The Failure of Roy Bhaskar's Explanatory Critique

According to Roy Bhaskar, social science can derive values from social facts by a process called “explanatory critique.” Bhaskar offers two different versions of explanatory critique: a belief-based version and a need-based version. Both versions are faced with a difficult objection. They seem either to employ an invalid inference or to assume the values that they are attempting to derive. I argue that at least the need-based version of Bhaskar's explanatory critique falls to the objection, and that the belief-based version on its own is insufficient. Bhaskar anticipates the objection and offers a defense. I show that his defense is unsuccessful. I also suggest a Baskar-inspired alternative explanatory critique.     

Rules, Social Ontology and Collective Identity

Mainstream game theory explains cooperation as the outcome of the interaction of agents who permanently pursue their individual goals. Amartya Sen argues instead that cooperation can only be understood by positing a type of rule-following behaviour that can be (and often is) out of phase with the pursuit of individual goals, due to the existence of a collective identity. However, Sen does not clarify the ontological preconditions for the type of social behaviour he describes. I will argue that Sen's account of collective identity can be best interpreted in the light of John Searle's notion of collective intentionality, while Sen's explanation of rule-following behavior and agency is best understood using the critical realist transformational model of social activity.     

Critical realist encounters: Morphogenizing the French régulation approach

Throughout the past two decades, Bob Jessop has drawn considerable attention to the compatibility between French Régulation (FR) and Critical Realist approaches (CR), arguing that FR implicitly works within a critical realist ontology, epistemology and methodology. Inspired by his insights, I argue that a Spinozian-led Immanent Causality Morphogenetic Approach (ICMA) provides a fruitful avenue for further regulationist research and represents a promising effort to ground FR in (meta)theory, whereby, ontologically speaking, the ICMA explores how structure and agency emerge, intertwine and redefine each other in and over time. The two approaches mutually reinforce each other: ICMA is able to provide FR with a solid theoretical and metatheoretical foundation, while FR, can enrich the ICMA with its direct engagement with capitalism related studies and a well-developed terminology in the field. The value added of ICMA can be seen in four points: it (1) clarifies the distinction between extensive and intensive regimes of accumulation and the speed of technological change, (2) specifies the problematique of hierarchy and stability of the dominant bloc, (3) fleshes out the problematique of endometabolism and hybridity, and (4) provides the researcher with a methodological framework to absent the necessary relations at the level of conditioning.     

Causal Mechanisms and the Philosophy of Causation

Lack of clarity about underlying philosophical commitments leads to lack of clarity at other levels of analysis. Here I show that the literature on so‐called “causal mechanisms” is rife with conceptual problems, stemming from insufficient rigor with respect to the metaphysics of causation.     

The Nature of the Political Reconsidered

I present an immanent, and explanatory, critique of reflections on the nature of politics and of power within political science. I argue that these reflections are problematic, to the extent that they presuppose an actualist conception of the political, and that this is generated by an empiricist way of thinking on the one hand and a constructivist way of thinking on the other. I show how re‐defining politics, power, and the political on the basis of a dialectical critical realist ontology resolves these problems and, thereby, allows us to understand the conditions for social change and the relationship between the political and the economic. My argument has two, important implications: first, that the proposal that those who study politics professionally should celebrate philosophical diversity is dangerous–at least if it makes it difficult to sustain a distinct, emancipatory form of political inquiry; and, second, that the nature of social reality justifies the need both for specialized forms of inquiry, such as politics and economics, and integrative forms of inquiry, such as political economy.     

The Causal Power of Discourse

This paper outlines a realist approach to the social ontology of discourse. It seeks to synthesise some elements of the approach to discourse found in the early work of Michel Foucault with a critical realist understanding of the causal power of social structures. It will argue that discursive structures can be causally significant when they are normatively endorsed and enforced by specific groups of people; that it is not discourse as such but these groups—discursive circles—that are causally effective; and that such an account allows us to reconcile the role of discourse with that of the subject.     

Social Network Analysis and Critical Realism

Social network analysis (SNA) is an increasingly popular approach that provides researchers with highly developed tools to map and analyze complexes of social relations. Although a number of network scholars have explicated the assumptions that underpin SNA, the approach has yet to be discussed in relation to established philosophies of science. This article argues that there is a tension between applied and methods‐oriented SNA studies, on the one hand, and those addressing the social‐theoretical nature and implications of networks, on the other. The former, in many cases, exhibits positivist tendencies, whereas the latter incorporate a number of assumptions that are directly compatible with core critical realist views on the nature of social reality and knowledge. This article suggests that SNA may be detached from positivist social science and come to constitute a valuable instrument in the critical realist toolbox.     

