Weber's Concept of Causality and the Modern Critique

Weber's concept of causality established a middle ground between the extremes of the causality debate in his day by developing a concept that was unique in two respects: it was tailored to the needs of the distinctive subject matter of the social sciences, meaningful human action, and it utilized the legal model of causal analysis. Interpreted in this light, Weber's concept meets several of the criticisms of the use of causal analysis in the social sciences recently advanced by Peters and Winch.     

Editorial

Abstract

The last century has been significant in terms of the development of the social sciences. Thus for instance, sociology, social psychology, politics, education and management have all taken their own pathways to reach some level of maturity. The relatively new addition to this group is, of course, management and its associated organisational theory that arose with Taylor at the turn of the nineteenth century. He pioneered the scientific movement and argued that management should be based on well-recognised, clearly defined and fixed principles, instead of depending on more or less hazy ideas. However, it seems that a management science has only in recent decades become substantive and rich enough to be able to think in the same terms as other branches of the social sciences. It has been enriched by the other social sciences through a process that I refer to as knowledge migration, a process in which knowledge that applies to one scientific area is migrated across to another in a way that validly transforms it to its new context. Thus, knowledge that takes a particular meaning in one of these sciences may end up with a quite different, though thematically related, meaning in another. Whenever a concept is shifted in a valid way from one paradigm that underpins a particular theory in one area of social science to another, the knowledge is migrated rather than transferred.     

From nation-state to global society: the changing paradigm of contemporary sociology

This paper discusses the strong criticism by Elias against the nation-state paradigm in sociology. Elias pointed his attention on sociologists of the twentieth century but particularly criticizes the analytical model of Parsons (AGIL), which seems to him an abstract combinatory of variables (pattern variables) without any references in social contexts. The sociology in the twentieth century is an apologetic of nation-state and, in Parsons, of the hegemonic role of the United States in the world. In fact, during the twentieth century many authors (historians and sociologists) tried to overcome the nation-state paradigm in the social sciences. The author of the paper analyses the contribution of Toynbee, Braudel, C. Schmitt, Huntington, Wallerstein and Hard–Negri. These attempts are based on different unit analysis: the civilization and its clash in the case of Toynbee and Huntington, the world economy in the case of Braudel and Wallerstein, and power in the case of C. Schmitt and Negri–Hardt. The author appreciates these attempts but his conclusion is that the concept of global society can better serve as unit analysis for a construction of a new paradigm in the social sciences.     

THE POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES

The relationship between knowledge, society, and power has been considerably rethought recently. Few defend the idea that knowledges such as the human sciences are merely representational practices. Instead, knowledge is approached as a social power to be analyzed for its social productivity. Assuming a tight link between knowledge and power, this paper aims to sketch a non-Whiggish framework for narrating the development of human sciences. I underscore how the scientization of social knowledge has, on the one hand, produced subaltern interpretative communities and, on the other hand, how these communities–as the repressed unconscious of the human sciences—have continued to shape and trouble the epistemic and social claims to authority by the human sciences.     

The making of European society: contesting methodological nationalism

The paper is concerned with the problem of “society” and in particular with the notion of “European society”. Rather than reject the possibility of society, it draws on theories of the social as networks. The thesis proposed is that the concept of society should rather be understood as a relational field of interconnections. It is argued that this is highly relevant to the analysis of Europe conceived of in terms of a society. This approach can be seen as an alternative to methodological nationalism. The paper applies a network conception of society to Europe with the emphasis on the nineteenth century. In this account, European society is not something that was produced by European integration. Rather than see European society as a recent development, it is argued that the field of tensions between capitalism and democracy constituted the major elements that shaped a European model of society.     

