Developing strategic thinking in senior management

Chief Executive Officers have recently stated that their greatest staffing challenge for the 1990s is the development of strategic leadership in their senior management. In order to do this, it is necessary to identify the substance of strategic thinking, and the capabilities that must be mastered. Writers on strategy have identified six major elements of strategic thinking and these have been organized to reveal the tasks, questions, decisions, and skills that senior executives must acquire in order to lead their organizations strategically. Finally, the article identifies training programme elements which are used by Directors of Manpower Development to develop strategic leadership ability.     

Motivating knowledge sharing through a knowledge management system

Based on both economic and sociological theory, the effects of supervisory control and organizational support on the frequency and effort of individuals in contributing their personally held valuable knowledge to a “best practices-lessons learned, repository-based” knowledge management system (KMS) were compared. Supervisory control, as expected, had significant impact on frequency, but it also had unexpectedly significant influence on effort. When system variables—usefulness and ease of use—were controlled for, the organizational support measure had little effect on either outcome. These results provide greater support for economic-agency-theory motivators of knowledge sharing and lesser support for organizational support motivators than has been previously believed. They also emphasize the important impact of systems variables in motivating KMS use. Since the study was conducted in a government (joint civilian–military) organization, the organizational type may significantly influence the results. However, since the result is contrary to the conventional wisdom that suggests that a “knowledge-sharing culture” is all-important, at the very least, this study shows that the nature of the organization may moderate the relationship between the motivational approach and the outcomes.     

Leadership across hierarchical levels: Multiple levels of management and multiple levels of analysis

We examined differences in leadership influence processes, perceptions, and multiple levels-of-analysis effects between close and distant charismatic and contingent reward leadership across three hierarchical levels in 13 Korean companies. Multi-source data revealed that followers' commitment to the leader mediated relationships between leadership and followers' attitudinal, behavioral, and performance outcomes in close situations, but not in distant relationships. Leadership at higher levels of management was positively related to leadership at the next lower level, which in turn related to follower outcomes at the lowest echelon. Multivariate within and between analysis indicated multiple-level effects differing by leader–follower distance and for the variables of interest.     

Trust in management and knowledge sharing: The mediating effects of fear and knowledge documentation

Knowledge sharing within and between teams is of vital importance for organizations. The influence of interpersonal trust in general and trust in management in particular on knowledge sharing is evident. However, it is not clear how the relationship between interpersonal trust and knowledge sharing works. This study provides a better understanding of that relationship by demonstrating that fear of losing one's unique value and knowledge documentation have a mediating effect on the relationship between trust in management and knowledge sharing. Specifically, trust in management increases knowledge sharing through reducing fear of losing one's unique value and improving willingness to document knowledge. These findings have important implications at both a managerial and theoretical level. For managers, this paper emphasizes the individual's central role in the knowledge sharing process in terms of knowledge documentation and fear of losing one's unique value. On the theoretical level, this study provides empirical evidence for two mechanisms that help explain the effect of trust in management on knowledge sharing. In future research, this study could be extended to include other psychosocial phenomena that enable knowledge sharing in organizations.     

Customer knowledge sharing in cross-border mergers and acquisitions: The role of customer motivation and promise management

Knowledge is a vital source of competitive advantage and renewal for contemporary organizations. However, to date, few studies have scrutinized how mergers and acquisitions (M&As)—processes dependent on knowledge sharing—offer a valuable inter-organizational context through which to understand the attainment of customer knowledge sharing following M&As. Applying an integrated theoretical perspective from customer relationship management and M&A performance research, we study a Chinese–Finnish acquisition and customer firms of the acquired party across four advanced Western countries. We find that customer knowledge sharing is an active relationship management process that relies on the factors of customer dedication-based motivation vs. customer concerns about M&As to maintain relationships after acquisitions. In addition, and more importantly, we find that the promise management mechanisms—making promises, enabling promises, and keeping promises—of the M&A parties reinforce the motivational factors to maintain customer knowledge sharing in cross-border M&As. We propose a conceptual framework of customer knowledge sharing in cross-border M&As.     

