Minimal winning coalitions in weighted-majority voting games

Riker's size principle for n-person zero-sum games predicts that winning coalitions that form will be minimal in that any player's defection will negate the coalition's winning status. Brams and Fishburn (1995) applied Riker's principle to weighted-majority voting games in which players have voting weights w ₁≥w ₂≥...≥w _n,and a coalition is winning if its members' weights sum to more than half the total weight. We showed that players' bargaining power tends to decrease as their weights decrease when minimal winning coalitions obtain, but that the opposite trend occurs when the minimal winning coalitions that form are “weight-minimal”, referred to as least winning coalitions. In such coalitions, large size may be more harmful than helpful. The present paper extends and refines our earlier analysis by providing mathematical foundations for minimal and least winning coalitions, developing new data to examine relationships between voting weight and voting power, and applying more sophisticated measures of power to these data. We identify all sets of minimal and least winning coalitions that arise from different voting weights for n≤6 and characterize all coalitions that are minimal winning and least winning for every n. While our new analysis supports our earlier findings, it also indicates there to be less negative correlation between voting weight and voting power when least winning coalitions form. In this context, players' powers are fairly insensitive to their voting weights, so being large or small is not particularly important for inclusion in a least winning coalition.     

THE ATTACK‐AND‐DEFENSE GROUP CONTESTS: BEST SHOT VERSUS WEAKEST LINK

This study analyzes a group contest in which one group (defenders) follows a weakest link, whereas the other group (attackers) follows a best shot impact function (IF). We fully characterize the Nash and coalition‐proof equilibria and show that with symmetric valuation the coalition‐proof equilibrium is unique up to the permutation of the identity of the active player in the attacker group. With asymmetric valuation, it is always an equilibrium for one of the highest valuation players to be active; it may also be the case that the highest valuation players in the attacker group free‐ride completely on a group member with a lower valuation. However, in any equilibrium, only one player in the attacker group is active, whereas all the players in the defender group are active and exert the same effort. We also characterize the Nash and coalition‐proof equilibria for the case in which one group follows either a best shot or a weakest link but the other group follows an additive IF. (JEL C72, D70, D72, D74, H41)     

The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items

We propose a procedure for dividing a set of indivisible items between two players. We assume that each player’s preference over subsets of items is consistent with a strict ranking of the items, and that neither player has information about the other’s preferences. Our procedure ensures an envy-free division—each player receives a subset of items that it values more than the other player’s complementary subset—given that an envy-free division of “contested items,” which the players would choose at the same time, is possible. We show that the possibility of one player’s undercutting the other’s proposal, and implementing the reduced subset for himself or herself, makes the proposer “reasonable,” and generally leads to an envy-free division, even when the players rank items exactly the same. Although the undercut procedure is manipulable and its envy-free allocation may be Pareto-inferior, each player’s maximin strategy is to be truthful. Applications of the procedure are discussed briefly.     

Hierarchy of players in swap robust voting games

Ordinarily, the process of decision making by a committee through voting is modeled by a monotonic game the range of whose characteristic function is restricted to {0, 1}. The decision rule that governs the collective action of a voting body induces a hierarchy in the set of players in terms of the a-priori influence that the players have over the decision making process. In order to determine this hierarchy in a swap robust game, one has to either evaluate a power index (e.g., the Shapley–Shubik index, the Banzhaf–Coleman index) for each player or conduct a pairwise comparison between players, whereby a player i is ranked higher than another player j if there exists a coalition in which i is more desirable as a coalition partner than j. In this paper, we outline an alternative mechanism to determine the ranking of players in terms of their a-priori power. This simple and elegant method uses only minimal winning coalitions, rather than the entire set of winning coalitions.     

