自由现金流量、银行债务契约与盈余管理

本文基于自由现金流量假说与债务控制假说,研究我国自由现金流量引发的盈余管理问题,并从银行监管视角出发,实证研究不同债务期限结构对盈余管理的影响,研究结果发现,低成长机会的公司,自由现金流量将引发经理人操控操纵性应计利润的行为,长期负债与短期负债对自由现金流量引发的盈余管理影响方向不同。进一步研究发现,银行债务契约对国有上市公司与非国有上市公司的影响方向不同,这说明国有上市公司在政府保护下,存在债务软约束的问题。     

企业数字化转型与审计师决策

数字技术的运用和商业模式的变革,对会计和审计工作产生了深远的影响。已有研究检验了企业“互联网+”以及大数据、区块链的运用与审计收费的关系,但从审计意见和审计收费双重视角,探讨数字化这一集合多种数字技术的业务模式如何影响审计决策的研究仍较为匮乏。基于审计风险和审计定价理论,以2012年至2019年A股上市企业为研究样本,通过上市企业年报文本分析构建企业数字化转型指标,采用Logit模型、OLS多元线性回归,研究企业数字化转型与审计意见和审计收费的关系,探究内在的影响机制,并使用数字资产、数字创新指标与数字化文本指标进行交叉验证,证明数字化文本指标具有有效性。在排除策略性信息披露影响、使用不同年份和行业样本、不同的数字化转型定义以及使用倾向得分匹配法平衡样本特征后,研究结果仍具有稳健性。研究结果表明,审计师将企业数字化纳入审计定价决策和风险决策中,企业数字化转型程度越高,审计师越有可能减少出具非标准审计意见并提高审计收费。经营风险和审计师努力是导致审计意见和审计收费调整的重要渠道,数字化转型降低了企业的经营风险,从而减少了审计师出具非标准审计意见的概率;数字化转型中审计业务难度增加,导致审...     

自由现金流与在职消费——基于所有制和公司治理的实证研究

自由现金流量是企业高管可以自由支配的现金流量。自由现金流量越多,企业高管越有可能出现损害所有者利益的行为,过度在职消费,从而最终导致企业绩效下降。本文选取2006-2010年沪市上市A股企业数据为样本,实证检验我国上市公司自由现金流和在职消费程度的关系,并进一步考察不同的所有制性质和公司治理水平对自由现金流和在职消费之间关系的影响。为完善公司治理结构、合理约束代理人行为提供政策建议。     

上市公司审计收费影响因素的实证分析

本文对我国上市公司2002年年报中所披露的有关审计收费因素数据进行多元线性回归分析,发现上市公司的资产总额、纳入合并范围的子公司数、聘任会计师事务所年限和地区差异是影响我国上市公司审计收费的主要因素,而存货占资产总额的比重、应收账款占资产总额的比重、资产负债率和审计意见类型对审计收费不存在显著的影响。     

审计费用与审计质量关系的实证研究——基于上证180指数成分股数据的分析

本文以上证180指数成分股为样本,利用操纵性应计利润的绝对值作为审计质量的衡量指标,参考Ash—baugh et al．（2003）模型对样本公司2005-2007年间的相关数据进行统计分析,实证检验了审计费用与审计质量之间的关系。研究发现,审计费用总额和操纵性应计利润的绝对值之间存在负相关关系,即被审计公司支付的审计费用越多,审计质量越高。而且,经营活动所产生的现金流量净额对审计质量有显著的正效应。     

审计师变更与审计收费——两种理论的检验

关于审计师变更是否会导致审计收费折扣存在交易成本和信息披露两种理论.通过收集中国自2001年年报公布审计收费数据以来的所有审计师变更数据,研究了审计师变更与审计收费的关系,以验证两种理论在中国的适用性.研究发现,审计师变更时存在明显的审计收费折扣现象,其折扣幅度为5.5%,进一步研究显示只有2001年的监管性变更存在显著的审计收费折扣现象,而自愿性变更不存在这一现象,上述结果更多地支持了信息披露理论,即审计收费信息公开披露后不存在明显的审计收费折扣现象,这说明在中国审计市场上并不存在明显的低价揽客行为.     

会计师事务所审计收费影响因素的实证研究

通过对我国上市公司 2002 年年报中所披露的审计费用数据进行多元线性回归分析,发现上市公司的资产总额、纳入合并范围的子公司数、聘任会计师事务所年限和地区差异是影响我国会计师事务所对上市公司年报审计业务收费的主要因素,而存货占资产总额的比重、应收账款占资产总额的比重、资产负债率和审计意见类型对审计收费不存在显著的影响.     

