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1.
Since 1949 and in particular the 1970s, China's fertility rate has undergone rapid and continuous change. This is a direct reflection of China's success in population control. The decline in China's fertility rate regulated the speed of population growth, altered the population structure, and brought population development to be in line with economic development. Data used in this article are from the National 1/1000 Random Sample of Fertility (1982), the 10% Sample of the 1982 Population Census, 1981, 1983 and 1984 statistical yearbooks, and other data from the Statistics Bureau. China's fertility rate dropped an annual average of 2.5/1000 from 1950-81. However, this time, the fertility rate fluctuated, depending on political, social and economic factors. As the nation prospered, the fertility rate remained stable and high; as China suffered severe economic losses, the fertility rate dropped. A steady decline was evident beginning in 1970 as the government began to propagandize the merits of smaller families. Between 1971-83 the average yearly rate of growth was 1.6%. The number of years a woman was fertile was similar for both urban and rural women in 1964 and 1981; moreover, in 1981 both groups showed a sharp drop in fertility between the ages of 27-35. The 1 child rate for urban women rose from 21.9% in 1964 to 86.6% in 1981. Urban women tend to be more receptive to late marriage, late births, and fewer children. This change in the 1 child rate contributed to the drop in the birth rate of 31.1/1000 in 1964 to 20.9/1000 in 1981.  相似文献   

2.
D Wang  D Xue  M Qian 《人口研究》1984,(1):49-50
A 15% random sampling from Rudong County was recently taken to survey fertility rates. 1153 primary units were chosen, which included 160,832 people. Among this group were 57,050 women aged 15-67 years. Topics surveyed included: marriage, birth, contraception, and population structure. Rudong County, among the earliest counties in China to begin the work of birth control, started in the 1960s with birth control education. The natural rate of population increase by the early 1970s had already fallen. From 1974 to 1982 the average rate of natural population growth was 3.8/1000. Reproduction has gone from a rising trend to a stabilized trend. The base of the population structure pyramid has shrunk; the number of youths aged from birth to 14 years has fallen from 35.05% in 1964 to 21.77% in 1982. The number of people who must be supported (the old and the young) has decreased, lessening society's responsibility for them. 29.45% of the total population are over 65 years or under 14. Society's coefficient factor of support has fallen from 66.31% in 1964 to 41.75%. There is a decrease in the number of people marrying at a young age; the trend is toward marriage at a later age. The average age at marriage had risen from 23.81 years in 1980 to 23.89 years in 1981. The fertility rate has decreased, as has the number of offspring per woman. 1 child family is on the rise and multiple children family is on the decline. In 1981 the 1 child rate reached 92.98%, the 2 children rate was 6.63% and the multiple children rate was 0.49%. Prior to 1979 the 1 child rate was under 10%. The fertility rate fell from 136/1000 in the 1960s to 41.5/1000 in 1981.  相似文献   

3.
The State Family Planning Commission in China surveyed 2,151,212 people, including 459,269 married women aged 15-57 on fertility and birth control, in July, 1988 from 30 provinces and other regions. From 1980- 87 the average total fertility rate was 2.47 vs. 4.01 in the 1970s. Fertility rates in the 80s were 1.33 for cities, 2.43 for towns, and 2.84 for villages. 1st parity births rose from 44.15% to 52.55% from Jan. to July of 1988 and 2nd parity births were about 30%. Women aged 50-57 had an average of 5.27 children while women aged 45-59 had an average of 4.44 children. 71.21% of childbearing-age women use contraception: 10.99% use male sterilization, 38.24% use female sterilization, 41.48% use IUDs, 4.91% oral pills, 2.65% condoms, 0.42% external contraceptives, and 1.32% use other methods. 13.79% of the married, childbearing-age couples have one-child certificates. The population of China as of April 1989 was 1.1 billion. In 1988 the birth rate was 20.78/1000 and the death rate was 6.58/1000.  相似文献   

