Below-replacement fertility in Thailand and its policy implications

The fertility transition in Thailand has been one of the most rapid among Asian countries that are yet to attain newly industrialized country status. In the early 1960s, the total fertility rate exceeded six births per woman; currently, it stands at 1.9 or slightly below replacement level. At present, it is hard to predict the future trend in fertility as this involves several factors that need much closer study, in particular, fertility preferences, changes in marriage patterns and the wider effects of the current economic crisis in Thailand. Rapid declines in fertility and mortality have had a profound effect on the age structure of the population, notably the increasing elderly proportion. Thailand now faces new challenges and priorities for population policy. Policy responses to concerns arising from below-replacement fertility will be much more complex and involve greater government activism, improved institutional capacities and more resources than in the past. This paper reviews the fertility transition in Thailand and looks at some consequences and policy implications of low fertility, with special reference to the family and the elderly population. National Statistical Office     

Baby booms,busts, and population ageing in the developed world

The key challenge facing contemporary society is a process of population ageing rooted mainly in past fertility cycles. The goals of the study reported in this paper were (i) to analyse jointly the post-1930s baby boom and the baby bust that followed, (ii) to consider the specific ways this particular combination influenced the process of ageing in different societies, and (iii) to evaluate some possible implications for policy of different historical experiences. Demographic time series for 27 nations in the developed world were used. The main results confirm the importance of the boom and bust fertility cycle of the second half of the twentieth century for population ageing. Some countries will experience ageing processes driven mainly by the growth of elderly populations while others will age largely as a result of declines in working-age populations. These differences underscore the need to tailor policy priorities for specific patterns of ageing.     

Policy options when population growth slows: The case of Thailand

Thailand reached replacement-level fertility almost a decade ago, although there has been a lag in measuring and recognising the implications of this benchmark event. Fertility could well sink still lower. The momentum of population growth will ensure substantial further increase before the population levels off, but this is not true in all regions. For example, earlier and faster fertility decline in the North, and net outmigration, have led to a situation where some geographical and age segments of the North's population are decreasing. Population policy in Thailand since 1970 has had two major planks: to reduce fertility through an active family planning program, and to distribute population away from the large primate city of Bangkok. The paper discusses whether these policies may need to be modified as a result of the major demographic and socio economic changes that have been taking place. It also discusses the limits to population policy in terms of the likely efficacy of various measures that could be adopted, based on both an assessment of the Thailand situation and the experience of other low-fertility countries.     

中国妇女生育水平变动考证和未来人口发展的策略选择

1990年以来各类人口调查和相关学者的研究结果显示,目前的低生育水平的实现有外在政策强力的作用,更有中国社会经济发展内生化的作用;真实的生育水平既不是调查包括人口普查所显示的那样低(低于1.5),也不是有关部门和政府所想象的那样高。调查显示农村居民平均生育意愿不会高于2个孩子,这是生育率持续稳定的根本。众所周知,为了保证人口稳定持续的发展,应使妇女生育率保持更替水平或至少接近更替水平。从人口发展规律和人口发展与社会经济发展相适应的规律出发,结合当前我国居民生育意愿和生育水平走低的实际,我们应该抓住生育政策调整的最佳时期,调整应该在最佳时期即未来5-10年内完成。     

新古典增长理论框架下的老龄化效应分析

众所周知,日益严重的老龄化进程将对一国经济和社会各个方面的产生深远影响。近年来,以OECD和亚洲国家为对象的定量研究大量涌现。着重于分析人口老龄化对中国宏观经济变量的影响,本文考察了现收现付制和取消现收现付制两种不同条件下的政策模拟。运用Ayse Imrohoroglu等人的新古典增长模型,我们的政策模拟基于两种不同的人口冲击:生育率降低、预期寿命延长。我们发现在上述政策模拟中,个体变量和汇总变量的变化各不相同。     

生育率演变的生态学逻辑及人口增长的长期趋势

人口增长的长期过程一直是充满困惑与引发争论的话题,将人类复归到生态系统的普通成员,按照生态学逻辑构建一个由替代生育率内生引导、人口容量外生制约的人口增长新模型,以代替用具体社会经济因子解释短周期人口变动的传统思路,探讨生育率转变的一般模式及人口发展的长期趋势。工业革命以来,全球人口已经或正在经历着第一次、第二次生育率转变,全球生育率演变可以聚类为欧美、亚非拉、撒哈拉以南非洲和东亚四种区域模式;在计划生育政策的推动下,我国在短短的三十年内完整经历了两次生育率转变。极限替代生育率是生育率演变的长期目标,但当前已有一些国家跌破更替水平,这也许会成为各个国家的普遍经历,预示着人口容量约束的日益显性化;世界及主要国家的人口规模正在日益逼近其容量极限,并会在惯性驱动下突破容量限制,达到峰值后再以负增长方式趋近人口容量,同期的生育率也将向极限替代生育率递增复归。按趋势模拟世界和中国的可持续人口容量分别约为65亿人和12亿人。研究设计出测量人口增长惯性的新指标——人口增长惯性系数,它是生育率与实时替代生育率之比或出生率与死亡率之比,相比常用的人口惯性因子更为简便易行。     