UNDERSTANDING BATESON AND MATURANA: TOWARD A BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATION FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES*

The attempts to clarify (purify) the conceptual foundations of family therapy by means of “epistemology” have bred excitement, boredom, irritation and confusion. In the belief that at least the confusion can be alleviated, the present paper is offered as a study guide and something of a Rosetta Stone for translating the work of Gregory Bateson and Humberto R. Maturana. The paper demonstrates that Maturana's work is highly compatible with that of Bateson. In addition, several major points of contrast are argued: (1) Maturana's concept of structure determinism is an explicit ontological claim which directly implies an epistemology, whereas Bateson delineated an epistemology, but never clearly developed a corresponding ontology; (2) structure determinism is a more general concept than Bateson's concept of “mind” (i.e., cybernetic epistemology); (3) structure determinism deletes the remnants of objectivity from Bateson's theory (i.e., “the difference that makes a difference”); and (4) Maturana's concept of instructive interaction is a more general, nonsystemic version of what Bateson meant when he used the term “epistemological error.” Finally, it is claimed that the emphasis on epistemology has distracted proponents and detractors alike from the essential message of Bateson and Maturana: social systems and all human endeavor must be understood in light of our existence as biological entities that are coupled to a medium. The biological ontology implicit in Bateson's writings and explicitly delineated in Maturana's may (at long last) provide a sound foundation for the social and behavioral sciences.     

INFORMATION WARFARE AND THE FUTURE OF THE SPY

This article examines the impact of the new ICTs on the collection of covert intelligence and covert political actions undertaken by national intelligence agencies. It is argued that there exist two distinct doctrines in the literatures of intelligence and information warfare concerning the future relative importance of information from human sources ('agents') and technical methods (signal interception, overhead imagery and the emerging field of clandestine penetration of networked information systems). The arguments in favour of human and technical methods are examined in the context of information warfare techniques and technologies, as are covert action methods such as disinformation, disruptive action and 'cyber-sabotage'. Certain civil liberties implications of ICT-based strong encryption are also examined. The article concludes that what is required is a greater emphasis on integrating human and technical methods into a unified whole, especially where human methods can provide opportunities which can be further exploited by technical methods.     

Changing methodologies for research

Abstract

The methodology of the social sciences has developed in the 21st century to a sub-optimal state and in this way research programs for handling complex societal problems are frustrated. To manage this deadlock the author returns to the original aims of the social sciences. He shows that in the past, concepts and aims were developed that goes beyond this regression. Those original starting points are connected to modern ideas of advanced interdisciplinary research, such as practiced in action science, system dynamics and computer simulation. With this exploration a more advanced methodology for social change and organisational transformation is outlined.     

我与译事

本文为作者译文选集的自序,对近半个世纪以来从事阿拉伯语翻译和阿拉伯研究工作的实践进行了回顾,以期使读者了解翻译和研究工作者的曲折坎坷和甘苦,增进对阿拉伯国家历史、地理、文学、艺术和社会科学的理解。     

Why the social sciences won't become high-consensus,rapid-discovery science

A research front of rapid discovery, leaving a trail of cognitive consensus behind it, is characteristic of natural sciences since about the 17th century in Europe. The basis of this high-consensus, rapid-discovery science is not empiricism, since empirical research existed in the natural sciences before the 17th century. The key is appropriation of genealogies of research technologies, which are pragmatically manipulated and modified to produce new phenomena; high consensus results because there is higher social prestige in moving ahead to new research discoveries than by continuing to dispute the interpretation of older discoveries. The social sciences have not acquired this pattern of rapid discovery with high consensus behind the research front. Their fundamental disability is not lack of empirical research, nor failure to adhere to a scientific epistemology, nor the greater ideological controversy that surrounds social topics. What is fundamentally lacking in the social sciences is a genealogy of research technology, whose manipulation reliably produces new phenomena and a rapidly moving research front. Unless the social sciences invent new research hardware, they will likely never acquire much consensus or rapid discovery. Possibilities may exist for such development stemming from research technologies in microsociology and in artificial intelligence.     

Moral theory based on the ‘heart’versus the ‘mind’: Schopenhauer's and Durkheim's critiques of Kantian ethics

Schopenhauer criticized Kant's moral theory on the grounds that it was non-empirical and inadequate, because it attempted to establish morality on the basis of reason and duty. Contrary to Kant, Schopenhauer argued that genuine morality is irrational, based on compassion, and a human product, hence that it could be studied empirically. Schopenhauer established the ‘science of morality’which occupied the attention of a host of turn of the century precursors of the social sciences, especially Durkheim. Durkheim's version of the science of moral facts is compared and contrasted with Schopenhauer's critique of Kant, and it is demonstrated that Durkheim tends to follow Schopenhauer's lead. Problems with Durkheim's and Schopenhauer's critiques of Kantian ethics are also discussed.     