4.
The total population of the ESCAP region reached 2.4 billion in 1979, up from 2 billion in 1970. 6 of the 10 largest countries are in the region: China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. East Asia contains 1.1 billion; Middle South Asia contains 923 million; Eastern South Asia, 354 million; and Oceania, 22 million. The crude birth rate for the total region dropped by 5 points from 1970-9; the crude death rate dropped by 2 points, resulting in a decline in the annual growth rate of .3 percentage points, from 2.1% in 1970 to 1.8% in 1979. Overall, the total fertility rate decreased by 15% from 4.8 to 4.1. The total fertility rate in Australia fell 33% from 2.8 to 1.9 and in New Zealand from 3.0 to 1.9, or 37%. Generally fertility is lower in urban areas than in rural with some exceptions. A strong negative relationship between level of education and fertility exists in all countries of Asia and the Pacific, however, the parity of women with some primary education exceeds that of women with no schooling. Life expectancy at birth for both sexes in the region increased from 55.1 years in 1970 to 58.7 years in 1979, or by 7%. The highest life expectancy is in Japan at 75.2 years. The infant mortality rate in the ESCAP region in 1979 was estimated to be 78/1000. World Fertility Survey data indicate that the mean age of first marriage is generally very low but gradually increasing.  相似文献   

5.
R Zha  Y Ji 《人口研究》1984,(6):11-20
The 1982 census provided detailed information on fertility in China. It recorded 20,689,704 births in 1981, producing a birth rate of 2.1%, a decrease, respectively, of 43% and more than 50% in comparison with 1952 and 1963. The birth rate has varied widely over the last 30 years, from 3.6% in the early 1950's, to 1.8% in 1961, after a planned birth program was begun, to a record high of 3.7% in 1962 following the economic recovery, to 3.3% in 1970, after a gradual decline through the 1960's. By 1981 the birth rate had declined to 2.1%, clearly resulting from the intense planned fertility promotion begun in the early 1970's. In the mid- and late 50's, urban birth rate was consistently higher than rural, with the mass move to the cities at the beginning of the People's Republic. General economic development after 1957 brought simultaneous declines of both urban and rural rates, both reaching a low point in 1961. Age structure of the population also has an influence, depending on the proportion of childbearing women in the population. In 1981, the fertility of China's childbearing women was 8.3%, lower than that of the developing countries, but higher than the developed countries. By age group, the fertility rates reached 14.7% and 23.9% respectively in women between 20-24 and 25-29 years of age; the legal marriage age is 20. The fertility rate in large cities is generally lower than that of provinces. Higher educational and socio-economic level also exert an inverse influence on fertility rates; in low socio-economic areas the rate reached 3.5%, and in more advanced areas it was held to 2.2%. In all professions with the exception of agriculture, fishing, and forestry, the percentage of families with 1 child was 81.8%. Since planned fertility was implemented, the overall fertility rate has dropped from 3% to 2%. China's fertility mode has changed to that of developed countries, with high intensity between 20 and 29 years of age. Appropriate measures should be taken to lower the fertility rate in different regions.  相似文献   

