Below-replacement fertility in east and southeast asia: Consequences and policy responses

Fourteen countries in Asia have total fertility rates at or below replacement level. This is more pronounced in China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand. The implications are far-reaching and profound as they affect the age structure of the population, giving rise to population ageing, labour force shortages, increased elderly dependency ratios and feminization of the aged population. Evidence from European countries suggests that although fertility may rebound, in most countries it is highly unlikely that fertility will recover sufficiently to reach replacement level in the near future. Mortality reduction will continue to be an overriding policy goal, which would further enhance the ageing process. Therefore, the greatest challenge will be to pension systems, old-age care systems, and health systems or health insurance. This paper first examines the fertility transition in five low-fertility countries. It then discusses the policy measures that these countries have adopted in response to low fertility and population ageing. The paper concludes with the policy implications for healthcare, social care, income security and caregiving facility, and the scope for further study.     

Below-replacement fertility: Determinants and prospects in South Asia

Although 10 countries and two of China’s special administrative areas, totalling 1,528 million people or 44 per cent of Asia’s total population, are now characterized by fertility rates below long-term replacement levels, no such countries are yet found in South Asia. This paper first examines the characteristics of 12 Asian administrations with very low fertility at various stages of their fertility declines and then compares the findings with the present situation in three South Asian countries, Sri Lanka, India and Bangladesh. This allows a prediction of when the South Asian countries will reach replacement fertility in accord with the trends in two key criteria, the percentage of girls in secondary school and the infant mortality rate. These conclusions are then buttressed for each country by the findings of anthropological demographic research programs in which the authors were involved. The predictions are that all three countries will attain a total fertility rate of 2.1 within the next 30 years and that the UN2000 Revision of the medium population projection is plausible in that regard. However, the authors part company with the UN projection in their assessment that the nature of these societies means that they will all subsequently fall to still lower fertility levels.     

Below-replacement fertility and prospects for labour force growth in Taiwan

Fertility in Taiwan had declined to replacement level in 1983. In 1986–1997, the total fertility rate dropped to 1.7–1.8, with continuing decreases observed in 1997–2001. Fertility will probably be sustained at the 2001 level of 1.48 or even decline further in the future. If the current fertility and labour-force participation rates persist, the size of the labour force will increase only slightly in the next 15 years and begin to shrink soon after 2015. After 2034, the labour force will fall below the current level and Taiwan will face a labour shortage. Though efficient, the policy option of importing more foreign workers is fraught with political sensitivities, especially given the current economic downturn and rising unemployment. Another policy approach, to increase the participation rates for women and mature men, would lead to growth in the labour supply sometime after 2030 and, combined with a modest increase in fertility, would prevent the labour force from falling below its current size in the next 50 years. Notwithstanding that any increase in fertility will have a delayed effect on labour supply, strong incentives are still required to affect fertility behaviour.     

The western fertility decline: Reflections from a chronological perspective

The study of recent fertility trends in the West has been dominated by examinations of Europe. A better perspective on twentieth-century fertility movements can be gained by giving an equal emphasis to trends in the ‘Offshoots’ (USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand). This paper focuses on the periods of rapid fertility decline and to a greater extent on the intervening periods of near-equilibrium. It is suggested that the ‘late twentieth century compromise’ is more stable than is suggested by reports on its internal strains, and that only massive government intervention could raise fertility.     

Explanations of the fertility crisis in modern societies: A search for commonalities

Near‐global fertility decline began in the 1960s, and from the 1980s an increasing number of European countries and some Asian ones achieved very low fertility (total fertility below 1.5) with little likelihood of completed cohort fertility reaching replacement level. Earlier theory aiming at explaining this phenomenon stressed the incompatibility between post‐industrial society and behaviour necessary for population replacement. Recent theory has been more specific, often concentrating on the current Italian or Spanish situations or on the contrast between them and the situation in either Scandinavia or the English‐speaking countries, or both. Such an approach ignores important evidence, especially that from German‐speaking populations. The models available concentrate on welfare systems and family expenses, omitting circumstances that may be unique to individual countries or longer‐term factors that may be common to all.     

Worldwide fertility declines do not rely on stopping at ideal parities

A key demographic hypothesis has been that fertility declines rely on stopping at target parities, but emerging evidence suggests that women frequently reduce fertility without specific numeric targets. To assess the relative importance of these two paths to fertility decline, we develop a novel mixture model to estimate: (1) the proportion of women who stop at a target parity; and (2) mean completed fertility among those who do not. Applied to Demographic and Health Survey data from women aged 45–49 in 84 low- and middle-income countries, and to United States Census cohorts, the model shows considerable variation in the proportion stopping at specific parities (1–84?per cent). The estimates also show that declines in completed fertility are largely attributable to women who do not stop at target parities, suggesting that stopping at ideal parities may be less important than parity-independent decisions for a wide range of fertility transitions.     