Coordination of a multidivisional organization through two levels of management

This paper develops the bilevel multidivisional programming problem (BMPP) as a model for a decentralized organization. In particular, a hierarchical arrangement comprising one superior unit and M subordinate units is proposed where each unit is assumed to control a unique set of decision variables defined over jointly dependent strategy sets. Individual but interdependent objective functions are also assumed so that each unit may influence but not control another. In the formulation, decisions are made in two stages with top management given the first choice followed by the concurrent responses of the divisions. In this way it is possible to account for production externalities at the lower level and coordination activities at the higher level. As such, after outlining the major geometry of the linear case, the usefulness of the general model is discussed from a management perspective. Ramifications relating to opportunity costs, capacity utilization and computational requirements are presented and highlighted through a variety of examples.     

Information sharing in supply chains

Supply chain is defined as a system of suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, retailers and customers where material, financial and information flows connect participants in both directions. Most supply chains are composed of independent agents with individual preferences. It is expected that no single agent has the power to optimise the supply chain. Supply chain management is now seen as a governing element in strategy and as an effective way of creating value for customers. The so-called bullwhip effect, describing growing variation upstream in a supply chain, is probably the most famous demonstration that decentralised decision making can lead to poor supply chain performance. Information asymmetry is one of the most powerful sources of the bullwhip effect. Information sharing of customer demand has an impact on the bullwhip effect. Information technology has lead to centralised information, shorter lead times and smaller batch sizes. The analysis of causes of the bullwhip effect has lead to suggestions for reducing the bullwhip effect in supply chains by strategic partnership. Supply chain partnership leads to increased information flows, reduced uncertainty, and a more profitable supply chain. The cooperation is based on contacts and formal agreements. Information exchange is very important issue for coordinating actions of units. New business practices and information technology make the coordination even closer. Information sharing and strategic partnerships of units can be modelled by different network structures.     

Horizontal capacity sharing between asymmetric competitors

A common practice to address supply-demand mismatch is capacity sharing, whereby a firm possessing excessive capacity collaborates with its rival that is incapable of meeting captured demand. However, previous studies have seldom focused on the role of capacity sharing in shaping market competition. In this paper, we investigate coopetition strategies under two widely used contracting mechanisms of capacity sharing, namely, the linear transfer payment contracting mechanism and the revenue sharing contracting mechanism. In a model of two competitors with asymmetric capacities, we find that the larger firm becomes less aggressive in market competition and benefits more from capacity sharing. Competition between the firms will be softened by capacity sharing. Moreover, competition intensity is more likely to be higher under the linear transfer payment contracting mechanism than under the revenue sharing contracting mechanism, while it may be lower if the total capacities are slightly larger than the aggregate demand.     

Bayesian Modeling of Initiating Event Frequencies at Nuclear Power Plants1

Probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) of nuclear power plants proceed by modeling potential accident sequences at the plant of interest. These hypothesized accident sequences begin with initiating events. A very important initiating event phenomenon is the loss of off-site power (LOSP). This is the interruption of the preferred power supply to the essential and nonessential switchgear buses resulting in the use of emergency power supplies. If off-site power is not restored in a reasonable period of time, emergency backup sources of AC and DC power may subsequently fail, resulting in a possible core meltdown. Industry data show 63 LOSP incidents in the operating history of nuclear plants in the United States. Two Bayesian models for the frequency of incidents of LOSP are presented. One model assumes that all nuclear power generating stations share a common incidence rate for LOSP, and a posterior distribution is found for the mean incidence rate for all plants. The second model assumes that the incidence rates for individual plants belong to a superpopulation of incidence rates. Under this model the incidence rate for each plant is unique, but related to the incident rate of all other plants through the superpopulation. These models provide a vehicle for incorporating initiating event uncertainty into PRAs.     