The information systems professional as a hermit

In this article, the contributions that Michael Thompson has made to the development of cultural theory are laid out. This is done by highlighting the ways in which Thompson has built upon the grid–group analysis of Mary Douglas. Thereafter, it is shown how cultural theory is compatible with, and can be strengthened by, the complexity theories that have been formulated within the natural sciences. The resulting theoretical framework is then applied to explain the persistent cultural gap between the business planning and the information systems (IS) departments within companies. It will be argued and demonstrated that the IS professional can usefully be understood as following the views and practices characteristic of the hermit, as defined in cultural theory.     

READING THE FUTURE

This essay asks how cultural studies practitioners can begin to found a critical practice that responds to the events of September 11 and their aftermath. Using Theodor Adorno' concept of ‘semi-erudition’, as developed in his analysis of horoscope readers in ‘The Stars Down to Earth’, together with Homi Bhabha' arguments about the links between racial stereotyping and fetishism, it is argued that those working in the discipline of cultural studies must respond to the multi-layered address of the official discourse regarding the ‘war on terrorism’ without becoming complacent about our own position vis-à-vis this discourse. The author connects this argument with a reading of Herman Melville' novella Benito Cereno to discuss the problem of American ‘innocence’ in this context. The concluding question is how, in the face of the current crisis, to begin to practice a truly responsive ‘criticism’, in the full sense of the term, one able to provide a different reading of the present and in turn affect the future.     

Sociological literature in an age of computerized texts

Although scholars have quickly adopted computers for word processing, new forms of interactive electronic texts pose important questions for the nature of scholarly literature in the social sciences. The social relationships constructed by interactive electronic texts devalue the authority of the writer and empower the reader. This is due in part to the phenomenology of electronic texts; in part to the social contexts governing the use of textual artifacts; and in part to the origin of electronic texts in the reading culture of computer technologists. Although narrative reading cultures empower the writer (as “author”) over readers, technical reading strategies construct the text as information which is given form by the reader. New information technologies thus challenge the scholarly concept of authorship, the status of scholarly writing as a “literature,” and the notion of copyright of texts.     

ON THE NEED FOR CONVERSATION IN THE FAMILY THERAPY FIELD

It is argued that the field of family therapy has entered a period which is characterized by a considerable absence of conversation. Such a lack hinders the field's development and increasingly saps its vitality. It is proposed that there be an annual working conference, founded on conversation and dialogue, which would rigorously examine (one at a time) the core issues of the field. It is further proposed that the papers and discussions at each conference be published as an annual monograph.     

Community,Individual or Information Development? Dilemmas of concept and culture in South Asian disability planning

From the 1820s to the present, disability planning in South Asia has faced hard choices, compounded by the submersion of indigenous concepts in well-intentioned western exports of welfare ideologies and eurocentric social sciences. Cultural imperialism continues, with western evangelists insisting that South Asian disability development be seen in terms of human rights and community-based rehabilitation, regardless of the actual strengths and weaknesses of communities. Reconceptualisation of disability planning, focusing on information factors of concept, knowledge, skills, design and feedback, has been suggested as an alternative approach. However, the associated information media, while offering hope to millions, will again divide those who gain access from the hundred-millions who remain info-poor. Western information concepts risk overwhelming indigenous knowledge and diminishing the cultural confidence needed for South Asians to find their own appropriate solutions. To counteract this tendency, a strong base of Asian disability history is needed.     

Institutional foundations for a just society

The author distinguishes between fundamental justice and incremental justice and argues that the Harsanyian/Rawlsian, ex ante, concept of justice is the only concept of justice relevant to the design and evaluation of institutions. Unlike incremental justice for which a concensus as to what constitutes justice is generally not possible the conditions that satisfy the Harsanyian/Rawlsian concept of justice are derived from the assumptions of rationality and aversion to large risks, and the postulate of fairness. A concensus occurs not fortuitously but inevitably. The paper develops eight principles of institutional design that contribute towards a just society and that follow logically from these assumptions and postulates. The paper argues that these principles are by and large needed for social welfare maximization, so that justice is generally consistent with efficiency. The paper applies the theory to the concept of exploitation, crime and punishment, as well as labour market and social security, to illustrate the working of the principles developed.