Abstractions on steroids: A critical realist approach to computer simulations

Computer simulations are increasingly used within various fields of the social sciences, including analytical sociology and computational social science. However, the method has yet to fully find its place within critical realism, generally regarded as reductionist and methodological individualist and thus inadequate to the task of grasping the full and enigmatic complexity of social life. This article contributes to the discussion by suggesting an alternative approach to computer simulations in the social realm. Instead of representing reality, simulations are seen as a way of boosting abstraction by enabling us to isolate and study the effects of emergent mechanisms. The need for such tools is growing more urgent in an age characterized by rapid change and global networks of causal interrelation. Hence there is a need not only for new tools to deal with causal complexity within critical realism, but also for a critical realist perspective to fill the meta‐theoretical vacuum on which the simulation approach is largely based. The approach developed here provides a challenge to the predominant ways in which simulations are utilized today, with increasingly sophisticated models aiming towards realistic representation on the basis of empirical data.     

Durkheim and realism

This article examines Durkheim's relationship to realism. I argue that there is enough prima facie evidence of realist commitments in his work that our task should be to consider what kind of realist Durkheim was. I discuss, first of all, Durkheim's epistemics and follow that analysis with a discussion of metaphysical realism in his texts. The first part of the paper covers a wide range of his work; the second part focuses primarily on The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. In a final concluding section, I go on to consider how his epistemic arguments and his philosophical realism might work together to support important parts of his general sociology. Realism is not often brought to bear on Durkheim's work. When it has been, Durkheim has been identified as a naïve realist. These interpretations of Durkheim do not recognize the sophistication of contemporary realism, which does not reduce to naïve representationalism. This paper will sort out Durkheim's realist commitments in his texts, and in light of the variety of realisms consistent with “sophisticated” (that is, non-naïve) realism.     

Transcending the fissure in risk theory: critical realism and child welfare

Within risk theory a key fissure has emerged. On the one hand, objectivist theories continue to treat risk as a measurable entity, while on the other, subjectivist accounts approach risk as a socially constructed phenomenon. Arguably, we need to transcend this false opposition and harmonize important insights from both approaches. Building on an earlier paper in this journal, the author tries to achieve this synthesis by applying Bhaskar's critical realist perspective to this contested area. The reconciliation of objectivism and subjectivism within critical realism, it is argued, redirects our attention to the deep‐seated causes of harm or the underlying mechanisms that, when activated, give rise to situations involving risk. The paper concludes by reviewing the implications of these ideas for child and family social work. It is here that connections are made with attachment theory and the recent interest in childhood resilience.     

Critical Realism and Causality: Tracing the Aristotelian Legacy

Rom Harré's generative account of causality has been drawn on heavily by advocates of critical realism. Yet Harré argues that critical realists often exaggerate the extent to which powerful causal explanations of social phenomena can be developed. Certain proponents of critical realism have responded to Harré's criticisms by suggesting that it is useful to consider the relevant issues in relation to the familiar Aristotelian classification of four causes. In this paper I contribute to this debate and pursue a similar strategy. The paper adds to existing contributions in two ways. Firstly, I outline how Harré sees his generative account of causality as linking up with Aristotelian themes. It emerges that Harré at times conceives of his generative theory as part of an alternative to the Aristotelian system while at other times he draws connections between it and a reformulated account of formal causality. Secondly, I argue that when we consider the positions of Harré and proponents of critical realism on the scope of causal explanation in the social realm in relation to the interpretation of final causes offered by another philosopher profoundly influenced by the Aristotelian tradition, namely Charles Peirce, we can see both as limited in certain respects.     

马克思主义与批判实在论的辩证法

黑格尔的绝对理念、马克思的辩证唯物主义和批判实在论都属于辩证哲学的家族。马克思敲碎了黑格尔的坚果,拣起了一些碎片,他的伟大在于发现了结构矛盾与颠倒。巴斯卡与马克思分享了三种矛盾(结构矛盾、颠倒与科莱蒂矛盾),又增加了埃奇利矛盾。批判实在论指出,辩证法的本真面目是四重缺失:使对使缺失成为缺失的约束成为缺失。     

Building a working alliance between professionals and service users in family preservation. A multiple case study

In the margin of the ongoing experimental and quasi‐experimental research projects on family preservation, some research projects focus on the process through which families accomplish change and acknowledge the importance of the working alliance. There is, however, little information about barriers and facilitators in building this working alliance. To fill this gap, we performed a multiple case study with a triangulation of ethnographical methods such as observation, in‐depth interviews, case file analysis, and multistakeholder focus groups. We illustrate how, in a context of managerialism and transactional leadership, social workers find themselves in a continuous tension between complying with the expectations of their social organization and “tuning in” with the service users. This jeopardizes the working alliance between a social worker and a family. Consequences for research, practice, and policy regarding family preservation interventions are discussed.     

