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在关键词拍卖中,由于广告商不能保证对关键词的估价是最优投标价格,因此如何选取最优的关键词投标价格一直是广告商急于解决的问题。基于与Friedman投标模型假设条件等价的关键词拍卖投标假设条件,计算了各个关键词广告位置的胜标概率,并在广义第一价格拍卖机制下建立了关键词投标价格决策模型。该模型可以使广告商选取最优的关键词投标价格。最后通过仿真验证了该模型的有效性。 相似文献
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本文从项目拍卖者的角度,对交通BOT项目进行特许经营权机制设计,设计了一套科学合理的竞标机制来提高项目拍卖者对特许经营权的配置效率。我们运用激励机制设计思想建立了竞标机制模型,在保证竞标企业参与投标和真实显示自己的经营能力的条件下最大化期望社会福利,通过求解此模型得到了最优的竞标机制;鉴于最优机制在形式上的复杂性,我们给出了得分规则拍卖和供应契约拍卖两种最优拍卖方式。 相似文献
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评标专家均衡随机抽取模型 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
在分析原有评标专家抽取模型不足的基础上,本文提出了评标专家均衡随机抽取模型.这种新的抽取模型不仅可以保证抽取过程的随机性,还能改善一段时间内专家被抽取状况的均衡性.本文介绍了新模型的构建思路和算法步骤,并利用实际数据进行仿真实验,验证了新模型的优势.评标专家均衡随机抽取模型的提出对提高招投标工作的公平性和公正性具有重要的现实意义. 相似文献
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Owing to servitisation, manufacturing companies are increasingly required to compete through the provision of services around their products. The contracts for these services are often allocated through competitive bidding where the potential suppliers submit a price bid to the customer. The pricing decision is influenced by various uncertainties. This article proposes a conceptual framework depicting these influencing uncertainties on the bidding strategy. This framework is based on three empirical studies with industry investigating different viewpoints on the decision-making process. The intention is to support the pricing decision when competitively bidding for a service contract. The framework can be applied to specific competitive bidding situations to identify the influencing uncertainties, model them and depict their influences on the pricing decision. 相似文献
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产品的期望寿命是重要的质量属性之一,事前不可观察且不可验证,直接对该质量属性进行投标没有意义。针对此问题,以大型寿命型医疗设备招标采购为例,利用拍卖机制设计理论建立了一类具有信号传递功能的多属性招标采购模型。模型确定了最优投标规则,包括设备最优期望寿命投标、最优保修期投标与最优价格支付。模型确立了甄别投标企业技术类型与传递产品质量可靠性信息的机制。研究结果表明:首先该机制满足参与约束与激励相容约束,投标企业分别按自身期望利润最大化进行投标;其次该最优机制能保证企业承诺的保修期与期望寿命正相关,能保证技术类型最高、所提供产品期望寿命最大(保修期最长)的企业中标,并且中标企业创造相对来说最高的社会福利。构造一个算例说明新的多属性招标采购机制在实践中易于操作,是可实施的。当质量指标存在不可观察和不可验证的维度时,相关研究为解决多属性招标采购问题提供了一个新思路。 相似文献
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在发电商报价古诺模型基础上,运用有限理性动态与自适应动态,建立了考虑滞后的电力报价动态模型,然后对动态模型的稳定域、倍岔、混沌等进行仿真分析;在此基础上,分别分析了滞后因子与不同报价动态对发电商的平均收益的影响,然后运用状态滞后反馈控制方法,对滞后报价动态模型进行了混沌控制分析;分析结果表明:1)引入滞后因子有利于报价系统的稳定,但并不一定能增加发电商的收益;2)在均衡状态下发电商获得最大的平均收益,在Nash均衡形成前,发电商宜采用自适应动态,但失稳后则宜采用有限理性动态;3)选择合适的控制参数,可维持报价系统Nash均衡的稳定,但若发电商仅考虑短期收益,则没有积极性去采用滞后控制策略. 相似文献
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Douglas R. Moodie 《Production and Operations Management》1999,8(2):151-162
The research considers the problem of demand management in a firm where the firm's historical delivery service level reputation influences the number of quotation requests from its potential customers. Customers have a maximum and the firm has a minimum net price to due date tradeoff curve for each job. The demand management function bargains with the customer over price and promised due date. Bargaining finishes either with an agreed price and delivery date or with the customer refusing the firm's bid and placing the order elsewhere. The firm's objective is to maximize its long-term net revenue. The firm's demand management negotiation strategy guides this bidding process. The research demonstrates the use of simulation to test different demand management bidding and negotiation strategies for different market and firm scenarios. The demonstration uses 16 scenarios to test the different demand management negotiation strategies with a model of a classical job shop in a classical market. The investigation examines finite scheduling-based due date estimation methods, as well as the more traditional parameter-based methods. This demonstration shows that it is possible to test different bidding policies, using a simulation model of a firm and its customers, and to obtain usable results. 相似文献
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Nuno Cassola Ali Hortasu Jakub Kastl 《Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society》2013,81(4):1309-1345
