内生时机下多阶段R&D博弈的均衡行动顺序

基于内生时机的博弈理论,研究了内生的R&D时机下双寡头企业先进行R&D活动后进行产品市场价格竞争的多阶段动态博弈的均衡R&D顺序,其中产品市场上的需求函数是线性的且企业在产品市场上的行动是同时进行的。运用逆向归纳法研究表明均衡R&D顺序只由企业的R&D外溢水平决定：若两企业的外溢水平都较低（较高）,则均衡R&D顺序为两企业同时行动（分别以两企业为领头者的序贯行动）;若一个企业的外溢水平较低而另一企业的外溢水平较高,则均衡R&D顺序为以低外溢水平的企业为领头者的序贯行动。在序贯R&D时两企业的R&D总水平、社会总福利水平及产品市场产量（价格）都高于（低于）同时R&D时的情形。     

不确定性和动态能力互动下企业投资竞争决策

环境不确定性和动态能力的互动对企业国际化投资竞争策略和时机选择有着重要影响．在考虑企业先后动优势和相对能力综合影响以及内外生环境不确定性差异冲击的基础上,构建了不完全竞争市场的投资策略决策模型,并结合跨国公司在华投资实践,分析了初始能力、动态能力、先后动优势以及内外生环境不确定性对企业间投资竞争策略的均衡条件和投资时机决策的影响． 研究结果表明,先后动优势和相对能力共同决定了企业间投资竞争策略均衡; 内生不确定性和外生不确定性对竞争策略均衡产生反向冲击,对抢占时机和投资时间间隔决策却产生一致影响．     

企业的承诺经营及其模型研究

企业间的竞争无处不在,如何选择适合自身发展的承诺经营战略直接关系着企业的存亡.本文拟以博弈论的方法,构建企业竞争中的承诺经营博弈模型,对有行动先后的Cournot寡头竞争博弈、承诺营销博弈和双重垄断博弈及其均衡分析,为企业提供相应的承诺经营理论与实践策略.     

市场领导者与行业质量水平：内生质量和时序选择模型

本文探讨不同的定价时序如何影响双寡头模型中的质量选择问题。研究表明：在一个垂直产品差异的双寡头博弈中,与同时定价博弈相比,厂商采用序贯定价会使市场内的高、低质量差距缩小;而且跟随者利润上升,领导者利润却会下降,消费者剩余和社会总剩余都会下降。最后,还发现在内生时序选择模型中,均衡时序选择会是高、低质量企业都选择作为跟随者进行同时定价。     

内生溢出与R&D竞争、合作的激励问题

在AJ模型的基础上,将技术溢出率作为内生变量.当政府采用平衡预算后,企业依次决定均衡R&D水平、溢出率和产量.如果企业共同决定R&D水平和外溢率,则可以避免技术共享中的"囚徒困境"问题.但是,在创新组织的选择中,社会福利与企业利润之间存在矛盾.     

内生溢出与R＆D竞争、合作的激励问题

在AJ模型的基础上,将技术溢出率作为内生变量.当政府采用平衡预算后,企业依次决定均衡R&D水平、溢出率和产量.如果企业共同决定R&D水平和外溢率,则可以避免技术共享中的"囚徒困境"问题.但是,在创新组织的选择中,社会福利与企业利润之间存在矛盾.     

基于建设时间的企业投资期权博弈均衡分析

本文在对称双头垄断时机选择期权博弈模型基础上引入了建设时间变量并进行了扩展,对企业研发投资策略均衡进行了分析.分析表明根据模型参数和投资初始时机不同,可能存在非约束共谋、序贯和同时投资策略均衡,随着项目建设时间的增加,企业的投资价值下降而投资临界值上升,市场需求波动对重复投资倾向产生主要影响,而与经济直观相反,建设时间和投资成本对重复投资没有影响,并为产业重复投资提供了一种解释.     

从FIPD的合作现象看潜在参与人对Nash均衡的影响

针对大量现实博弈与Nash均衡预测相背离的现象,抛开"共同理性"假设,提出了Nash均衡理论的另一个隐性前提"博弈的封闭性假设",进而引入"潜在参与人"的概念,扩展了博弈参与人的范围,从理论上指出开放环境下策略偏离者的支付增益可能导致博弈结果偏离原Nash均衡;然后举例说明,将随机扰动引入标准复制子动态,对一个两阶段重复囚徒博弈偏离预期均衡的原因进行剖析;最后基于CAS理论和多主体系统的建模思想,应用仿真实验进一步分析和验证了以上结论.     