Losses Disguised as Wins Affect Game Selection on Multiline Slots

Multiline slots are exciting games that contain features which make them alluring. One such feature is a loss disguised as a win (LDW); wherein, players win less than they wager (e.g., bet 2 dollars, win back 50 cents), but this net loss is disguised by flashing graphics and winning sounds. Research to date concludes that LDWs are both rewarding and reinforcing. Here, we investigated whether LDWs affect players’ game selection. Thirty-two undergraduate students with experience playing slot machines played 100 spins on four games—two had positive payback percentages (115%) and two had negative payback percentages (85%) after 100 spins. For each payback percentage condition, there was a game with no LDWs and a game with a moderate number of LDWs. For the 100 spins, players could choose to play whichever game they wished. They then rated their preference for each game following the 100-spins and chose a game to continue playing. The majority of players preferred playing the positive payback percentage game with LDWs and chose to continue playing this game over the three other games. We conclude that in addition to LDWs being reinforcing and rewarding, LDWs do in fact influence game selection. We conclude that responsible gambling initiatives should educate players about LDWs.     

Agenda control in coalition formation

Theoretical models of government formation in political science usually assume that the head of state is non-strategic. In this paper, we analyze the power of an agenda setter who chooses the order in which players are recognized to form coalitions in simple games. We characterize those sets of players which can be imposed in the equilibrium coalition and show that the only decisive structures where the agenda setter can impose the presence of any minimal winning coalition are apex games, where a large player forms a winning coalition with any of the small players. Keywords: Government Formation, Agenda Control, Coalitional Bargaining, Finite Bargaining Rules. Received: 26 January 2001/Accepted: 31 July 2001     

The framed right to participate in municipal youth councils and its educational impact

This study describes the phenomenon of framed participation, which constrains children's participation frameworks within a confined area of decision-making. It draws on interviews and focus groups with 32 children who participated in eight Israeli municipal youth councils, ranging in age from 13 to 18. In addition, five interviews were conducted with adult leaders of youth councils. The study showed that council activities remained confined to the particular municipal department responsible for them and comprised mostly the organization of leisure activities, such as parties, performances, and group trips for youth. Yet, almost all the children participating in the study perceived the organization of leisure activities as “meaningful” participation, which “succeeds”, “empowers”, and “leads”. The adult leaders acknowledged the framed participation and, while critical of it, preferred to remain within the comfort zone of their professional responsibility. We argue that when framed participation entails the organization of popular activities, in which the municipality invests considerable resources, the ensuing positive experiences may frame the children's rights consciousness and critical thinking. We also discuss the institutional conditions that may shape framed participation, and the role of human rights education in building children's capacity to mobilize their participation rights.     

Spoilers,blocking coalitions,and the core

This paper surveys non-cooperative implementations of the core which tell an intuitive story of coalition formation. Under the core solution concept, if a blocking coalition exists those agents abandon the current allocation without regard for the consequences to players outside the blocking coalition. Yet in certain circumstances, these players have an incentive to prevent formation of any blocking coalition; a game analyzed in Lagunoff (Games Econ Behav 7:54–61, 1994) is vulnerable to such circumstances. To obtain all core allocations and only core allocations, a mechanism must either restrict the actions of non-members of a proposed coalition, or ensure that non-members are unharmed by the departure of the coalition. These requirements illustrate the core’s nonchalance toward agents not in blocking coalitions. The author gives special thanks to Beth Allen and Andy McLennan for their direction, and gratefully acknowledges valuable discussions with Roger Lagunoff, Hugo Sonnenschein, John Ledyard, Myrna Wooders, Nuray Akin, as well as comments from participants at the 2004 Spring Midwest Economic Theory and the Society for Economic Design conferences and from anonymous referees. All errors remain my own. Partial funding came from National Science Foundation grants DMI-0070257 and DMI-0217974.     

TO DETER OR TO MODERATE? ALLIANCE FORMATION IN CONTESTS WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

We consider two players' choice about the formation of an alliance ahead of conflict in a framework with incomplete information about the strength of the potential ally. When deciding on alliance formation, players anticipate the self‐selection of other players and the informational value of own and other players' choices. In the absence of these signaling effects, strong players have an incentive to stand alone, which leads to a separating equilibrium. This separating equilibrium can be destabilized by deception incentives if beliefs are updated on the basis of endogenous alliance formation choices. Weak players may find it attractive to appear strong in order to deter competitors from positive effort choices. Strong players may find it attractive to appear weak in order to give their competitors a false sense of security and then beat them with little effort. Moreover, appearing weak allows players to free‐ride when alliances are formed. (JEL D72, D74)     

