Candidate Sex and Congressional Elections

Abstract

In 1992, an unprecedented number of women were elected to Congress. This election seemed to debunk the notion of female disadvantage as female candidates ran better than males. Since 1992, however, female candidates have failed to compete as effectively as men in congressional elections, again raising the specter of a sex bias. In this paper, we examine 365 open seat congressional elections held since 1982 in order to ascertain whether the indicators of female success in the 1980s and early 1990s structured female candidate success and/or failure after 1992. For this study, these indicators include candidate attributes such as financial quality and candidate experience. Our examination indicates that candidate attributes have significantly weakened as predictors of open seat election outcomes, especially in female versus male races. Instead, a strong increase in the correlation of the presidential normal vote and the congressional vote in open seats since 1992 indicates the emergence of elections where candidate attributes are secondary to the partisanship of the district. Female versus male races demonstrate much higher partisan coherence than all-male open seat contests, and Democratic women run about six points behind Republican women when district partisanship is controlled. These factors, combined with the increasingly Democratic distribution of female nominations, mitigate against female gains through open seats after 1992.     

On the selection of the same winner by all scoring rules

Different scoring rules can result in the selection of any of the k competing candidates, given the same preference profile, (Saari DG 2001, Chaotic elections! A mathematician looks at voting. American Mathematical Society, Providence, R.I.). It is also possible that a candidate, and even a Condorcet winning candidate, cannot be selected by any scoring rule, (Saari DG 2000 Econ Theory 15:55–101). These findings are balanced by Saari’s result (Saari DG 1992 Soc Choice Welf 9(4):277–306) that specifies the necessary and sufficient condition for the selection of the same candidate by all scoring rules. This condition is, however, indirect. We provide a sufficient condition that is stated directly in terms of the preference profile; therefore, its testability does not require the verdict of any voting rule.     

The Influence of Gender on the Placement of Children with Gay or Lesbian Adoptive Parents

Abstract

This study examines the opinions of men and women from a random phone sample of super voters (those persons voting in the last three out of four possible elections) in Florida (N = 413) toward gay men and/or lesbians as adoptive parents. The survey gathered information on whether the respondents would place boys or girls available for adoption with gay men or lesbians. Controlling for various demographic variables, bivariate logistic regressions were performed for each possible parent/child combination. Several variables were consistently significant across the models tested, explaining from 22 to 29% of the variance. These included race/ethnicity, religious identification, respondent's gender, and political ideology. Implications of this study for policy-makers and child welfare practitioners are posited.     

Statistical Methods and Graphical Displays for Analyzing How the Association Between Two Qualitative Variables Differs Among Countries, Among Groups, Or Over Time: A Modified Regression-Type Approach

Many interesting sociological questions pertain to how the association between two variables depends on a third variable. In sociological applications, the third variable often pertains to countries, to subgroups of a population, or to time periods. We propose a regression-type approach that specifies that the log-odds- ratios that describe the two-way association of interest are a linear function of latent scores for the third variable. Additive and multiplicative models currently in use by researchers are special cases of the regression-type model. To illustrate the utility of the regression-type approach, we apply this approach to analyze (1) data on occupational mobility in the United States, Britain, and Japan (comparing mobility in these countries) and (2) data on the association between religion and voting behavior in U.S. presidential elections from 1968 to 1992 (comparing this association in the different elections). We also introduce here graphical displays that can be used to obtain worthwhile information about goodness-of-fit and to aid in substantive interpretation.     

DECEPTION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: THEORY AND LABORATORY EVIDENCE

We model two‐candidate elections in which (1) voters are uncertain about candidates' attributes; and (2) candidates can inform voters of their attributes by sending advertisements. We compare between political campaigns with truthful advertising and campaigns in which there is a small chance of deceptive advertising. Our model predicts that voters should vote in‐line with an advertisement's information. We test our model's predictions using laboratory elections. We find, in the presence of even a small probability that an advertisement is deceptive, voters become substantially more likely to elect a “low‐quality” candidate. We discuss implications of this for existing models of voting decisions. (JEL C92, D72, D82)     

Contending with the “Double Handicap”

SUMMARY

This article explores the impact of a quarter century of gender politics in presidential elections in the United States stressing the dual importance of differences between men and women, the gender gap, and women as a political force as they have come not only to exceed men in their voting numbers but also in their turnout rate. It reviews the way women's votes have affected presidential campaigns, drawing attention to the effect women's and men's votes have had on the Electoral College which is what counts in presidential elections. It raises the important question of what impact the attention to women voters has had on the public policies of administrations between elections.     

