Awareness and partitional information structures

This is the first of two papers where we present a formal model of unawareness. We contrast unawareness with certainty and uncertainty. A subject is certain of something when he knows that thing; he is uncertain when he does not know it, but he knows he does not: he is consciously uncertain. On the other hand, he isunaware of something when he does not know it, and he does not know he does not know, and so on ad infinitum: he does not perceive, does not have in mind, the object of knowledge. The opposite of unawareness is awareness, which includes certainty and uncertainty.This paper has three main purposes. First, we formalize the concept of awareness, and introduce a symmetry axiom which states that a subject can be aware of something, say, if and only if he is aware of its negation not-; in other words, that and not- are perceived together, or neither is. We then derive the basic properties of awareness.The second purpose is to prove a different axiomatic characterization, based on the concept of awareness of the system which underlies the model of information with partitional structures (known asS5).The third purpose of this paper is to show that without a substantial weakening of the rules of inferences normally assumed in modal logic a satisfactory model of unawareness, which includes the symmetry axiom, is impossible. This alternative approach is developed in a second paper by the same authors.     

Choice Functions with States of Mind

An agent is rational by dominance then states of mind (DSM) if he makes his decisions by, first, preselecting the alternatives that are not dominated by any other alternative in the choice set, and second, by choosing the preselected alternative corresponding to his state of mind. This state of mind is dependent on the previous choices he made. An agent is rational by states of mind then dominance (SMD) if he makes his decisions by, first, preselecting the alternatives corresponding to his state of mind and second, choosing the alternative that is not dominated. We give axiomatizations for SMD-rational or DSM-rational choice functions.      

What Policies Advance Infants and Toddlers? Evidence to Inform State and Federal Options

A variety of civic actors—government, associations, and local agencies—work to help parents advance the vitality of our youngest children. Empirical findings accumulating over the past half-century identify benefits for infants and toddlers stemming from three policy models: paid leave for parents after a newborn arrives; regular pediatric assessments, including home visiting; and quality caregivers situated in homes or centers. We review what is known about the effects of these policies, along with constituent elements of quality (mediators) that operate proximal to children's health, cognitive, and emotional growth. Much has been learned about how such collective action, carried out by local organizations, advance infant–toddler development. Methodological advances foster new knowledge: moving closer to causal inferences and pinpointing social mechanisms that enrich infant–toddler settings. Less well understood is how policy levers can move the malleable elements of program quality to raise the magnitude or sustainability of program effects. We note the benefits of income-support efforts for fragile families, while urging new work on how economic dynamics touch the capacity of parents and caregivers to better nurture infants and toddlers.     

Towards a critical realist epistemology?

When critical realists consider epistemology they typically start from “epistemological relativism.” We find this position necessary, but we also find it insufficient because it lacks a critique of the highly unequal social relations among observers themselves—relations that shape the very production of knowledge. While it is indeed the case that all knowledge is fallible, it is also the case that all knowledge is positioned, with a particular standpoint. What is more, the social power relations between standpoints organize the production of truth in ways that produce systematic distortions. In this paper, we propose a critical realist social epistemology. We introduce feminist standpoint theory and postcolonial theory as our suggested interventions into critical realism and we use two case studies of existing work to highlight i) the social production of truth and the real, and ii) what is at stake for radicalizing epistemology in critical realism. In so doing, our paper emphasizes the epistemic complexities that continuously shape ontology, a commitment to subaltern voices or experiences, and a thorough interrogation of the relations between positions of knowledge production.     

Living in a Wittgensteinian World: Beyond Theory to a Poetics of Practices

As human beings, we share many historically developed, language-game interwoven, public forms of life. Due to the joint, dialogically responsive nature of all social life within such forms, we cannot as individuals just act as we please; our forms of life exert a normative influence on what we can say and do. They act as a backdrop against which all our claims to knowledge are judged as acceptable or not. As a result, it is not easy to articulate their inadequacies in a clear and forceful manner. However, within most of our forms of life, we have a first-person right to express how our individual circumstances seem to us. And by the use of special forms of poetic, gestural talk—talk that can originate new language-games—we can offer to make our own 'inner lives' public. In this paper, I want to claim that this is just what Wittgenstein is attempting to do in his later philosophy: by use of the self-same methods that anyone might use to express aspects of their own world picture, he is offering us his attempts to make the background 'landscape' of our lives more visible to us. These methods are explored below.     