6.
F Lin 《人口研究》1987,(1):15-21
China's fertility rate, affected by various economic, cultural and social factors, is in a state of flux. In analyzing the major factors affecting the change, and in determining a fixed ratio for the degree of effectiveness of each factor, it is possible to improve birth policy in terms of predicting trends in fertility changes. Based on data gathered in 1981, the following observations were made: 1) A look at gross output value for industry and agriculture by geography shows that the more economically developed an area is, the lower is the fertility rate, and that the less economically developed an area is, the higher is the fertility rate. For example, Yunnan, with an average gross output value per person of 406.5 yuan, has a total fertility rate of 3.814, whereas Shanghai's average gross output value per person is 5566.4 yuan, and its total fertility rate is 1.316. 2) Figures comparing educational levels with total fertility rates show that cities with a greater number of women with a middle school education tend to have a lower fertility rate than cities with fewer such women. For example, Beijing's 516,000 middle school educated women have a total fertility rate of 1.589, compared to Anhui's 186,000 middle school educated women who have a total fertility rate of 2.799. Also, among college educated women, the fertility rate is 41.5/1000, the 1 child rate is 88.6%, and the multiple child rate is 1.2%, whereas those women with a primary school education have a fertility rate of 86.4/1000, a 1 child rate of 44.3%, and a multiple child rate of 26.7%. 3) As towns become urbanized, the fertility rate of those towns tend to decline. For example, Sichuan, with an Urbanization Index of 14.3 has total fertility rate of 2.650; Tianjin's Urbanization Index is 68.7, and its total fertility rate is 1.645. 4) A comparison of women engaged in physical labor to those in non-physical jobs shows that the former tend to have a higher fertility rate: women working at physical labor have a fertility rate of 86.7/1000, compared to a fertility rate of 65/1000 for those in non-physical jobs. 5) China's family planning programs advocating late marriage, late births and 1 child per couple in itself does not influence fertility rates, but taken with economic factors, it will have far reaching consequences. For example, cities with high gross output value tend to have a higher rate of 1 child per couple. 6) As the average age at marriage for women rose from 18 years in 1949 to 23 years in 1981, the rate of women having multiple children has declined in all age groups since 1964.  相似文献   

7.
Z Yang 《人口研究》1986,(1):17-20
The dynamic characteristics of China's 5 distinct stages of population development since the People's Republic of China was established in 1949, namely, 1950-1958, 1959-1963, 1964-1970, 1971-1981, and 1982-present, are outlined and discussed. By tracing both the overall rate of population growth and age-specific fertility rates for women aged 15-45 (5-year groups), a clear pattern emerges which indicates that the rates of early and late fertility (ages groups 15-19 and 30-45) are significantly declining. This is interpreted as a key factor in the overall decline in fertility rate. Annual statistics showing the number of children per woman of childbearing age and interval between 1st marriage and 1st birth are compared and discussed. It is concluded that the overall decline in birth rate and fertility rate since the 1970's is attributable to China's successful family planning campaign.  相似文献   

8.
X Zhao 《人口研究》1984,(2):50-54
Immigration is an important factor in America's population growth. In the last 200 years over 50 million persons immigrated to the U.S.; 99.6% of the current total population are descendents of those immigrants. In the 1930s, American population decreased by about 7.2/1000, but during the 1950s the annual rate of natural increase rose to 18.5/1000. In the 1960s, this rate began to decrease until the 1970s when it was about 9/1000. By 1981 and 1982, the rate of natural increase declined to 7/1000. These changes are due to the relatively slow decline in the mortality rate of the last 30 years (10.6/1000 in 1945 to 9/1000 in 1981) and to the fluctuations in birth rates (from 19.5/1000 in 1945 to a high of 25.3/1000 in 1957 and back to 16/1000 in 1981). Birth rates are influenced by factors such as the number of fertile women, age structure, fecundity, marriage, family, occupation, and education. In 1950 there were 38,920,000 women aged 15-49, and by 1980 there were 57,630,000. Of these, in 1950, 31.28% were aged 20-29, the most fertile period for women, as compared with 35.04% in 1980. Thus, in postwar America, the changes in birth rate did not follow changes in the number of fertile women. Marriage patterns also underwent changes, particularly in the last 20 years. From 1930 to 1935, the marriage rate was 8.6/1000. By 1945, it rose to 16.4/1000. But during the 1960s, an increasing number of women aged 20-29 years remained unmarried. At the end of the 1970s, there was also an increase in the number of married women who did not have children. Furthermore, the number of divorces increased, an additional reason for a declining birth rate. Changes in family structure also influenced postwar American reproduction. In the last two decades, the traditional family has almost disappeared and the nuclear fammily is on the decline. By 1970 there were more people living alone, single parent families, and unrelated people sharing a domicile, than there were family units. Also, educated women who worked often married at a later age, thus placing restrictions on the birth rate.  相似文献   

