The Census Bureau on Prospects for US Population Growth in the Twenty‐First Century

The U.S. Census Bureau periodically releases projections of the US resident population, detailed by age, sex, race, and Hispanic origin. The most recent of these, issued 13 January 2000, for the first time extend to the year 2100 and also include information on the foreign‐bom population. (Earlier projections were carried up to 2080.) The extensive tabulations presenting the new set, and detailed explanation of the methodology and the assumptions underlying the projections, are accessible at the Census Bureau's web site: http://www.census.gov . A brief summary of some of the main results of these projections is reproduced below from United States Department of Commerce News, Washington, DC 20230. (The Census Bureau is an agency of the Department of Commerce.) Uncertainties as to future trends in fertility, mortality, and net migration over a period of some 100 years are very great, as is illustrated by the massive difference in the projected size of the population for 2100 in the three variants produced. The “middle” projected population figure of 571 million (which represents a growth of some 109 percent over its current level) is bracketed by “lowest” and “highest” alternative projections of 283 million and 1.18 billion, respectively. With somewhat lesser force, the point also applies to the 50‐year time span considered in the well‐known country‐by‐country projections of the United Nations. These projections are also detailed in three variants: low, middle, and high. The UN projections (last revised in 1998) envisage less rapid growth in the United States during the first part of the twenty‐first century than do the Census Bureau's. The projected population figures for 2050 in the three variants (low, middle, and high) are as follows (in millions):

The forecast accuracy of Australian Bureau of Statistics national population projections

This paper examines the forecast accuracy of Australian Bureau of Statistics national population projections produced from the 1960s to the early 2000s. As well as total populations, the accuracy of the following is assessed: age-sex-specific populations, the Total Fertility Rate, life expectancy at birth and net international migration. It is shown that forecasts of the 1960s and 70s were the most inaccurate; forecasts of the 1980s and later proved to be much more reliable. The paper goes on to take an alternative perspective on population forecast error through the use of an adapted percentage error measure which accounts for offsetting errors in births, deaths, net migration and the jump-off population. This measure also permits an assessment of the relative contributions of the components of demographic change to overall inaccuracy. It is shown that errors in forecasting net international migration have generally contributed most to inaccuracy followed by births and then deaths and jump-off error. ABS projections of total population are also compared to those produced using a simple naïve model. The paper concludes by arguing that the new error measure could prove valuable in other studies of population forecast accuracy.     

Natural decrease of population: The current and prospective status of an emergent American phenomenon

In the early 1950’s, more deaths than births began to occur in a few counties of the United States. The phenomenon has since spread, especially in the 1960’s. In 1966 it occurred in 271 counties, and had affected a total of 324 counties since 1950. Natural decrease had earlier been present in some areas of the United States during the 1930’s. At that time, it was primarily associated with population of low intrinsic fertility. Its occurrence since 1950, however, has not been related to inadequate childbearing rates, but rather to the development of distorted age structures. In most eases, the distortion is the product of prolonged and heavy outmigration of young adults to the extent that the number of couples of childbearing age remaining in an area is insufficient to produce births in excess of the number of deaths occurring to the larger older population. In a minority of cases, the excess of deaths has resulted from large in-migration of older people into retirement areas. The occurrence of natural decrease has been most heavily concentrated in the central part of the country, especially in marginal Corn Belt areas of Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska, and Iowa. It has also been common in central Texas. The counties affected are typically rural and agricultural, with a high median age, a history of population decline, and average population fertility. They had a total 1960 population of 4,003,000 persons. It is projected that an excess of deaths over births will have affected 520 or more counties by 1970, or about a sixth of all counties in the Nation. Given the increasing extent of the condition, research appraising its social and economic consequences for an area is urged.     

Patterns of residential segregation within a metropolitan ghetto

The residential segregation of families by income and by stage of the family life cycle within Milwaukee’s black community resembles in both pattern and degree that in the white community. The greater the difference in income, the more dissimilar are the distributions by census tract. Dissimilarity is greater between younger couples without children and older couples with children than between any other pair of family types defined by husband’s age and presence of children. However, segregation by income was substantially greater than by family type in 1960. The bases of selectivity of blacks in“changing” areas of the city, where the proportion black is still relatively low, and of whites in the“suburban” areas adjoining the city are similar. Families in the higher income groups and couples with children are over-represented in these areas. It would appear that given the pressures of limited housing space in the inner core of the black community, given the fact that certain amenities are not available in that area, and given the economic and social barriers which restrict the movement of blacks into the suburbs, the changing areas must function as“suburbs” for the black community.     