Critical Realism,Dialectics, and Qualitative Research Methods

Critical realism has been an important advance in social science methodology because it develops a qualitative theory of causality which avoids some of the pitfalls of empiricist theories of causality. But while there has been ample work exploring the relationship between critical realism and qualitative research methods there has been noticeably less work exploring the relationship between dialectical critical realism and qualitative research methods. This seems strange especially since the founder of the philosophy of critical realism, Roy Bhaskar, employs and develops a range of dialectical concepts in his later work in order to extend the main tenets of critical realism. The aim of this paper is to draw on Bhaskar's later work, as well as Marxism, to reorient a critical realist methodology towards a dialectical approach for qualitative research. In particular, the paper demonstrates how dialectical critical realism can begin to provide answers to three common criticisms made against original critical realist methodology: that the qualitative theory of causal powers and structures developed by critical realists is problematic; that critical realist methodology contains values which prove damaging to empirical research; and that critical realists often have difficulties in researching everyday qualitative dilemmas that people face in their daily lives.     

Continuities Between Peircean Realism and Critical Realism: On Causation,Ontology, and Truth

In recent years, critical realists have increasingly engaged with the thought of Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914), the founder of the American pragmatist tradition. But the engagement has been mostly narrow in focus and at times misinformed. This paper examines points of continuity between Peircean thought and critical realism with respect to causation, ontology, and truth. Its purpose is to lay the groundwork for further and more fruitful engagement between the traditions by bringing attention to some things critical realists may not have known, and to correct some inaccurate things they thought they knew, about Peirce's philosophy.     

Critical Realism and the Althusserian Legacy

This paper undertakes an historical re‐evaluation of Louis Althusser's philosophical legacy for modern Marxism. While Althusser self‐consciously sought to defend the scientific character of Marxism, many of his closest followers eventually exited the Marxian paradigm for a post‐structural post‐Marxism. We argue that this development was predominately rooted in a series of philosophical errors that proved fatal in a period of retreat for European socialism. There has always been, however, a second post‐Althusserian legacy associated with the critical realist conception of Marxism initiated by Roy Bhaskar. Bhaskar found part of his inspiration in Althusser's successful posing of the question of Marx's science and this paper sets out to excavate the proper links between Althusser and Bhaskar in order to deepen the relationship between critical realism and scientific Marxism.     

Social cognition and the origin of concepts in Durkheim's sociology of knowledge

This paper re-examines a key feature of Emile Durkheim's sociology of knowledge from a critical realist perspective. It is argued that Durkheim's attempt to establish a social basis for the categories in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life should be understood along ontological rather than epistemological lines. This brings to light new problems with the argument which, however, can be brought fruitfully into contact with the more recent social psychological literature on collective intentionality. This yields insights into future lines of inquiry into social cognition and theories of human conceptualizing capacities.     

Towards a critical realist epistemology?

When critical realists consider epistemology they typically start from “epistemological relativism.” We find this position necessary, but we also find it insufficient because it lacks a critique of the highly unequal social relations among observers themselves—relations that shape the very production of knowledge. While it is indeed the case that all knowledge is fallible, it is also the case that all knowledge is positioned, with a particular standpoint. What is more, the social power relations between standpoints organize the production of truth in ways that produce systematic distortions. In this paper, we propose a critical realist social epistemology. We introduce feminist standpoint theory and postcolonial theory as our suggested interventions into critical realism and we use two case studies of existing work to highlight i) the social production of truth and the real, and ii) what is at stake for radicalizing epistemology in critical realism. In so doing, our paper emphasizes the epistemic complexities that continuously shape ontology, a commitment to subaltern voices or experiences, and a thorough interrogation of the relations between positions of knowledge production.     

批判实在论有助于马克思主义发展的五条途径

机械马克思主义的问题在于机械的辩证唯物主义;西方马克思主义虽然避免了机械论,但是具有目的论的先验图式,即把历史作为主观知识或阶级意识的证实过程的先验图式。这两种方法都偏离了马克思主义作为科学的社会理论的本质。批判实在论对机械论马克思主义者和西方马克思主义者的方法进行的批判,在五个方面有助于马克思主义本质的恢复,从而使我们成为纯粹朴素的马克思主义者。     

Practitioner Research: Evidence or Critique?

In this paper, I revisit some of the origins and more recentdirections in practitioner research in social work, seeing itas a phenomenon that—rather than being special or narrowlyassociated with social work—manifests a pervasive clusterof concerns about good professional practice in contemporarysociety. Drawing on some general conclusions of a recent studyof practitioner inquiry, I indicate ways in which the widersystems of which it is a part frequently hamstring the potentialof such research to operate as more than a fringe operation—a‘street market’ version of mainstream research.I outline four ways in which social workers, service users,agency managers, academics, government departments and universitiesshould work to a transformative agenda for practitioner research—transformativefor both practice and research. This will involve refashioningthe interface between the methodology and methods of practiceand research; generating practitioner research capacity; recognizingthe subtlety and critical potential of a genuinely ‘practical’agenda in practitioner research; and rescuing practitioner researchfrom a simply technical information-providing function, thatby-passes the challenge to promoting critical practice.