FISCAL STABILIZATION WITH PARTIAL EXCHANGE RATE PASS‐THROUGH

This article examines the role of fiscal stabilization policy in a two‐country framework that allows for partial exchange rate pass‐through. Analytical solutions for optimal monetary and fiscal policy rules depend on the degree of pass‐through. Each country unilaterally uses its fiscal instrument to stabilize the costs facing exporters. The welfare effects differ strongly depending on the degree of pass‐through. For high levels, both countries are better off with the fiscal instrument and welfare is closer to the benchmark flex‐price level. For low levels, however, the unilateral equilibrium policy rules lead to high volatility in taxes, and fiscal policy ends up being destabilizing by transmitting exchange rate fluctuations. Because these results stem from strategic considerations by the two countries, the fiscal instrument is not used under policy coordination. In addition, imposing a monetary union increases welfare when pass‐through is low, including the case of local currency pricing. (JEL E52, E63, F41, F42)     

THE STATE OF THE FEDERAL BUDGET AND THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY: FURTHER EVIDENCE

Simultaneous monetary and fiscal policy reaction functions are derived and estimated for the 1969:2–1984.3 period. The results suggest that the Reagan administration has abandoned fiscal policy as a stabilization tool. Furthermore, although the average money growth rate declined in the Reagan administration, variation in the rate of money growth indicates that monetary policy has been used to combat unemployment. Finally, monetary and fiscal policies were not coordinated during this period. Rather, monetary and fiscal policy appear to be set by a Nash equilibrium in a non-cooperative game. In a Nash equilibrium, the policy chosen by each authority maximizes its payoff, given the policy choice of the other authority.     

MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY DESIGN AT THE ZERO LOWER BOUND: EVIDENCE FROM THE LAB

The global economic crisis of 2007–2008 has pushed many advanced economies into a liquidity trap. We design a laboratory experiment on the effectiveness of policy measures to avoid expectation‐driven liquidity traps. Monetary policy alone is not sufficient to avoid liquidity traps, even if it preventively cuts the interest rate when inflation falls below a threshold. However, monetary policy augmented with a fiscal switching rule succeeds in escaping liquidity trap episodes. We measure the effect of fiscal policy on expectations, and report larger‐than‐unity fiscal multipliers at the zero lower bound. Experimental results in different treatments are well explained by adaptive learning. (JEL E70, C92, D83, D84, E52, E62)     

Assessing Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction in a Small Open Economy: the Case Republic of Macedonia

The aim of this paper is to analyze empirically the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy in a small open transition economies: the case the Republic of Macedonia. This paper employs SVAR methodology to examine jointly the impact monetary and fiscal policy on real GDP and prices. The result reveals that the monetary policy counteracts the effects of fiscal policy and persists until the effects of fiscal policy changes disappear. This causes a crowding out effect. In addition, the result shows that the best fiscal policy for stimulating the economy appears to be one of tax-cuts. The empirical research, in jointly analyzing fiscal and monetary policy also provides an additional, possibly interesting result. The sizes of the responses of real GDP and prices to monetary shock are not significantly reduced when fiscal shock is included into monetary SVAR.     

THE FISCAL FRAMEWORK OF MONETARY POLICY

This paper i11ustrates the importance of the fiscal framework for monetary analysis by discussing three separate issues. I begin by examining how the fiscal framework changes the macroeconomic equilibrium associated with different steady state rates of money growth. This includes a summary of research that I have presented elsewhere and comments on several additional aspects of the way in which the fiscal structure destroys the neutrality of monetary policy.
The second section deals with the short-run impact of changes in monetary policy. Here again the fiscal structure complicates the economy's response to monetary policy.
The final section looks at the effect of the fiscal structure on the central banks choice of monetary policies. Fiscal structures are likely to influence the policies adopted because they affect the costs and benefits of monetary policies.     

POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLES IN THE NEW KEYNESIAN MODEL

This paper tests various political business cycle theories in a New Keynesian model with a monetary and fiscal policy mix. All the policy coefficients, the target levels of inflation and the budget deficit, the firms' frequency of price setting, and the standard deviations of the structural shocks are allowed to depend on “political” regimes: a preelection versus postelection regime, a regime that depends on whether the president (or the Fed chairman) is a Democrat or a Republican, and a regime under which the president and the Fed chairman share party affiliation in preelection quarters or not. The results provide evidence that several coefficients are influenced by political variables. The best‐fitting specification, in fact, is one that allows coefficients to vary according to a regime that depends on whether the economy is in the few quarters before a presidential election or not. Monetary policy becomes considerably more inertial before elections and fiscal policy deviations from a simple rule are more common. There is some evidence that policies become more expansionary before elections, but this evidence disappears for monetary policy in the post‐1985 sample. (JEL C11, D72, E32, E52, E58, E63)     

RULES AND DISCRETION WITH NONCOORDINATED MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIES

The time inconsistency of optimal monetary policy is due to the effects of tax distortions. Thus the issue of how to improve upon the time-consistent suboptimal monetary policy is related to that of the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy. We present a model with three players (the central bark, the fiscal authority, and wage setters) in which distortionary taxes are explicitly modelled. We show that binding commitments to monetary rules are not necessarily welfare improving if monetary and fiscal policy are not coordinated. We also examine the effects of different degrees of independence of the central bank.     

