A simultaneous-equations model of the relationship between public sector bargaining legislation and unionization

This paper estimates a simultaneous-equations model with public sector bargaining laws and union membership treated as jointly-determined variables. The extent of public sector unionization has a significant positive influence on the passage of prolabor bargaining legislation and bargaining legislation has strong, independent effects on the extent of public sector unionization. We gratefully acknowledge the research support provided by Minbo Kim and Parisun Chantonahom.     

Financial and political resources of nine major public sector unions in the 1980s

Current research offers two potentially competing perspectives on union strength: membership and financial/political resources. We update and broaden the research on the financial and political resources of nine major public sector unions in the U.S. by reporting these unions’ financial assets, net worth, revenues, and political action committee (PAC) receipts during the 1980s and the early 1990s. We find that unions may expand their financial and political resources even though membership levels stagnate or decline. Overall, the unions have amassed larger asset bases, even though some have actually lost members. On a per member basis, federal executive branch unions do not appear as financially weak as the level of their financial resources suggests. Postal unions as a group are clearly the strongest in terms of per member financial and political resources. Federal executive branch unions have experienced a striking reduction in their PAC activity, while the postal and the state and local union PACs have grown substantially. Our analysis indicates that union membership may not adequately measure union strength.     

Union Organizing and Membership Growth: Why Don’t They Organize?

This study analyzes U.S. union organizing activity and membership growth from 1990 to 2004, a period in which an overall pattern of union decline continued and in which organizing achieved renewed prominence as both a union policy and public policy issue. Models for organizing activity and membership growth were proposed and tested. Union decentralization and employer opposition were found to be key predictors of organizing activity differences among unions. These same factors, along with organizing activity, helped explain union differences in membership growth, as did a ??Sweeney era?? effect.     

Who joins unions in the public sector? The effects of individual characteristics and the law

Analysis of a large micro-data set shows that state public-sector bargaining laws significantly influence state and local government union membership in several ways. Membership probability is lowest where a right-to-work law is present; it is greatest when there are mandatory agency shop provisions. Compulsory arbitration leads to a significantly greater probability of membership than does the right-to-strike. Simulations based on model estimates indicate that policy changes along the lines of proposed national public bargaining laws could lead to major changes in public-sector union density. Among individual and demographic characteristics, membership probability is significantly affected by full-time/part-time status and the statewide extent of private-sector unionism. Although non-whites and males are more likely to be union members, race and gender membership differentials are shown to be relatively small. The author thanks Jack Fiorito, Paul Jarley, Joe Stone, and Rob Valletta for their helpful comments. Any remaining errors are his sole responsibility.     

Exclusive representation in public employment: A public choice perspective

Public sector unionization has grown rapidly in recent years, and research has suggested that among the reasons for such growth is legislation granting special privileges to public employee unions. This paper examines one form of legislative privilege, exclusive representation, from a public choice perspective. It is shown that exclusivity reduces employees’ freedom of choice, increases the welfare of union leaders at the expense of union members, limits employment opportunities to “outsiders,” entrenches the monopoly provision of public services, and generates conflict and instability in labor relations.     

Union wage premiums by gender and race: Evidence from PSID 1980–1992

We find that the overall union wage premium is relatively stable (ranging from 22.3 to 28.4 percent), but there seems to be a convergence of union wage premiums across different demographic groups between 1980 and 1992. Nonwhite men (whose premium ranges from 23.5 to 36.2 percent) show the largest gain, followed by white women (17.1 to 30.5 percent), white men (19 to 26.4 percent), and nonwhite women (10 to 20 percent). One explanation for this convergence of union wage premiums might be the “equalization hypothesis” associated with unions. This converging trend could have important implications for the future of unions. If union membership can explain a portion of the gender/racial wage gap, and if women/nonwhites can obtain, through union membership significant wage premia, increased female/nonwhite union participation in highly unionized sectors that offer high union wage gains could, in time, greatly decrease the gender/racial wage differential. This study was supported in part by National Science Foundation funds [OSR-9350540]. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Southern Economic Association conference in New Orleans in 1995. We thank Emilia Lulcheva and Michael Lauze for their able research assistance and William Warren for his valuable editorial comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The usual caveat applies.     

Judging unions’ future using a historical perspective: the public policy choice between competition and unionization

VII. Conclusion In discussing the future of private sector union membership one needs to evaluate the early period of union ascendancy (1930s through the early 1950s) as well as the past few decades when unions have been in decline. We know trends currently in place are unfavorable to unions. What conditions would be favorable? When the earlier period of union growth us studied, two factors become prominent — the competitiveness of the labor market and the ability of unions to fullfill their major goal of either extracting economic rents or remedying market failures that result in exploitive employment relationship.     

Voting in an Officer Election: Testing a model in a multi-site local

We test a model based on social exchange theory to explain the patterns of membership voting in a local union officer election. Survey data from members and stewards aggregated by 55 voting units, when combined with the control variable, explained 46 percent of the variance in the incumbent president's re-election. A greater percentage of member votes for the incumbent president were related to higher union loyalty, higher confidence in the grievance procedure, better union-management relations, and more positive perceptions of the union contract, findings that support our model of membership voting.     