Rationalizations of Condorcet-consistent rules via distances of hamming type

In voting, the main idea of the distance rationalizability framework is to view the voters’ preferences as an imperfect approximation to some kind of consensus. This approach, which is deeply rooted in the social choice literature, allows one to define (“rationalize”) voting rules via a consensus class of elections and a distance: a candidate is said to be an election winner if she is ranked first in one of the nearest (with respect to the given distance) consensus elections. It is known that many classic voting rules can be distance-rationalized. In this article, we provide new results on distance rationalizability of several Condorcet-consistent voting rules. In particular, we distance-rationalize the Young rule and Maximin using distances similar to the Hamming distance. It has been claimed that the Young rule can be rationalized by the Condorcet consensus class and the Hamming distance; we show that this claim is incorrect and, in fact, this consensus class and distance yield a new rule, which has not been studied before. We prove that, similarly to the Young rule, this new rule has a computationally hard winner determination problem.     

Pre-election polling and third party candidates

I analyze voters’ incentives in responding to pre-election polls with a third party candidate. Third party supporters normally have an incentive to vote strategically in the election by voting for one of the major candidates. But these voters would vote third party if the third party candidate is doing surprisingly well in the polls. Because voters are more likely to vote third party if the third party candidate is doing well in polls, voters who like the third party candidate best have an incentive to claim they will vote third party in the polls so that more voters will ultimately vote third party in the election. The differing incentives faced during polls and elections accounts for why third party candidates do better in polls than in elections.     

The paradox of multiple elections

Assume that voters must choose between voting yes (Y) and voting no (N) on three propositions on a referendum. If the winning combination is NYY on the first, second, and third propositions, respectively, the paradox of multiple elections is that NYY can receive the fewest votes of the 2³ = 8 combinations. Several variants of this paradox are illustrated, and necessary and sufficient conditions for its occurrence, related to the “incoherence” of support, are given. The paradox is shown, via an isomorphism, to be a generalization of the well-known paradox of voting. One real-life example of the paradox involving voting on propositions in California, in which not a single voter voted on the winning side of all the propositions, is given. Several empirical examples of variants of the paradox that manifested themselves in federal elections – one of which led to divided government – and legislative votes in the US House of Representatives, are also analyzed. Possible normative implications of the paradox, such as allowing voters to vote directly for combinations using approval voting or the Borda count, are discussed. Received: 31 July 1996 / Accepted: 1 October 1996     

Condorcet efficiencies under the maximal culture condition

The Condorcet winner in an election is a candidate that could defeat each other candidate in a series of pairwise majority rule elections. The Condorcet efficiency of a voting rule is the conditional probability that the voting rule will elect the Condorcet winner, given that such a winner exists. The study considers the Condorcet efficiency of basic voting rules under various assumptions about how voter preference rankings are obtained. Particular attention is given to situations in which the maximal culture condition is used as a basis for obtaining voter preferences. Received: 4 February 1998/Accepted: 13 April 1998     

Voting here and there: political integration and transnational political engagement among immigrants in Europe

In this article, I examine voting patterns in origin and receiving country national elections among immigrants in Europe. The existing scholarship on transnational political engagement offers two competing interpretations of the relationship between immigrant integration and transnational engagement, which I classify as the resocialization and complementarity perspectives. The resocialization perspective assumes that transnational political engagement gradually declines as immigrants become socialized into the new receiving society. Conversely, the complementarity perspective assumes that immigrant integration increases transnational political engagement. I test these competing perspectives with survey data collected between 2004 and 2008 for 12 different immigrant groups residing in seven European cities. The analysis examines how immigrant political and civic participation in receiving countries affect their proclivities to vote in homeland elections. I also analyse the effects of receiving and origin country contexts on immigrant voting behaviour in homeland elections. While my findings support both the resocialization and complementarity perspectives, they also highlight the ways in which a set of origin‐country contexts shape immigrant propensities to engage in transnational electoral politics. I observe a degree of complementarity among immigrants with resources who are motivated and eligible to participate in both receiving and origin‐country elections.     

The Relative Irrelevance of Candidate Sex

Abstract

This study tests the relevance of candidate sex to electoral contests. We predict that voters, in general, will use issue or party cues to select between candidates and not the sex of the candidate. This will not hold under two conditions: party or issue cues are unavailable or candidate sex is likely to be particularly salient to the voter. Data were collected from a random sample of registered voters who were presented with hypothetical elections featuring candidates who were systematically varied by party, position on abortion, and sex. The results are consistent with the line of research that suggests that the majority of voters do not use candidate sex as a cue for choice, but candidate sex does affect choice among those for whom gender equality issues are particularly salient. Although generally irrelevant, candidate sex can have significant implications for the outcome of particular contests.     

Voting to belong: the inevitability of systemic Islamophobia

In this article, I connect Muslim American voting practices to the ‘good Muslim’ trope. Tracing participation of members of Islamic Representative Organizations (IRO’s) in election cycles from 2000 to 2016, I argue that elections have been a site for Muslim Americans to negotiate a sense of belonging in the U.S. My research reveals deep cynicism about the transformative potential of elections and a sense that systemic Islamophobia (i.e. militarism and surveillance) were perceived as inevitable. IRO members opted instead to vote as a way to articulate the presence of Muslims in the U.S.; for instance, Muslims ought to ‘make a statement’ by voting against Donald Trump or for the first woman candidate. In this way, voting can be understood as an articulation of a ‘good Muslim’ subjectivity through which IRO members seek legitimacy within, rather than a dismantling of, an Islamophobic milieu.     

