The Bicameral Postulates and Indices of a Priori Voting Power

If K is an index of relative voting power for simple voting games, the bicameral postulate requires that the distribution of K -power within a voting assembly, as measured by the ratios of the powers of the voters, be independent of whether the assembly is viewed as a separate legislature or as one chamber of a bicameral system, provided that there are no voters common to both chambers. We argue that a reasonable index – if it is to be used as a tool for analysing abstract, uninhabited decision rules – should satisfy this postulate. We show that, among known indices, only the Banzhaf measure does so. Moreover, the Shapley–Shubik, Deegan–Packel and Johnston indices sometimes witness a reversal under these circumstances, with voter x less powerful than y when measured in the simple voting game G₁ , but more powerful than y when G₁ is bicamerally joined with a second chamber G₂ . Thus these three indices violate a weaker, and correspondingly more compelling, form of the bicameral postulate. It is also shown that these indices are not always co-monotonic with the Banzhaf index and that as a result they infringe another intuitively plausible condition – the price monotonicity condition. We discuss implications of these findings, in light of recent work showing that only the Shapley–Shubik index, among known measures, satisfies another compelling principle known as the bloc postulate. We also propose a distinction between two separate aspects of voting power: power as share in a fixed purse (P-power) and power as influence (I-power).     

Public Perceptions of Risk and Preference-Based Values of Safety

This article reports the results of two studies aimed at estimating preference-based values of safety in three contexts—namely rail, domestic fires and fires in public places—relative to the corresponding value for roads using matching (or equivalence) questions. In addition, both studies included a variety of questions intended to shed light on respondents' perceptions of risk and attitudes to safety in the various contexts. While the two studies were, to all intents and purposes, identical in the procedure that they employed, the essential difference between them was that the first study took place in late 1998, whereas the second study was carried out in early 2000 in the aftermath of a major rail accident at Ladbroke Grove near London's Paddington station which occurred in October 1999 and in which 29 passengers and 2 train drivers died. In addition, the second study sample was deliberately weighted to contain an above-average proportion of regular rail users. These studies demonstrated how certain factors which have been shown to affect people's perception of risk (see Slovic, P. (1992). In S. Krimsky and D. Golding (eds.), Social Theories of Risk, Westport, CT: Praeger, pp. 117–152) also affected our respondents' priorities over safety programs. The results also showed however, that the impact of these perceptions upon the trade-offs between preventing deaths in different hazard contexts was a good deal less pronounced than has been suggested by the value differentials that are currently implicit—and in some cases, explicit—in public policy making.     

Academic Affiliations of Social Work Journal Article Authors from 1999–2003: A Productivity Analysis from the United Kingdom

ABSTRACT

Following the protocols established by Ligon, Jackson, and Thyer (2007), author affiliations of 639 articles published in five UK social work journals between 1999 and 2003 were tabulated to generate a ranking of universities. Seventy-three universities published three or more articles. The findings are discussed in relation to the earlier article by Ligon et al. (2007) Ligon, J., Jackson, D. L. and Thyer, B. 2007. Academic affiliations of social work journal article authors from 1993–2003: A productivity analysis spanning 25 years of social work scholarship. Journal of Social Service Research, 33(2): 13–20. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar]. It is argued that a globalized approach to the analysis of the productivity of social work academics should be developed. A first step might be the integration of the U.S. and UK productivity analysis for relevant years.     

Mixed-Status Families and Immigration Interior Enforcement Policies: Effects on Clinical Practice and the Intraethnic Therapeutic Dyad

