POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND DEBT MATURITY

Political instability has been blamed for many poor macroeconomic outcomes such as high inflation, unemployment and low growth. I propose yet another negative consequence of political instability: political instability and polarization generate inflation uncertainty which causes the term structure to steepen, consequently political instability and polarization reduce the average maturity and increase the expected cost of debt. A model is derived which illustrates these relationships. Political instability and polarization are then proxied and shown to be inversely related to debt maturity for a sample of OECD countries.     

VOTERS' INTERMEDIATION ENVIRONMENTS IN THE 1988 PRESIDENTIAL CONTEST

Considerable information about a presidential election campaigncomes to voters through such intermediaries as personal networksand the mass media. This article examines the operation of theseintermediaries in the 1988 Ohio presidential campaign by focusingon exposure to them and the perceived partisan content of theirmessages—and how these key features of intermediationrelate to various voter characteristics. People are most disposedto discuss politics with like-minded relatives and friends,but discussions with co-workers provide an opportunity for politicallydissonant messages to intrude. This political discussion ismodulated by political attentiveness rather than personal orpartisan characteristics. Media exposure is high and also isrelated most to political attentiveness, although age is animportant determinant as well. Surprisingly, the media werecommonly perceived as balanced and neutral in the presidentialrace or, where committed, as supporting the candidate the respondentopposed. Because of this, only a third of the respondents foundthemselves in an overall intermediation environment that wasconcordant with their own preferences. Considerably more werein environments containing some discordant views, which couldchallenge their partisan dispositions.     

Voting is Social Work: Voices From the National Social Work Voter Mobilization Campaign

ABSTRACT

The National Social Work Voter Mobilization Campaign, also known as Voting is Social Work, involved social work faculty, field educators, practitioners, and students in a nonpartisan voter engagement drive. Following the 2018 elections, researchers surveyed Campaign participants in social work schools and agencies to document their voter engagement activities.The study reported extent and amount of their involvement. The survey distinguished between the voter engagement participation of school- versus agency-based social workers, which has not been studied elsewhere. Participants also reported the benefits of political participation to individuals, communities, and the profession and perceived barriers such as organizational constraints, fears of appearing partisan, and distrust of politics. Presented in historical context, the findings highlight the need to mainstream voter engagement throughout social work education.     

SURVEY EVIDENCE ON EXCESSIVE PUBLIC PESSIMISM ABOUT THE FUTURE BEHAVIOR OF UNEMPLOYMENT

Two of the questions in the Surveys of Consumer Attitudes undertakenby the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigandeal with households' expectations about inflation and the changein unemployment. We compare quarterly time series of the meanresponses with the actual behavior of inflation and unemploymentto see whether households are overly optimistic or pessimisticabout the future behavior of inflation and unemployment. Wefind an asymmetry. Over the 21 years of our analysis, on averagethe public is neither overly optimistic nor overly pessimisticabout future inflation. However, the public has been significantlytoo pessimistic about the future behavior of unemployment. Theseresults have an important implication for macroeconomic policy.If politicians respond to complaints from the public about inflationand unemployment they will target policy instruments at unemploymentto a greater extent than if the public was not so pessimisticabout the behavior of unemployment. The result may be a higherrate of inflation than if the public were not mistakenly pessimisticabout the behavior of unemployment.     

AN EQUILIBRIUM POLITICO-ECONOMIC MODEL

A politico-economic model is developed in which rationally formed forecasts are available to all traders. Systematic government policy is neutral, but a large majority of the electorate, those who adopt rationally formed forecasts but do not know the model, hold the government responsible for the economy's performance. Real and political shocks generate novel feedback effects due to anticipated regime changes. These feedback effects may amplify or dampen the initial shocks; this depends on whether the government follows a high or low monetary growth rate rule and whether inflation or unemployment is the main concern of the electorate.     

POLITICAL MODELS OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE SHOULD BE REVIVED

Political models of the business cycle have typically been ignored because they appear inconsistent with rational behavior and because empirical evidence is inconclusive. This paper addresses the second issue, demonstrating for U.S. real GNP, unemployment, and inflation that electoral cycles (persistent patterns across electoral terms) are significant, but apparently only for Republican incumbents, and that partisan cycles (persistent differences between parties) are also significant. These findings are consistent with the conjecture that a minority party is more constrained by electoral concerns, whereas a majority party is freer to pursue partisan objectives.     

THE GROWTH OF SOCIAL SECURITY: ELECTORAL PUSH OR POLITICAL PULL?

