Increasing health inequality in China: An empirical study with ordinal data

This paper employs a recently introduced method of income-health matrix to study health inequality in China. The method overcomes the problems associated with ordered self-reported health (SRH) responses when the conventional tools of inequality analysis are used. Applying the new method to the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) data, we find that over the study period of thirteen years, health inequality has increased by more than one hundred percent in spite of the multifold increase in average income. We conclude that the most likely explanations for the recent increase in China’s health inequality are: aging population, worsening income inequality and poverty, division between urban and rural, and environment deterioration.     

Maximum likelihood approach to vote aggregation with variable probabilities

The Condorcet-Kemeny-Young statistical approach to vote aggregation is based on the assumption that voters have the same probability of comparing correctly two alternatives and that this probability is the same for any pair of alternatives. We relax the second part of this assumption by letting the probability of comparing correctly two alternatives be increasing with the distance between two alternatives in the allegedly true ranking. This leads to a rule in which the majority in favor of one alternative against another one is given a larger weight the larger the distance between the two alternatives in the true ranking, i.e., the larger the probability that the voters compare them correctly. This rule is not Condorcet consistent and does not satisfy local independence of irrelevant alternatives. Yet, it is anonymous, neutral, and paretian. It also appears that its performance in selecting the alternative most likely to be the best improves with the rate at which the probability increases.We would like to thank Michel Le Breton for his encouragement to examine this question and for his comments, as well as Philippe De Donder, Jean-Yves Duclos, Stephen Gordon, Cyril Téjédo and an anonymous referee for their comments.     

An empirical study of ordinal condom use measures

Accurate condom use assessment is critical in sexually transmitted infection‐prevention research. Ordinal condom use frequency measures may be problematic due to subjective interpretation by respondents. To assess this potential bias, we examined the ordinal condom use labels (e.g., “never,” “rarely,” etc.) assigned by college students to 17 scenarios that described how frequently a hypothetical couple used condoms. Scenarios varied by condom use frequency (0% to 100%) and by whether frequency was described by stating the number of protected acts out of 20 total acts of intercourse, out of 100 total acts, or as a proportion of acts that were protected. There was substantial interpersonal variability in the labels assigned by participants in all 17 scenarios and inconsistent use of the “never” and “always” labels to characterize 0% and 100% condom use, respectively. The assigned labels varied as a function of the number of total acts (20 vs. 100) and whether condom use was expressed as a count or a percentage, which suggests that participants did not convert the number of protected acts to an equivalent proportion. These results call into question both the reliability and validity of ordinal condom use measures.     

The ordinal egalitarian bargaining solution for finite choice sets

Rubinstein et al. (Econometrica 60:1171–1186, 1992) introduced the Ordinal Nash Bargaining Solution. They prove that Pareto optimality, ordinal invariance, ordinal symmetry, and IIA characterize this solution. A feature of their work is that attention is restricted to a domain of social choice problems with an infinite set of basic allocations. We introduce an alternative approach to solving finite social choice problems using a new notion called the Ordinal Egalitarian (OE) bargaining solution. This suggests the middle ranked allocation (or a lottery over the two middle ranked allocations) of the Pareto set as an outcome. We show that the OE solution is characterized by weak credible optimality, ordinal symmetry and independence of redundant alternatives. We conclude by arguing that what allows us to make progress on this problem is that with finite choice sets, the counting metric is a natural and fully ordinal way to measure gains and losses to agents seeking to solve bargaining problems.     

Anonymity, ordinal preference proximity and imposed social choices

Extending on an impossibility result by Baigent [1], it is shown that an anonymous social choice procedure which preserves preference proximity cannot satisfy the weakest possible form of non-imposition. Received: 20 September 1999/Accepted: 11 May 2001     

Working with Uncertainty: An Unfinished Case Study

A disclosure of sexual abuse, which is then retracted, places the family therapist in a difficult position both ethically and in terms of whom the therapist's primary alliance is to. This case study will examine some of these difficulties and will describe the process of working with a family when child protection issues are suspected but not substantiated.     

Uncertainty and the lives of persons with AIDS

This article uses interview data to explore how 23 gay and bisexual men who had AIDS were affected by and managed uncertainty. Before diagnosis these individuals had to find ways to cope with uncertainty about their risk of contracting AIDS and about their initial symptoms. After diagnosis they had to find answers to their questions about why they contracted this disease, whether they would be able to function in the short run, whether their illness would kill them, and whether they would be allowed to live and (if death was unavoidable) to die with dignity. The data suggest that persons with AIDS respond to the uncertainties of their illness by attempting to assert as much control as possible over their lives, through such divergent strategies as seeking and avoiding knowledge about their illness.     

Employment location choices: Factors associated with the likelihood of homebased employment

The purpose of this research analysis is to investigate the factors that are associated with the likelihood of a worker choosing homebased employment. Using a sample of 6,744 employed men and women from the 1984 Panel Study of Income Dynamics, a logit estimation procedure is employed. Factors which decrease the likelihood of being a homebased worker include minority status, higher levels of total family labor income, a high school education or less, and longer working hours. Older workers, workers without children, workers with young children under age six, the self-employed, and farmers are all more likely to be involved in homebased employment.Ramona K.Z. Heck is an Associate Professor in the Department of Consumer Economics and Housing, 133 Martha Van Rensselaer Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y. 14853. Her current research interests include: household asset and debt formation, working families and employers' benefits, and homebased employment. She received her Ph.D. from Purdue University in 1978.The analyses in this paper are related to work in progress under the Cooperative Regional Research Project, NE-167 entitled, At-Home-Income-Generation: Impact on Management, Productivity and Stability in Rural/Urban Families, partially supported by the stations of Hawaii, Iowa, Lincoln University (Missouri), Michigan, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture.     