Everybody is doing it: the effects of base rate information on correspondent inferences from violations of perfect and imperfect duties

Three experiments examined the extent to which people’s correspondent inferences from immoral behaviors are influenced by the base rates of those behaviors. Supporting a theory by Trafimow and Trafimow (1999), when immoral behaviors violated what Kant termed imperfect duties (duties that people only sometimes have to perform to be moral), then base rates strongly influenced whether correspondent inferences were made. However, if the immoral behaviors violated what Kant termed perfect duties (duties that people always have to perform to be moral), then base rates were significantly less relevant.     

Competence effects for choices involving gains and losses

We investigate how choices for uncertain gain and loss prospects are affected by the decision maker’s perceived level of knowledge about the underlying domain of uncertainty. Specifically, we test whether Heath and Tversky’s (J Risk Uncertain 4:5–28, 1991) competence hypothesis extends from gains to losses. We predict that the commonly-observed preference for high knowledge over low knowledge prospects for gains reverses for losses. We employ an empirical setup in which participants make hypothetical choices between gain or loss prospects in which the outcome depends on whether a high or low knowledge event occurs. We infer decision weighting functions for high and low knowledge events from choices using a representative agent preference model. For gains, we replicate the results of Kilka and Weber (Manage Sci 47:1712–1726, 2001), finding that decision makers are more attracted to choices that they feel more knowledgeable about. However, for losses, we find limited support for our extension of the competence effect.     

More on Plagiarism in the Social Sciences*

This research presents the results of a follow‐up survey to journal editors more than a decade after Enders and Hoover (Journal of Economic Literature 42(3):487–93). The original survey asked editors about their definition of plagiarism and known cases. This work investigates what, if anything, has changed in regards to how journal editors react to suspected plagiarism and if the definition of plagiarism has changed. In addition to surveying editors of economics journals, we have surveyed many more editors, including political science, sociology, and others, to contrast differences that might exist. There is great variation within disciplines regarding the appropriate definition of plagiarism or punishments but fairly consistent agreement across disciplines.     

Contemplative Methods Meet Social Sciences: Back to Human Experience as It Is

The aim of this paper is to trace a pathway connecting contemplative knowledge and practices with the social sciences. Contemplative knowledge and practices offer material for reflection in social science even concerning their very foundation. I'll found an opportunity for meshing our disciplinary tools with this knowledge as I introduced it in a health promotion program. The result will be a transdisciplinary confluence of different lines of inquiry contributing to a new perspective of self and social action. First of all I will give a definition of contemplative knowledge and practices. Then, I will make a bridge between the contemplative approach and the social sciences, showing the contribution that symbolic interactionism can play. I will illustrate the perspective drawing on an action research program called Auriga aimed at smoking cessation and reduction among health professionals. The aim of this paper is focused on the specification of the conceptual background in which such kind of program has been developed. Finally, I outline some implications it could represent for what might be called transformative sociology. I believe that contemplative knowledge could contribute to disentangle some of the unanswered questions and concerns in the social sciences, once they dismiss for a while their scientistic perspective. The secular redefinition of tools mainly belonging to the wisdom traditions represents an innovation that can reshape what we intend by the self and experience, contributing to what is called the “social transformation from within,” a pragmatic and wise approach to change at any level.     