Countries with Rapid Population Growth and Resource Constraints: Issues of Food,Agriculture, and Development

Recent long‐term demographic projections suggest a fast deceleration of global population growth and the eventual peaking of world population later in this century at about 9.2 billion, roughly 50 percent above the present level. Some low‐income and food‐insecure countries, however, have projected populations in 2050 that are multiples of present ones. In some of these countries agriculture must play a leading role in their development efforts because they have high economic dependence on that sector. For those among them that have scarce agricultural resources, a prima facie case can be made that the high population growth rates projected may not be compatible with the development potential offered by such resources. Their demographic projections may need to be revisited, taking into account such inadequate potential. The global demographic slowdown notwithstanding, the “population explosion”‐related issues pertaining to food and agriculture will not become irrelevant but will be become increasingly localized.     

Local and foreign models of reproduction in Nyanza Province, Kenya

This article uses colonial archival records, surveys conducted in the 1960s, and surveys and focus group discussions in the 1990s to describe three distinct but temporally overlapping cultural models of reproduction in a rural community in Kenya between the 1930s and the present. The first model, “large families are rich,” was slowly undermined by developments brought about by the integration of Kenya into the British empire. This provoked the collective formulation of a second local model, “small families are progressive,” which retained the same goal of wealth but viewed a smaller family as a better strategy for achieving it. The third model, introduced by the global networks of the international population movement in the 1960s, augmented the second model with the deliberate control of fertility using clinic provided methods of family planning. By the 1990s this global model had begun to be domesticated as local clinics routinely promoted family planning and as men and women in Nyanza began to use family planning and to tell others of their motivations and experiences.     

Levels and patterns of infant and child mortality in ghana

This paper attempts to measure infant and child mortality levels and also to determine their structure by utilizing the results of the 1968–1969 National Demographic Sample Survey which was conducted under the directorship of the author. Among the major problems encountered in the exercise are the adjustment of the current raw mortality data and the estimation of infant and child mortality from independent source material. The estimated infant mortality rates range from 56 per 1,000 live births in the Accra Capital District to 192 in the Upper Region during the late 1960’s. The urban rate is lower than the rural rate, 98 as against 161 per 1,000 live births. A large proportion of the deaths among children aged 0–4 occur in the second year of life, and deaths in this age group account for the bulk of the deaths within the age group 1–4 years.     

Aggregate population and economic growth correlations: The role of the components of demographic change

The results of recent correlations showing a negative impact of population growth on economic development in cross-country data for the 1980s, versus “nonsignificant” correlations widely found for the 1960s and 1970s, are examined with contemporaneous and lagged components of demographic change, convergence-type economic modeling, and several statistical frameworks. The separate impacts of births and deaths are found to be notable but offsetting in the earlier periods. In contrast, the short-run costs (benefits) of births (mortality reduction) increase (decrease) significantly in the 1980s, and the favorable labor-force impacts of past births are not fully offsetting.     

Lessons from stochastic small-area population projections: the case of Waikato subregions in New Zealand

Subnational population projections in New Zealand by means of the conventional deterministic cohort-component method have had a tendency to be conservative: underprojecting fast-growing populations and overprojecting slow-growing ones. In this paper we use a stochastic population projection method as an alternative. We generate population projections for five demographically distinct administrative areas within the Waikato region of New Zealand: Hamilton City, Franklin District, Thames-Coromandel District, Otorohanga District and South Waikato District. The results are compared to official subnational deterministic projections. The accuracy of subnational population projections in New Zealand is strongly affected by the instability of migration as a component of population change. Differently from the standard cohort-component method, in which net migration levels are projected, the key parameters of our method are age-gender-area specific probabilistic net migration rates. Generally, the identified and modelled uncertainty makes the traditional ‘mid-range’ scenario of subnational deterministic projections of limited use for policy analysis or planning beyond a relatively short projection horizon. We find that the projected range of rates of population growth is wider for smaller regions and/or regions more strongly affected by net migration. Directions for further development of the methodology are suggested.     

