Evaluating the Evaluators: Should Investors Trust Corporate Governance Metrics Ratings?

Companies are under increasing pressure to have their corporate governance rated by an independent corporate governance metrics firm, such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) or Governance Metrics International (GMI). These rating firms claim to be able to determine how effective and responsive a company’s board is. Institutional investors have begun using these board governance ratings when deciding which firms to include in their stock portfolios. This paper considers whether investors, many of whom claim to be socially responsible, should be relying upon board governance metrics. We find that these metrics are not good indicators of either the quality of a firm’s earnings or of its ethics.     

SOCIAL NETWORKS IN THE BOARDROOM

This paper provides evidence that social networks strongly affect board composition and are detrimental to corporate governance. Our empirical investigation relies on a large data set of executives and outside directors of French public firms. This data source is a matched employer–employee data set that provides detailed information on directors/CEOs as well as information about the firm employing them. We find a strong and robust correlation between the CEO's network and that of his directors. Networks of former high‐ranking civil servants are the most active in shaping board composition. Our identification strategy takes into account not only firm and directors’ fixed effects but also the matching of firms and director in terms of one observable and one unobservable characteristic. Turning to the direct effects of such network activity, we find that firms in which these networks are most active pay their CEOs more, are less likely to replace a CEO who underperforms, and engage in less value‐creating acquisitions. These findings suggest that social networks are active in the boardroom and have detrimental effects on firms’ governance.     

Corporate governance and accounting irregularities: Canadian evidence

This study examines the extent to which corporate governance acts as an efficient means of protecting investors against accounting irregularities. It is grounded in the literatures on public enforcement of securities laws by market authorities, governance, and fraudulent financial statements. A unique feature of the Canadian tracking and enforcement system for reporting issuers in default is used to refine the definitions of accounting irregularities or fraudulent financial statements used in other studies. We test and find that the governance mechanisms of firms found in default of financial reporting regulations during the first 5 years of existence of the Canadian system are weak compared to a sample of no-default firms. For instance, they have fewer independent and financial expert directors on their boards and audit committees, are more prone to have recently changed auditor and to having their CEO as chair of the board. They also appear to fulfill their financing requirements through private rather than public funds, which is consistent with the fact that default firms are less likely to be in a position to return to the public market to fulfill their needs. This study offers evidence relevant to policy makers and others who are concerned with the potential role of market authorities and governance in protecting investors against accounting irregularities.     

Does the presence of independent and female directors impact firm performance? A multi-country study of board diversity

This study empirically analyzes whether gender diversity enhances boards of directors’ independence and efficiency. Using data from 3,876 public firms in 47 countries and controlling for a wide set of corporate governance mechanisms, we find that firms with more female directors have higher firm performance by market (Tobin’s Q) and accounting (return on assets) measures. The results also suggest that external independent directors do not contribute to firm performance unless the board is gender diversified. These results hold with respect to different estimation models and robustness tests. Overall, our findings provide evidence that the female directors enhance boards of directors’ effectiveness. Finally, we find that firms that are concerned with board independence, and that firms in more complex environments are more likely to have gender-balanced boards.     

Comparing corporate governance practices and exit decisions between US and Japanese firms

This study examines how widespread the similarities between US and Japanese corporate governance practices have become. Results suggest that, in spite of convergence in many areas of business practices, Japanese board structures and governance practices still differ greatly from those in the United States—particularly in Securities and Exchange Commission-mandated reforms such as independent audit and compensation committees. Our results suggest that corporate governance differences between Japanese and US firms may be driven, in part, by differences in directors’ recognition of investors’ performance expectations. In particular, results indicate that the exit barriers related to employment influence decision-making for Japanese directors more strongly than they affect US directors’ decisions. Board independence—particularly with respect to audit and compensation committee membership—reduces the height of perceived exit barriers. Results suggest that, in spite of convergence in many areas of business practices, Japanese board structures and governance practices still differ greatly from those in the United States although it does not conclude that the transition is necessarily desirable.     