9.
F Gao  X Gu 《人口研究》1984,(1):26-33
In 1981 a 3% random sampling of women born between 1931-66 was taken in Shanghai to study their menstrual and marital histories, pregnancies, contraceptive use, education, and occupation. In the last 30 years the fertility rate and the rate of natural population increase began to decline beginning around 1957-58. The changes in fertility rate fall into 3 periods: 1) between 1958-61 the fertility rate fell from 238.6/1000 to 159.2/1000, averaging 26.5/1000 annually; there was a slight period of stability from 1961-63; 2) between 1963-67 it fell from 155.8/1000 to 56.3/000, averaging 24.9/1000 annually and between 1967-68 there was a slight increase; and 3) between 1968-74 it fell from 63.2/100 to 26.4/1000, averaging 6.1/1000 annually. The fertility rate of various age groups also declined during the last 30 years. The average number of children for married women was 1.92. Factors influencing the fertility rate include: 1) birth control policy: the changes in the fertility rates were dominated by the birth control policy; for instance, from 1956-60, after late marriages were officially advocated, the average age at 1st marriage for men was 1.64 years older than before; between 1962-64, those women with more than 3 children were sterilized. 2) Education: the higher the educational attainment, the later was the age at 1st marriage, the more effective was the use of contraceptives and the lower the standard was for fertility; 3) occupation: the type of job influenced the age at marriage, as well as the frequency of miscarriage and live births; 4) attitude towards children: the total number of children women reported they would like averaged out to be 1.7; 5) urban and rural differences: the fertility rate for Shanghai City was not only lower than for Shanghai County, it fell at a faster rate; 6) changes in the age structure of fertile women affected the fertility rate; and 7) others: nutrition, the ability to propagate, age at 1st marriage, plus economic and social factors all affected fertility.  相似文献   

10.
In 1983, the ESCAP region added 44 million people, bringing its total population to 2600 million, which is 56% of the world population. The annual rate of population growth was 1.7% in 1983 compared to 2.4% in 1970-75. The urban population rose from 23.4% in 1970 to 26.4% in 1983, indicative of the drift from rural areas to large cities. In 1980, 12 of the world's 25 largest cities were in the ESCAP region, and there is concern about the deterioration of living conditions in these metropoles. In general, however, increasing urbanization in the developing countries of the ESCAP region has not been directly linked to increasing industrialization, possibly because of the success of rural development programs. With the exception of a few low fertility countries, a large proportion of the region's population is concentrated in the younger age groups; 50% of the population was under 22 years of age in 1983 and over 1/3 was under 15 years. In 1983, there were 69 dependents for every 100 persons of working age, although declines in the dependency ratio are projected. The region's labor force grew from 1100 million in 1970 to 1600 million in 1983; this growth has exceeded the capacity of country economies to generate adequate employment. The region is characterized by large variations in life expectancy at birth, largely reflecting differences in infant mortality rates. Whereas there are less than 10 infant deaths/1000 live births in Japan, the corresponding rates in Afghanistan and India are 203 and 121, respectively. Maternal-child health care programs are expected to reduce infant mortality in the years ahead. Finally, fertility declines have been noted in almost every country in the ESCAP region and have been most dramatic in East Asia, where 1983's total fertility rate was 40% lower than that in 1970-75. Key factors behind this decline include more aggressive government policies aimed at limiting population growth, developments in the fields of education and primary health care, and greater availability of contraception through family planning programs.  相似文献   