ABSTRACT

This article explores the sociopolitical and intersubjective enactments that unfolded when working with a mixed-status immigrant family facing parental deportation. Through the integration of a sociopolitical and intersubjective conceptualization, dynamics pertaining to inclusion, exclusion, domination, and subjugation are examined. The psychological exploration of the clinical treatment is guided by Altman’s (2010 Altman, N. (2010). The analyst in the inner city: Race, class and culture through a psychoanalytic lens (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Routledge. [Google Scholar]) three-person psychology and Stolorow’s (1991 Stolorow, R. D. (1991). The intersubjective context of intrapsychic experience: A decade of psychoanalytic inquiry. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 11, 171–184. doi:10.1080/07351699109533850[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 1993 Stolorow, R. D. (1993). Chapter 3 thoughts on the nature and therapeutic action of psychoanalytic interpretation. Progress in Self-Psychology, 9, 31–43. [Google Scholar]) theory of intersubjectivity. The analysis also incorporates dynamics pertaining to the ethnocultural transference and countertranference (Comas-Díaz & Jacobsen, 1991 Comas-Díaz, L., & Jacobsen, F. M. (1991). Ethnocultural transference and countertransference in the therapeutic dyad. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 61(3), 392–402. doi:10.1037/h0079267[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 1995 Comas-Díaz, L., & Jacobsen, F. M. (1995). The therapist of color and the white patient dyad: Contradictions and recognitions. Cultural Diversity and Mental Health, 1(2), 93–106. doi:10.1037/1099-9809.1.2.93[Crossref], [PubMed] , [Google Scholar]) and to associative identification processes (Shonfeld-Ringer, 2000 Shonfeld-Ringer, S. (2000). Close encounters: Exclusion and marginalization as an intersubjective experience. Smith College Studies in Social Work, 71(1), 51–59.[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). The case illustrates how dynamics of racialization, embedded within an increasingly White Nativist, ideological deportation immigration context, infiltrated the intraethnic, therapeutic relational encounter. The therapist took part in an intragroup, racialized reenactment that could have led to the therapist becoming part of the oppressive structure, but the therapist avoided doing so, explaining her internal process for rectifying the situation.     

Towards a more precise decision framework

The terms negative utility of gambling and risk aversion conflate three things:

Government size and economic growth in Taiwan: A threshold regression approach

The Armey curve developed by [Armey, R. (1995). The freedom revolution. Washington, DC: Rognery Publishing Co.] and [Vedder, R. K., & Gallaway, L. E. (1998). Government size and economic growth. Joint Economic Committee] demonstrates that there is a non-linear relationship between government size and economic growth. In order to search for the threshold effects, this paper employs [Hansen, B. E. (2000). Sample splitting and threshold estimation. Econometrica, 68(3), 575–603] threshold regression model to test whether the Armey curve exists in Taiwan, allowing for endogenous government size thresholds. We apply the two-sector production function developed by [Ram, R. (1986). Government size and economic growth: A new framework and some evidence from cross-section and time-series data. American Economic Review, 76(1), 191–203] to construct the threshold regression model. Three classifications of government size are tested in sequence as threshold variables. The result indicates that all three classifications of government size have a threshold effect and that a non-linear relationship of the Armey curve exists in Taiwan.     

A strategic foundation for the cooperator's advantage

Orbell and Dawes develop a non-game theoretic heuristic that yields a cooperator's advantage by allowing players to project their own cooperate-defect choices onto potential partners (1991, p. 515). With appropriate parameter values their heuristic yields a cooperative environment, but the cooperation depends, simply, on optimism about others' behavior (1991, p. 526). In earlier work, Dawes (1989) established a statistical foundation for such optimism. In this paper, I adapt some of the concerns of Dawes (1989) and develop a game theoretic model based on a modification of the Harsanyi structure of games with incomplete information (1967–1968). I show that the commonly made conjecture that strategic play is incompatible with cooperation and the cooperator's advantage is false.     

Notes about the Authors

Stanislav Gustavovich Strumilin (born in 1877) is a ranking member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. He is the author of about 200 books and articles in the fields of economics, theoretical statistics, planning, and labor productivity. THE SOVIET REVIEW has previously translated his "Family and Community of the Future" (February 1961) and "The Effectiveness of Education in the USSR" (September 1962).     

Separating marginal utility and probabilistic risk aversion

This paper is motivated by the search for one cardinal utility for decisions under risk, welfare evaluations, and other contexts. This cardinal utility should have meaningprior to risk, with risk depending on cardinal utility, not the other way around. The rank-dependent utility model can reconcile such a view on utility with the position that risk attitude consists of more than marginal utility, by providing a separate risk component: a probabilistic risk attitude towards probability mixtures of lotteries, modeled through a transformation for cumulative probabilities. While this separation of risk attitude into two independent components is the characteristic feature of rank-dependent utility, it had not yet been axiomatized. Doing that is the purpose of this paper. Therefore, in the second part, the paper extends Yaari's axiomatization to nonlinear utility, and provides separate axiomatizations for increasing/decreasing marginal utility and for optimistic/pessimistic probability transformations. This is generalized to interpersonal comparability. It is also shown that two elementary and often-discussed properties — quasi-convexity (aversion) of preferences with respect to probability mixtures, and convexity (pessimism) of the probability transformation — are equivalent.     

Comment on Pommerehne et al., “concordia discors: Or: What do economists think?”