How do boards of directors contribute to family SME export intensity? The role of formal and informal governance mechanisms

Internationalization is a strong challenge that firms have to face today. However, small and medium-sized family firms internationalize their business after consolidating their position in domestic markets. Family SMEs approach international markets usually through export activities. Considerable academic attention has been given to family SME export behaviour, however, the debate is still inconclusive. Therefore, more attention on family SME unique governance mechanisms may shed a new light on this issue. The paper analyses family SME export intensity by showing how the board of directors could provide assistance in the selection and implementation of this strategy. We explore whether, and to what extent, both formal and informal features of boards of directors (dual governance) influence family SME export intensity. This is explored in a sample of 101 Norwegian family SMEs. Export intensity is the dependent variable and hypotheses on the positive effect of independence in board behaviour (formal governance mechanism), relational norms and trust (informal governance mechanisms) are supported. The paper has substantial theoretical contributions and practical implications. The results show that formal and informal governance mechanisms can co-exist complementing and supplementing each other, thus positively influencing family SME export intensity.     

Independent directors,large shareholders and firm performance: the generational stage of family businesses and the socioemotional wealth approach

The effectiveness of independent directors is empirically addressed in the Southern European context using a sample of 221 publicly traded firms during the 2001–2007 period. Drawing on the socioemotional wealth approach, we focus on family control and influence to test whether there are significant differences in the effect of independent directors on the firm’s performance among non-family businesses (NFBs) that have a non-family large shareholder, and family businesses (FBs). In doing so, we consider the heterogeneity of FBs by testing whether the FB’s life cycle moderates the effectiveness of independent directors. To that end, we differentiate among founder lead family businesses and non-founder lead family businesses. Moreover, we test whether dual leadership structures, in particular when the family chief executive officer is also the chairperson of the board, moderates the effectiveness of independent directors. A cross-country and panel data design was used, taking into account the endogeneity problem arising in studies of corporate governance. The results show that the contribution of independent directors to a firm’s performance differs for NFBs and FBs. Moreover, findings confirm that in FBs, contribution is moderated by the generational stage of the FB and by the leadership structure of the firm.     

The Performance-Governance Relationship: The Effects of Cadbury Compliance on UK Quoted Companies

This paper investigates the extent to which recommendations madeby the Cadbury Committee have affected UK company performance.The Committee recommended that certain internal monitoringmechanisms should be adopted by quoted firms because they weremore effective than others as a means of promoting shareholderinterests. The mechanisms analysed are duality, the number ofoutside directors on the board and the presence of a remunerationcommittee. We analyse the relationship between governancestructures and performance for two years, 1992 and 1995. Usingsamples of 200 companies for each of the years, we find that theproportion of firms adopting the governance structuresrecommended by Cadbury has increased. However there is mixedevidence that the structures are associated with betterperformance. Depending on the choice of dependent variable, thepresence of a remuneration committee has a positive effect onperformance and outside director representation has a negativeeffect. However, there is evidence of a simultaneous relationshipbetween outside director representation and performance, a resultconsistent with additional outside directors being appointedafter a period of poor performance. Complete compliance with themodel of governance proposed by the Cadbury Committee does not,however, appear to be associated with performance which is betterthan that achieved by either partial or non compliance.     

董事会非正式层级与高管薪酬契约有效性

董事会治理是影响高管薪酬契约有效性的关键,已有研究主要从董事会结构层面展开,缺乏对董事会内部运作机制与高管薪酬契约有效性关系的具体分析。基于董事权威不平衡性的治理效应视角,系统考察了董事会非正式层级与高管薪酬契约有效性的逻辑关系及其作用机理,得出了一些具有重要价值的结论,主要包括:1.董事会非正式层级对高管薪酬业绩敏感性具有显著的负向调节作用,且主要体现在业绩下滑的样本公司中,表明董事会非正式层级对高管薪酬契约的影响主要体现在公平性和风险匹配性方面。2.只有当最高层级董事身份为独立董事时,董事会非正式层级对高管薪酬业绩敏感性具有显著的负向调节效应。3.董事会非正式层级增强了高管薪酬的行业和地区薪酬敏感性,进一步验证了董事会非正式层级的社会公平效应。论文的研究为从微观运作层面理解董事会治理和高管薪酬契约有效性提供一种新的视角和结论,对于优化董事会治理和提高高管薪酬契约有效性等均具有重要借鉴意义。     

Shareholders and managers: Who care more about corporate diversity and employee benefits?