The social security program has grown more than a thousand fold since its inception. Even fnter the increased number of retired persons and inflation are accounted for, average real social security benefit levels more than tripled from the late 1940s to the early 1980s. What accounts for this growth? This paper finds that increased retirement benefit levels are generated by changes in the constraints faced by the median voter rather than by changes in the political power of special interest groups. The results suggest that the median voter has a finite planning horizon.     

The Virtues of Participation without Power: Campaigns,Party Networks,and the Ends of Politics

Following Francesca Polletta's call to reconsider participatory democracy in a new millennium, this article analyzes and makes a normative case for institutional and partisan forms of participation without decision making. I draw on field research and interviews conducted over the last decade on Democratic Party campaigns to argue against contemporary denunciations of partisanship and critiques of institutional participation by radical democrats. First, this article discusses the opportunities available for citizens to participate in electoral politics. Volunteering is often limited to fund‐raising and instrumental voter contacts given the constraints of electoral institutions. Although campaign volunteerism is a fundamentally limited form of civic engagement, institutional and partisan participation has democratic value. Campaigns are institutionally linked to political parties that offer distinct moral, ideological, and policy choices to citizens. Recent analytical and empirical work shows that contemporary political parties are constituted by relatively coherent networks of civil society and social movement organizations that devote considerable resources to electoral politics to shape primary and general election outcomes and advance their agendas in governance. This reveals electoral participation to be tightly linked to larger partisan dynamics and institutional sites of power.     

Bandwagon, underdog, and political competition: the uni-dimensional case

This article studies the effects of bandwagon and underdog on the political equilibrium of two-party competition models. We adapt for voter conformism the generalized Wittman?CRoemer model of political competition, which views political competition as the one between parties with factions of the opportunists and the militants that Nash-bargain one another, and consider three special cases of the general model: the Hotelling?CDowns model, the classical Wittman?CRoemer model, and what we call the ideological-party model. We find that the presence of voter conformism significantly affects the nature of political competition, and its effect on political equilibrium is quite different depending on the model one uses. In the Hotelling?CDowns model, political parties put forth an identical policy at the equilibrium, regardless of the type of voter conformism, and this is the only equilibrium. In both the ideological-party and classical Wittman?CRoemer models, parties propose differentiated policies at the equilibrium, and the extent of policy differentiation depends on the degree of voter conformism.     

The inflation-unemployment trade-offs of union members

Social preference functions between inflation and unemployment are estimated for individuals classified by union status using Gallup Poll presidential popularity data. We expected union members to assign higher weights to unemployment and lower weights to inflation than those who are not union members, but we found the reverse. Union members weight unemployment relative to inflation less than nonunion members because they weight unemployment less. Given the emphasis that trade union leaders place on reducing unemployment rather than inflation, this suggests a divergence in views between union leaders and the rank and file. The authors are indebted to Jeff Moore and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. Any remaining errors are our own. Smyth’s research was aided by the LSU Foundation.     

‘Them that runs the country don't know what they're doing’: political dissatisfaction amongst members of the white working class

There are signs that a significant number of British people do not feel that their concerns are being addressed by the mainstream parties or the political system. This paper attends to the quality of that political dissatisfaction amongst members of ‘the white working classes’. There is a need to extend typical concerns about youth disengagement to adults and to consider the role that class plays. Lower participation in formal democratic processes may not mean disengagement from all forms of politics, but could have considerable consequences for who gains power and for the tone and focus of political debates and policies. Our project contributes to exploring political dissatisfaction by engaging with low wage workers in Yorkshire and the North West, where high support for the far‐right BNP and low voter turnout are signs that mainstream politics and politicians are failing to impress. We asked people about their feelings in relation to mainstream politics and their concerns. These participants feel distanced from governing elites, formal political processes and old ideologies. They are searching for ways to make sense of their struggles to live a decent life, and in doing so must contend with the dominance of racist discourses.     

THE STATE OF THE FEDERAL BUDGET AND THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY

This paper tests systematic responses of the Federal budget to forecasts of inflation and unemployment. Estimated coefficients from fiscal policy reaction functions are examined to determine whether there are such systematic responses. Additionally, the coefficients of these estimated fiscal policy reaction functions are used to test several hypotheses concerning fiscal policy which have been advanced in the political business cycle and public choice literatures.     

Conformity to implicit social pressure: the role of political identity

Although studies have shown that implicit social cues, such as images of watchful eyes, can elicit prosocial behavior, little research to date has examined individual differences in people’s susceptibility to such subtle social cues. For example, individuals with a conservative ideology typically value social conformity, obedience, and adherence to social norms more than liberals. To examine partisan heterogeneity, we analyze data from two large randomized field experiments on voting behavior. Results suggest that the impact of eyespots on voter mobilization is indeed likely driven by political identity, with a significant effect for Republicans but not Independents or Democrats. These findings are consistent with an emerging line of research revealing individual differences in how susceptible humans are to implicit social cues.     