11.
J Pan 《人口研究》1984,(1):53-57
Most developing countries are in the demographic stage of early mortality, high birth rates and high rates of natural population increase. A characteristic of developing countries is that after World War ii, particularly since the 1960s fertility rates are on the decline, even though they still remain high. The fertility rate of developed countries fell from a 1950 rate of 22.9/1000 to 15/1000 in 1982, a decrease of 34.5%, whereas the fertility rate of developing countries hovered around 43/1000 between 1930-1950, 40.6/1000 during the 1960s and 33/1000 in 1982. Between 1950 and 1982 there was a decrease of 24.8%. But the main reason for this decrease is the decline in the last 20 years of the fertility rates of China and India, whose rates fell 34.9% from 1960-1980. Changes in fertility rates are influenced by the age structure of a country, as seen in the changing age structure of developing countries from 1960-80. For example, an increase in fertility rates was 1 consequence of an increase in the number of fertile women aged 15-45 from 42.6% in 1960 to 44.4% in 1980. Nevertheless, there exists some sort of birth control, whether conscious or subconscious, because the number of births per fertile woman is 3-4 fewer than the 14-15 children a woman can theoretically bear. The reason for changes in fertility rates in developing countries can be traced to marriage and family customs, and even more important, to social and economic factors. For example, Asian, African and Latin American cultures tend to support early marriages. When the fertility rates of developed and developing countries are looked at for a comparable period, then the rate of decrease for developing countries is slower than developed countries. But, if the comparison is made for a transitional period (i.e., industrialization), then the rate of decrease for developing countries is faster than for developed countries. Currently there are 25 developing countries that have attained a fertility rate of 25/1000 or lower, and 52 developing countries with a rate of 35/1000.  相似文献   

12.
This article explains that birth delays skew developing world's fertility figures. When successive groups of women who have delayed childbearing start having children, the rapid fertility decline stalls. Such change in the timing of childbearing skews the total fertility rate (TFR). Analysis of the tempo component of TFR trends in Taiwan suggests that tempo effects reduced its TFR by about 10% in the late 1970s and early 1990s and by about 19% in the late 1980s. In Colombia, on the basis of increasing mean maternal age at childbirth between the 1970s and the late 1980s, tempo distortions of the TFR during the most of the 1980s seem likely. Moreover, many developing countries are now experiencing rapid fertility declines that are in part attributable to tempo changes. These changes have accelerated past fertility transitions, but they also make these countries vulnerable to future stalls in fertility when the delays in childbearing end. Since fertility reductions caused by tempo effects lead to real declines in birth rates and hence in population growth, countries that wish to reduce birth rates can take actions that encourage women to delay marriage and the onset of childbearing.  相似文献   

13.
Shanghai has had the lowest fertility rate in China for many years. Shanghai had a negative rate of natural growth during 1990-95. During 1980-93, fertility dropped continuously. In 1982, contraceptive use among married women included 29.47% using IUDs, 29.33% using oral pills, 23.44% using female sterilization, and 10.48% using condoms. Contraceptive prevalence declined slightly from 98.6% in 1982 to 92.29% in 1993. By 1993, method use changed. Oral pill and female sterilization use declined to 8.04% and 7.22%, respectively, among married women of reproductive age. IUD use increased dramatically to 72.2% in 1993. Condom use declined to 8.83% of total users. Despite reduced contraceptive prevalence, the birth rate declined from 18.51/1000 population in 1982 to 6.50/1000 population in 1993. The proportion of women accepting the one-child certificate increased from 53.32% of all married women of reproductive age in 1984 to 70.13% in 1993. The shift use of contraceptive methods means reliance on long-term reversible methods.  相似文献   

14.
Historical research among European countries finds large differences in the level of social, economic or demographic development among countries, or regions within countries at the time marital fertility rates began their decline from traditional high levels. This research tests a threshold hypothesis which holds that fertility will decline from traditional high levels if threshold levels of life expectancy and literacy are surpassed. Using a pooled regression analysis of 1950, 1960, 1970 and 1980 crude births rates (CBRs) in 20 less developed Latin American countries, in conjunction with 10-year lagged measures of social, economic and family planning program development, analyses reveal statistically significant effects of passing Beaver's (1975) threshold levels of 1950 literacy, or 1950 life expectancy, that are independent of levels of lagged literacy (or lagged life expectancy), economic and family planning program development, as well as measures that control period effects.  相似文献   