The Johannesburg Summit on Health and Sustainable Development

The World Summit on Sustainable Development was held in Johannesburg, South Africa, 26 August‐4 September 2002. The meeting was a follow‐up to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) that took place in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 but with a mandate broader than that of the Rio conference: the Summit was to consider strategies toward sustainable development in all its dimensions. According to the opening paragraph of the Plan of Implementation adopted by the Johannesburg Summit, the Rio conference “provided the fundamental principles and the programme of action for achieving sustainable development.” But while reaffirming commitment to the Rio principles, the Plan states that it intends to “further build on the achievements made since UNCED and expedite the realization of the remaining goals.” A topic conspicuously missing from the deliberations of the Rio conference was population, even though rapid population growth has a plausible bearing on sustainable development and specifically on the problem of poverty, an issue at the center of the discussions concerning sustainability. It had been expected that Johannesburg would make amends for that omission. In the ten years between the two conferences, the size of the world's population increased by some 790 million persons. Of this growth, 754 million, or 95 percent, occurred in the countries the United Nations classifies as “less developed.” The population of these countries grew by 18 percent between the two conferences, as compared with a 3 percent growth in the more developed countries. The countries classified as “least developed“—a subset of the less developed countries consisting of 48 countries, predominantly African, with a 2002 population of nearly 700 million—grew during the interconference period by 29 percent. This record of population growth since the Rio conference may be supplemented by the projections of the United Nations up to 2050. The medium variant of these projections for the next 48 years envisages a slight population decline in the more developed countries and an addition of some 2 billion persons to the less developed group. For the least developed countries, the UN projects a population of more than 1.8 billion in 2050, some 164 percent larger than the current population size. Although the magnitudes of past population growth and its likely future dynamics are well known, they attracted very little attention at the Johannesburg meeting. The Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, a concise political document issued at the closing of the conference along with the Plan of Implementation, pledges “to place particular focus on, and give priority attention to, the fight against the worldwide conditions that pose severe threats to the sustainable development of our people.” It then proceeds to specifics: “Among these conditions are: chronic hunger; malnutrition; foreign occupation; armed conflicts; illicit drug problems; organized crime; corruption; natural disasters; illicit arms trafficking; trafficking, in persons; terrorism; intolerance and incitement to racial, ethnic, religious and other hatreds; xenophobia; and endemic, communicable and chronic diseases, in particular HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis” (Paragraph 19 of the Declaration,). The Plan of Implementation, a 27,000‐word document, was the main product of the Johannesburg meeting. Apart from a mention of the Cairo conference on Population and Development, the Plan's treatment of population issues is confined to health. The relevant section—section VI, titled Health and sustainable development—is reproduced below in full. (Paragraph numbers have been retained.) It presents a statement of goals couched in general exhortative terms (“integrate,”“promote,”“provide,”“improve,”“develop”), and specifies some quantitative targets, notably to reduce “by the year 2015, mortality rates for infants and children under 5 by two thirds, and maternal mortality rates by three quarters,” and “reduction of HIV prevalence among young men and women aged 15–24 by 25 per cent in the most affected countries by 2005 and globally by 2010.” The full text of the Plan can be found at http://www.un.org/jsummitlhtmlldocumentslsummit_docsl21Q9_planfinal.htm     

The Astonishing Population Averted by China’s Birth Restrictions: Estimates,Nightmares, and Reprogrammed Ambitions

China launched an unprecedented program to control its population in 1971. Experts have dismissed the official estimate of 400 million births averted by this program as greatly exaggerated yet neglect to provide their own estimates. Counterfactual projections based on fertility declines in other countries suggest that China’s program-averted population numbered 360–520 million as of 2015. The low end of this range is based on Vietnam—China’s best national comparator, with a two-child program of its own—and the high end is based on a 16-country comparator selected, ironically, by critics of the official estimate. The latter comparator further implies that China’s one-child program itself averted a population of 400 million by 2015, three-quarters of the total averted population. All such estimates are projected to double by 2060, due mostly to counterfactual population momentum. These and other findings presented herein affirm the astonishing impact of China’s draconian policy choices and challenge the current consensus that rapid socioeconomic progress drove China’s fertility well below two children per family. International comparisons of fertility and income suggest instead that China’s very low fertility arrived two or three decades too soon. If China had not harshly enforced a norm of 1.5-children during the last quarter century, most mothers would have had two children, one-half birth higher than observed.     