Supply chain coordination using revenue-dependent revenue sharing contracts

A typical single period revenue sharing contract specifies a priori a fixed fraction for the supply chain revenue to be shared among the supply chain players. Over the years, supply chains, especially in the movie industry, have adopted multi-period revenue sharing contracts that specify one fraction for each contract period. These revenue sharing contracts are of revenue-independent type such that the revenue sharing fractions are independent of the quantum of revenue generated. Motivated by the recent events in Bollywood – one of the popular arms of the Indian movie industry – in this paper we develop and analyze a game theoretic model for revenue-dependent revenue sharing contracts wherein the actual proportion in which the supply chain revenue is shared among the players depends on the quantum of revenue generated. Our aim is to understand why revenue-dependent revenue sharing contracts are (or not) preferred over revenue-independent contracts. We also examine if supply chains can be coordinated over multiple periods using both types of revenue sharing contracts. We build a two-period model characterizing supply chains in the movie industry and highlight the implications of the multi-period contractual setting for the supply chain coordinating revenue sharing contracts. We show that supply chains can be perfectly coordinated using both types of revenue sharing contracts; however, there exist situations in which revenue-dependent contracts outperform revenue-independent contracts. Using revenue-dependent revenue sharing contracts supply chains can be coordinated while providing positive surplus to the supply chain players that is otherwise not possible under certain situations in revenue-independent contracts. We also demonstrate how revenue-dependent contracts enhance supply chain coordination and highlight their significance when the drop in the revenue potential from one period to another is moderate.     

The ethical aspects of gain sharing with physicians

Gain sharing arrangements involving physicians can be a model combination of ethical business practices and maximizing profits. Or, gain sharing can be as unethical as fee-splitting was at the turn of the century, and as corrupt as any conflict of interest. The devil is--or is not--in the details.     

Critical factors affecting information sharing in supply chains

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to empirically examine a comprehensive list of factors that are anticipated to affect information sharing (IS) in supply chains (SC) in the context of a landlocked developing country Nepal. A survey questionnaire was developed and data were collected from 131 supply chain participants in Nepal. Exploratory factor analysis and path analysis were conducted to examine the fitness of the proposed model and the relationships between the identified factors and information sharing. The results suggest that interaction routines and personal connection influenced both operational and strategic information sharing while organisational compatibility, incentives, project payoffs, commitment (inter-organisational), top management commitment and supply network configuration affected operational IS and government support and monitoring were associated with strategic IS. The paper provides empirical evidence on how information sharing is affected in the context of a landlocked developing country. The paper also identifies and discusses the similarities and differences in the importance of these factors on information sharing between developed and developing countries. The main limitation is the moderate sample size as compared to the large number of variables contained in the study which may have limited the use of analytical tools. The study provides a better understanding of information sharing behaviours of supply chain participants in Nepal which will help firms to develop strategies accordingly to enhance information sharing.     

Cost sharing on prices for games on graphs

Let \(N=\{1,\dots ,n\}\) be a set of customers who want to buy a single homogenous goods in market. Let \(q_i>0\) be the quantity that \(i\in N\) demands, \(q=(q_1,\dots ,q_n)\) and \(q_S=\sum _{i\in S}q_i\) for \(S\subseteq N\). If f(s) is a (increasing and concave) cost function, then it yields a cooperative game (N, f, q) by defining characteristic function \(v(S)=f(q_S)\) for \(S\subseteq N\). We now consider the way of taking packages of goods by customers and define a communication graph L on N, in which i and j are linked if they can take packages for each other. So if i and j are connected, then a package can be delivered from i to j by some intermediators. We thus admit any connected subset as a feasible coalition, and obtain a game (N, f, q, L) by defining characteristic function \(v_L(S)=\sum _{R\in S/L}f(q_R)\) for \(S\subseteq N\), where S / L is the family of induced components (maximal connected subset) in S. It is shown that there is an allocation (cost shares) \(x=(x_1,\dots ,x_n)\) from the core for the game (\(x_S\le v_L(S)\) for any \(S\subseteq N\)) such that x satisfies Component Efficiency and Ranking for Unit Prices. If f(s) and q satisfy some further condition, then there is an allocation x from the core such that x satisfies Component Efficiency, and \(x_i \le x_j\) and \(\frac{x_i}{q_i} \ge \frac{x_j}{q_j}\) if \(q_i \le q_j\) for i and j in the same component of N.