产量-价格策略下的双寡头动态多维博弈

根据动态多维博弈理论,讨论了两个企业对具有一定替代性的两种产品的完全信息动态产量-价格二维博弈模型及其均衡,证明了两个企业关于无替代性的两种产品的产量-价格动态单独博弈模型是这种二维博弈模型的特例,并得到两个企业对每一种产品进行单独博弈的均衡策略劣于联合对两种产品进行二维博弈的均衡策略。结论表明,当两个企业对处于市场未饱和的一种产品产量策略和与其具有一定替代性的处于市场饱和的另一种产品价格策略同时进行二维博弈时,要充分考虑它们之间替代性,这样选择的产量和价格策略才是最优策略。     

不同权力结构下竞争性供应链合作广告策略研究

鉴于现有文献广泛研究的单边参与策略不能协调合作广告冲突问题，本文以具有替代性的同质产品的竞争性供应链为研究对象，探讨生产商Stackelberg(MS)、零售商Stackelberg(RS)和垂直Nash(VN)博弈结构下成本共享比例内生和外生对合作广告协调的影响。同时，基于平等讨价还价模型探讨不同博弈结构下成本共享比例内生对合作广告协调的影响。研究表明：当市场竞争不激烈时，外生成本共享比例在三种博弈结构下都可以协调整个供应链，而内生成本共享比例只有在平等讨价还价模型中才能协调。研究结论对涉及成本共享契约的合作广告决策具有指导意义。     

Equilibrium Joining Strategies and Optimal Control of a Make‐to‐Stock Queue

We consider a make‐to‐stock, finite‐capacity production system with setup cost and delay‐sensitive customers. To balance the setup and inventory related costs, the production manager adopts a two‐critical‐number control policy, where the production starts when the number of waiting customers reaches a certain level and shuts down when a certain quantity of inventory has accumulated. Once the production is set up, the unit production time follows an exponential distribution. Potential customers arrive according to a Poisson process. Customers are strategic, i.e., they make decisions on whether to stay for the product or to leave without purchase based on their utility values, which depend on the production manager's control decisions. We formulate the problem as a Stackelberg game between the production manager and the customers, where the former is the game leader. We first derive the equilibrium customer purchasing strategy and system performance. We then formulate the expected cost rate function for the production system and present a search algorithm for obtaining the optimal values of the two control variables. We further analyze the characteristics of the optimal solution numerically and compare them with the situation where the customers are non‐strategic.     

On the Advantage of Quantity Leadership When Outsourcing Production to a Competitive Contract Manufacturer

This study investigates a supply chain comprising an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a contract manufacturer (CM), in which the CM acts as both upstream partner and downstream competitor to the OEM. The two parties can engage in one of three Cournot competition games: a simultaneous game, a sequential game with the OEM as the Stackelberg leader, and a sequential game with the CM as the Stackelberg leader. On the basis of these three basic games, this study investigates the two parties' Stackelberg leadership/followership decisions. When the outsourcing quantity and wholesale price are exogenously given, either party may prefer Stackelberg leadership or followership. For example, when the wholesale price or the proportion of production outsourced to the CM is lower than a threshold value, both parties prefer Stackelberg leadership and, consequently, play a simultaneous game in the consumer market. When the outsourcing quantity and wholesale price are decision variables, the competitive CM sets a wholesale price sufficiently low to allow both parties to coexist in the market, and the OEM outsources its entire production to this CM. This study also examines the impact of the supply chain parties' bargaining power on contract outcomes by considering a wholesale price that is determined via the generalized Nash bargaining scheme, finding a Stackelberg equilibrium to be sustained when the CM's degree of bargaining power is great and the non‐competitive CM's wholesale price is high.     

Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium1

We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by thinking of assets as pools. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling phenomena in a perfectly competitive, general equilibrium framework. Perfect competition eliminates the need for lenders to compute how the size of their loan or the price they quote might affect default rates. It also makes for a simple equilibrium refinement, which we propose in order to rule out irrational pessimism about deliveries of untraded assets. We show that refined equilibrium always exists in our model, and that default, in conjunction with refinement, opens the door to a theory of endogenous assets. The market chooses the promises, default penalties, and quantity constraints of actively traded assets.     

