Education Gains Attributable to Fertility Decline: Patterns by Gender,Period, and Country in Latin America and Asia

We investigate the heterogeneity across countries and time in the relationship between mother’s fertility and children’s educational attainment—the quantity-quality (Q-Q) trade-off—by using census data from 17 countries in Asia and Latin America, with data from each country spanning multiple census years. For each country-year, we estimate micro-level instrumental variables models predicting secondary school attainment using number of siblings of the child, instrumented by the sex composition of the first two births in the family. We then analyze correlates of Q-Q trade-off patterns across countries. On average, one additional sibling in the family reduces the probability of secondary education by 6 percentage points for girls and 4 percentage points for boys. This Q-Q trade-off is significantly associated with the level of son preference, slightly decreasing over time and with fertility, but it does not significantly differ by educational level of the country.     

The Effect of Childhood Family Size on Fertility in Adulthood: New Evidence From IV Estimation

Although fertility is positively correlated across generations, the causal effect of children’s experience with larger sibships on their own fertility in adulthood is poorly understood. With the sex composition of the two firstborn children as an instrumental variable, we estimate the effect of sibship size on adult fertility using high-quality data from Norwegian administrative registers. Our study sample is all firstborns or second-borns during the 1960s in Norwegian families with at least two children (approximately 110,000 men and 104,000 women). An additional sibling has a positive effect on male fertility, mainly causing them to have three children themselves, but has a negative effect on female fertility at the same margin. Investigation into mediators reveals that mothers of girls shift relatively less time from market to family work when an additional child is born. We speculate that this scarcity in parents’ time makes girls aware of the strains of life in large families, leading them to limit their own number of children in adulthood.     

Fertility,gender preference,the Birth Planning Policy and life satisfaction in China

Using data from China Family Panel Studies 2010, we evaluate the role of the Birth Planning Policy (BPP) in altering decisions to have another child by birth parity, and the relationship of life satisfaction with the gender structure of the children of Chinese residents. We find strong positive effects of the BPP on the decision of having an additional child for Chinese residents, particularly if the previous children were girls. In spite of strong son preference in fertility behaviour, residents whose children are all daughters are found to be more satisfied with their lives than with other gender structures. The empirical findings support the view that daughters are more helpful in providing assistance to parents and in mitigating family conflicts hence increasing life satisfaction, while son preferences may be pursued reasons of lineage and hence do not result in more satisfied lives. We also find evidence that the BPP penalty might be a reason why having more sons could reduce life satisfaction.     

The Implementation of Preferences for Male Offspring

Over the past quarter century the sex ratio at birth (SRB) has risen above natural levels in a number of countries, mostly in Asia. This rise has been made possible in populations with strong son preference by the increasing availability of safe, effective, and inexpensive technologies to determine the sex of a fetus and to end unwanted pregnancies. This article documents levels and trends in the sex ratio at birth, in preferences for male offspring (using information on desired number of girls and boys), and in the implementation of these preferences. DHS surveys from 61 countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and for Indian states are the main source of data. A comparison of desired with actual SRBs finds large gaps in most populations, implying a substantial pent‐up demand for male offspring and the technology to implement this preference. Two types of actions to implement preferences are considered: the practice of contraception to stop childbearing after the desired number of sons has been born and the use of sex‐selective abortion to avoid female births. The second part of the article discusses factors that could influence the SRB, including the promotion of gender equality, and the implications of these factors for future trends.     

Simultaneity in the use of maternal-child health care and contraceptives: evidence from developing countries

This study examined the relationship between the use of maternal-child health (MCH) care and the use of contraceptives. The high correlation between the two may be due to the independent effect of one on the other or to an association of both with the same or similar background factors. We used structural equation models to examine the relationship between these two interventions. The data were derived from six Demographic and Health Surveys: Zimbabwe from Sub-Saharan Africa, Thailand from Asia, Egypt and Tunisia from North Africa, and Guatemala and Colombia from Latin America. The results show that in all six countries, the use of contraceptives and MCH care are significantly associated, independent of intervening factors; this finding suggests that families develop a joint demand for better-quality health and limited family size and translate these demands into action by using health services for mothers and for children and by voluntarily regulating fertility.     