Policy convergence in a two-candidate probabilistic voting model

We propose a generalization of the probabilistic voting model in two-candidate elections. We allow the candidates have general von Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions defined over the voting outcomes. We show that the candidates will choose identical policy positions only if the electoral competition game is constant-sum, such as when both candidates are probability-of-win maximizers or vote share maximizers, or for a small set of functions that for each voter define the probability of voting for each candidate, given candidate policy positions. At the same time, a pure-strategy local Nash equilibrium (in which the candidates do not necessarily choose identical positions) exists for a large set of such functions. Hence, if the candidate payoffs are unrestricted, the “mean voter theorem” for probabilistic voting models is shown to hold only for a small set of probability of vote functions.     

Approval voting and positional voting methods: Inference,relationship, examples

Approval voting is the voting method recently adopted by the Society for Social Choice and Welfare. Positional voting methods include the famous plurality, antiplurality, and Borda methods. We extend the inference framework of Tsetlin and Regenwetter (2003) from majority rule to approval voting and all positional voting methods. We also establish a link between approval voting and positional voting methods whenever Falmagne et al.s (1996) size-independent model of approval voting holds: In all such cases, approval voting mimics some positional voting method. We illustrate our inference framework by analyzing approval voting and ranking data, with and without the assumption of the size-independent model. For many of the existing data, including the Society for Social Choice and Welfare election analyzed by Brams and Fishburn (2001) and Saari (2001), low turnout implies that inferences drawn from such elections carry low (statistical) confidence. Whenever solid inferences are possible, we find that, under certain statistical assumptions, approval voting tends to agree with positional voting methods, and with Borda, in particular.Michel Regenwetter thanks the National Science Foundation for funding this research through NSF grant SBR 97-30076. Both authors thank the Fuqua School of Business for financially supporting their collaboration. Most of this research was done while Regenwetter was a faculty member at Fuqua. We thank Prof. Steven Brams for his valuable comments as a discussant of a previous version of this paper, given at the 2002 Public Choice meeting, and Prof. Donald Saari for his helpful comments in conversations and on another draft. We also thank the editor in charge and a referee for their valuable comments. Tsetlin acknowledges the support of the Centre for Decision Making and Risk Analysis at INSEAD.     

CANDY ELASTICITY: HALLOWEEN EXPERIMENTS ON PUBLIC POLITICAL STATEMENTS

We conducted experiments during trick‐or‐treating on Halloween in a predominantly liberal neighborhood in the weeks preceding the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections. We decorated one side of a house porch with McCain material in 2008 (Romney material in 2012) and the other side with Obama material. Children were asked to choose a side, with half receiving the same candy on either side and half receiving more candy to go to the McCain/Romney side. This yields a “candy elasticity” of children's political support. Results vary by age: children ages nine and older were two to three times more likely to choose the Republican candidate when offered double candy for voting Republican compared to when offered equal candy, whereas children ages eight and under were particularly sticky and did not waver in their choice of candidate despite the offer of double candy. (JEL C93, D72, D12)     

A law of large numbers for weighted plurality

Consider an election between $k$ candidates in which each voter votes randomly (but not necessarily independently) for a single candidate, and suppose that there is a single candidate that every voter prefers (in the sense that each voter is more likely to vote for this special candidate than any other candidate). Suppose we have a voting rule that takes all of the votes and produces a single outcome and suppose that each individual voter has little effect on the outcome of the voting rule. If the voting rule is a weighted plurality, then we show that with high probability, the preferred candidate will win the election. Conversely, we show that this statement fails for all other reasonable voting rules. This result is an extension of one by Häggström, Kalai and Mossel, who proved the above in the case $k=2$ .     

Conditions for Exercising Residents’ Voting Rights in Long-Term Care Residences: A Prospective Multicenter Study

To assess voting conditions in long-term care settings, we conducted a multicenter survey after the 2009 European elections in France. A questionnaire about voting procedures and European elections was proposed in 146 out of 884 randomized facilities. Sixty-four percent of facilities answered the questionnaire. Four percent of residents voted (national turnout: 40%), by proxy (58%) or at polling places (42%). Abstention related to procedural issues was reported in 32% of facilities. Sixty-seven percent of establishments had voting procedures, and 53% declared that they assessed residents’ capacity to vote. Assistance was proposed to residents for voter registration, for proxy voting, and for voting at polling places, respectively, in 33%, 87%, and 80% of facilities. This survey suggests that residents may be disenfranchised and that more progress should be made to protect the voting rights of residents in long-term care facilities.     

Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study

We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked preferences, we find that the rational choice theory provides very good predictions of actual individual behavior in one-round and approval voting elections but fares poorly in explaining vote choice under two-round elections. We conclude that voters behave strategically as far as strategic computations are not too demanding, in which case they rely on simple heuristics (under two-round voting) or they just vote sincerely (under single transferable vote).