15.
H Hao 《人口研究》1983,(2):56-8, 46
At the end of 1981 Yanging County had 26 communes, 375 production brigades and a total population of 211,098. A random sampling of 5.07% of the production brigades was taken, which included teams from the plains as well as mountainous regions. The sample had a population of 10,888, or 5.16% of the entire county, among whom 189 subjects were interviewed. These 189 women, whose ages ranged from 35-67, were divided into 5 birth year cohorts (1914, 1920, 1930, 1940, 1946). Findings include: 1) Age at marriage: the average age at marriage (about 17 years) between the 1914 and 1946 groups rose 1.82 years, indicating that early marriage was the norm. The time between marriage and 1st birth has shortened. 2) Fertility data: from 1914 to 1946 the lifetime fertility rate tended to decline from 4.60 to 3.70, but the 1930 cohort was the highest (6.42), followed by the 1920 cohort (6.26). The fertility rate of the 1914 cohort tended to rise in the 1950s after already having reached a peak in the early 1940s, probably because after Liberation fertility rose due to a higher standard of living and a stablized society. The fertility of the 1930 cohort was highest around 1963 when they were already 30 years old. The fertility of the 1940 cohort was also highest beginning around 1963. In both cases, the reason probably was because the national economy improved at this time. Indeed, the national fertility rate rose from a 1960 low of 20.9/1000 to 43.6/1000 in 1963. 3) Contraceptive use: prior to 1972 before there was an offical birth control policy, a sizeable number of women already desired to use contraceptives, the reason being most of these women felt they already had enough children. However, many women did use contraceptives in response to the call to do so. 4) Factors influencing fertility standards: in general, the less a woman's education and the lower her income, the higher was her standard of fertility, and vice versa. 5) The percentage of women who had children who died before the age of 15 ranged from 35.9% of the 67 year olds to 12.6% of the 35 year olds.  相似文献   

16.
The author argues that the effect of sex preference must be disentangled from the effect of number preference in Korea. This study tests--with hazard models--the effect of the number of previous children on the next birth according to the sex composition of previous children. Data were obtained from the 1974 Korean Fertility Survey. This paper also analyzes the timing of childbearing in recent periods in order to determine whether replacement-level fertility is temporary or permanent. The ideal number of children declined from 3.9 children in 1965 to 2.1 in 1991. The age-specific fertility rates for ages 20-24 years declined rapidly during the late 1980s. The fertility rates among women aged 25-29 years and 30-34 years increased during 1985-90. The proportion of fertility among women aged 20-29 years increased from 67.9% in 1975 to 86.6% in 1984. Women born in the late baby boom period of the late 1950s to mid-1960s reached prime reproductive age during the late 1980s and 1990s, but the crude birth rate remained about the same during 1985-92. A higher percentage of women (22.4%) born during 1955-59 remained single in 1990. During 1960-90, the percentage of women aged 20-24 years who were married declined. These trends indicate later age at childbearing and an explanation for the temporary nature of below-replacement fertility in the late 1980s. Korean women did not want to have more than 2 children, and the interval between first and second births increased since 1985. Among pregnancies of parity 2 conceived since 1985, over 90% of women with at least one son ended subsequent pregnancies by abortion compared to only 59% without sons. Hazard models of 1974 data reveal that son preference had an important effect on fertility. Fertility was higher among women with only daughters. Findings suggest that the value of sons must be measured at the societal and not at the individual level.  相似文献   

