规范美德伦理学

人们通常认为美德伦理学并不能告诉我们应该做什么。任何认为美德伦理学可以替代道义论和功利主义伦理学的人都会发现自己面对这样一个人们普遍接受的诘难 :“美德伦理学并没有告诉我们应该做什么 ,因为它无法告诉应该怎么做。因此 ,它无法成为替代道义论和功利主义的规范性理论。”文章的目的就是要反驳这一诘难 ,为美德伦理学辩护     

当代西方规范美德伦理学研究近况

当代规范美德伦理学的主要任务是证明美德的第一性或美德伦理学的独立性,以及回答美德何以能够成为行动的指导原则(做人的原则何以能够成为做事的原则).本文对当代西方规范美德伦理学研究近况作出综合性的评介,内容包括:对规范美德伦理学的责难;弗兰肯纳关于美德伦理学的标准观点;谢勒对规范美德伦理学的辩护;西方学者最近提出的实际行动者动机论、假设行动者动机论和美德目标中心论;作者对规范美德伦理学责难的回答.     

美德伦理如何复兴?

当代美德伦理的复兴有着现实而复杂的社会实践背景和文化理论成因.然而,美德伦理的当代复兴究竟意味着什么?美德伦理学能否真正复兴?又如何复兴? 其理论复兴——假如其复兴是可能且现实的——的当代前景又会怎样? 文章试图对这些问题作出初步的解释和回答.     

伦理学把握生活世界的三种方式

只要有人类存在,只要人们愿意生活下去并意欲过上好生活,伦理以及伦理学的存在就是必然的.伦理道德绝不仅仅是过往生活经验的总结,伦理学也不仅仅为过往的和当下的生活作注释和辩护,伦理和伦理学本质上是面向未来的.伦理学通常以三种方式把握、解释和指导生活,这就是政坛伦理学、讲坛伦理学和论坛伦理学.在伦理学把握生活世界的三种方式之间并不存在孰优孰劣的问题,存在的只是不同题材的问题,探讨它们之间的边界以及相互通约的可能性,对于推进当下的伦理学研究无疑是重要的理论工作.     

现代技术伦理学的理论可能与实践意义

本文首先提出了现代伦理学的必不可少的原则，然后根据这些原则概述了程序伦理学，论证了它的理论可能性和社会意义。这种伦理学并不涉及“美好生活”问题，而是一种以非暴力方式解决由于人们的“美好生活”观的多样性而产生的社会冲突的方法论。作者将这样的伦理学同现代技术发展联系起来，从而规定了技术伦理学的特征     

道德价值的理性建构——兼论当前伦理学科的发展

道德价值是道德本质的真正体现,对于元伦理、规范伦理、美德伦理具有根本性和终极性的意义。现代伦理学的一个主要问题就是对于道德价值的忽视,这在很大程度上影响了伦理学的发展与社会道德的进步。建构起公正与幸福的道德价值,可以生成内在的激励机制,促进个体道德的提升、增强规范伦理的有效性,可以促成元伦理、规范伦理、美德伦理的统一。人类为实现幸福的公正而制定的规范才是真正的道德规范,人类为实现公正的幸福而完善的德性才是真正的美德。     

应用伦理学的双重意味

应用伦理学是因应人性的新发展而产生的伦理学新形态。这与我们在传统伦理学意义上讲的应用伦理学是不一样的。后者是一种广义的应用伦理学。由于伦理学本身就内涵了应用的特性,所以不管伦理学有何种形态,都可以成为现实社会生活领域的应用伦理学。在这个意义上,伦理学就意味着应用伦理学。前者是一种狭义上的应用伦理学,由于它内涵了传统伦理学所不具有的新的人性纬度,因而是伦理学的当代形态。这个意义上的应用伦理学则意味着伦理学。     

选择可能性原则和法兰克福式的反例

一自由论者认为 ,行动者的自由是建立在“拥有选择的能力”之基础上的 ,作出一个选择是对所拥有的选择能力的练习 ,既不是被因果确定了的 ,又有解释其产生的原因。现在让我们看一下选择可能性原则 (ＰＡＰ)的明确规定 :行动者只有在他可以自由地作出彼种选择的情况下 ,才对他所作出的此种选择负道德责任。传统上自由论者坚持认为 ,对一个选择所负的道德责任需以可以作出别样选择的自由为前提。这样 ,如果一个行动者出于理由Ｒ1的考虑选择进行了行为Ａ ,他只有在可以自由的选择由于理由Ｒ2不去做Ａ或者由于理由Ｒ3而选择作出另一个完全不同于…     