The First Fifty Years – A Tribute to E. Grebenik

India is a country with a pervasive preference for sons and one of the highest levels of excess child mortality for girls in the world (child mortality for girls exceeds child mortality for boys by 43 per cent). In this article, data from the National Family Health Survey are used to examine the effect of son preference on parity progression and ultimately on child mortality. The demographic effects of family composition are estimated with hazard models. The analysis indicates that son preference fundamentally affects demographic behaviour in India. Family composition affects fertility behaviour in every state examined and son preference is the predominant influence in all but one of these states. The effects of family composition on excess child mortality for girls are more complex, but girls with older sisters are often subject to the highest risk of mortality.     

Evidence for an Incipient Decline in Numbers of Missing Girls in China and India

The apparently inexorable rise in the proportion of “missing girls” in much of East and South Asia has attracted much attention among researchers and policymakers. An encouraging trend was suggested by the case of South Korea, where child sex ratios (males to females under age 5) were the highest in Asia but peaked in the mid‐1990s and normalized thereafter. Using census data, we examine whether similar trends have begun to manifest themselves in the two most populous countries of this region, China and India. The data indicate that child sex ratios are peaking in these countries, and in many subnational regions are beginning to trend toward lower, more normal values. This suggests that, with continuing economic and social development and vigorous public policy efforts to reduce son preference, the “missing girls” phenomenon could eventually disappear in Asia.     

Sibling size and investment in children’s education: an asian instrument

This study estimates the trade-off between child quantity and quality by exploiting exogenous variation in fertility under son preferences. Under son preferences, both sibling size and fertility timing are determined depending on the first child’s gender, which is random as long as parents do not abort girls at their first childbearing. For the sample South Korean households, I find strong evidence of unobserved heterogeneity in preferences for child quantity and quality across households. The trade-off is not as strong as observed cross-sectional relationships would suggest. However, even after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, a greater number of siblings have adverse effects on per-child investment in education, in particular, when fertility is high.

The links between women’s employment and children at home: Variations in low- and middle-income countries by world region

As fertility declines in low- and middle-income countries, the time women devote to childbearing and rearing may also be reduced. This shift has been described as one of the positive consequences of the demographic transition, as it opens opportunities for women to pursue educational and employment opportunities that were previously constrained by the demands of bearing and raising children. We estimate the numbers of children residing at home (with their mother) for women in 58 countries in Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa. We then examine the association between women’s employment and having children at home. Finally, we assess trends over recent decades in the relationship between employment and childbearing, and differences in this relationship by mother’s occupation. We find a negative association between women’s employment and having children at home; this association varies substantially by world region, age of child, and mother’s occupation.     

Demographic transition in sub-Saharan Africa: how big will the economic dividend be?

In mid-demographic-transition, many Asian countries enjoyed a large demographic 'dividend': extra economic growth owing to falling dependant/workforce ratios, or slower natural increase, or both. We estimate the dividend, 1985-2025, in sub-Saharan Africa and its populous countries. Dependency and natural increase peaked around 1985, 20 years after Asia. The UN projects an acceleration of the subsequent slow falls but disregards slowish declines in young-age mortality and thus, we argue, overestimates future fertility decline. Even if one accepts their projection, arithmetical and econometric evidence suggests an annual, if not total, dividend well below Asia's. The dividend arises more from falling dependency than reduced natural increase, and could be increased by accelerating the fertility decline (e.g., by reducing young-age mortality) or by employing a larger workforce productively. Any dividend from transition apart, low saving in much of Africa (unlike Asia) means that, given likely natural increase, current consumption per person is unsustainable because it depletes capital per person.     

Demographic transition in sub-Saharan Africa: How big will the economic dividend be?