17.
This demographic profile of India addresses fertility, family planning, and economic issues. India is described as a country shifting from economic policies of self-reliance to active involvement in international trade. Wealth has increased, particularly at higher educational levels, yet 25% still live below the official poverty line and almost 66% of Indian women are illiterate. The government program in family planning, which was instituted during the early 1950s, did not change the rate of natural increase, which remained stable at 2.2% over the past 30 years. 1993 marked the first time the growth rate decline to under 2%. The growth rate in 1995 was 1.9%. The total population is expected double in 36 years. Only Nigeria, Pakistan, and Bangladesh had a higher growth rate and higher fertility in 1995. India is geographically diverse (with the northern Himalayan mountain zone, the central alluvial plains, the western desert region, and the southern peninsula with forest, mountains, and plains). There are regional differences in the fertility rates, which range from replacement level in Kerala and Goa to 5.5 children in Uttar Pradesh. Fertility is expected to decline throughout India due to the slower pace of childbearing among women over the age of 35 years, the increase in contraceptive use, and increases in marriage age. Increased educational levels in India and its state variations are related to lower fertility. Literacy campaigns are considered to be effective means of increasing the educational levels of women. Urbanization is not expected to markedly affect fertility levels. Urban population, which is concentrated in a few large cities, remains a small proportion of total population. Greater shifts are evident in the transition from agriculture to other wage labor. Fertility is expected to decline as women's share of labor force activity increases. The major determinant of fertility decline in India is use of family planning, which has improved in access and use during the 1980s. If India is to keep a stable population under 1.6 billion in the future, Indians may have to accept only one child per family.  相似文献   

18.
This paper provides an assessment of the nature and magnitude of Tanzania's recent fertility decline, using robust methods for the identification of fertility trends. A decline in Tanzanian fertility began some time in the late 1970s or early 1980s. The pattern of decline exhibits similarities to patterns identified some years ago in Zimbabwe and Kenya. The decline has been especially marked in urban areas. It has been accompanied by a rapid rise in contraceptive prevalence from the very low levels before 1990 to just under 20 per cent of currently married women of reproductive age. Although falling marital fertility associated with a rise in contraceptive use is the main contributor to the decline in fertility, a rise in the average age at marriage has also made a (smaller) contribution, as has the AIDS epidemic. The fact that fertility is declining in Tanzania raises questions about the social and economic requirements for fertility transitions to begin in sub-Saharan Africa.  相似文献   

19.
On the basis of data collected in the 1975 National Fertility Study (NFS) in which continuously married white women interviewed in the 1970 NFS were reinterviewed five years later, the aggregate and individual validity of reported fertility intentions is evaluated. The main finding about aggregate prediction is that 1970 intentions overestimated 1971–1975 fertility to the same extent as the conventional 1970 total fertility rate. The conclusion is that intentions suffer all of the same vulnerabilities as other period measures. At the individual level, the validity of intentions is considerable in comparison with most other indicators.  相似文献   

20.
E S Gao  X Y Gu  X Z Zheng  X Y Ding  G D Xu 《人口研究》1982,(3):42-6, 59
The survey was conducted in February-March 1981. The population of this commune at the end of 1980 was 18,608. The cultural and educational levels, economic condition, and work in family planning of this commune form a typical example among numerous similar communes in Shanghai County. The birthrate, natural growth rate, and average fertility rate began to decline in the later half of 1950s and reached the lowest level in 1974. The survey shows a delay in the marriage age. The fertility rate also dropped by 21.31% from 1963 to 1980. The average fertility rate dropped by 162.73% from 1963 to 1980. Among the women of childbearing age, 99% of them have a knowledge of birth control measures, 95% of them have used them before, and 78% are currently using them. All these figures show that the work in family planning in the commune has reached a high level by world standards. 3 factors which have a strong impact on fertility are: the economic and educational level, formation of population elements, and family planning work. A rise in the standard of living and improvement in education normally leads to late marriage and a decline in fertility. An increase in the number of women of childbearing age causes a rise in fertility. The population growth after 1974 is a reflection of this situation. The survey shows that the decline in fertility before 1973 was caused mainly by family planning work.  相似文献   

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