Conclusion Why do Pommerehne and associates apparently overlook the point that both their hypothesis and data contain elements which are not compatible? Their findings in fact might be interpreted as contradictory to a human capital explanation for the behavior of their sample of economists. Kuhn (1970) would propose that mainstream economics has provided a set of assumptions to place over these findings that allows a neo-classical interpretation. However, the human capital theory does not address the contradictions in the data they gathered. As Berger and Luchman (1966, pp. 62–63) would conclude, institutionalization may take place in any area of relevant conduct to provide a corresponding canopy of legitimations, stretching over a protective cover of both cognitive and normative interpretation. Once again, the institutionalization of mainstream science has been successful in suppressing alternative assumptions that could explain the data more adequately and with greater consistency.We conclude that the paper by Pommerehne and associates contains shortcomings of theorizing and method. Likewise we conclude that a theoretical formulation which takes into account the normative and therefore the cultural factors of science will provide an explanation of the opinion and behavior of economists more in keeping with their empirical findings than one based on self-interest alone.     

Problems Entailed in the Effective Utilization of Labor Resources

"The first productive force of all mankind" — this is how Lenin evaluated the role of working people. Under socialism, where the principle of universal labor is operative and where there are no exploiting classes, the entire able-bodied population represents the labor resources of society. Rational utilization of these resources is a most important prerequisite to the fulfillment of the task, set by the 23d Party Congress, of increasing the effectiveness of social production and labor productivity. Under socialism, the objective conditions for this are created as a result of public ownership of the means of production and the planned organization of the economy. However, rational employment is not realized spontaneously.     

Group decision and negotiation support in evolving,nonshared information contexts

Based on evolutionary systems design (ESD), group decision and negotiation support in evolving, nonshared information contexts is discussed. A non-shared information context — one without full information sharing — is associated with what has been loosely called a noncooperative context in the group decision and negotiation support systems (GDNSS) literature. Without full information sharing, we have a game with incomplete information that, in general, is evolving. The paper discusses how the GDNSS, MEDIATOR, supports evolution of the group problem representation — a process of consensus seeking (through information sharing, here partial) subject to problem adaptation and restructuring within which compromise is possible.     

Knots and blanks: The pragmatic foundation of logical principles

Logical principles, in particular the law of noncontradiction and the law of exclusion of middle term, play different roles at different levels of discourse: valid formulae in an axiomatic calculus, methodological requirements (of consistency and completeness) for formalized systems. When postulated as formal laws, —pvp and —(p·—p), they are totally interdefinable and equivalent as well (DeMorgan's transformations are proof of this). If postulated as methodological requirements, the principles are not equivalent, although they could still be said in some sense to be interdefinable (the existence of consistent yet incomplete systems shows that the requirements are not equivalent; still, completeness of a system can be defined in terms of consistency of another system which keeps a definite relationship with the first one).There exists a third level of discourse: scientific praxis. At this level, the principles come even farther apart: they neither have the same logical value nor is one definable in terms of the other. However, they keep a family resemblance which justifies our dealing with them jointly. Let us call the principles at this level pragmatic imperatives. They deal with paradoxes, which are of two types: knots (conflicts) and blanks (gaps in the scientific pattern). The left-hand pragmatic imperative says: Be intolerant with knots, try to remove (dissolve) them. The right-hand pragmatic imperative says: Try to remove (fill) all blanks. The knot-removing and the blank-dissolving imperatives are prior to and more important than the laws of noncontradiction and excluded middle and the requirements of consistency and completeness. Logical principles are not prime categories: pragmatic imperatives are primordial.     

A Shortcut Method of Calculating the Distribution of Election Outcome Types Under Approval Voting

The paper applies to approval voting, under which the voter casts a ballot by casting one vote for each of k candidates, wherek=;1,2, , m–1 and there are m candidates. I assume (following Brams and Fishburn) that each of the voter's 2=;–2 strategies is equally likely to be chosen. Election-outcome types include: the m-way tie;(m-1) -way ties with the runner-up trailing by 1,2,,m votes; (m-2)-way ties, and so on. The frequency distribution of outcome types varies only with m and n and is necessary to the calculation of the expected utilities of successive ballots cast, in the same election, by a voter under a variant of approval voting. This variant allows the voter to cast several complete ballots provided that he pays the respective prices, which could reasonably be based on the expected utilities. The paper describes a shortcut method of calculating the distribution of outcome types when m=;4 andn rises to levels that make straightforward calculation computationally infeasible. The shortcut involves the combining of an outcome type, instead of each member of that type, with each of the 14 strategies available to the incremental voter. In going fromn-1 to n, for n3, the number of outcome types increases by a factor of (n+3)/n whereas, the number of combinations of strategies increases by a factor of 14.     