The residential segregation of occupational groups in central cities and suburbs

The impression of journalists and social critics in the 1950’s that post-war suburbia was uniformly middle-class has been generally rejected by social scientists, but there is a persisting belief in a high degree of residential segregation by social level in suburbia and in a high degree of socio-economic homogeneity within suburban neighborhoods. A comparison of eight central cities with their suburban zones in 1950 and in 1960 revealed, for both dates, (a) small differences in occupational distributions between the central cities and the suburban zones and (b) generally higher Index of Residential Dissimilarity values for pairs of occupational groups in the central cities. These findings indicate that suburban neighborhoods, at least in the eight suburban zones studied, were little, if any, more occupationally homogeneous than the central city neighborhoods. This suggests that the belief in homogeneous suburban neighborhoods should be added to the growing list of discredited “myths of suburbia. ”     

Emigration and fertility decline: The case of Barbados

This paper examines the role of emigration in the recent fertility declines which have occurred on the island of Barbados. Barbados with a history of over two centuries of out-migration has experienced in the period 1951–1970 very significant migration loss. In the period 1960–1970 and up to the present fertility has been declining. An important question is what part has this net migration loss of 32,600 had on the reduction of the crude birth rate from 33.6 in 1960 or from 31.5 in 1956 to 20.5 in 1970? Using officially published net migration loss figures and supplementing them with data on Barbadians living overseas, we calculated the crude birth rates which would have occurred had there been no migration loss. We also calculated the numbers of births to be expected if certain age-specific fertility rates were maintained and compared these with the births to residents plus the calculated births to Barbadians overseas. We conclude that in both cases emigration is a very significant contributor to the fertility declines which have occurred and are still underway.     

Oswald Spengler on Cosmopolis and Depopulation

Historians are professionally averse to grand civilizational themes, especially where predictions may be entailed. The German historian Oswald Spengler (1880–1936), whose membership in the academic fraternity of his discipline has often been questioned, was an exception. His two‐volume magnum opus. The Decline of the West, published in 1918 and 1922 (English translation, 1928), in its time attracted much public and professional attention. (It remains in print.) It presents an enormously ambitious tableau of universal history seen as the unfolding of the fates of eight cultures, with a focus on four main strands: Indian, Classical, Arabian, and Western. In Spengler's interpretation, imbued with cultural and historical pessimism, the West was exhibiting symptoms found in earlier civilizations in decline. “Civilization,” in Spengler's vision, was a stage that follows cultural flowering—creative manifestations of the culture's unique soul expressed in art and thought. Civilization's preoccupation is with the enjoyment of material comforts; the sequence from “culture” to “civilization” represents the very antithesis of progress. Spengler saw the West as having entered that latter phase in the nineteenth century: a phase in which, in the words of the synoptic chart appended to Volume 1 of The Decline of the West, “The body of the people, now essentially urban in constitution, dissolves into formless mass.” Urbanism, the emergence of “megalopolis,” or “cosmopolis“—the world city—is a distinguishing and crucial feature of that declining civilization. A passage (section V, including some translator's notes) from the chapter titled The Soul of the City in Vol. II of The Decline of the West, which has the subtitle Perspectives of World History, is reproduced below. It offers arresting characterizations of the morphology of urban forms and of the rise of the world city. As longer‐term consequences (for the West “between 2000 and 2200”) Spengler foresaw the “formation ofCeasarism”; “victory of force‐politics over money”; “increasing primi‐tiveness of political forms”; and “inward decline of the nations into a formless population, and constitution thereof as an Imperium of gradually increasing crudity and despotism.” As to demographic consequences, Spengler highlights the emerging “sterility of civilized man“—“an essentially metaphysical turn toward death.”“Children do not happen, not because children have become impossible, but principally because intelligence at the peak of intensity can no longer find any reason for their existence.”“Prudent limitation of the number of births” eventually leads to a “stage, which lasts for centuries, of appalling depopulation.” Immigration apart, the time scale specified by Spengler for depopulation—“for centuries”—may be seen today as relatively cautious. Should Europe's current period fertility level—slightly below a TFR of 1.4—be translated into cohort performance, it would yield an intrinsic annual rate of population growth of roughly ‐1.5 percent. Within 200 years, such a growth rate would reduce a population to 5 percent of its original size. From The Decline of the West: Volume 2 by Oswald Spengler, translated by C. F. Atkinson, copyright 1928 and renewed 1956 by Alfred A. Knopf, a division of Random House, Inc. Used by permission of Alfred A. Knopf, a division of Random House, Inc.     