In mid-demographic-transition, many Asian countries enjoyed a large demographic ‘dividend’: extra economic growth owing to falling dependant/workforce ratios, or slower natural increase, or both. We estimate the dividend, 1985–2025, in sub-Saharan Africa and its populous countries. Dependency and natural increase peaked around 1985, 20 years after Asia. The UN projects an acceleration of the subsequent slow falls but disregards slowish declines in young-age mortality and thus, we argue, overestimates future fertility decline. Even if one accepts their projection, arithmetical and econometric evidence suggests an annual, if not total, dividend well below Asia's. The dividend arises more from falling dependency than reduced natural increase, and could be increased by accelerating the fertility decline (e.g., by reducing young-age mortality) or by employing a larger workforce productively. Any dividend from transition apart, low saving in much of Africa (unlike Asia) means that, given likely natural increase, current consumption per person is unsustainable because it depletes capital per person.     

Old Habits Die Hard? Lingering Son Preference in an Era of Normalizing Sex Ratios at Birth in South Korea

South Korea was among the first countries to report both an abnormally high sex ratio at birth (SRB) and its subsequent normalization. We examine the role of son preference in driving fertility intentions during a period of declining SRB and consider the contribution of individual characteristics and broader social context to explaining changes in intentions. We employ data from the National Survey on Fertility, Family Health and Welfare that span 1991–2012. We find that reported son preference declined to a great extent but remained substantial by the end of the observation period, and that the intention to have a third child still differed by sex of existing children. Change in individual-level factors does not explain the decline in son preference, suggesting that broad social changes were also important. This study provides a better understanding of how son preference evolves in the post-transitional context of very low fertility.     

A global perspective on happiness and fertility

The literature on fertility and happiness has neglected comparative analysis. We investigate the fertility/happiness association using data from the world values surveys for 86 countries. We find that, globally, happiness decreases with the number of children. This association, however, is strongly modified by individual and contextual factors. Most importantly, we find that the association between happiness and fertility evolves from negative to neutral to positive above age 40, and is strongest among those who are likely to benefit most from upward intergenerational transfers. In addition, analyses by welfare regime show that the negative fertility/ happiness association for younger adults is weakest in countries with high public support for families, and the positive association above age 40 is strongest in countries where old-age support depends mostly on the family. Overall these results suggest that children are a long-term investment in well-being, and highlight the importance of the life-cycle stage and contextual factors in explaining the happiness/fertility association.     

The intergenerational transmission of fertility in contemporary Denmark: The effects of number of siblings (full and half), birth order,and whether male or female

Using the Danish Fertility Database, we investigate intergenerational fertility transmission, including the relationship between the number of children born to those aged 25 and 26 years in 1994 and the number of their full sibs and half-sibs. We find that the fertility behaviour of parents and their children is positively correlated, and that half-sibs and full sibs have broadly similar effects. We do not find, in this complete national population, the strong birth order effects reported in some earlier studies. Nor do we find evidence of a weakening of intergenerational fertility transmission over time, perhaps because the greater flexibility of lifestyles in this post-transitional phase provides the extended social space within which intergenerational continuities can manifest themselves. We show that members of large families are over-represented in subsequent generations - that they have far more kin than those from smaller families - and that intergenerational continuities in fertility behaviour play a substantial role in keeping fertility higher than it would be in the absence of such transmission.     

The intergenerational transmission of fertility in contemporary Denmark: the effects of number of siblings (full and half), birth order,and whether male or female

Using the Danish Fertility Database, we investigate intergenerational fertility transmission, including the relationship between the number of children born to those aged 25 and 26 years in 1994 and the number of their full sibs and half-sibs. We find that the fertility behaviour of parents and their children is positively correlated, and that half-sibs and full sibs have broadly similar effects. We do not find, in this complete national population, the strong birth order effects reported in some earlier studies. Nor do we find evidence of a weakening of intergenerational fertility transmission over time, perhaps because the greater flexibility of lifestyles in this post-transitional phase provides the extended social space within which intergenerational continuities can manifest themselves. We show that members of large families are over-represented in subsequent generations - that they have far more kin than those from smaller families - and that intergenerational continuities in fertility behaviour play a substantial role in keeping fertility higher than it would be in the absence of such transmission.     