论麦金太尔的道德叙事理论

麦金太尔在近著《现代性冲突中的伦理学:欲望、实践推理与叙事》中对其道德叙事思想进行了系统化、理论化的阐释。具体而言,在伦理学的话语体系中,我们反思自己为了满足某些欲望或者因为何种理由选择这样做而非那样做时,也就是试图解释我作为一个理性行为者的行动是合理的。我们通过这类解释能够发展出一种关于人类行为的结构性叙事,从而获得透彻理解人类幸福意味着什么的方式。这一叙事不仅是文本的,也是历史的、实践的,我们对自己的选择、行动、人生的理解和解释都体现着叙事的作用,这一叙事又是所属传统与社会背景下的宏观叙事的一部分。     

走向实用主义多元论——试论普特南伦理学思想的理论维度与价值

美国著名哲学家希拉里·普特南晚年的学术旨趣逐渐转向伦理学.他主张建构一种既关注现实的道德实践又不放弃寻求客观性的伦理学来纠正逻辑实证主义之后哲学研究过于科学主义化的倾向.普特南认为,哲学必须同时具有理论化和道德化两个面向,应该采取实用主义多元论的立场,来建构伦理学的学科形象和理论关切.普特南提出当前的伦理学研究至少需要融合列维纳斯、亚里士多德、康德和杜威所代表的四种不同的理论维度,以便在尊重具体的道德情境与寻求道德思考的客观性、普遍性之间找到平衡.分析普特南构想的实用主义多元论伦理学出场的学术背景和思想内涵,并在哲学史意义上对其学术立场的建设性和可行性加以揭示具有重要的理论意义.普特南客观评价了各种伦理学观点,主张放弃一元论,倡导用一种可错论精神去构想伦理学.这些都显露出其伦理学思想的独特价值.     

The Failure of Roy Bhaskar's Explanatory Critique

According to Roy Bhaskar, social science can derive values from social facts by a process called “explanatory critique.” Bhaskar offers two different versions of explanatory critique: a belief-based version and a need-based version. Both versions are faced with a difficult objection. They seem either to employ an invalid inference or to assume the values that they are attempting to derive. I argue that at least the need-based version of Bhaskar's explanatory critique falls to the objection, and that the belief-based version on its own is insufficient. Bhaskar anticipates the objection and offers a defense. I show that his defense is unsuccessful. I also suggest a Baskar-inspired alternative explanatory critique.     

Trust, Staking, and Expectations

Trust is a kind of risky reliance on another person. Social scientists have offered two basic accounts of trust: predictive expectation accounts and staking (betting) accounts. Predictive expectation accounts identify trust with a judgment that performance is likely. Staking accounts identify trust with a judgment that reliance on the person's performance is worthwhile. I argue (1) that these two views of trust are different, (2) that the staking account is preferable to the predictive expectation account on grounds of intuitive adequacy and coherence with plausible explanations of action; and (3) that there are counterexamples to both accounts. I then set forward an additional necessary condition on trust (added to the staking view), according to which trust implies a moral expectation. When A trusts B to do x , A ascribes to B an obligation to do x , and holds B to this obligation. This Moral Expectation view throws new light on some of the consequences of misplaced trust. I use the example of physicians' defensive behavior/defensive medicine to illustrate this final point.     

Scientific authorship,pluralism, and practice

In this article, I argue that understanding authorship requires that we grapple with the plurality of distinct accounts of scientific authorship. As a result, we should be careful in how we identify and quantify unethical practices such as ghostwriting. Judgements about who should be able to decide who is an author raise interesting questions about the autonomy of scientific practices.     