We study European banks' demand for short‐term funds (liquidity) during the summer 2007 subprime market crisis. We use bidding data from the European Central Bank's auctions for one‐week loans, their main channel of monetary policy implementation. Our analysis provides a high‐frequency, disaggregated perspective on the 2007 crisis, which was previously studied through comparisons of collateralized and uncollateralized interbank money market rates which do not capture the heterogeneous impact of the crisis on individual banks. Through a model of bidding, we show that banks' bids reflect their cost of obtaining short‐term funds elsewhere (e.g., in the interbank market) as well as a strategic response to other bidders. The strategic response is empirically important: while a naïve interpretation of the raw bidding data may suggest that virtually all banks suffered an increase in the cost of short‐term funding, we find that, for about one third of the banks, the change in bidding behavior was simply a strategic response. We also find considerable heterogeneity in the short‐term funding costs among banks: for over one third of the bidders, funding costs increased by more than 20 basis points, and funding costs vary widely with respect to the country‐of‐origin. The funding costs we estimate using bidding data are also predictive of market‐ and accounting‐based measures of bank performance, reinforcing the usefulness of “revealed preference” information contained in bids. 相似文献
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针对新股询价“价高者得”的配给规则,本文提出与之相对应的“价近者得”规则,运用进化博弈理论,对询价对象群体建立单群体模仿者动态模型,分析两种规则下询价对象的报价行为和新股发行价格的形成,并采用2009年6月到2010年10月我国中小企业板市场发行的新股数据,对两种规则下询价对象的进化稳定策略进行数值分析。结果表明,当询价对象预期抑价率均值足够大时,“价高者得”规则下询价对象有高报价的倾向,而“价近者得”规则下询价对象倾向于合理报价,改变我国现行“价高者得”的新股分配规则,采取“价近者得”的规则有助于提高IPO询价效率。 相似文献
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Lars Engwall 《Omega》1975,3(4):395-401
This paper discusses the importance of permanent customer relations for firms in an environment where bidding takes place. The analysis is first directed toward the bidding resources per order with special reference to the differences in order rate between permanent and non-permanent customers. The importance for bidding firms to keep close track of order rates for different customer groups is stressed here. In the succeeding analysis the bidding on requests from non-permanent customers is treated as investments in future orders. Here we note the dilemma of firms with low or zero profit margins, which are likely to bid on too many bids, thus incurring higher bidding costs than their more profitable competitors. 相似文献
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关键词拍卖是搜索引擎盈利手段之一,同时给广告主带来高额回报。在搜索引擎注重质量权重的拍卖规则的推动下和广告主自身利益的驱使下,广告主通过投资来提高自身表现水平,赢得更好排位增加点击量。引入广告主投资,并用连续可变的努力水平来表征参与竞价的广告主投资过程中所付出的各种要素和资源投入,考虑投资和竞价两阶段模型,分析高低两类广告主的努力水平决策及均衡竞价策略。研究表明当满足初始投入最低努力水平时的边际成本大于边际收益的条件时,决定低类型广告主类型转换的估价阈值存在且唯一,并且在情形一中,潜力广告主的最优努力水平总是大于高类型广告主,在情形二中,随着估价的增大,两类广告主的最优努力水平趋于一致;同时,搜索引擎拍卖规则会影响广告主投资过程中最优努力水平的决策:搜索引擎给低类型广告主的质量权重越大,转换类型的估价阈值就越高,且潜力广告主取内点解时的最优努力水平和高类型广告主的最优努力水平均随之减少。最后,通过数值算例分析了两类广告主最优努力水平以及拍卖规则对广告主努力水平的影响。 相似文献
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本文考虑一个由单个制造商和多个供应商群体组成的供应链——该制造商需要采购多个部件,对于每个部件在市场上均存在多个供应商。不同于传统的从各供应商群体分别采购各个部件,制造商考虑将所有部件的采购整体外包给某个供应商。在第一阶段,制造商使用一级价格密封投标的逆向拍卖来确定赢得整体采购合约的供应商。接下来,第一阶段投标的获胜者生产其所能供应的部件,并使用逆向拍卖向第一阶段中未获胜的其他竞标者采购其余部件。我们分析了供应商在两个阶段的均衡竞价策略,并比较了制造商在亲自逐件采购和外包整体采购两种情况下的期望采购成本。我们证明了在两种机制下制造商的总的期望采购成本相等。 相似文献
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We analyze bidding behavior in auctions when risk‐averse buyers bid for a good whose value is risky. We show that when the risk in the valuations increases, DARA bidders will reduce their bids by more than the appropriate increase in the risk premium. Ceteris paribus, buyers will be better off bidding for a more risky object in first price, second price, and English auctions with affiliated common (interdependent) values. This “precautionary bidding” effect arises because the expected marginal utility of income increases with risk, so buyers are reluctant to bid so highly. We also show that precautionary bidding behavior can make DARA bidders prefer bidding in a common values setting to bidding in a private values one when risk‐neutral or CARA bidders would be indifferent. Thus the potential for a “winner's curse” can be a blessing for rational DARA bidders. 相似文献
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The generalized second price auction has recently become a much studied model for sponsored search auctions for Internet advertisement.
Though it is known not to be incentive compatible, properties of its pure Nash equilibria have been well characterized under
the single bidding strategy of each bidder. 相似文献