Union–Firm Bargaining as a Repeated Game and the Behaviour of Wages over the Business Cycle

This paper studies a repeated game between a union and a firm in the presence of revenue fluctuations. The simple setup, mainly based on Schultz’s (1995) model, gives support to the idea that the existence of a long-term relationship may change the predictions of the static one-shot model of wage and employment determination in unionized labour markets. In particular, when revenue is fluctuating and the discount factor is moderate the players can commit themselves to some ‘second best’ strategies, rather than playing non-cooperative strategies. As a consequence of the enforcement problems a flat wage over the business cycle may arise. This analysis suggests that ‘second best’ strategies allowing for a pro-cyclical wage as well as for a counter-cyclical wage are feasible. However, when the discount factor decreases and approaches a certain threshold value the parties cannot do better than play a wage constant over the cycle. Moreover, the resulting wage varies less than the employment level, in accordance with the empirical evidence.     

Union–Firm Bargaining,Productivity Improvement and Endogenous Growth

This paper presents a growth model with two sectors. In the high‐tech sector, R&D increases productivity and union–firm bargaining determines wages, but in the traditional sector there are neither R&D nor labour unions. The government is able to regulate union bargaining power. The main results are as follows. Because firms try to escape wage increases through the improvement of productivity by R&D, the increase in union bargaining power boosts R&D and growth. It is welfare enhancing to strengthen (weaken) unions when the growth rate is below (above) some critical level. A specific rule is presented for when de‐unionization is socially desirable.     

Unionization Structures in International Oligopoly

We examine how competition in international markets affects a union's choice of wage regime, which can be either uniform or discriminatory. Firms are heterogeneous with regard to international competition. When unions choose their wage regimes sequentially, a discriminatory outcome becomes more likely when international competition increases. However, for intermediate levels a union may stick with a uniform wage regime even if the rival union adopts a discriminatory regime. When competition is sufficiently intense, both unions revert to the discriminatory regime. Paradoxically only in those latter instances all parties (consumers, workers, and firms) may be better off (each in aggregate) if all unions adopt a uniform wage regime. We conclude that union incentives to coordinate their wage regimes should then also become largest.     

Changes in Union Membership Over Time: A Panel Analysis for West Germany

Abstract. Despite the apparent stability of the wage bargaining institutions in West Germany, aggregate union membership has been declining dramatically since the early 1990s. However, aggregate gross membership numbers do not distinguish between employment status and it is impossible to disaggregate these sufficiently. This paper uses four waves of the German Socio‐economic Panel in 1985, 1989, 1993, and 1998 to perform a panel analysis of net union membership among employees. We estimate a correlated random‐effects probit model suggested by Chamberlain (Handbook of Econometrics, Vol. II, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 1984) to take proper account of individual‐specific effects. Our results suggest that at the individual level the propensity to be a union member has not changed considerably over time. Thus, the aggregate decline in membership is due to composition effects. We also use the estimates to predict net union density at the industry level based on the IAB employment subsample for the time period 1985–97.     

Wage Commitment,Signalling, and Entry Deterrence or Accommodation

Abstract. We analyse the wage choice of a monopoly union against entry threat. The wage carries information about market demand, which is crucial to an uninformed entrant, and in addition affects the entrant's post‐entry cost through labour market institutions. The union may wish to deter or accommodate entry depending on whether the entrant will hire from a different source or from the union. Equilibrium wage is distorted downwardly (upwardly) for deterrence (accommodation); but because of wage correlation a low (high) wage can also turn entry profitable (unprofitable). Therefore, separating equilibrium may not always exist, and entry outcomes may be inefficient.     

Unions,Firing Costs,and Unemployment

Abstract. We study the effects of firing costs in unionized economies with heterogeneous workers. We consider an overlapping generations model where workers participate in the labour market both when young and when old. All workers belong to the same union that sets wages unilaterally. We find that at given wages firing costs increase youth unemployment and decrease old‐age unemployment. However, once the wage response is considered, firing costs increase both youth and old‐age unemployment. Indeed, knowing that when firing costs are higher firms refrain from firing, the union increases the wage of old workers, and, therefore, old‐age unemployment increases.     