Ethical Virtues in Scientific Research

Most approaches to promoting integrity in research are principle-based in that they portray ethical conduct as consisting of adherence to ethical rules, duties, or responsibilities. Bruce MacFarlane has recently criticized the principle-based approach to promoting integrity in research and offered a virtue-based alternative. MacFarlane argues that principle-based approaches do not provide adequate guidance for ethical decision-making and are not very useful in moral education. In this article, I examine and critique MacFarlane's defense of the virtue-based approach. I argue that virtue-based and principle-based approaches to ethics are complementary and that they both can help promote research integrity.     

Social cognition,social neuroscience,and evolutionary social psychology: What's missing?

In this paper I argue that something important, and something social, is missing from contemporary accounts of social cognition, social neuroscience and evolutionary social psychology. Contemporary accounts of social cognition focus on cognition directed towards social objects, that is, towards persons and social groups. In contrast, early twentieth century accounts of socially engaged cognition focused upon beliefs and attitudes oriented to the represented beliefs and attitudes of members of social ‘reference groups’ and directed towards both social and non‐social objects. I argue that this earlier conception of socially engaged cognition should be integrated with contemporary research on social cognition, social neuroscience and evolutionary social psychology, since it poses a challenge but also an opportunity for these disciplines.     

"Mirror Neurons," Collective Objects and the Problem of Transmission: Reconsidering Stephen Turner's Critique of Practice Theory

In this paper, I critically examine Stephen Turner's (1994) critique of practice theory in light of recent neurophysiological discoveries regarding the “mirror neuron system” in the pre‐frontal mo‐tor cortex of humans and other primates. I argue that two of Turner's strongest objections against the sociological version of the practice‐theoretical account, the problem of transmission and the problem of sameness, are substantially undermined when examined from the perspective of re‐cently systematized accounts of embodied learning and intersubjective action understanding in‐spired by these developments. In addition, I show that the practice‐theoretical framework out‐lined by Pierre Bourdieu in the Logic of Practice and other works is, in contrast to Turner's por‐trayal of a confused hodgepodge of logical errors and empirical impossibilities, largely consistent with the latest neurophysiological evidence and as such fundamentally foreshadowed more recent understandings of the neurocognitive foundations of the perception, understanding and structure of the motor schemes productive of action in the world. Also in line with these newer neurosci‐entific developments, the practice‐theoretical focus on the body as the central matrix generative of tacit understandings and analogical operations responsible for “higher order” systems of classi‐fication emerges as the key to solving some of the thorniest problems in the theory of action: eliminating to need to resort to unwarranted “collective object” explanations for the origins of shared presuppositional frameworks.     

Minimal Risk in Pediatric Research: A Philosophical Review and Reconsideration

Despite more than thirty years of debate, disagreement persists among research ethicists about the most appropriate way to interpret the U.S. regulations on pediatric research, specifically the categories of “minimal risk” and a “minor increase over minimal risk.” Focusing primarily on the definition of “minimal risk,” we argue in this article that the continued debate about the pediatric risk categories is at least partly because their conceptual status is seldom considered directly. Once this is done, it becomes clear that the most popular strategy for interpreting “minimal risk”—defining it as a specific set of risks—is indefensible and, from a pragmatic perspective, unlikely to resolve disagreement. Primarily this is because judgments about minimal risk are both normative and heavily intuitive in nature and thus cannot easily be captured by reductions to a given set of risks. We suggest instead that a more defensible approach to evaluating risk should incorporate room for reflection and deliberation. This dispositional, deliberative framework can nonetheless accommodate a number of intellectual resources for reducing reliance on sheer intuition and improving the quality of risk evaluations.     

Hybridization in China's elder care service provision

Although the party‐state has embarked on a mission to increase elder care services, evaluating this development according to different sectors demonstrates certain challenges. Official statistics do not include sector‐specific information, and while provider websites suggest that elder care services are largely in public hands, Chinese experts argue that they are mostly “civilian‐run.” How can we explain these discrepancies in data on Chinese elder care? Drawing on the concept of hybridization and triangulating quantitative and qualitative data, I argue that the party‐state's efforts to “socialize” elder care provision has resulted in hybridization within the industry which blurs the line between care providers and obfuscates the stark role of the state in elder care service provision. During the implementation of state‐initiated hybridization, providers misclassify their ownership type to benefit from financial incentives or circumvent political control, resulting in even greater hybridization and fragmentation on the ground.