我国上市公司债务期限结构影响因素的实证研究

本文采用非金融上市公司面板数据,应用混合回归、横截面回归对债务期限结构的影响因素进行了经验检查,研究对清算假说和期限匹配假说提供了支持,对代理成本假说提供了一定的支持,而对信号传递假说和税收假说没有提供支持。     

自由现金流代理成本假说还是过度自信假说?——中国上市公司投资——现金流敏感性的实证研究

企业投资现金流敏感性问题可以由现金流代理假说解释,也可以由管理者过度自信假说解释,本文以企业的成长性、现金流特征为划分指标对企业进行分组,并以此来区分与检验两种理论假说。研究结果显示,自由现金流代理问题较为严重的低成长—高现金流企业,将会发生企业过度投资。同样,过度自信问题较为严重的高成长—高现金流企业,也将发生企业过度投资。实证研究结果即支持了自由现金流代理假说,也支持了过度自信假说。     

基于自由现金流量的证券投资组合分析

通过比较中美两国在处理和计算自由现金流量方面的不同,提出自由现金流量的计算方法,并论述了在我国会计准则下如何通过会计调整计算自由现金流量。在获得公司自由现金流量的基础上,通过引入自由现金流量乘数和自由现金流量负债比,结合经营现金流量、市盈率和低财务杠杆指标,构造了基于自由现金流量的证券投资组合,对我国证券市场做出实证分析。同时,对比其他投资策略的实际效果,证明基于自由现金流量的投资策略所具有的优越性。     

Quasirentenmodell und Honorare für Abschlussprüfungen in Deutschland – eine empirische Analyse

The model by DeAngelo LE (1981a) Auditor independence, ’Low Balling’, and disclosure regulation. J Acc Econ 3:113–127 suggests, that audit fees do not cover audit costs with the client´s first audit when there is perfect competition in the audit market (low balling). Further, audit fees are supposed to increase with the maturity of the relationship with the client (fee cutting). In order to test the DeAngelo model we perform a multiple regression analysis for the German market of listed clients. The results are: First year audit fees do not significantly differ from audit fees in later periods. Audit fees increase with the maturity of the relationship with the client. Additionally, audit fees are positively associated with non-audit fees and (weakly) with Big4-auditors. These findings partly support the propositions of the DeAngelo models.     

Einflussfaktoren der Pr��fungshonorare �C Anmerkungen zu den Beitr?gen ?Quasirentenmodell und Honorare f��r Abschlusspr��fungen in Deutschland �C eine empirische Analyse�� und ?Pr��fungshonorare in Deutschland �C Determinanten und Implikationen��

Bigus and Zimmermann and Köhler et al. investigate various determinants of audit fees of companies that are listed on German stock exchanges using multiple linear regression analysis. While Bigus and Zimmermann identify not significant higher audit fees for initial audit engagements than for continuing audit engagements, Köhler et al. detect significant lower audit fees for initial audit engagements than for continuing audit engagements. Although the authors of both studies only investigate the fees for the audit of the German entities of the respective groups of companies, they use determinants from the prior audit fee literature that relate to the audit of the worldwide entities that are included in the groups of companies. In addition to this mismatch of the geographic scope of the variables, the authors use determinants whose influence on audit fees is not explained by theories, that have been rarely used in prior studies, or that have previously been associated with inconsistent results, and that should have been critically questioned. Given the weaknesses of the methodologies used in both studies, the gain in knowledge from their results is questionable.     

Prüfungshonorare in Deutschland – Determinanten und Implikationen

The audit fees available since 2005 as a consequence of the Bilanzrechtsreformgesetz (commercial code reform act) show an extremely high supplier concentration on the German audit market of publicly listed companies. This justifies the assumption of audit fees above perfect market equilibrium prices. However, the complete collection and multivariate regression analysis of all relevant audit fee and client data document a 24 % decrease in audit fees in 2005 and an average 15 % decrease in the two subsequent years due to auditor changes. This can be interpreted as an indicator for price competition. In addition, the audit fee data shows that the audit fee decreases are only partially compensated by subsequent increases. As a consequence, there is no evidence for lowballing at present. Further time series are necessary to show if the current trend is sustainable.     

Does municipal ownership affect audit fees?