Impossibility theorems for normal form games

Two recent papers (Cubitt and Sugden, 1994; Samuelson, 1992) have established impossibility results which cast doubt on the coherence of the assumption of common knowledge of rationality'. It is shown that the Cubitt–Sugden result is the more powerful of the two impossibilities. Second, it is proved that the existence of a quasi-strict equilibrium is sufficient to construct sets which satisfy the Cubitt–Sugden axioms. This fact is used to establish that their impossibility result cannot arise in 2-player games. Finally, it is shown that if a weak symmetry postulate is added, a new impossibility result arises for this class of games.     

Payoff Kinks in Preferences over Lotteries

This paper identifies two distinct types of payoff kinks that can be exhibited by preference functions over monetary lotteries—locally separable vs. locally nonseparable—and illustrates their relationship to the payoff and probability derivatives of such functions. Expected utility and Fréchet differentiable preference functions are found to be incapable of exhibiting locally nonseparable payoff kinks; rank-dependent preference functions are incapable of avoiding them.     

Problems of points of inflection in trend functions as described by a model for the forecast of brand shares

Trends often have special points of uncertainty (surprises) which make forecasts by trend extrapolation impossible. Such points of uncertainty are found especially at points of inflection of functions. In many cases it will be possible to decompose the trend to be forecast into two or more (causal) time series which have no points of inflection. By extrapolating these individual time series it will then be possible to predict the trajectory of the trend function inclusive of the point of inflection. This method is represented and critically discussed by means of an example for the forecast of a brand share.Werner Kroeber-Riel, Dr. rer. pol., is full professor of business and head of the Institute for Research in Consumption and Behavior at the University of the Saar in Saarbrücken.Sighard Roloff is a certified mathematician and assistant at the Institute for Research in Consumption and Behavior at the University of the Saar in Saarbrücken.This contribution first appeared under the title: Zur Problematik von Wendepunkten in Trendfunktionen, dargestellt an einem Modell zur Prognose von Marktanteilen, Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung 24 (1972) 294–300.     

Are antidepressant and antipsychotic drug trials registered? A cross-sectional analysis of registration and reporting of methodologic characteristics

Introduction: In 2005, the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE) proposed that all submitted trials in all 11 member journals must be prospectively registered in order to be considered for publication. Registering drug trials was meant to reduce the likelihood of selective reporting. The aim was to determine the proportion of antipsychotic and antidepressant trials that were registered.

Methods: We searched in Pubmed for all randomized controlled trials of any antidepressant or antipsychotic published between July and December 2014. The primary objective was to determine the proportion of trials that were registered. Secondary objectives included comparing the reporting of methodological details and positive study findings between registered and unregistered trials.

Results: Of the 67 studies identified, 58% were registered. 75% of the antipsychotic trials and 51% of the antidepressant trials were registered, respectively. Registered trials were more likely to report important methodological details associated with risk of bias in RCTs. There was no significant difference in trials reporting positive outcomes for the study intervention between registered and unregistered trials.

Conclusion: Approximately 60% of published antidepressant and antipsychotic drug trials during July to December 2014 were registered. Unregistered trials were less likely to report important methodological details.     

Divide the Dollar: Three solutions and extensions

Divide the Dollar (DD) is a game in which two players independently bid up to 100 cents for a dollar. Each player receives his or her bid if the sum of the bids does not exceed a dollar; otherwise they receive nothing. This game has multiple Nash equilibria, including the egalitarian division of (50, 50), but this division is not compelling except for its symmetry and presumed fairness.This division is easy to induce, however, by punishing — more severely than does DD — deviations from it, but these solutions are not reasonable. By altering the rules of DD, however, one can induce an egalitarian division (by successive elimination of weakly dominated strategies), but no reasonable payoff scheme produces this division with egalitarian bids of 50.Three alternatives to DD are analyzed. DD1, which rewards lowest bidders first, shows how an egalitarian outcome can be induced with equal but nonegalitarian bids. DD2, which adds a second stage that provides the players with new information yet restricts their choices at the same time, is used to introduce dominance inducibility. DD3 combines the features of DD1 and DD2, is reasonable (like DD1), makes calculations transparent (like DD2), and induces egalitarian bids as well as the egalitarian outcome. The possible application of the different procedures to a real-world allocation problem (setting of salaries by a team), in which there may be entitlements, is described.