考虑战略顾客行为时的供应链性能分析与协调

动态定价策略的广泛应用使得越来越多的顾客具有了战略性,战略顾客会根据产品在销售期内的价格路径确定最优购买时机,零售商则根据顾客的购买行为确定订货数量和销售价格.研究了双方静态博弈时的理性预期均衡解和零售商进行数量承诺时的情形.研究表明:理性预期均衡时的最优销售价格、最优存货数量和最优期望利润分别小于标准报童模型的情形;数量承诺时的最优存货数量小于理性预期均衡时的最优存货数量;最优期望利润则大于理性预期均衡时的最优期望利润,并且在一定条件下可能会大于标准报童模型的最优期望利润,战略顾客行为的存在对零售商可能有利.最后分析了在分散式供应链中如何利用收入分享契约和数量折扣契约实现供应链协调.     

A Dynamic Reinterpretation of Nash Bargaining With Endogenous Threats

This paper concerns the two‐stage game introduced in Nash (1953). It formalizes a suggestion made (but not pursued) by Nash regarding equilibrium selection in that game, and hence offers an arguably more solid foundation for the “Nash bargaining with endogenous threats” solution. Analogous reasoning is then applied to an infinite horizon game to provide equilibrium selection in two‐person repeated games with contracts. In this setting, issues about enforcement of threats are much less problematic than in Nash's static setting. The analysis can be extended to stochastic games with contracts.     

需求不确定下生产能力与竞争优势之间的关系

在需求不确定的条件下,用生产能力刻画产量决策的柔性,用古诺模型描述企业间的(产量)竞争,建立一个两企业战略竞争博弈模型,并利用博弈均衡构建柔性水平与竞争优势之间的函数关系。比较静态分析结果表明,(1)其他条件不变,一家企业的相对竞争优势随着自己的生产能力增加而增加,但随着对手的生产能力增加而降低;(2)生产能力较高的企业将获得较高的绝对竞争优势。这些结果暗示,柔性水平与竞争优势之间呈现一种正向的变动关系。这一结论一方面在一定程度上澄清了战略管理文献中呈现出的"战略柔性与竞争优势之间的联系方向模凌两可"这一问题;另一方面,由于引入了竞争性战略互动,从而将基于个人理性决策的结果扩展到战略相互依赖的竞争性情形下。     

Experientia Docet: Professionals Play Minimax in Laboratory Experiments

We study how professional players and college students play zero‐sum two‐person strategic games in a laboratory setting. We first ask professionals to play a 2 × 2 game that is formally identical to a strategic interaction situation that they face in their natural environment. Consistent with their behavior in the field, they play very close to the equilibrium of the game. In particular, (i) they equate their strategies' payoffs to the equilibrium ones and (ii) they generate sequences of choices that are serially independent. In sharp contrast, however, we find that college students play the game far from the equilibrium predictions. We then study the behavior of professional players and college students in the classic O'Neill 4 × 4 zero‐sum game, a game that none of the subjects has encountered previously, and find the same differences in the behavior of these two pools of subjects. The transfer of skills and experience from the familiar field to the unfamiliar laboratory observed for professional players is relevant to evaluate the circumstances under which behavior in a laboratory setting may be a reliable indicator of behavior in a naturally occurring setting. From a cognitive perspective, it is useful for research on recognition processes, intuition, and similarity as a basis for inductive reasoning.     

Inventory and transshipment decisions in the rationing game under capacity uncertainty

In this paper, we consider the inventory decisions of two retailers who are supplied by a single supplier with uncertain capacity. When capacity is allocated in proportion to the retailers׳ orders, the retailers compete for the capacity by inflating their orders (i.e., the rationing game). In addition, we allow the retailers to implement transshipment between them such that they cooperate by transshipping the surplus stock of one to another who is out of stock. Our analysis of Nash equilibrium orders shows that, while order inflation in the equilibrium orders persists in the rationing game with transshipment, it may not occur if the amount of capacity shortage is small and the transshipment prices are low. Thus, carefully chosen transshipment prices may alleviate order inflation behavior. We also characterize centralized orders that maximize the total profit of the retailers and compare them to equilibrium orders. In particular, we investigate coordinating transshipment prices that induce the retailers to choose centralized orders. Our numerical analysis shows that, even for two identical retailers, coordinating transshipment prices exist in a more limited range of parameter values in the rationing game than they do outside the rationing game due to capacity uncertainty and limitation.