Explanations of the fertility crisis in modern societies: A search for commonalities

Near‐global fertility decline began in the 1960s, and from the 1980s an increasing number of European countries and some Asian ones achieved very low fertility (total fertility below 1.5) with little likelihood of completed cohort fertility reaching replacement level. Earlier theory aiming at explaining this phenomenon stressed the incompatibility between post‐industrial society and behaviour necessary for population replacement. Recent theory has been more specific, often concentrating on the current Italian or Spanish situations or on the contrast between them and the situation in either Scandinavia or the English‐speaking countries, or both. Such an approach ignores important evidence, especially that from German‐speaking populations. The models available concentrate on welfare systems and family expenses, omitting circumstances that may be unique to individual countries or longer‐term factors that may be common to all.     

Study on Standard of Population Aging

Do an increase in ageing in developed countries and"getting old before getting rich"in developing countries indicate that f luctuations in the population age structure have produced a qualitative change?What is a qualitative change and what is a quantitative change?Here we propose a new concept of Shadow Population,then establish a new standard for evaluating population age structure,finally present a typical five stage population age structure type transition model.The model simulation shows that all world regions are still in the adult stage and that population ageing belongs to the category of quantitative change.However,sustained low fertility will lead to a qualitative change in the ageing population.The current pressure of population aging in the adult stage placed on the pension security system shows that this system is truly not a sustainable system,Gradually raising the retirement age and Long-term stability in replacement fertility is the key to solving the socioeconomic development dilemma presented by future population ageing in low fertility regions or countries,but the latter is more urgent.     

New strategies for slowing population growth

Growth of world population over the next 100 years, until the year 2100, will produce an estimated 11.5 billion people. The past focus on reducing rapid population growth exclusively through family planning has not been sufficient. Population policy needs to be broadened to include health care, education, and poverty reduction. The population policy recommendations of Population Council Vice-President John Bongaarts and Senior Associate Judith Bruce were to reduce unwanted pregnancies by expanding services that promote reproductive choice and better health, to reduce the demand for large families by creating favorable conditions for small families, and to invest in adolescents. The Population Council 1994 publication "Population Growth and Our Caring Capacity" outlined these issues. Another similar article by John Bongaarts appeared in the journal "Science" in 1994. In developing countries, excluding China, about 25% of all births are unwanted; 25 million abortions are performed for unwanted pregnancies. The provision of comprehensive family planning programs will go a long way toward achieving a reduction in unwanted pregnancies. In addition, changes are needed in male control over female sexuality and fertility and in cultural beliefs that are obstacles to use of contraception. Stabilization of population at 2 children per family will not occur unless there is a desire for small families. In most less developed countries, large family sizes are preferred. Governments have an opportunity to adopt policies that reduce economic and social risks of having small families. This can be accomplished through the widespread education of children, a reduction in infant and child mortality, improvement in the economic and social and legal status of women, and provision of equitable gender relations in marriage and child rearing. The rights of children to be wanted, planned, and adequately cared for need to be supported. These aforementioned measures will help to reduce fertility, provide support for small families, and justify investment in social development. Population momentum will keep population growing for some time even with replacement level fertility. Investment in adolescents through enhancement of self-esteem and promotion of later childbearing can lengthen the span between generations and slow population momentum. Population policies will be more effective when human rights are protected.     

Demographic change and the needs-based planning of government services: projecting small area populations using spatial microsimulation

Changing patterns of longevity, fertility and migration in Australia have driven substantial changes in population age structure and household size and composition. Of the various dimensions of population change, population ageing is expected to present major challenges to the financing and sustainability of welfare state programs in industrialized countries. One key issue for many of these countries will be assessing where particular services will be required in the future. This paper outlines the application of new forecasting techniques that age a spatial microdataset to 2027. Two illustrative examples are provided to highlight the potential capacities of the new modelling approach for government service delivery planners. For many older people, ageing in place is important, but is more difficult when the person is single: and so the first illustrative application focuses on where aged single people will be living in 2027. The second application examines where future childcare places will be required given the projected growth in the number of children aged 3–4 years living in families where all parents are working. This information will be important for Government planners in deciding the best location for childcare places. The creation of synthetic small-area household microdata for future years offers great potential for a number of purposes, such as analysis of the likely future sociodemographic characteristics of individuals and families at the local level and assessment of the future geographic effect of alternative scenarios such as changes in labour force participation or fertility rates.     