‘Investment’ in Union Membership: A Managerial Approach

This paper concerns wage formation in a unionized economy when union membership is endogenous and determined by employment. A union is run by a leadership which has as an objective to strengthen the union’s position in the labour market. This is achieved by building up membership. Among the results, it is found that since membership is determined by employment, the inclusion of the leadership’s preferences into a union’s objective function produces lower real wages than a static version would predict. It is also shown that an increase in the union’s rate of time preference increases the natural rate of unemployment, while an increase in the speed at which workers enter/leave a union has an opposite effect.     

Endogenous Contracts in Unionized Oligopoly

We study the endogenous determination of contracts in a unionized oligopoly and the welfare implications thereof. Alternative contracts specify the sequencing in the selection of R&D and wages. They can be classified as ‘fixed’ when the unions set wages before the firms make their R&D decisions or ‘floating’ when the sequencing of these choices is reversed. If the unions are highly employment‐oriented, we find that either all firm–union pairs choose floating‐wage contracts or both contract types may coexist depending on the degree of technological spillovers. However, when the unions have stronger preference over attaining a good wage deal, then it becomes very likely that fixed‐wage contracts will endogenously emerge because they can serve as an insurance device against oppor tunistic wage increases. Our welfare analysis suggests that welfare‐improving contracts may nevertheless not always arise in equilibrium.     

Wage Setting in Sweden: An Empirical Test of a Barebones Union Model

ABSTRACT In this paper a simple monopoly union model for the Swedish economy is presented and estimated. Interest is focused on the union's objectives. The results indicate that two popular representations of union objectives — wage bill and rent maximisation — are rejected by the data. Instead, preferences are highly concave in the wage rate, with an estimated degree of relative risk aversion well above unity evaluated at sample means.     

Wage Premium in the Industrial Sector of the Spanish Economy: Empirical Evidence

Abstract. This paper presents evidence that firm-level productivity increases when the relative wage rises, or the level of unemployment rises. Both facts are consistent with the efficiency wage model. Moreover, there is support for the idea that an increase in the sector's wage with respect to the previous year also increases productivity. We obtain the empirical evidence through a double-hurdle model. We use this estimation technique because it can be established that the differences in productivity between sectors could be explained by differences in effort. It means that some of the industrial sectors of the Spanish economy may pay wage premia while others do not. We also test this implication through panel data.     

Union Wage Setting,Employment and Investment: a Survey of Theory and Empirical Evidence

Abstract. This paper provides a survey of recent theoretical and empirical research on union wage setting, employment and investment. The basic models of union wage setting and employment are presented in a unified framework. The distinction between insiders and outsiders is introduced as an extension of the basic models. Empirical evidence on union preferences and on the performance of the various models is accessibly ordered. Finally, attention is paid to the effects of strategic behaviour between union and firm on wages, employment and investment.     

Union Membership and the Union Wage Gap in the UK

We consider the choice of union membership in the UK and its effect on the union/non‐union wage differential allowing for the endogeneity of the union choice. We include identifying variables not previously used and find that correcting for selectivity is important and has a large impact on the estimated differential. Moreover, union choice is itself affected by the wage gap.     

Reasons for Wage Rigidity in Germany

Abstract. This study investigates institutional and economic reasons for downward wage rigidity regarding three occupational skill groups. Based on a survey of 801 firms in Germany and an econometric analysis, we find strong support for explanations based on the effects of labour union contracts and efficiency wages that differ between skill groups. Survey respondents indicate that labour union contracts and implicit contracts are important reasons for wage rigidity for the (less) skilled. Specific human capital and negative signals for new hires are causes of the stickiness of wages for the highly skilled. Compared with US evidence, German firms seem to attach more importance to labour union contracts and specific human capital.     

Welfare Effects of Local versus Central Wage Bargaining

The paper analyses the welfare effects of union bargaining (de)centralization in a dual labour market with a unionized and a competitive sector. We show that social welfare depends on both the structure of the union's objective function and the elasticities of labour demand in both sectors. The welfare‐maximizing employment allocation can be obtained under a high degree of centralization if the union maximizes the total wage‐bill. Otherwise, if the union is rent maximizing, welfare is higher under local bargaining. However, in that case neither central nor local wage setting yields the social optimum.     