Three Fertility Compromises and Two Transitions

Demographers and those concerned with population policy are increasingly focusing on the steep fertility declines that occurred in developed countries from the 1960s and the consequent widespread below-replacement fertility levels. The decline has been termed the Second Demographic Transition. This paper argues that the recent demographic change can best be understood and analyzed if we broaden the concept to include the first demographic transition, and the three demographically more settled periods preceding, separating, and following the two fertility transitions. These more settled periods or “compromises” are examined to ascertain their nature and so to help predict the likely developments in the present or third compromise. It is argued that the third compromise has now extended for 20 years with little movement in fertility rates or other socioeconomic behavior which has been said to be associated with the second transition, and that this provides sufficient evidence for analysis. The approach has two key aspects. First, it is confined in Europe to countries that distinctly experienced the full five demographic periods, namely northwestern and central Europe. Second, the analysis gains strength by including non-European countries that progressed through all five stages, namely the English-speaking countries of overseas European settlement: USA, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand.     

The end of population growth in Asia

This paper presents probabilistic population projections for five regions of Asia (South Asia, Central Asia, China region, Pacific OECD and Pacific Asia) and Asia as a whole. Over this century, Asia will experience very heterogeneous demographic development: Central Asia is expected to almost double in population and South Asia will become by far the world’s most populous region, rapidly surpassing the China region. Simultaneously, the Pacific OECD countries are likely to shrink in population size and experience extreme population ageing. The proportion of the population aged 60 and above in these countries (with Japan having the greatest weight) is expected to reach 50 per cent of the total population (with the 95 per cent uncertainty interval ranging from 35 to 61 per cent). The China region will experience a more rapid speed of ageing, with the proportion aged 60 and above expected to increase by a factor of four from 10 per cent in 2000 to 39 per cent in 2100.     

Completing the fertility transition in the developing world: The role of educational differences and fertility preferences

This study summarizes patterns of educational differentials in wanted and unwanted fertility at different stages of the fertility transition. The data are from Demographic and Health Surveys in 57 less developed countries. As the transition proceeds, educational differentials in wanted fertility tend to decline and differentials in unwanted fertility tend to rise. An assessment of fertility patterns in developed and less developed countries with low fertility concludes that these differentials are likely to remain substantial when less developed countries reach the end of their transitions. This conclusion implies that the educational composition of the population remains a key predictor of overall fertility in late transitional countries and that low levels of schooling can be a cause of stalling fertility.     

Modelling period fertility: Schooling and intervals following a birth in Eastern Africa

We describe a regression-based approach to the modelling of age-, order-, and duration-specific period fertility, using retrospective survey data. The approach produces results that are free of selection biases and can be used to study differential fertility. It is applied to Demographic and Health Survey data for Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe to investigate differential trends in fertility by education. Parity progression fell and the intervals following each birth lengthened between the 1970s and 2000s in all four countries. Fertility fell most among women with secondary education. In contrast to other world regions, postponement of successive births for extended periods accounted for much of the initial drop in fertility in these African countries. However, family size limitation by women with secondary education in Ethiopia and Kenya and longer birth spacing in Zimbabwe also played significant roles. Thus, birth control is being adopted in Eastern Africa in response to diverse changes in fertility preferences.     

超低生育率阶段的区域人口发展战略

随着我国人口转变的实现和完成,越来越多的地方进入了"超低生育率"发展阶段,未来时期的人口发展战略面临着何去何从的抉择。以辽宁省辽阳市为案例总结区域人口转变的阶段和特点,指出辽阳已经出现"意愿性超低生育率"现象,带来了人口发展风险问题。随着计划生育风险家庭和残缺家庭的增多,辽阳的公共财政压力已经感受到巨大挑战。人口安全要求坚守计划生育的"底线伦理",降低计划生育风险家庭和残缺家庭在整个计划生育家庭中的规模和比例。未来的区域人口安全发展战略必须考虑确立的两个基本点是"优先健全人口结构、兼顾控制人口增量",不鼓励农村一女户放弃二胎生育指标,尽快建立独生子女家庭风险防范的社会机制和独生子女困难家庭公益救助机制。     

对我国未来“内生型”极低生育率水平的预警分析

本文通过对世界“内生型”极低生育率国家和地区的生育率主要影响因素分析,采用横截面替代方法得出了在极低生育率条件下生育率影响因素的替代系数,并对我国生育意愿达到“内生型”极低生育率的时间进行了估测,为我国调整生育政策避免进入“逆马尔萨斯”陷阱的人口危机做出了预警,并结合实际对我国生育政策微调提出了相关建议。     

中国人口生育问题研究

本文对建国以来中国人口的生育转变、生育水平、生育模式和生育政策研究的各种有代表性的观点进行了综述和评论。     

Sixty years of change in Tibetan fertility: An assessment

Existing knowledge of Tibetan historical population development is mostly based on ‘best-guess’ estimates and is heavily politicized. Using census data, I reconstruct the development of Tibetan fertility in China since the 1940s, with the objective of providing an independent assessment that can be used as benchmark for future studies and debates on Tibetan demography. Following major social and economic transformations starting in the 1950s, Tibetan fertility unexpectedly increased from the late 1950s to the late 1960s. As noted in several existing studies, Tibetan fertility in China then declined swiftly from the early 1980s onwards and has now reached values close to replacement level. Focusing on the 1950–70 period, I examine factors that contributed to shaping the Tibetan fertility increase in more detail. This confirms that changes in nuptiality and disease-related infertility both played a role in pushing up fertility rates among Tibetan women in China.     