We test two competing theories that explain a firm’s engagement in corporate diversity and employee benefits: socially responsible investment theory and management overinvestment theory. We find that publicly-traded companies with strong shareholder rights are more likely to promote women and/or minorities to the positions of CEO and board of directors in their organizations, conduct business with women- and/or minority-owned operations, and provide better family benefits to their employees than firms with strong management power. These findings indicate that the companies with strong shareholder rights engage more actively in internal aspects of CSR activities, which supports the socially responsible investment theory rather than the management overinvestment theory. Shareholders (i.e. institutional investors) tend to integrate their social goals (i.e. internal CSR issues) and financial goals into their investments. In response to these changes, managers should engage in the internal aspects of corporate social issues more aggressively as the agents of shareholders.     

When Boards Matter: The Case of Corporate Social Irresponsibility

While academic research has made remarkable progress in understanding corporate social responsibility (CSR), we have scant understanding of corporate social irresponsibility (CSiR). This paper adopts a stakeholder‐agency perspective towards CSiR to ask two related questions: (1) What board‐level structures can monitor management to reduce CSiR? and (2) What are the conditions that render board monitoring more effective? Employing a unique objective measure of CSiR and a sophisticated system generalized method of moments with dynamic panel model on a sample of publicly listed firms in the USA between 2002 and 2015, this paper demonstrates how firms with a specific board‐level governance bundle (i.e. a large, more independent board, with a board CSR committee, a higher proportion of women within boards with frequent director activity) are better equipped to reduce irresponsible behaviours, both in terms of number of irresponsible incidents as well as in terms of their economic costs to the firm. Moreover, the effectiveness of this governance bundle sustains under conditions of high institutional ownership and high board remuneration. This paper has implications for CSR and corporate governance literatures, as well as for managers and policymakers.     

中国上市公司董事会行为与公司绩效关系实证研究

以2005年中国证券市场公布的指标股为研究样本,用董事会会议频率表示董事会行为,实证分析了董事会行为的决定因素以及董事会行为与前期、当期和后期公司绩效之间的关系.研究表明,独立性越强的董事会将导致较高强度的董事会行为,内部所有权和董事会行为在规范管理方面存在替代性,股权制衡有助于产生积极的董事会行为,而外部董事的声誉激励制度和机构投資者制度对董事会行为的作用还有待进一步加强;董事会行为与前期经营绩效显著负相关,与当期和后期绩效显著正相关,两者之间存在显著的内生关系,而董事会行为的决定因素在内生关系中起着重要的作用.     

Sustaining the Buyout Governance Model: Inside Secondary Management Buyout Boards

This paper examines the impact of private equity (PE) directors and their human capital on operating performance in a unique hand‐collected sample of 200 secondary management buyouts (SMBOs) during 2000–2015. It shows that PE directors’ human capital tends to play a statistically and economically important role in performance. Financial (rather than operational) experience of PE directors in acquiring PE firms tends to have a substantial impact on post‐SMBO profitability, while high‐level business education is especially important in post‐SMBO growth performance enhancement. Complementary expertise, provided by directors in buying and selling PE firms, plays an important role only in post‐SMBO growth improvements. Overall, the paper's results provide evidence that governance benefits of the buyout model tend not to be exhausted in the primary buyout stage, but the effects in the secondary buyout phase depend on the nature of PE directors’ human capital resource, notably in respect of the balance between board monitoring and advisory roles. This study therefore adds to growing evidence on how the ownership and life‐cycle nature of firms affect sustainability of boards fulfilling their roles. The results are robust to sample selection bias, different types of PE firms and different measures of human capital.     