New Estimates and Projections of Population Growth in Pakistan

Pakistan's population growth rate rose steadily from about 2.6 percent per annum in the early 1960s to a high of about 3.5 percent during the late 1980s. Since then it has declined to an estimated 2.1 percent for 2003. Growth rates calculated from the population censuses, which show a very different picture, are distorted by differential accuracy of enumeration. During the period of rising growth rates, fertility was constant at just under 7 children per woman while life expectancy at birth rose by nearly 20 years. Fertility decline began in the late 1980s, bringing the population growth rate down with it. Remarkably, there appears to have been little change in life expectancy over the past 15 years.     

Foreign-Born Emigration From The United States: 1960 To 1970

This paper presents estimates of emigration of foreign-born persons by age and sex for 1960 to 1970, based on 1960 and 1970 census counts of the foreign-born population, adjusted life table survival rates, and annual statistics on alien immigration published by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The effects of nativity bias are discussed. It is estimated that approximately 1,140,000 foreign-born persons emigrated between 1960 and 1970, of which 663,000, or 58 percent, were women and 477,000 were men. Almost one-quarter of the foreign-born emigrants were women 25–44 years of age in 1970. About 175,000 foreign-born persons 65 years and over in 1970 emigrated during the decade. The most significant finding, that more than one million foreign-born persons left the United States between 1960 and 1970, has important implications for U.S. immigration policy and for net immigration data used to estimate the population of the United States.     

Evaluating multi-regional population projections with Taylor’s law of mean–variance scaling and its generalisation

Organisations that develop demographic projections usually propose several variants with different demographic assumptions. Existing criteria for selecting a preferred projection are mostly based on retrospective comparisons with observations, and a prospective approach is needed. In this work, we use the mean–variance scaling (spatial variance function) of human population densities to select among alternative demographic projections. We test against observed and projected Norwegian county population density using two spatial variance functions, Taylor’s law (TL) and its quadratic generalisation, and compare each function’s parameters between the historical data and six demographic projections, at two different time scales (long term: 1978–2010 vs. 2011–2040; and short term: 2006–2010 vs. 2011–2015). We find that short-term projections selected by TL agree more accurately than the other projections with the recent county density data and reflect the current high rate of international migration to and from Norway. The variance function method implemented here provides an empirical test of an ex ante approach to evaluating short-term human population projections.     