Replacement Migration: A Questionable Tactic for Delaying the Inevitable Effects of Fertility Transition

This article critiques a recent U.N. Population Division report, Replacement Migration: Is it a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations? The report explores the use of increased immigration to bolster future population size and change age distribution patterns in a group of developed countries. Fertility rate declines and lengthening life expectancies associated with demographic transition inevitably yield an aging population and a falling potential support ratio (PSR), a situation which some demographers and economists view with alarm. As the U.N. report itself suggests, replacement migration can only temporarily delay population aging and decline. These issues are ultimately better addressed through changes in retirement policy. Population projections should be used only with great caution in designing long-term demographic policy. In particular, some assumptions used to make the U.N. projections are questionable, and even minor changes in those assumptions would yield substantially different policy conclusions. Replacement migration also raises difficult environmental questions by moving large numbers of people from low to high per-capita consumption nations. Modest population decline, particularly in more developed countries, may have significant local and global environmental and climate policy benefits.

     

Regional fertility trends in Mozambique

This article increases our knowledge of Mozambique's demography by assessing the nature and magnitude of fertility decline, using the 1980 and 1997 censuses and the 1997 Demographic and Health Survey. Several robust methods, including P/F ratios from census and birth history data, the own-children procedure (census data), and estimates of censored parity progression ratios (adjusted for truncation bias) are used to identify fertility trends. Regional differences in fertility trends are discussed in the light of the proximate determinants of fertility. Fertility decline has started in Mozambique but the magnitude of the decline differs among the three administrative regions in the country. In Southern Region the fertility decline is well established, while in Northern and Central regions the decline is still incipient.     

中国西部民族地区的人口生育与死亡状况浅析

西部民族地区包括中国少数民族人口最集中的8个省区,少数民族人口占全国少数民族人口的63.41%。受到这些地区本身历史的、自然的、民族的、以及社会经济发展水平等多种因素影响,其人口状况也表现为与中国中、东部很大的不同,具有自身显著的独特性。本文通过对历次人口普查资料和有关统计数据的分析,对中国西部民族地区的人口变动以及自然增长状况进行了系统地分析,得出了一些有意义的结论。     

Socio-economic status and fertility decline: Insights from historical transitions in Europe and North America

The timings of historical fertility transitions in different regions are well understood by demographers, but much less is known regarding their specific features and causes. In the study reported in this paper, we used longitudinal micro-level data for five local populations in Europe and North America to analyse the relationship between socio-economic status and fertility during the fertility transition. Using comparable analytical models and class schemes for each population, we examined the changing socio-economic differences in marital fertility and related these to common theories on fertility behaviour. Our results do not provide support for the hypothesis of universally high fertility among the upper classes in pre-transitional society, but do support the idea that the upper classes acted as forerunners by reducing their fertility before other groups. Farmers and unskilled workers were the latest to start limiting their fertility. Apart from these similarities, patterns of class differences in fertility varied significantly between populations.     

中国妇女生育水平变动考证和未来人口发展的策略选择

1990年以来各类人口调查和相关学者的研究结果显示,目前的低生育水平的实现有外在政策强力的作用,更有中国社会经济发展内生化的作用;真实的生育水平既不是调查包括人口普查所显示的那样低(低于1.5),也不是有关部门和政府所想象的那样高。调查显示农村居民平均生育意愿不会高于2个孩子,这是生育率持续稳定的根本。众所周知,为了保证人口稳定持续的发展,应使妇女生育率保持更替水平或至少接近更替水平。从人口发展规律和人口发展与社会经济发展相适应的规律出发,结合当前我国居民生育意愿和生育水平走低的实际,我们应该抓住生育政策调整的最佳时期,调整应该在最佳时期即未来5-10年内完成。     

Cash support vs. tax incentives: The differential impact of policy interventions on third births in contemporary Hungary

Following steep falls in birth rates in Central and Eastern European countries during the economic and institutional restructuring of the early 1990s, governments made substantial efforts to stop or at least reduce the fertility decline. In Hungary, parents with three or more children could benefit from specific new policy measures: the flat-rate child-rearing support paid from the youngest child's third to eighth birthdays (signalling recognition of stay-at-home motherhood) and a redesigned and upgraded tax relief system. However, the success of these policy measures, if any, is difficult to detect in aggregate statistics. Analysing data from the Hungarian Generations and Gender Survey, we rely on event history methods to examine the policies’ effects on third birth risks, especially among different socio-economic groups. The results indicate that while the child-rearing support increased third birth risks among the least educated, the generous tax relief had a similar effect for parents with tertiary education.