Union Bargaining,Wage Differentials and Employment

Abstract. Reviewing empirical studies concerning the corporatism-flexibility-performance nexus the paper discusses decentralized and centralized bargaining systems. Revenue pay systems, concession bargaining and two-tier wage systems as means to enhance wage flexibility at the firm level are also considered. Both theoretical and empirical evidence is presented, showing that unions are bargaining for greater employment security for the already employed (the insiders). In return, unions are ready to accept greater wage flexibility and even wage decreases. By contrast, the insider-outsider theory does suggest how unions may accentuate involuntary unemployment, because there may be ways in which a union can help to raise the wages of the insiders without reducing their chances of continued employment.     

Trade Union Preferences in Double Dividend Models

This paper analyses wage formation in a unionized economy where consumers as an externality in their utility function have the level of local pollution. If modelled in a microeconomically consistent way this externality should also be present in the preferences of the trade union. The key result is that when this trade‐off between pollution and employment is included in the trade unions’ preferences then they are willing to lower wages to generate substitution towards higher employment and lower pollution. As a consequence, an increase in the pollution tax will lead to lower wages. At a more general level the results show that in models analyzing pollution issues, such as the double dividend literature, it is very important for the policy conclusions how trade unions are introduced.     

The Union Effect on Wages in Chile: A Two‐Stage Approach Using Panel Data

We estimate the union effect on wages in Chile to be between 18 and 24 per cent. We follow a two‐stage procedure that allows us to correct the endogeneity of union status and to separate true from spurious dependence, by exploiting the union history of individuals using panel data. We find evidence of comparative‐advantage sorting in union status, strong true state dependence and a re‐distributional effect of union membership (i.e. wage gains from unionization are larger for lower‐wage earners).     

Employment‐protecting Labour Market Institutions and Inward Foreign Direct Investments

Abstract. This paper proposes labour market institutional arrangements as a strategic device to induce or deter export‐substituting inward foreign direct investments (FDI) — in either instance protecting domestic employment. In a union‐oligopoly context it is shown that, if the FDI‐associated unit costs (FC) are not high enough, then employment‐neutral (‐enhancing) inward FDI will emerge in equilibrium if the domestic wage setting is credibly centralized and the unemployment benefit is sufficiently high (low), each instance arising for a different range of — intermediate — FC values. If however the FC values are sufficiently high, then the centralized structure of wage setting along with a low enough unemployment benefit will deter employment‐reducing inward FDI.     

A Structural Model of Trade Union Behaviour under Uncertainty,with Sticky Wage

ABSTRACT: Trade union concern for job security is modelled under asymmetric information about labour demand, with rigid wage. Sequential decision processes are discussed, for the individual, on whether to join the union (utility defined over consumption and leisure); for the union, about the contribution to charge (utility defined over level of membership and level of contributions); for the employer, on level of labour to hire (profit maximizer). Equilibrium solutions, and ‘disequilibrium‘ solutions with shocked output price, are provided in a general and algebraic formulation; simulations with 1982 British data are shown, with shocks on probability of fall in output price, on technology, and on working time.     

Monopoly Union Wage Setting and Evaluation of Public Projects: An Intertemporal General Equilibrium Approach

ABSTRACT This paper contains cost-benefit rules for public projects in a small open economy with a tradeable and non-tradeable sector, where wage setting is done by a representative household. The interpretation, with regard to traditional trade union theory, is in terms of a general equilibrium version of a monopoly union model. The intertemporal character of the model makes it possible to consider public projects which involve the creation of infrastructure that improves the future productivity of both labour and capital. A special feature of the model is the introduction of endogenous investment behaviour. However, since private investment is optimally adjusted in the initial equilibrium, envelope properties guarantee that first-order projects will only have second-order repercussions through changed investment behaviour, which means that indirect changes in private investment do not enter the project evaluation rules for small projects.