This study analyses whether municipal ownership affects and determines audit fees. Our model of the determinants of audit fees was tested on data from 249 Swedish municipal and 240 private corporations within the real estate industry, thus extending the study of audit fees to hybrid organizations. The statistical analysis was followed up with interviews of five partners from five different audit firms. The result of the study shows that municipal corporations are paying significantly lower audit fees than equivalent private corporations. This finding is primarily explained by lower perceived business risk and by the fact that municipalities are able to push prices by coordinating procurements of audit services.

     

Related party transactions and audit fees: the role of the internal audit function

Related party transactions (RPTs) are viewed as genuine transactions that rationally fulfil other economic demands of a company. However, RPTs can also be used to transfer wealth from minority shareholders to controlling shareholders. The existence of such transactions may deteriorate financial reporting quality, increase audit risk, and as a result increase audit fees. This study examines the relationship between RPTs and audit fees in Malaysia, where ownership is often concentrated within a controlling family and corporate governance mechanisms are poor. It also investigates the moderating effect of the internal audit function (IAF) on this relationship. We find that external auditors base their fees on the types of RPTs undertaken. Specifically, our results show that audit fees are higher for firms that undertake RPTs involving the sale and purchase of assets, goods, and services. We also document that external auditors rely on the IAF, and thus their fees are lower for firms that undertake RPTs and that have made a large investment in an IAF. Our study is the first to provide evidence that RPTs in Malaysian firms may be abused as a channel to facilitate tunnelling and that the IAF plays a vital role in controlling such transactions.     

从委托理财收益率看上市公司委托代理问题

本文将委托理财收益率作为研究对象,考察了上市公司的委托代理问题.通过研究发现,"可操控现金"与委托理财收益率显著负相关;若给定"可操控现金",大股东持股比例越高的公司其委托理财收益率越高.这一结果说明,"可操控现金"越多,上市公司的委托代理问题越严重;大股东的持股比例越高,其对管理层代理问题的约束力越强.研究还发现国外同类研究常用的"自由现金流"变量不能捕捉这一现象.     

External audit and goodwill write-off

Building on agency theory, we investigate whether and how salient external auditor characteristics (size, audit fees, non-audit fees, tenure) impact on the reported goodwill write-off. We use a sample of US firms applying SFAS 142. We find that Big-4 auditors are more prone to limit underestimated write-offs rather than overestimated write-offs and that auditors require higher fees from companies underestimating the write-offs. The findings are consistent with the auditors’ preference for more conservative goodwill and earnings values, which reduce their litigation and reputation costs. This preference can converge with the managerial interest to use unnecessary overestimated goodwill write-offs for earnings management purposes (e.g. to smooth the income or take big baths). Our findings do not support the hypotheses that non-audit fees and tenure affect the goodwill write-off. Our paper contributes to prior literature on external audit and financial accounting choices. Our study suggests that leniently audited discretional fair value estimates are likely to compromise the role of auditing (and of financial reporting) as an external control mechanism. Our study can contribute to the current policy debate around goodwill accounting.     

重大资产收购关联交易中的大股东“掏空”行为研究

采用实证分析的方法,以上市公司和大股东之间的重大资产收购关联交易为研究点,通过事件研究法,对关联交易公告日前后的市场反应进行检验,从而证实大股东确实存在通过关联交易"掏空"上市公司的行为,进而损害了投资者的利益.通过实证检验发现,当上市公司大股东以较复杂的持股方式控制上市公司时,此时其控制权和现金流权的分离度大,"掏空"上市公司、侵害投资者利益的动机大大增强.同时,对上市公司最终控制人类型作了详细的划分,并在模型中分别加以回归,得出相应的结论.最后,针对以上检验发现的问题,给出了有关对策建议.     

The effect of outside directors’ and auditors’ incentives on managers’ ability to manage cash bonuses

This paper investigates the impact of outside directors’ and auditors’ monetary incentives on the association between discretionary accounting and managers’ cash bonuses in a two-tier system. For a sample of German stock corporations from 2005 to 2007 we expect and find that outside directors who receive compensation based on accounting income and auditors who receive high non-audit fees have the incentive to tolerate managers’ bonus-increasing accounting choices. More specifically, we show that positive discretionary accruals are more strongly associated with managers’ cash bonuses than negative discretionary accruals if outside directors receive accounting-based compensation and/or if auditors receive high non-audit fees. Our results suggest that executives’ ability to manage their cash bonuses depends on the monitoring institutions’ monetary incentives.