresidence were motivated by a need for old‐age support—are on the decline in most of the countries. Multivariate analysis reveals that intergenerational families headed by the older generation are positively associated with measures of economic development. These findings are at variance with widely accepted social theory. We hypothesize that housing shortages, economic stress in the younger generation, and old‐age pensions may contribute to the change. More broadly, in some developing countries rising incomes may have allowed more people to achieve their preferred family structure of intergenerational coresidence following traditional family forms.     

On ‘Consistent’ Poverty

The measurement of poverty as ‘consistent’ poverty offers a solution to one of the primary problems of poverty measurement within Social Policy of the last three decades. Often treated as if they were synonymous, ‘indirect’ measures of poverty, such as low income measures, and ‘direct’ measures, such as indices of material deprivation, identify surprisingly different people as being poor. In response to this mismatch, a team of Irish researchers put forward a measure which identified respondents in as being in poverty when they experienced both a low standard of living, as measured by deprivation indicators, and a lack of resources, as measured by a low income line. Importantly, they argued that the two measures required an equal weight. In this paper, I present a reconsideration of the consistent poverty measure from both conceptual and empirical perspectives. In particular, I examine the claim that low income and material deprivation measures should be given an ‘equal weight’. I argue that, from a conceptual perspective, the nature of the indicators at hand means that a deprivation-led measurement approach might be understood to align with the definition of poverty which Nolan and Whelan outline and, from an empirical perspective, that it is the material deprivation measure—and not the low income measure—which is particularly effective in identifying individuals at risk of multiple forms of deprivation. However, I argue that greater attention needs to be given to the question of whether indicators of material deprivation provide a sufficient measure of material poverty and suggest that advancing the measurement of material deprivation beyond its relatively rudimentary state represents an important priority for poverty research.     

Economic Independence and Union Formation in Sweden

Although sociologists, demographers, and economists are generally agreed that economic independence enhances the likelihood that men will marry, there is disagreement concerning its effect on women. The view that economic independence weakens women's incentive to marry has probably been the most influential, although it has been subjected to few rigorous empirical tests with individual-level data. In the present paper we examine the predictors of forming a first cohabiting union, of progressing from this union to marriage, and of marrying without previously cohabiting by applying hazard regression to event-history data from the 1992 Swedish Family Survey, supplemented by earnings data extracted from the national taxation register. We test a battery of measures that reflect people's past, current, and potential attachment to the labour market. We find that the correlates of union formation for women are largely indistinguishable from the correlates of union formation for men, and that far from being less likely than other women to cohabit or to marry, women with a greater degree of economic self-sufficiency are more likely to do so.     

Income per Natural: Measuring Development for People Rather Than Places

It is easy to learn the average income of a resident of El Salvador or Albania. But there is no systematic source of information on the average income of a Salvadoran or Albanian. We estimate a new statistic: income per natural—the mean annual income of all people born in a given country, regardless of where those people now reside. Income per natural often differs substantially from income per resident, both in its mean and in its distribution. A large part of this difference is caused by movement across borders. Indeed, for people from a number of developing countries, departing their country of birth is one of the most important sources of poverty reduction and material advancement. If economic development is that which raises human well‐being, then crossing international borders is not an alternative to economic development; it is a form of economic development.     

Sidney Webb on the Penalization of Parenthood

The costs of educating and socializing children to take on adult roles in the economy and society are borne in part by their parents and in part, recognizing the substantial public‐good element involved, by the community or the state. The size of that public subsidy and how it is allocated across families of different incomes potentially affect decisions on childbearing—that, at least, is the assumption behind one category of measures seeking to raise fertility where it is very low. That the arguments underlying this area of social policy are of long standing is shown by the statement reproduced below by the prominent British socialist Sidney Webb. It is his evidence before the National Birth‐rate Commission, delivered on July 8, 1918. The Commission was set up in 1913 by the National Council of Public Morals, a self‐appointed group of prominent citizens. It issued a widely read report, The Declining Birth‐Rate: Its Causes and Effects, in 1916. However, the continuing drop in the birth rate (from 24 per 1000 in 1913 to 18 in 1918) led to calls for further investigation and to a reconstituted Commission. One of the terms of reference for this second deliberation was to consider “the economic problems of parenthood in view of the rise of prices and taxation and their possible solutions.” Sidney Webb's statement takes up this matter with characteristic clarity and conviction. Webb is exercised both by the overall deficit of births and, more particularly, by its disproportionate weighting among “the prudent and responsible, and those capable of foresight.” (This eugenic concern is spelled out more strongly in his 1907 Fabian Tract, The Decline of the Birth‐rate.) Various ways in which “the economic penalisation of parenthood might be mitigated” are considered, including free schooling, public housing, and abolition of the “marriage penalty” in income tax. But he puts most store in “some system of universal endowment of children during their period of complete dependence.” (In its subsequent report, the Commission declined to recommend any such scheme.) Webb's proposals prefigure many of the social policies later adopted in European welfare states—with at best seemingly modest influence on fertility. Sidney Webb (1859–1947) was a significant figure in the history of social democratic thought in Britain. He was an early member of the Fabian Society and one of the group that in 1895 established the London School of Economics. As a member of Parliament in the 1920s, he held ministerial posts in the first two Labour governments. In collaboration with his wife Beatrice, Webb was a prolific writer on social problems and policies—notably trade unionism, local government, and Fabian socialism. The text below is taken from Problems of Population and Parenthood [Being the Second Report of and the chief evidence taken by the National Birthrate Commission, 1918–1920.], London: Chapman and Hall, 1920.     

Economic Well-Being in U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas

In recent years there has been increased interest from economists and policy makers to measure a nation’s economic well-being. This paper extends this development to US Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs). An economic well-being index is constructed using indicators of income, education, crime, health and pollution. The analysis allows comparison of a MSA with another and with itself over time. The index is not highly correlated with real gross domestic product per capita and therefore adds value to the discussion of economic well-being in MSAs. However, it is shown that the index may violate social choice principles thereby reducing its usefulness.