Women on boards and bank efficiency in ASEAN-5: the moderating role of the independent directors

Corporate governance codes around the world promote women’s presence in corporate board. The extant literature suggests women directors contribute to improve monitoring and advisory role of the board. This study aims to examine the role of independent women directors in improving banks’ efficiency. Using 102 commercial banks from ASEAN-5 countries for a period of 1999–2012, we run generalized method of moments models to test the relationship between the variables. Our results show that banks with independent women directors on board contribute significantly to the bank’s efficiency level. Contrary to the literature, we found that the appointment of women directors or independent directors alone does not significantly enhance banks’ efficiency. The result suggests that women directors are more effective on boards if they are also appointed as independent directors. This finding implies that a combination of corporate governance mechanism is more powerful than relying on a single element of corporate governance.     

Controlling shareholders and the composition of the board: special focus on family firms

This article analyses the relevance of the agency problems that exist between shareholders and managers (type I agency problems) and between majority and minority shareholders (type II agency problems), in determining the composition of the board of directors, differentiating between family owned and non-family owned firms. The hypotheses are tested on a sample of 173 Spanish listed companies for the period 2004–2011. The results of our study indicate that, on one hand, as type I agency problems increase, firms increase their percentage of outside directors and, on the other, as type II agency problems increase, firms increase the ratio of independent to nominee directors. Whether the company is a family firm or not does moderate the influence of insider ownership over the composition of the board. Generally speaking, our findings support the view that firms configure their board of directors in such a way as to best signal to the market both efficient management and a balance of the interests of all shareholders. Likewise, these results could be taken into account when formulating recommendations on the composition of the board of directors.     

投资机会（IOS）设定下公司内部治理对经营绩效的影响——基于中国上市公司的经验研究

传统的公司治理研究将处于不同组织环境的企业等同对待,造成了研究结论的较大分歧.本文依据投资机会集(IOS)理论,运用我国上市公司的经验证据,在设定投资机会集的条件下,考察了不同成长性的企业其公司治理对经营绩效的影响.研究结果表明:成长性较高的公司,其经营绩效的改善与独立董事比例、高管层的持股比例显著正相关,但与高管层年薪相关关系不显著;成长性较低的公司.其经营绩效的提高与独立董事比例和高管层的持股比例相关关系均不显著,但与高管层年薪存在弱的正相关关系.     

Board of directors and insider trading with share repurchase programs

This study examines the relationship between insider trading and board of directors’ characteristics around stock repurchase announcements. It is hypothesized that information disparity between insiders and shareholders from share repurchases announcements creates opportunities for insiders to time their trading. However, there is little evidence on whether board characteristics reduce the probability of insider trading with repurchase announcements. Using data from firms listed on Forbes 500 between 1998 and 2004, we found that insider trading is related to share repurchase announcements. In order to focus on board of directors’ role, we controlled for board characteristics that may change the repurchase decision. Our results provide corroborative evidence of insider net selling around repurchase announcements and the advantages of board characteristics to offset insider trading. In particular, the results suggest that board tenure, directors’ ownership and board directorship change positively insider trading around repurchase announcements. Hence, Securities and Exchange Commission should consider rigorous restrictions on share repurchase announcements and be aware of potential influence of the corporate governance device.     

机构投资者持股与上市公司违规行为的实证研究

本文采用部分可观测的Bivariate Probit估计方法,对2001年至2009年中国1729家上市公司进行回归检验,发现机构投资者持股比例降低了公司违规行为倾向,同时增加了公司违规行为被稽查的可能性。该结论在控制了机构投资者变量内生性的因素后仍旧稳健。进一步研究表明,相比公司经营违规,机构投资者对信息披露违规倾向的影响更强。另外,相比证券机构投资者,养老保险基金、社保基金、企业年金持股的公司中违规公司比例更低。除此以外,机构投资者对公司违规的抑制与检举作用并不受其它公司治理变量的影响。本文的研究表明中国机构投资者在预防与打击上市公司违规行为方面发挥了重要的作用,并且也为上市公司与监管部门提供了治理和防范企业违规的线索。