D. V. Glass on the Problems of a Declining Population

During the past quarter century fertility has dropped below replacement levels in many parts of the world. According to United Nations estimates, in 2005 this was the case in 65 countries, comprising 43 percent of the world's population. In many cases, most notably in Europe and East Asia, the shortfall of fertility from the level that would be necessary in the long run to sustain a stationary population is substantial. In Europe, for example, the average total fertility rate for the period 2000–2005 was 1.4. Indefinite maintenance of such a level implies a shrinkage of the total population by one‐third over a generation–roughly every 30 years. Accompanying that rapid decline of total numbers would be an age structure containing a preponderance of the elderly, posing extreme adjustment difficulties for the economic and social system. Societies that wish to avoid radical depopulation would have to engineer a substantial rise infertility–if not to full replacement level (slightly more than two children per woman), then at least to a level that would moderate the tempo of population decline and make population aging easier to cope with. An additional counter to declining numbers, if not significantly to population aging, could come from net immigration. This is the demographic future assumed in the UN medium‐variant projections for countries and regions currently of very low fertility. Thus, for example, in Europe over the period up to 2050 fertility is assumed to rise to 1.85 and net immigration to amount to some 32 million persons. The UN projections also anticipate further improvement in average life expectancy–from its current level of 74 years to 81 years. This factor slows the decline in population size but accelerates population aging. Under these assumptions, Europe's population would decline from its present 728 million to 653 million by 2050. At that time the proportion of the population over age 65 would be 27.6 percent, nearly double its present share. Demographic change of this nature is not a novel prospect. It was envisioned in a number of European countries and in North America, Australia, and New Zealand in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Concern with the possible economic and social consequences generated much discussion at that time among demographers and social scientists at large and also attracted public attention. Possible policy measures that might reverse the downward trend of fertility were also debated, although resulting in only hesitant and largely inconsequential action. The article by D. V. Glass reproduced below is an especially lucid and concise treatment of demographic changes under conditions of low fertility and their economic and social implications. It appeared in Eugenics Review (vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 39–47) in 1937 when the author was 26 years old. Glass's line of argument is broadly representative of the main focus of demographic analysis in the mid‐1930s on aspects of population dynamics, applying the then still novel analytical tool of the stable population model. It also echoes the work of economists then witnessing the great difficulties capitalist economies faced in adjusting to structural changes in consumer demand and labor supply. While Glass addresses these issues primarily with reference to England and Wales, he sees the issues as affecting all industrialized countries. The Malthusian problem of relentless population growth he persuasively declares to be irrelevant for these countries. The Western world faces the opposite problem: population decline, a trend only temporarily masked by the effects of an age distribution that still has a relatively high proportion of women in the child‐bearing ages, reflecting the higher fertility level of the past. A stationary population, Glass cogently argues, is to be welcomed, and he considers the absolute size at which zero growth would be achieved relatively unimportant. In contrast, a continuous population decline would have “thoroughly disastrous” results in an individualist civilization and in “an unplanned economic system.” And, he concedes, somewhat quaintly, that sustained below‐replacement fertility would pose a great problem “even in a country in which the means of production were owned communally.” Glass's conclusions about the reversibility of low fertility are as pessimistic as those of most informed observers today. Still, he sees hope in a future “rationally planned civilization” that would “produce an environment in which high fertility and a high standard of life will both be possible.” In this context, high fertility means the level necessary to sustain the population in a stationary state. By present‐day standards the level Glass calculates as needed for long‐term zero growth is indeed fairly high: 2.87 children per woman. But that figure reflects the fact that, when he wrote, mortality up to age 50 was still fairly high and fertility occurred almost wholly within marriage; it also assumes zero net immigration. In the last 70 years much has changed in each of these three components of population dynamics, both in England and Wales and in the rest of Europe. Still, Glass's commentary remains highly relevant to the discussion of the problems of low fertility today. David Victor Glass (1911–78) was associated with the London School of Economics throughout much of his scientific career. He followed R. R. Kuczynski as reader in demography in 1945 and became professor of sociology in 1948. His work on demography, population history, and population policy had already made him one of the most influential demographers in pre‐World War II Britain. After the war he rose to international prominence through pioneering work on the Royal Commission of Population; through his research on historical demography, the history of demographic thought, and social mobility; and through founding, in 1947, the journal Population Studies, which he edited until his death.     

Estimates of coverage of the population by sex,race, and age in the 1970 census

Several estimates of total net underenumeration and of net census errors by sex, race (white, Negro-and-other-races, Negro), and age (five-year groups) in the 1960 and 1970 Censuses, for the total population of the United States, derived by the methods of demographic analysis, are presented. The different data, procedures, and assumptions employed in developing the various estimates are described briefly, and the findings are then discussed in terms of a”preferred” set of estimates. The preferred set of estimates of corrected population for 1970 combines estimates for persons under age 35 based directly on birth, death, and migration statistics, estimates for females aged 35 to 64 based on the Coale-Zelnik estimates (white) for 1950 or the Coale-Rives estimates (Negro) for 1960, estimates for males aged 35 to 64 based on the use of expected sex ratios, and estimates for the population 65 and over based on”Medicare” enrollments and expected sex ratios. These estimates indicate an overall net underenumeration of 5.3 million persons or 2.5 percent in 1970, as compared with 5.1 million or 2.7 percent in 1960, and a net underenumeration of 1.9 percent for whites and of 7.7 percent for Negroes in 1970, as compared with 2.0 percent and 8.0 percent, respectively, in 1960. As in 1960, undercoverage in 1970 was greatest for Negro males (9.9 percent); net error rates exceeded 12 percent in each age group 20 to 49 and reached 17 to 19 percent at ages 25 to 44. All sex-race groups showed marked increases between 1960 and 1970 for children under ten and marked declines at ages ten to 24. Equally reliable estimates of population coverage cannot be prepared for states and smaller geographic units or for the population of Spanish ancestry.     