Explaining Asia's “Missing Women”: A New Look at the Data

The fact that millions of females are “missing” in East Asia and South Asia has been attributed to cultural factors that support strong son preference in these countries. A widely disseminated paper by Emily Oster argues that a large part of this phenomenon can be attributed to excessively masculine sex ratios at birth resulting from maternal infection with hepatitis B. If her thesis is true, current policies to address this problem would need to be reframed to include biological factors in addition to cultural factors. The data show, however, that whether or not females “go missing” is determined by the existing sex composition of the family into which they are conceived. Girls with no older sisters have similar chances of survival as boys. However, girls conceived in families that already have a daughter experience steeply higher probabilities of being aborted or of dying in early childhood. This indicates that cultural factors still provide the overwhelming explanation for the “missing” females.     

Demographic transitions: analyzing the effects of mortality on fertility

The effect of mortality reductions on fertility is one of the main mechanisms stressed by the recent growth literature in order to explain demographic transitions. We analyze the empirical relevance of this mechanism based on the experience of developed and developing countries since 1960. We distinguish between the effects on gross and net fertility, take into account the dynamic nature of the relationship, and control for alternative explanatory factors and for endogeneity. Our results show that mortality plays a large role in fertility reductions, that the change in fertility behavior comes with a lag of about 10 years and that both net and gross fertility are affected. We find comparatively little support for explanations of the demographic transition based on changes in GDP per capita.     

Gender preference and birth spacing in matlab,Bangladesh

Gender preference, particularly son preference, is believed to sustain high fertility in many Asian countries, but previous research shows unclear effects. We examine and compare gender-preference effects on fertility in two otherwise comparable populations in Bangladesh that differ markedly in their access to and use of contraception. We expect, and find, stronger effects of gender preference in the population that has more access to contraception and higher levels of contraceptive use. Thus gender preference may emerge as a significant barrier to further national family planning efforts in Bangladesh. We find that if a woman has at least one daughter, the risk of a subsequent birth is related negatively to the number of sons. Women with no daughters also experience a higher risk of having a subsequent birth; this finding suggests that there is also some preference for daughters. Son preference is strong in both the early and later stages of family formation, but women also want to have at least one daughter after having several sons.     

World population in transition

The world's population growth rate peaked at slightly over 2%/year in the late 1960s and in 1986 is down to 1.7% and falling. Annual numbers added continue to rise because these rates apply to a very large base, 4.9 billion in 1986. According to UN medium variant projections, world population growth will peak at 89 million/year in the late 1990s and then taper off until world population stabilizes in the late decade of the 21st century at about 10.2 billion. Close to 95% of this growth is occurring in less developed countries (LDCs) of Africa, Asia (minus Japan), and Latin America. LDC fertility rates are declining, except in sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Latin America and South Asia, but most have far to go to reach the replacement level of 2.1 births/woman. Fertility is below replacement in virtually all more developed countries. For LDCs, large numbers will be added before stabilization even after attainment of replacement level fertility because of the demographic momentum built into their large and young population bases. This complicates efforts to bridge gaps between living standards in LDCs and industrialized countries. From a new debate about whether rapid population growth deters or stimulates economic growth, a more integrated view has emerged. This view recognizes the complementary relationship between efforts to slow population growth and other development efforts; e.g., to improve health and education, upgrade women's status, increase productivity. Most effective in the increased contraceptive prevalence and fertility declines seen in many LDCs has been the combination of organized programs to increase access to family planning information and supplies with socioeconomic development that enhances the desire for smaller families.     

The End of “Lowest‐Low” Fertility?

Total fertility rates fell to previously unseen levels in a large number of countries beginning in the early 1990s. The persistence of TFRs below 1.3 raised the possibility of rapid population aging and decline. We discuss the recent widespread turnaround in so‐called lowest‐low‐fertility countries in Europe and East Asia. The number of countries with TFRs below 1.3 fell from 21 in 2003 to five in 2008. Moreover, the upturn in the TFR was not confined to lowest‐fertility countries, but affected the whole developed world. We explore the demographic explanations for the recent rise in TFRs stemming from fertility timing effects as well as economic, policy, and social factors. Although the current economic downturn may suppress TFRs in the short run, we conclude that formerly lowest‐low‐fertility countries will continue to see increases in fertility as the transitory effects of shifts to later childbearing become less important.