Eastern Europe: pronatalist policies and private behavior

Fertility trends in the 9 Eastern European socialist countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, USSR, Yugoslavia) are reviewed. Official policy in all these countries but Yugoslavia is explicitly pronatalist to varying degrees. Attention is directed to the following areas: similarities and differences; fertility trends (historical trends, post World War 2 trends, and family size); abortion trends (abortion legislation history, current legislation, abortion data, impact on birth rates, abortion seekers, health risks, and psychological aftereffects); contraceptive availability and practice; pronatal economic incentives (impact on fertility); women's position; and marriage, divorce, and sexual attitudes. The fact that fertility was generally higher in the Eastern European socialist countries than in Western Europe in the mid-1970s is credited to pronatalist measures undertaken when fertility fell or threatened to fall below replacement level (2.1 births/woman) after abortion was liberalized in all countries but Albania, following the lead of the USSR in 1955. Fertility increased where access to abortion was again restricted (mildly in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary at various times, and severely in Romania in 1966) and/or economic incentives such as birth grants, paid maternity leave, family and child care allowances, and low interest loans to newlyweds were substantially increased (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland to some extent, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the German Democratic Republic in 1976). Subsequent declines in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania suggest that policy induced increases in fertility are short-lived. Couples respond to abortion restrictions by practicing more efficient contraception or resorting to illegal abortion. It is evident that the region's low birth rate is realized mainly with abortion, for withdrawal remains the primary contraceptive method in all countries but Hungary and the German Democratic Republic. It seems that cash incentives have advanced the timing of 1st and 2nd births without substantially increasing the 3rd births required to keep national fertility above replacement level. Demographic factors alone will most likely keep birth rates low in several Eastern European countries during the 1980s and the 1990s. Due to the low birth rates in the 1960s, there will be fewer women in the prime childbearing ages of 20-29 in at least Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary. It becomes clear that policy efforts to influence private reproductive behavior can only be moderately successful if the living conditions are such that women are determined not to have more than 1 or 2 children.     

Evaluating public policy responses to the economic burden of population ageing with application to Australia

This paper reviews the issues in evaluating public policy interventions that are designed to address the economic burden of population ageing. It then briefly reviews the main public policy options with application to Australia. The economic burden of ageing is defined as the burden on national economic well-being over time and the extent to which this burden is shared between the public and private sectors. A key policy issue is the extent to which the economic burden of ageing should be spread out over present and future generations. This depends on how we value the economic well-being of future generations relative to our own, future projections of economic growth, and the rate at which our subjective sense of well-being improves with our living standards. The paper discusses policies to boost the labour force participation rates of older workers, measures to boost fertility and immigration policy. Also discussed are several policies to shift the burden of ageing from the public to private sectors: the establishment of government financial funds such as the Future Fund, superannuation policy, and health and aged care policy.     

Fertility in China: An uncertain future

As one of the world’s two population ‘billionaires’, the future of China’s population is truly of global significance. With its very low fertility and a rapidly ageing population, it might appear that the country’s famous (or notorious) family planning restrictions are somewhat anachronistic. Here, we explore the process of reform seen over the past three decades and, most recently, in late 2013. We suggest that the popular notion that the family planning restrictions are acting as a pressure valve suppressing a pent-up demand for childbearing, particularly in rural China, is likely to be inaccurate. We also suggest that further reform of the restrictions will not solve the problems of population ageing or many of the other issues widely associated with the restrictions. We conclude that the prospects for further reform are wide-ranging, but likely to be beset by many challenges.     

Declining world fertility: trends,causes, implications

This Bulletin examines the evidence that the world's fertility has declined in recent years, the factors that appear to have accounted for the decline, and the implications for fertility and population growth rates to the end of the century. On the basis of a compilation of estimates available for all nations of the world, the authors derive estimates which indicate that the world's total fertility rate dropped from 4.6 to 4.1 births per woman between 1968 and 1975, thanks largely to an earlier and more rapid and universal decline in the fertility of less developed countries (LDCs) than had been anticipated. Statistical analysis of available data suggests that the socioeconomic progress made by LDCs in this period was not great enough to account for more than a proportion of the fertility decline and that organized family planning programs were a major contributing factor. The authors' projections, which are compared to similar projections from the World Bank, the United Nations, and the U.S. Bureau of the Census, indicate that, by the year 2000, less than 1/5 of the world's population will be in the "red danger" circle of explosive population growth (2.1% or more annually); most LDCs will be in a phase of fertility decline; and many of them -- along with most now developed countries -- will be at or near replacement level of fertility. The authors warn that "our optimistic prediction is premised upon a big IF -- if (organized) family planning (in LDCs) continues. It remains imperative that all of the developed nations of the world continue their contribution to this program undiminished."     