Why Trust Matters: How Confidence in Leaders Transforms What Adolescents Gain From Youth Programs

Youth's trust in program leaders is considered a key to the positive impact of youth programs. We sought to understand how trust influences youth's program experiences from their perspective. We interviewed 108 ethnically diverse youth (ages 12–19) participating in 13 arts, leadership, and technology programs. Analysis of these accounts suggested five ways in which youth's trust in leaders amplified program benefits. Trust increased youth's (1) confidence in leaders' guidance in program activities, (2) motivation in the program, (3) use of leaders for mentoring, (4) use of leaders as a model of a well‐functioning relationship, and (5) experience of program cohesiveness. Across benefits, trust allowed youth to draw on leaders' expertise, opened them to new experiences, and helped increase youth's agency.     

Role conceptions of university communicators: A segmentation analysis of communication practitioners in higher education institutions

Higher education institutions (HEIs) are major players in public science communication. However, only a few studies have investigated HEI communication practitioners, who play an important role in shaping universities’ public relations and outreach communication. Building on the assumption that HEI communicators differ in their role conceptions, as well as professional and educational backgrounds, we surveyed 189 communicators from all 42 HEIs in Switzerland. Using segmentation analysis, we identified four types of communicators—(1) the leading all-rounder, (2) the generalist, (3) the science mediator, and (4) the service partner—who differ in their role conceptions, but also in their professional characteristics and organizational contexts.     

BIDDING FOR TALENT IN SPORT

We present a novel microstructure for the market for athletes. Clubs simultaneously target bids at the players, in (Nash) equilibrium internalizing whether—depending on the other clubs' bids—a player not hired would play for the competition. When talent is either scarce or has low outside options, we support—and generalize to heterogeneous players—the Coasian results of Rottenberg (1956) and Fort and Quirk (1995): talent allocation is efficient and independent of initial “ownership” and revenue sharing arrangements. We also characterize equilibria when talent is abundant (or has a high outside option). The analysis uses a nonspecific club objective with an endogenously derived trade‐off between pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits.(JEL J4, L1, L2)     

Collegial oligarchy and networks of normative alignments in transnational institution building

This paper presents a combined relational and cultural approach to transnational institution building by focusing on a network analysis of a small collegial oligarchy and normative alignments among its peers. To contribute to a theory of institutionalization, we propose hypotheses about whom professionals as institutional entrepreneurs are likely to select as members of their collegial oligarchy, about the role of social networks among them in identifying these leaders, and about the costs of alignments on these leaders’ normative choices. We test these hypotheses using mainly Exponential Random Graph Models (ERGMs) applied to a dataset including network information and normative choices collected at the so-called Venice Forum – a field-configuring event that was central in creating and mobilizing a network of European patent judges for the construction of a new transnational institution, the European Unified Patent Court. We track normative alignments on the collegial hierarchy in this network of judges and their divergent interpretations of the contemporary European patent. Highlighting this under-examined articulation of relational infrastructures and cultural framing in transnational institutionalization shows how Northern European forms of capitalism tend to dominate in this institutionalization process at the expense of the Southern European forms. It also helps reflect on the usefulness of analyses of small networks of powerful players in organizational societies, where power and influence are highly concentrated.     

Multiculturalism and Cultural Issues in Online Gaming Communities

This article looks at racism, nationalism, and culture wars within multicultural Internet communities, specifically looking at Omerta, an international mafia‐themed text‐based massively multiplayer online role‐playing game (MMORPG). Omerta allows players to live and create a world of their own where groups of players, called families, interact and work together in peace and war. The text‐based aspect leads the majority of play dealing with negotiations in multi‐user chat (Internet Relay Chat), with the focus being on diplomacy and negotiation. Within the Omerta game, players of Turkish nationality have been refused admission into some families due to the perception that their primary loyalties are to other members of their own nationality, rather than members of their current family. This has led to much turmoil within the community and the creation of “Turkish Alliances”— families consisting of only Turkish players due to the lack of recruiting from other nationalities. What does this say about the functionality of multiculturalism and the possibility for success?     