Wahlbeteiligung im Lebensverlauf

This empirical investigation attempts to answer the question whether the change in voter turnout at the German general elections is related to cohort specific voting behavior of political generations, also taking into account age and period effects. Furthermore, it is asked whether the decline of voter turnout after the 1972 German general election is a statistical artefact of official statistics. Both questions are investigated with retrospective life history data about voting behavior of individuals from several birth cohorts. It is analyzed that the voter turnout has really declined in the 1980s because of the increased number of determined non-voters. There is evidence that the changes of the voting behavior of younger individuals in successive political generations results in the social change of the general voter turnout. While the effects of the citizens’ age on the voter turnout are minimal for the whole period between 1953 and 1987, the impact of period effects are less important for the historical change of voter turnout as often assumed.     

Social class and political participation: A review and an explanation

This paper reviews and explains the relationship between socioeconomic status and political participation from a structural perspective; i.e., social organization influences people's range of options, producing different rates of behavior among those in varying locations in the society. There are six categories of political participation: cognitive, expressive, organizational, electoral, partisan, and governmental. In each case, the poor display the lowest and the rich the highest rate of participation. This difference reflects variations in political and psychological resources and the structure of the electoral process. As a result, political benefits also differ by social class.     

The Undeserving Rich: “Moral Values” and the White Working Class1

White working‐class citizens who vote for the Republican Party have been fodder for much political discussion and speculation recently, and a debate has arisen about the role that “moral values” played in the political decision making of this segment of voters. In this article, we defend a version of the moral values claim. We show that although the Republicans’ policies are unpopular, they are bundled with an overarching moral framework that is extremely resonant to this set of voters, and we use in‐depth interviews to uncover this framework. A key feature of this framework, on which in the 2004 presidential election George W. Bush scored high and John Kerry scored low, is the appropriate attitude to wealth, which serves as an indicator for a candidate’s general moral philosophy and as a heuristic about whether the candidate will govern with working‐class voters’ interests in mind. National Election Studies data support the argument that this was a key influence on the voting decision in 2004, even controlling for voters’ partisan identification.     

Poverty and the business cycle: A regional panel data analysis for Spain using alternative measures of unemployment

Conventional wisdom predicts that changes in the aggregate unemployment rate may significantly affect a country’s income distribution and, consequently, have a relevant impact on the evolution of its poverty rate. However, the relationship between labour macroeconomic indicators and poverty seems to have become weaker recently. Using panel data on unemployment and poverty for Spanish regions, we estimate a system GMM model to model this relationship using alternative measures of the unemployment rate. We also test the hypothesis of asymmetric effects of the business cycle on the share of poor individuals in the population. Our results show that unemployment has a positive impact on severe poverty, while inflation has a negative effect. We also highlight the extent to which results differ when alternative intra-household unemployment distribution-sensitive measures are considered. Regarding the existence of asymmetric business cycle effects on severe poverty, our results show that despite the fact that the Great Recession has had a strong and positive effect on severe poverty, the effects of expansions and recessions on poverty are not significantly different.     

STABILIZATION POLICY: A RECONSIDERATION

Should stabilization policy be a macroeconomic priority? Most central banks consider it a goal, but Robert Lucas has contended that policies to stabilize output, even if effective, yield negligible welfare gains. This article critiques Lucas's argument. Existing literature suggests nontrivial benefits from stabilization due to nonlinearity of the social welfare function and of the short‐run Phillips curve. Our analysis and examination of the evidence from periods of prolonged high unemployment also suggest further significant gains to stabilization since the “accelerationist” hypothesis does not seem to hold in times of very low inflation. (JEL E61, E63)     

Finding the Truth in Politics: An Empirical Validation of the Epistemic Political Efficacy Concept

Self-efficacy theory suggests that one’s perceived ability to successfully find facts may motivate political information seeking. A telephone survey of voters in a presidential campaign attempted to further validate the concept of epistemic political efficacy (EPE), or belief one can discover the “truth” in politics, and applied it to modern information-seeking behaviors. This study of North Carolina registered voters (N = 605) demonstrates that EPE adds predictive power beyond commonly used measures such as individual political efficacy for contemporary media use variables like online information seeking and partisan cable viewing. EPE was a stronger positive predictor of online information seeking than individual political efficacy. In addition, viewing partisan cable shows had a stronger relationship with EPE than mainstream TV news viewing, and EPE significantly predicted MSNBC viewing, even after controlling for partisanship. In a word, voters who are high in the belief that political facts or “truths” exist take steps to find and understand them.