World population in transition

The world's population growth rate peaked at slightly over 2%/year in the late 1960s and in 1986 is down to 1.7% and falling. Annual numbers added continue to rise because these rates apply to a very large base, 4.9 billion in 1986. According to UN medium variant projections, world population growth will peak at 89 million/year in the late 1990s and then taper off until world population stabilizes in the late decade of the 21st century at about 10.2 billion. Close to 95% of this growth is occurring in less developed countries (LDCs) of Africa, Asia (minus Japan), and Latin America. LDC fertility rates are declining, except in sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Latin America and South Asia, but most have far to go to reach the replacement level of 2.1 births/woman. Fertility is below replacement in virtually all more developed countries. For LDCs, large numbers will be added before stabilization even after attainment of replacement level fertility because of the demographic momentum built into their large and young population bases. This complicates efforts to bridge gaps between living standards in LDCs and industrialized countries. From a new debate about whether rapid population growth deters or stimulates economic growth, a more integrated view has emerged. This view recognizes the complementary relationship between efforts to slow population growth and other development efforts; e.g., to improve health and education, upgrade women's status, increase productivity. Most effective in the increased contraceptive prevalence and fertility declines seen in many LDCs has been the combination of organized programs to increase access to family planning information and supplies with socioeconomic development that enhances the desire for smaller families.     

中国普遍二孩生育的政策环境与政策目标

普遍二孩生育政策的实施效果,不仅涉及人口长期均衡发展目标的实现,也决定着生育政策下一步改革的方向和速度。文章围绕“谁来生”（生育主体）、“如何养”（社会经济条件）、“生多少”（生育文化）三个问题,着重分析了中国普遍二孩生育的人口环境、社会经济环境和政治文化环境。结果显示普遍二孩生育政策并不会起到立竿见影提升生育率水平的效果,其对劳动力短缺、人口老龄化等结构性问题的解决也不会是即时的。文章对这一政策的可能效果与实现政策目标的关系进行了理论上的探讨,认为政府工作的重点须顺应政策环境的变化,努力创造生育友好型社会,而不是急于求成再次贸然改变生育政策。     

Policy responses to low fertility and its consequences: A global survey

Fertility at or below replacement level now characterizes 64 countries with populations totalling 44 per cent of that of the world. Many of these countries have total fertility rates below 1.5 and some have recorded below-replacement fertility for decades. It appears likely that some countries will eventually adopt policies aimed at raising fertility. Accordingly, the paper examines the effect of past policies of this type, and briefly looks to the future.     

亲属、法律、家庭养老

中国家庭养老的传统在今天仍被社会、家庭和个人所重视和依赖。这种传统的部分基础是亲属制度。在这种制度下家中的每个人有其约定俗成的权利和义务 ,在赡养老年人的问题上也如此。亲属数量和类别的多少不仅可以增加老年人晚年接受各方面照料的力量 ,也会潜移默化地促使人们认同、接受和依靠家庭养老这种方式。国家法律也对家庭养老传统的延续起到了监督和推动的作用     

Is low fertility a twenty-first-century demographic crisis?

Nearly half of the world's population in 2000 lived in countries with fertility rates at or below replacement level, and nearly all countries will reach low fertility levels in the next two decades. Concerns about low fertility, fertility that is well below replacement, are widespread. But there are both persistent rationales for having children and institutional adjustments that can make the widespread intentions for two children attainable, even in increasingly individualistic and egalitarian societies.     

Below-replacement fertility: Determinants and prospects in South Asia

Although 10 countries and two of China’s special administrative areas, totalling 1,528 million people or 44 per cent of Asia’s total population, are now characterized by fertility rates below long-term replacement levels, no such countries are yet found in South Asia. This paper first examines the characteristics of 12 Asian administrations with very low fertility at various stages of their fertility declines and then compares the findings with the present situation in three South Asian countries, Sri Lanka, India and Bangladesh. This allows a prediction of when the South Asian countries will reach replacement fertility in accord with the trends in two key criteria, the percentage of girls in secondary school and the infant mortality rate. These conclusions are then buttressed for each country by the findings of anthropological demographic research programs in which the authors were involved. The predictions are that all three countries will attain a total fertility rate of 2.1 within the next 30 years and that the UN2000 Revision of the medium population projection is plausible in that regard. However, the authors part company with the UN projection in their assessment that the nature of these societies means that they will all subsequently fall to still lower fertility levels.