Abstracts

The concept of ‘tacit knowledge’ as the means by which individuals interpret the ‘rules’ of social interaction occupies a central role in all the major contemporary theories of action and social structure. The major reference point for social theorists is Wittgenstein's celebrated discussion of rule-following in the Philosophical Investigations. Focusing on Giddens' incorporation of tacit knowledge and rules into his ‘theory of structuration’, I argue that Wittgenstein's later work is steadfastly set against the ‘latent cognitivism’ inherent in the idea of tacit knowledge and tacit rules. I also argue that the idea of tacit knowledge and tacit rules is either incoherent or explanatorily vacuous. Scholars of the emotions maintain that all anger requires an object of blame. In order to be angry, many writers argue, one must believe than an actor has done serious damage to something that one values. Yet an individual may be angered without blaming another. This kind of emotion, called situational anger, does not entail a corresponding object of blame. Situational anger can be a useful force in public life, enabling citizens to draw attention to the seriousness of social or political problems, without necessarily vilifying political officials. In the first half of this paper I show how H. L. A. Hart's theory of rules can resolve, or at least clarify, a central methodological problem in legal anthropology that was first posed in Llewellyn and Egebel's The Cheyenñe Way In the second half I explore and develop Hart's theory (a) of rules, and apply it to problems of agency and behaviourism in legal anthropology, and (b) of legal development, and apply it to the problem of rule-scepticism in legal anthropology as it is posed in Roberts and Comaroffs Rules and Processes and elsewhere. As human beings, we share many historically developed, language-game interwoven, public forms of life. Due to the joint, dialogically responsive nature of all social life within such forms, we cannot as individuals just act as we please; our forms of life exert a normative influence on what we can say and do. They act as a backdrop against which all our claims to knowledge are judged as acceptable or not. As a result, it is not easy to articulate their inadequacies in a clear and forceful manner. However, within most of our forms of life, we have a first-person right to express how our individual circumstances seem to us. And by the use of special forms of poetic, gestural talk—talk that can originate new language-games—we can offer to make our own ‘inner lives’ public. In this paper, I want to claim that this is just what Wittgenstein is attempting to do in his later philosophy: by use of the self-same methods that anyone might use to express aspects of their own world picture, he is offering us his attempts to make the background ‘landscape’ of our lives more visible to us. These methods are explored below. Proponents of the view that social structures are ontologically distinct from the people in whose actions they are immanent have assumed that structures can stand in causal relations to individual practices. Were causality to be no more than Humean concomitance correlations between structure and practices would be unproblematic. But two prominent advocates of the ontological account of structures, Bhaskar and Giddens, have also espoused a powers theory of causality. According to that theory causation is brought about by the activity of particulars, in the social psychological case, individuals of some sort. Consistence would demand that structure be those individuals. But neither Giddens nor Bhaskar wish to reify structure to the extent that would fit it for a role as a powerful particular. If only human beings can be powerful particulars in these contexts, the only way that structures can be real must be as properties of conversational (symbolic) interactions. Human action is social just in so far as people direct themselves to engage well in joint activities with others.     

Vygotsky,Wittgenstein, and sociocultural theory

This paper considers the use made of Vygotsky's work by many who take a sociocultural perspective and, in particular, by those who use his work to advance a particular view of second language acquisition and the ‘silent period’. It is argued that Vygotsky's account as represented in Thought and Language (Vygotsky, 1986 ) needs to be thought of as consisting of two distinct aspects: first, the observations he made (or claimed to have made) and, second, the theoretical account he proposed to explain them. It is shown that some of Vygotsky's observations are problematic but that, even if they are accepted, Vygotsky's theoretical account suffers from fundamental difficulties. Thus the support claimed from Vygotsky in accounts of second language acquisition is misplaced, first because of those difficulties and, second, because many who claim support from Vygotsky, do not need or even use his theory but instead focus their attention on his empirical observations and assume incorrectly that if their own empirical observations match Vygotsky's, then Vygotsky's theory can be accepted. Wittgenstein's later philosophy is shown to provide a perspective which dispels confusions about, and gives us a clearer insight into, the issues.     

论《资本论》的方法

《资本论》以唯物史观和辩证法为基础 ,运用科学的从抽象到具体的研究方法和逻辑方法 ,从商品的价值规律及其体现的社会经济关系入手 ,揭示了资本主义经济关系受价值规律支配产生和发展的自然必然性及其历史趋势 ,充分体现了逻辑、辩证法和唯物主义认识论三者的统一。认识《资本论》的方法对于研究我国的市场经济关系 ,建立起完善的市场经济体制和科学的政治经济学体系 ,具有现实指导意义。     

The real foundations of the alleged errors in Allais' Impossibility Theorem: Unceasingly repeated errors or contradictions of mark machina

1.-The Impossibility Theorem rests on five fundamental properties. On each of them Machina has confirmed his agreement over and over again between 1984 and 1986. The proof of the Impossibility Theorem is mathematically and rigorously correct.2.- The alleged Machina's demonstration of the Allais' two errorsis indeed only grounded on a series of errors and it isin total contradiction with the interpretationsexplicitly given by Machina from 1982 to 1986 of his local utility theory in the discrete case, especially in his letters.3.1 In fact one cannot but ask if Machina really understands the meaning and the implications of his formulation of the local utility, and what is really in question.In any case it would he without any doubt eminently desirable that before hastily concluding that the others are making mistakes, Machina should begin by seriously asking himself if he is not himself into error.     

