信任的经济理性分析

本文对信任的经济理性进行了分析,先后探讨了信任的物质基础、委托人参与委托事项对信任关系的影响以及信任的成本效益等内容.研究发现,信任是激励的结果,对方是否值得信任,关键在于信任方是否愿意付出足够的代价来让他成为这样的人.信任方对委托事项的参与程度会影响到信任关系的建立.建立信任关系是需要一定的经济成本的,但是,当客观地建立起信任之后,信任方将从中获得明显的收益.可以通过理性行为建立起广泛有效的信任关系.     

Identifying Higher‐Order Rationality

Strategic choice data from a carefully chosen set of ring‐network games are used to obtain individual‐level estimates of higher‐order rationality. The experimental design exploits a natural exclusion restriction that is considerably weaker than the assumptions underlying alternative designs in the literature. In our data set, 93 percent of subjects are rational, 71 percent are rational and believe others are rational, 44 percent are rational and hold second‐order beliefs that others are rational, and 22 percent are rational and hold at least third‐order beliefs that others are rational.     

基于非对称理性的ITIO动态演化分析

本文根据一对多配送系统ITIO问题的特点,构建了配送中心和零售商双方理性不对称条件下的退化收益矩阵,得出复制动态方程,求出复制动态演化稳定策略(ESS),并分析了各参数对ESS的影响.研究结果表明,有限理性的零售商最终会演化成采用联合优化策略还是不采用联合优化策略,取决于完全理性的配送中心是否选择联合以及零售商分到的联合优化利润份额大小.当零售商分到的联合优化利润份额大于其单独优化利润占联合优化总利润的比例时,所有零售商最终都会采取联合优化策略;当零售商分到的联合优化利润份额小于其单独优化利润占联合优化总利润的比例时,所有零售商最终都会采取不联合优化策略.这意味着不完全信息条件下有限理性零售商的ESS与完全信息条件下完全理性的零售商选择是一致的.通过对运输库存各参数对ITIO双方演化稳定策略的影响可以知道,单独优化时候的库存安全因子、零售商与配送中心的距离、运输启动成本越大,零售商最终越倾向采取联合优化策略.     

Reputational Bargaining With Minimal Knowledge of Rationality

Two players announce bargaining postures to which they may become committed and then bargain over the division of a surplus. The share of the surplus that a player can guarantee herself under first‐order knowledge of rationality is determined (as a function of her probability of becoming committed), as is the bargaining posture that she must announce in order to guarantee herself this much. This “maxmin” share of the surplus is large relative to the probability of becoming committed (e.g., it equals 30% if the commitment probability is 1 in 10 and equals 13% if the commitment probability is 1 in 1000), and the corresponding bargaining posture simply demands this share plus compensation for any delay in reaching agreement.     

基于有限理性假设的秘书问题研究

已有解决秘书问题的方法主要是以取样选项中的最大值作为标杆,其优点是能保证赢的概率最大,但很少考虑决策者的有限理性与启发式偏见.探索性地提出截止阀法则的均值标杆与次大值标杆策略的设想,通过计算机仿真实验与理论求解验证与比较了该策略的特征与规律.结果发现,均值标杆的决策最优度明显优于最大值标杆,决策最优度随标杆变动呈U型曲线变化趋势,最高点是均值标杆20%及其附近,赢的概率随着标杆的降低而逐渐减少,且最优截止阀值也不断后移.     

Objective and Subjective Rationality in a Multiple Prior Model

A decision maker (DM) is characterized by two binary relations. The first reflects choices that are rational in an “objective” sense: the DM can convince others that she is right in making them. The second relation models choices that are rational in a “subjective” sense: the DM cannot be convinced that she is wrong in making them. In the context of decision under uncertainty, we propose axioms that the two notions of rationality might satisfy. These axioms allow a joint representation by a single set of prior probabilities and a single utility index. It is “objectively rational” to choose f in the presence of g if and only if the expected utility of f is at least as high as that of g given each and every prior in the set. It is “subjectively rational” to choose f rather than g if and only if the minimal expected utility of f (with respect to all priors in the set) is at least as high as that of g. In other words, the objective and subjective rationality relations admit, respectively, a representation à la Bewley (2002) and à la Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Our results thus provide a bridge between these two classic models, as well as a novel foundation for the latter.     