Alvin Hansen on Economic Progress and Declining Population Growth

The driving forces of economic growth, according to the mainstream of classical economic thinking, are threefold: technological innovations, the opening up of new territories and discovery of new resources, and increase in population. In interaction, in an entrepreneurial market economy, these forces generate growth not only in the aggregate but also per capita. Evidence of their power was seen in the long stretch of rising living standards in the West over the nineteenth century, despite the ups and downs of the business cycle. However, the economic experience of the interwar years, and in particular the Great Depression of the 1930s, suggested that the forces were largely spent and hence that future economic prospects were gravely imperiled. The Keynesian revolution in economics was a response to the evident malfunctioning of the capitalist economic system, although the policy recipes it offered (for increasing demand and investment to levels capable of generating an equilibrium consistent with full employment of productive resources, especially labor) by no means commanded unanimity. The most prominent American contributor to and spokesman for the new line of economic analysis—often called “the American Keynes”—was Alvin H. Hansen (1887–1975), who took up his professorship of political economy at Harvard in 1937, just after the appearance of Keynes's General Theory. In that post, which he held until his retirement in 1956, he was one of the most influential economists of the era as a theorist, policy adviser, and teacher. Hansen interpreted the economic problems of the 1930s not just as the manifestation of a particularly sharp cyclical downturn, but as evidence of secular stagnation caused by the closing of the economic frontier, sluggishness in technological innovation, and, not least, “a drastic decline in population growth.” This “stagnation thesis” is most succinctly set out in his presidential address to the American Economic Association, delivered in Detroit, 28 December 1938, under the title Economic Progress and Declining Population Growth. The address is re‐produced below from the March 1939 issue of the American Economic Review. (The opening paragraphs of the address, and two paragraphs, immediately preceding the closing paragraph, in which Hansen discusses changes in US national income in the 1930s, have been omitted.) Hansen's analysis of the effects of declining population growth in many ways echoes the thesis set out by Keynes in his seminal Galton Lecture delivered to the Eugenics Society in 1937 (reprinted in the Archives section of PDR 4, no. 3): a demographic slowdown decreases opportunities for profitable investments and increases levels of attempted saving, hence pushes the economy toward a low‐growth equilibrium at which resources are underutilized and unemployment is high. Hansen puts special emphasis on demographically induced shifts in the composition of output. He suggests that, beyond its direct positive effect on investment and output, population growth also has an indirect enhancing effect on these factors by facilitating technological progress–contrary to the “older Malthusian view.” In his policy proposals Hansen was more interventionist than Keynes, advocating a more intrusive government role in the economy as a possible means of escaping the vicious cycle of low demand and high unemployment. As to government action to reverse demographic trends seen as deleterious, neither Keynes nor Hansen argued for policies to increase fertility, presumably because they saw them as both inappropriate and, in comparison to remedial economic policy measures, inefficient or unfeasible. The demands of the war economy in the years following Hansen's address took care of the employment problem, and the immediate postwar decades brought the stimuli of pent‐up consumer demand, an outpouring of technological innovations, a reopening of the economic frontier produced by a more liberal trade regime, and, also, an acceleration of population growth. The result was rapid overall economic growth and increasing levels of per capita income. Keynesian demand management played some role in this economic success story: by the end of the 1960s even US President Richard Nixon pronounced himself a Keynesian. But it offered no remedy for the stagflation that eventually followed. The growth‐promoting recipes favored in the last decades of the century (especially in the most successful developing economies) were anything but Keynesian: limited government, fiscal restraint, and globalization. Yet recent and anticipated demographic trends, especially in Europe—notably fertility decline and population aging—make Hansen, once again, interesting reading. Commitments of the modern welfare state for health care, retirement pensions, and job security command wide approval, but they have boosted governments' weight in the economy and made labor markets inflexible, unemployment high, and retirement early—developments that may increasingly impose a brake on economic growth and on improvements of living standards. Reform measures to ease these burdens are, in principle, straightforward, but their immediate social costs are heavy and their rewards are delayed, hence resistance to reform is strong and growing. This is likely to stimulate the search for alternative policies that offer politically more palatable tradeoffs—some of which may turn out to have an unmistakably Hansenian flavor. As to future population trends, Hansen, despite his reference to a “drastic decline in population growth” based on a comparison of nineteenth‐ and twentieth‐century Western demographic change, envisaged a convergence to a stationary population or a tendency toward very slow decrease. Yet some economies are already locked into a demographic pattern that augurs sharper declines and more rapid population aging, enhancing the relevance of the issues posed by Hansen. In Germany, for example, in the absence of immigration, the population between ages 20 and 40 will decline from 21.6 million in 2005 to 16.3 million in 2025—a drop of 23 percent. Over the same time period, the population aged 60 and older will grow from 20.5 million to 25.8 million—an increase of 26 percent. Serious efforts to slow population decline and retard population aging by stimulating fertility would of course add another major burden to government budgets.