On the likelihood of Condorcet's profiles

Consider a group of individuals who have to collectively choose an outcome from a finite set of feasible alternatives. A scoring or positional rule is an aggregation procedure where each voter awards a given number of points, w _j, to the alternative she ranks in j ^th position in her preference ordering; The outcome chosen is then the alternative that receives the highest number of points. A Condorcet or majority winner is a candidate who obtains more votes than her opponents in any pairwise comparison. Condorcet [4] showed that all positional rules fail to satisfy the majority criterion. Furthermore, he supplied a famous example where all the positional rules select simultaneously the same winner while the majority rule picks another one. Let P ^* be the probability of such events in three-candidate elections. We apply the techniques of Merlin et al. [17] to evaluate P ^* for a large population under the Impartial Culture condition. With these assumptions, such a paradox occurs in 1.808% of the cases. Received: 30 April 1999/Accepted: 14 September 2000     

Parties with Policy Preferences and Uncertainty over Voter Behavior

The equilibrium redistributive policy proposals of two parties with policy preferences are studied. Each party’s ideal policy coincides with that of citizens having a particular income level, and the party’s utility function reflects its attitude to the trade-off between the choice of preferred policy and the likelihood of victory. When parties face uncertainty about citizens’ abstention from voting, divergent equilibrium proposals are derived which are more moderate than their contrasting ideal policies. Political equilibria under different prior beliefs on abstention are then compared. It is shown that a lower likelihood of abstention in a particular income group induces both parties to make proposals catering to that group, in equilibrium.An erratum to this article can be found at     

Sequential elections with limited information

We develop an incomplete information model of a sequence of elections in a one-dimensional policy space, where voters have no contemporaneous information about candidate positions, and candidates have no information about voter preferences. The only source of information is contemporaneous endorsement data and historical data on the policy positions of previous winning candidates. We define a notion of stationary rational expectations equilibrium, and show that such an equilibrium results in outcomes which are equivalent to those that would occur under full information.We acknowledge support from ISF Grant #SES 82-08184 and #SES84-09654     

Using ordinal variables to measure multidimensional poverty in Egypt and Jordan

This paper examines the empirical relevance of recent methodological refinements to the “counting approach” to multidimensional poverty measurement. It provides an empirical illustration based on data available in the Demographic and Health Surveys of Egypt and Jordan. The paper relies on the general framework proposed by Silber and Yalonetzky (2013) to compare multidimensional poverty measures, such as the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) and others that are sensitive to the distribution of deprivation counts among individuals. It thus computes the measures introduced by Chakravarty and D’Ambrosio, 2006 and Rippin (2010) as well as indices based on the extension of the Aaberge and Peluso (2012), suggested by Silber and Yalonetzky (2013). It appears that it is useful to consider several multidimensional poverty measures when analyzing national poverty trends and when making a distinction between urban and rural areas.     

Wages,union membership,and public sector bargaining legislation: Simultaneous equations with an ordinal qualitative variable

A simultaneous equations model of teachers’ wages and unionization is constructed. The exogenous impact of collective bargaining legislation is captured by conditioning the wage-union system on an ordinal qualitative variable. A new estimation method involving N-chotomous probit and two-stage least squares is developed. The estimation results are consistent with a private interest theory of regulation, predicting that legislators will avoid direct subsidization of teacher wages. By comparison it is also shown that a conventional dummy variable specification of the qualitative legislative outcomes will yield misleading results. The authors gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments of John Addison, Cletus Coughlin, and Robert P. Trost.     

Bridges to Safe Uncertainty: An Interview with Barry Mason

Vivien Hardham talks to Barry Mason about the development of his ideas and practice over the past twenty years, outlining the influences upon him. He speaks about the ideas that he has contributed to the field.     

Decisions with conflicting and imprecise information

When facing situations involving uncertainty, experts might provide imprecise and conflicting opinions. Recent experiments have shown that decision makers display aversion towards both disagreement among experts and imprecision of information. We provide an axiomatic foundation for a decision criterion that allows one to distinguish on a behavioral basis the decision maker’s attitude towards imprecision and disagreement. This criterion accommodates patterns of preferences observed in experiments that are precluded by two-steps procedures, where information is first aggregated, and then used by the decision maker. This might be seen as an argument for having experts transmitting a more detailed information to the decision maker.     

Economic Uncertainty and Fertility

Sociologists and demographers have long been interested in the role of economic uncertainty in family behavior. Despite the prevailing “bourgeois conviction” that economic uncertainty discourages people from having children, the empirical evidence on this issue is mixed. In this paper, I summarize the recent empirical evidence, and discuss the potential limitations of previous investigations. Among the possible shortcomings of these studies is that many relied exclusively on unemployment as an operational definition of labor market uncertainty. Subjective indicators of economic uncertainty, which measure the individual’s perception of his or her economic situation more directly, often were not available to researchers. Moreover, few of these studies explored group-specific differences in behavior. In this paper, we seek to overcome some of the limitations of these earlier analyses. Based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), we study the role of perceived economic uncertainty in transitions to first and higher order births for the period 1990–2013. In addition, we examine how different population subgroups (stratified by education, parity, and age) respond to economic uncertainty.