Rationality in policy making: Two concepts not one

The concept of rationality, central to any analysis of policy making, is shown to be dual. The qualitative concept of rationality, broadly equivalent to ‘appropriate’ directs the policy analyst to an examination of information flow (since it may be defective), of goals (since these may conflict), and of the momentum of decisions (since it can produce irrationality). The quantitative concept of rationality, broadly equivalent to ‘efficient’ is itself divisible into two models (‘ends–means’ and ‘alternative behaviour’). Either, however, directs the policy analyst to an exploration of alternatives (since ideally all should be known) and of evaluative techniques (since ideally these should indicate the best alternative). Quantitative, but not qualitative, rationality is frontally challenged by some theorists (notably Lindblom) and claimed to be insufficient by others (notably Dror).     

有限理性下序贯价格竞争的动态演化

本文建立了两个企业的序贯价格竞争模型,基于有限理性预期调整,研究了企业博弈的动态演化特征,分析了模型的均衡解及其稳定性条件。研究发现,边界解和纳什均衡解是一定参数条件下的局部稳定均衡。基于有限理性的动态博弈能够实现基于完全信息的纳什均衡。单纯跟随策略是一定条件下的均衡策略,并能使跟随企业获得更高的销售价格。企业之间报价的相互跟随程度和企业预期的调整速度将会影响均衡点的稳定性。本文对模型进行了数值模拟分析,当参数不满足稳定性条件时会出现分岔、奇异吸引子等混沌现象。本文的主要研究结果对相关行业的企业竞争和稳定市场有启发意义。     

裁员决策的经济理性分析

本文从员工行为取向角度对裁员决策的经济理性进行了分析.裁员决策的依据是员工能否忠实地履行自己的职责.裁员是一把双刃剑,虽然裁的是员工,最受伤的往往却是企业.无论企业的经营状况如何,裁员都应该是一种最后的、不得已的选择.本文探讨了裁员的经济因果,分析了裁员决策中的薪酬策略和目标策略等补救措施,指出了应该如何把握裁员的时机,理性地选择裁员对象.     

Risk and Rationality: Uncovering Heterogeneity in Probability Distortion

It has long been recognized that there is considerable heterogeneity in individual risk taking behavior, but little is known about the distribution of risk taking types. We present a parsimonious characterization of risk taking behavior by estimating a finite mixture model for three different experimental data sets, two Swiss and one Chinese, over a large number of real gains and losses. We find two major types of individuals: In all three data sets, the choices of roughly 80% of the subjects exhibit significant deviations from linear probability weighting of varying strength, consistent with prospect theory. Twenty percent of the subjects weight probabilities near linearly and behave essentially as expected value maximizers. Moreover, individuals are cleanly assigned to one type with probabilities close to unity. The reliability and robustness of our classification suggest using a mix of preference theories in applied economic modeling.     

寡占市场中有限理性博弈模型分析

基于有限理性的假设,通过构建模型,对一个不同理性、不同结构成本函数的双寡头博弈进行分析.讨论了Nash均衡点的存在性和稳定性,数值模拟出分支、混沌和奇异吸引子等复杂的动力学现象并计算出最大Lya-punov指数.指出寡头的理性会对博弈结果产生较大影响,对企业在混沌市场中的产量决策提供了理论依据.     

有限理性、异质信念与商品期货价格波动

本文构建了一个基于交易者异质信念的商品期货市场仿真模型,在控制外部信息对市场影响的前提下,研究交易者异质信念的演化对市场价格产生的影响.采用Brenner的随机信念学习模型能够刻画个体交易者的学习、模仿行为,改以往所采用的遗传算法等借鉴生物进化论思想的模型无法将宏观价格动态与个体行为相联系的不足.检验结果表明,仿真产生的期货价格时间序列具有高峰厚尾分布、波动聚集、长记忆性,与真实期货价格的统计特征一致的典型特征,验证了模型的有效性.结果表明,外部信息不是形成收益序列典型特征的原因,个体交易者通过学习发生的信念转换和交易者之间的相互影响是造成价格收益序列典型特征的根本原因.     