Rules of behavior and expected utility theory. Compatibility versus dependence

Conclusions We have seen that many decision rules which are intuitively and/or empirically supported and compatible with MEU, are compatible with it but not dependent on it.There are of course rules of behavior which are implied in MEU and also depend on it like this:If the hope of winning any of the prizes in a lottery motivates you to buy a ticket, and if you win half the amount of the highest prize, you should play double or nothing with your prize.Suppose you would prefer a one in a million chance of winning $2 million to a two in a million chance of winning $1 million, but your first choice is not available so you buy a ticket for $1 million. If you win, you should play 50–50 double or nothing with your prize. Generalize: put x in the place of $1 million and p in the place of 1/1 000000, and test yourself against this principle (Pf = preferred to): (p, 2x)Pf(2p, x) (0.5, 2x)Pf(1, x).See Friedmann and Savage (1968).In the real world lotteries are multiprize, i.e., composite games of elements like these. The same applies: If you would not have preferred the highest prize exchanged for a higher probability of some lower prize, then winning a lower prize would put you in the market for some simple bet like above. If you stand up to this test, you are a unique person because, as we know, such bets are not made.While in the process of finishing the final draft, I got hold of (Samuelson, 1983). He expresses grave doubts as to what he calls the dogma of Expected Utility maximizing. In a somewhat apologetic way, he preserves some formulations deriving behavior from EUM because, as he states in a general way, they do not depend on that particular dogma. More specifically: many models incompatible with EUM imply risk aversion, which would result also from maximizing the expectation of a concave utility function,In view of the authoritarian disposition of some of the strongest defenders of EUM and of Samuelson's (well deserved) authority and his leading role in the school of EUM theory, his open expression of doubt may well mark the beginning of the last chapter in the history of the rise and fall of the most powerful school that has so far been active in 20th century decision theory.     

Parametric multi-attribute utility functions for optimal profit under risk constraints

We provide an economic interpretation of the practice consisting in incorporating risk measures as constraints in an expected prospect maximization problem. For what we call the infimum of expectations class of risk measures, we show that if the decision maker (DM) maximizes the expectation of a random prospect under constraint that the risk measure is bounded above, he then behaves as a “generalized expected utility maximizer” in the following sense. The DM exhibits ambiguity with respect to a family of utility functions defined on a larger set of decisions than the original one; he adopts pessimism and performs first a minimization of expected utility over this family, then performs a maximization over a new decisions set. This economic behaviour is called “maxmin under risk” and studied by Maccheroni (Econ Theory 19:823–831, 2002). As an application, we make the link between an expected prospect maximization problem, subject to conditional value-at-risk being less than a threshold value, and a non-expected utility economic formulation involving “loss aversion”-type utility functions.     

在理论模型的平台上思考新经济社会学的一个倡导

在以往比较长的一段时间内,许多中国学者或理论工作者都比较喜欢进行概念上的争论。这种争论某种意义上颇类似于西方中世纪对宗教教义的不同理解引发的辩驳,它对于正本清源,明晰人们的认知,改变意识形态,形成一种共识,促进社会转型是有较大作用的。不过,这样的学术活动,其实对于学术的直接的建设性作用甚小。当前中国学术界,这种现象少了一些,学者们转而满足于对经验进行简要概括,以期形成一定的能够唤起读者共鸣的概念。这些概念往往能够引起一定的社会效应,然而,其学术意义同样不大,因为它们对于真正的学术累积作用甚小。众所周知的是:仅…     

An agenda for future research regarding the mental health of young people with care experience

Young people who are currently or were previously in state care have consistently been found to have much higher rates of mental health and neurodevelopmental difficulties than the general youth population. While a number of high-quality reviews highlight what research has been undertaken in relation to the mental health of young people with care experience and the gaps in our knowledge and understanding, there is, until now, no consensus, so far as we aware, as to where our collective research efforts should be directed with this important group. Through a series of UK wide workshops, we undertook a consultative process to identify an agreed research agenda between those with lived experience of being in care (n = 15), practitioners, policy makers and researchers (n = 59), for future research regarding the mental health of young people with care experience, including those who are neurodiverse/have a neurodevelopmental difficulty. This consensus statement identified 21 foci within four broad categories: how we conceptualize mental health; under-studied populations; under-studied topics; and underused methodologies. We hope that those who commission, fund and undertake research will engage in this discussion about the future agenda for research regarding the mental health of young people with care experience.