The Role of Parents in Introducing Children to Financial Services: Evidence from Ghana-YouthSave

Financial capability—financial knowledge, skills, and access to financial services—may help smooth transitions to adulthood for youth and is affected by socialization experiences with parents and other family members. Among a sample of youth and their parents enrolled in the YouthSave experiment in Ghana (n?=?4,065), this study examined whether physical access to financial services and/or visiting banks with parents or other family members was associated with youth’s perceptions and understanding of financial institutions. We found a statistically significant association between visiting the bank with a parent or other family member and youth’s attitudes (β?=?1.45, p?<?0.001) and understanding of financial services (β?=?2.96, p?<?0.001), controlling for other factors like household income and assets. Conversely, physical access (distance, travel time) was not associated with financial services attitudes or understanding. Parents may play an important role in introducing their children to financial services. Practitioners and policy makers should consider ways to include parents in efforts to promote financial capability among youth.     

Hidden Agendas in Beratungs-und Veränderungsprozessen

Consulting and organization development claim to boost the client organization’s efficiency — this official goal is frequently foiled by hidden agendas which are not officially communicated. Hidden functions of consulting are to prove to the management’s legitimacy, to explain the failure of change processes, to strengthen the initator’s position in internal power struggles or to relieve the system from conflict. On the consultants’ side there is a tension between professionalism on one side and the necessity to secure follow-up projects and to sell standard products on the other side. The authors present possible interpretations for such hidden agendas and illustrate them with case studies from their practical experience as consultants.     

The public relations paradox of erasure: Damnatio memoriae as public relations strategy and tactic

Public relations scholars study how organizations co-create meaning with engaged stakeholders. Not well understood is how and why such co-creation modifies shared meaning, amplifies change, and even “erases” some piece of memory from the public record with the purpose of redirecting and redefining societal narratives. To help establish erasure as a concept for studying public relations, we draw from Freud’s theory of memory to establish a foundation upon which to critique strategic erasure. We adapt Freud’s theory of memory into the intersecting critique of visual rhetoric as public relations by analyzing, via narrative inquiry, remnants of Imperial Rome that have been modified, amplified, but even erased to present Rome’s modern identity. For centuries, even during Imperial Rome, leaders practiced damnatio memoriae —a modern Latin phrase that means “condemnation of memory.” We use this concept to interrogate the public relations identity process Rome’s leaders have used to modify for emphasis and even obliterate Roman elites’ names and images from the texts of public records by destroying, mutilating and modifying statues and monuments as a means for co-creating new public memory. Such analysis reveals how damnatio memoriae helps elites to redefine the “memory” of the Eternal City.     

Leaders' Attitudes and Computer Use in Religious Congregations

This study explores the attitudes of leaders of religious congregations toward computers. We uncover attitudes toward information (and thus toward computers) that are different from those reported for leaders in other organizational contexts. In short, clergy felt that systematically collecting and storing information and trying to serve as many people as possible could distract them from what is distinctive about their jobs—that the job in a religious congregation is accomplished through personal rather than transactional relationships.     

INFORMATION VALUE UNDER DEMAND UNCERTAINTY AND ENDOGENOUS MARKET LEADERSHIP

In an oligopoly model with firms choosing to produce in one of two periods, we identify the circumstance under which a firm's having early information regarding stochastic demand results in market leadership. High demand volatility leads to Stackelberg competition with the information‐advantaged firm leading. In the N‐firm case an equilibrium with multiple leaders and multiple followers emerges endogenously. In a duopoly information acquisition game we identify conditions that determine whether neither, one, or both firms will pay to acquire early information and note that one firm's obtaining early information may generate a positive externality benefitting its competitor. Both symmetric and asymmetric outcomes are possible and Stackelberg market leadership may occur in equilibrium, but only when firms have different costs of information. Our finding that an information advantage may convey leadership which then affects the value of information to the players applies to other settings exhibiting first‐mover advantage such as certain public good provision games. (JEL C72, D82, L13)