基于Mealy自动机的多人重复博弈演化模型及仿真分析

本文提出一种基于Mealy自动机的多人重复博弈演化模型。该模型用Mealy自动机表示博弈参与人的战略行为,并构造一个基于遗传算法的自动机演化程序。博弈初始时,博弈参与人提交一个Mealy自动机。博弈参与人的有限自动机在当前状态下与竞争对手的自动机进行博弈,并且依据其获取的支付转换到下一状态,然后在新的状态下开始新一周期的博弈。在进行一段时间博弈后,则利用自动机演化程序对自动机进行演化,演化的标准是依据其在这一段时间博弈中的获得的平均支付及战略成本。通过仿真可以验证,在参与人理性程度较低且存在信息干扰的情况下,博弈参与人为了降低在博弈过程中的信息失真率,战略成本需要以较大的幅度下降。     

Supply Chain Contract Design: Impact of Bounded Rationality and Individual Heterogeneity

In this article, we model various forms of non‐optimizing behavior in a newsvendor setting, including biases such as recency, reinforcement, demand chasing, and anchoring, as well as unsystematic decision errors. We assume that a newsvendor may evaluate decisions by examining both past outcomes and future expected payoffs. Our model is motivated by laboratory observations under several types of supply chain contracts. Ordering decisions are found to follow multi‐modal distributions that are dependent on contract structures and incentives. We differ from previous research by using statistics to determine which behavioral factors are applicable to each decision maker. A great deal of heterogeneity was discovered, indicating the importance of calibrating a contract to the individual. Our analysis also shows that the profit performance and the effectiveness of co‐ordinating contracts can be affected by non‐optimizing behaviors significantly. We conclude that, in addition to the aggregate order quantities, the decision distributions should be considered in designing contracts.     

Tight Revenue Bounds With Possibilistic Beliefs and Level‐k Rationality

Mechanism design enables a social planner to obtain a desired outcome by leveraging the players' rationality and their beliefs. It is thus a fundamental, but yet unproven, intuition that the higher the level of rationality of the players, the better the set of obtainable outcomes. In this paper, we prove this fundamental intuition for players with possibilistic beliefs, a model long considered in epistemic game theory. Specifically, • We define a sequence of monotonically increasing revenue benchmarks for single‐good auctions, G⁰≤G¹≤G²≤⋯, where each Gⁱ is defined over the players' beliefs and G⁰ is the second‐highest valuation (i.e., the revenue benchmark achieved by the second‐price mechanism). • We (1) construct a single, interim individually rational, auction mechanism that, without any clue about the rationality level of the players, guarantees revenue G^k if all players have rationality levels ≥k+1, and (2) prove that no such mechanism can guarantee revenue even close to G^k when at least two players are at most level‐k rational.     

战略决策过程中决策、决策团队与程序理性的实证研究

战略决策制定是企业高管团队的主要职责之一。本文基于管理决策、高管团队与组织行为学的相关理论,对企业战略决策过程的影响因素和影响机制进行探讨,深入分析了决策团队对战略决策过程中程序理性行为的影响,提出假设并进行了实证检验。研究发现,战略决策团队的工作经验、进取精神和沟通正向影响程序理性;战略决策的重大程度正向影响程序理性。同时发现,控制变量企业的业务多元化程度负向影响程序理性。     

The Relationship between Procedural Rationality and Political Behavior in Strategic Decision Making

Despite the central place of rationality and political behavior in the decision-making literature, we know little about the relationship between these two dimensions. Can decisions be made using both rational and political methods, or must managers use one approach or the other? These questions were addressed in a study of 61 strategic decisions in 24 companies using a multiple-informant, structured interview protocol. Results indicate that procedural rationality and political behavior are independent dimensions of the strategic decision-making process. The implications of our findings for future strategic decision-making research are discussed.     

Institutional Theory: Employing the Other Side of Rationality in Non-profit Organizations1

The non-profit sector has become increasingly important in diverse economic, political and social environments. It is not clear that we have effectively communicated, to colleagues, students and decision makers, theoretical developments useful for understanding and managing non-profit organizations. This paper discusses the potential implications of institutional theory to the management of one type of non-profit organization, the publicly supported non-profit organization with input-output relationships that are not well understood. We review institutional theory and discuss the implications of institutional theory to the management and evaluation of publicly supported non-profit organizations.     

Towards Design Theory and Expandable Rationality: The Unfinished Program of Herbert Simon

Journal of Management and Governance -