MONETARY POLICY AND ANTI‐CYCLICAL BANK CAPITAL REGULATION

The financial crisis of 2008–2009 revived attention given to booms and busts in bank credit, and their effects on real activity. This interest sparked two different strands of research in macro. The first one focuses on monetary policy in the context of financial frictions. The second studies capital regulation in banking. To the best of our knowledge, so far these two topics have mostly been studied in isolation from each other. Thus, we still lack an understanding of how monetary policy and bank capital regulation interact in the presence of financial fragility. This paper aims to contribute to furthering this understanding. Specifically, we ask how the monetary policy rule should look like in the presence of cyclical capital requirements. We extend the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with bank capital in Aliaga‐Díaz and Olivero by introducing price rigidities in the spirit of the New‐Keynesian literature. We find that: First, anti‐cyclical requirements have important stabilization properties relative to the case of constant requirements. This is true for all types of fluctuations that we study, which include those caused by productivity, preference, fiscal, monetary, and financial shocks. Second, output and consumption volatilities present in the no regulation economy can be recovered with anti‐cyclical requirements as long as the policy rate responds only slightly to credit spreads. Third, monetary policy rules that respond to credit conditions also perform better in terms of welfare. (JEL E32, E44)     

WHO IS AFRAID OF THE FRIEDMAN RULE?

We explore the connection between optimal monetary policy and heterogeneity among agents in a standard monetary economy with two types of agents where the stationary distribution of money holdings is nondegenerate. Sans type-specific fiscal policy, we show that the zero-nominal-interest rate policy (the Friedman rule) does not maximize type-specific welfare; it may not maximize aggregate ex ante social welfare either. Indeed, one or, more surprisingly, both types may benefit if the central bank deviates from the Friedman rule. ( JEL E31, E51, E58)     

Aid and Fiscal Deficits: Lessons from Uganda on the Implications for Macroeconomic Management and Fiscal Sustainability

This article contributes to the ongoing debate on the macroeconomic management of large aid inflows to low‐income countries by analysing lessons drawn from Uganda, where the fiscal deficit before grants, which was largely aid‐funded, doubled to over 12% of GDP in the early 2000s. It focuses on the implications of the widening fiscal deficit for monetary policy, the real exchange rate, debt sustainability and the vulnerability of the budget to fiscal shocks, and argues that large fiscal deficits, even when funded predominantly by aid, risk undermining macroeconomic objectives and long‐run fiscal sustainability.     

MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS,EXPECTATIONS, AND INFORMATION RIGIDITIES

This paper contributes to the literature by assessing expectation effects from monetary policy for G7 economies. We rely on expectation data from Consensus Economics and a panel vector autoregression framework, which accounts for international spillovers and time‐variation. We analyze whether monetary policy has changed the degree of information rigidity after the emergence of the subprime crisis and estimate effects of interest rate changes on expectations, disagreements, and forecast errors. We find strong evidence for information rigidities and identify higher forecast errors by professionals after monetary policy shocks. Our results suggest that the international transmission of monetary policy shocks introduces noisy information and partly increases disagreement among forecasters. (JEL E31, E52)     

Policy diffusion as empowerment: domestic agency and the institutional dynamics of monetary policy diffusion in China

ABSTRACT

The policy diffusion literature has often focused on external pressures on domestic policy. However, by analysing the evolution of China’s monetary policy regime, we demonstrate a pattern of highly selective diffusion that is largely shaped by domestic political and institutional dynamics. We use an historical institutionalist approach to probe how the most relevant institutionally embedded agents, in this case, those within the Chinese central bank, have strategically engaged with this process. We show how selective diffusion has been shaped by epistemic policy learning through international engagement by China’s central bankers, and, in particular, how they have strategically used imported policy ideas as an institutional empowerment strategy, furthering the interests and agenda of the People’s Bank of China.     

The Macro Content of PRSPs: Assessing the Need for a More Flexible Macroeconomic Policy Framework

This article analyses the content of 15 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers from a growth and poverty reduction perspective. Contrary to new trends in developed and middle‐income countries, their policy frameworks lack the necessary flexibility to deal with external shocks and address macroeconomic volatility appropriately. Their fiscal and monetary policies are too narrowly focused on fiscal balance and price stability and consequently pay too little attention to economic fluctuations arising from external shocks, which have major effects on poverty and growth. To address these issues, the article proposes a set of policy measures, including avoidance of excessively tight inflation and fiscal targets (with provisions for fluctuations in commodity prices), more room for countercyclical policy and the adoption of permanent safety nets.     

EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES AND FISCAL DISCIPLINE: THE ROLE OF CAPITAL CONTROLS

How do exchange rate regimes influence fiscal discipline? This important question has typically been addressed exploiting the classic dichotomy of fixed versus flexible exchange rate regimes assuming perfect capital mobility. However, the role of capital controls cannot be neglected, particularly in developing countries. This paper analyzes the effects of capital controls on fiscal performance by focusing on dual exchange rate regimes. In a model in which the fiscal policy is endogenously determined by a nonbenevolent fiscal authority, dual regimes induce politicians to have higher fiscal deficits than under fixed and flexible regimes operating under perfect capital mobility. The model also shows this effect increases as fiscal authorities become more impatient. Dynamic panel regressions confirm that dual regimes lead to higher fiscal deficits than fixed and flexible regimes operating under unified rates. Using a dummy for pre‐electoral year as an indicator of fiscal authorities' shortsightedness, we also confirm that dual exchange rate has a more adverse effect on fiscal deficits as the authorities become more impatient. (JEL E50, E60, F31, F41)     

ELASTIC CAPITAL SUPPLY AND THE EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY

Existing analyses of the effects of fiscal policy in general equilibrium models have typically been conducted under the assumption that the long-run supply of capital is perfectly elastic at a fixed rate of time preference. These analyses have shown that the long-run response of the capital stock to changes in fiscal policy is crucial to generating the potential for “multiplier” effects in these models. In this paper we ask, what are the implications of relaxing the assumption of perfectly elastic capital supply for the analysis of fiscal policy? We show that with less than perfectly elastic capital supply, the potential for multipliers is actually enhanced. (JEL E62, D90)     

CAN MONETARY POLICY INFLUENCE LONG‐TERM INTEREST RATES? IT DEPENDS

Can monetary policy influence long‐term interest rates? Studies that have tackled this question using vector autoregressions (VARs) generally find that monetary policy's influence on long‐term interest rates is small and often statistically insignificant. Other studies, however, using a single‐equation approach, have found a robust relationship. Our study sheds new light on this question by estimating the effect of monetary policy shocks on long‐term interest rates in a VAR with long‐run monetary neutrality restrictions. We find that U.S. monetary policy can strongly influence long‐term interest rates, but only when the Federal Reserve has inflation‐fighting credibility and is able to firmly anchor inflationary expectations. (JEL E43, E51, E52)     

WELFARE AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONALIZED PRODUCTION

I incorporate internationalized production, whereby firms hire domestic and foreign production factors, into the model of Corsetti and Pesenti (2001). In contrast to their conclusion, I find that an expansionary monetary shock can be beggar-thy-neighbor and a fiscal shock can improve national welfare. The transmission mechanism of public policy here is different from theirs. In particular, a fiscal shock can affect the short-run exchange rate and generate long-run welfare effects even if it is temporary. Results in this article offer another rationale for international retaliation and coordination. (JEL F30, F40 )     

UNION POWER,COLLECTIVE BARGAINING,AND OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY

We study Ramsey policies and optimal monetary policy rules in a dynamic New Keynesian model with unionized labor markets. Collective wage bargaining and unions' monopoly power amplify inefficient employment fluctuations. The optimal monetary policy must trade off between stabilizing inflation and reducing inefficient unemployment fluctuations induced by unions' monopoly power. In this context the monetary authority uses inflation as a tax on union rents and as a mean for indirect redistribution. Results are robust to the introduction of imperfect insurance on income shocks. The optimal monetary policy rule targets unemployment alongside inflation. (JEL E0, E4, E5, E6)     

Effects of Macroeconomic Uncertainty on Investment and Economic Growth: Evidence from Pakistan

The relationship between macroeconomic uncertainty, investment and economic growth is an empirical issue in developing countries. This paper investigates the effects of macroeconomic uncertainty on investment and economic growth in Pakistan for the period 1975–2008 by using the accelerator model of investment and endogenous growth model. The conditional variances, directly estimated through the Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model is utilized for erecting the uncertainty variables related to fiscal policy, openness and foreign capital inflows. The results clearly indicate that the macroeconomic uncertainty have significant negative effects on investment and per capita income of Pakistan. We conclude that a reduction in macroeconomic uncertainty through appropriate fiscal and monetary policy, stability in capital inflows and improved trade performance could result in high investment and sustainable economic growth in the country.     

THE EFFECTS OF ASSET PURCHASES AND NORMALIZATION OF U.S. MONETARY POLICY

This paper examines changes in the effects of unconventional monetary policies in the United States. To this end, we estimate a Markov-switching VAR model with absorbing regimes to capture possible structural changes. Our results detect regime changes around the beginning of 2011 and the middle of 2013. Before 2011, the U.S. large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) had relatively large impacts on the real economy and prices, but after the middle of 2013, their effects were weaker and less-persistent. In addition, after the middle of 2013, which includes the monetary policy normalization period, the asset purchase (or balance sheet) shocks had slightly weaker effects than during the early stage of the LSAPs but stronger effects than during the late stage of the LSAPs, while interest rate shocks had insignificant effects on the real economy and prices. Finally, our results suggest that the positive responses of durables and capital goods expenditures to interest rate shocks weakened the negative impacts of interest rate hikes after the middle of 2013 including the period of monetary policy normalization. (JEL C32, E21, E52)