The Political and Civic Lives of Public Sector Workers: Unions and “Public Service Motivation”*

Public sector employees are highly engaged in civic and political life, from voting to volunteering. Scholars have theorized that this political activity stems from “public service motivation,” or the selection of publicly oriented individuals into public work. We build on this work by analyzing the role of public sector unions in shaping participation. Unions are central mobilizing organizations in political life, and one in three public sector workers are unionized. Special supplements of the Current Population Survey provide data on various forms of participation, sector, union membership, and union coverage. Logistic regressions find that unionized public sector workers have much higher odds of engaging in a range of activities compared to non‐union public workers, including protest, electoral politics, and political communication. Union membership impacts service work to a lesser extent, suggesting that unions are more central to political lives. These findings have implications for the consequences of union decline, including the class, race, and gender composition of who participates in democratic life.     

The impact of changing union density on earnings inequality: Evidence from the private and public sectors

The degree of inequality in U.S. earnings has varied considerably over the past 20 years, including a dramatic, much documented rise since 1980. We examine empirically how changes in union density have contributed to these trends, using Current Population Survey data for 1977 and 1992. Inequality is measured as the mean logarithmic deviation of individual earnings from overall average earnings. A decomposition of the change in the inequality index reveals that decreases in private-sector union density have accounted for about 25 percent of the overall rise in earnings inequality during the past 15 years. Decompositions based on public-sector earnings indicate that increases in union density have produced inequality that is 29 percent below what it otherwise would have been. The analysis demonstrates that, among private sector workers, the results are sensitive to the population being studied: Changing union density accounts for 13 percent of the rise among prime aged males (a noticeably smaller fraction than found in existing studies) and only 4 percent among females and non-prime-aged males. The analysis also demonstrates that covariances between the subsamples explain why the union effect is larger in percentage terms for the whole sample than it is in either subsample.     

Challenging Misconceptions about Organizing Women into Unions

In many countries, women are the fastest growing group of unionized workers. As unions scramble to restore their flagging membership, women become central to the process of union membership renewal. Yet survey data collected from union organizers in Canada show that unions are only partially meeting women’s demand for union representation, in large part because of gender bias in union organizing practices. To develop this argument, this article offers data analysis that challenges four popular misconceptions about women and unions which contribute to gender bias in union organizing practices. These misconceptions are: women are less likely to support unions than men; high rates of unionization in the public sector rather than women themselves explain the high rates of union growth amongst women; small workplaces are a particular barrier to organizing women and women are more passive and avoid conflict, therefore reducing their likelihood of withstanding a hostile organizing drive. Having challenged these misconceptions, the article concludes with a discussion of the many ways in which union organizing practices are gender biased. Issues discussed range from the limited number of women hired as organizers to the tendency of unions to target small male‐dominated workplaces for organizing, over women‐dominated workplaces, in spite of the latter’s greater likelihood of success.     

Compensation,employment, and the political activity of public employee unions

It has been hypothesized that because public employee unions are politically influential, they have a bargaining advanatage over their private-sector counterparts. Previous studies, however, have not directly measured the political activities of public employee unions and have instead usually used some type of unionization proxy. This paper uses unpublished data from the International City Managers Association to develop a more direct measure of union political activity. Using this measure, it is found that an increase in union political activity leads to higher compensation and employment for public employee union members.     

The determinants of union membership growth in Taiwan

This paper examines the determinants of intertemporal variation in the growth rate of trade union membership in Taiwan during 1960–1987. The empirical results indicate that the widely used empirical model of growth in trade union membership based largely on cyclical variables applies to the case of a newly industrialized Asian country—Taiwan.     

Union activity and the decline in American trade union membership

This paper extends recent research on the determinants of the decline in union membership in the United States. Using biennial state-level data for a set of years between 1958 and 1982, my model tests “union organizing,” “structural,” “management opposition,” and “public policy” hypotheses concerning union membership and suggests improved specifications of each of these hypotheses. The paper also examines the relative importance of each factor in explaining the decline in unionization. The results support each of the hypotheses and confirm previous findings that changes in the structure of the labor force are most important in explaining union membership decline.     

Agency costs,property rights,and the evolution of labor unions

Collective bargaining requires that an agent represent workers. This paper examines the implications for the trade union movement of the resulting agency costs. Without transferable rights in the union, union members lack the means and incentive to bring forth the innovative agent controls common to the modern corporation. Considerations of the bargaining strengths of employers and employees, each represented by an agent, provide an explanation of the simultaneous decline of private sector union membership (corporate share holders have been more successful at lowering agency costs) and growth of public sector union representation (where the union official, a “double agent,” serves the interest of both employee and bureaucratic employer). The authors acknowledge the helpful remarks Donald L. Martin whose earlier research on property rights in unions inspired this effort. Don Bellante’s work was supported by a grant from the Research Committee of the College of Business Administration, University of South Florida.     

Outsourcing and union power

The outsourcing of union work and jobs either diffuses or diminishes union membership, depending on perspective and situation. The correlation of trends in union membership to trends in union power, while less than perfect, has until recently been relatively strong over the past sixteen years. The fact that as diverse a sample of unions as AFSCME, SEIU, and UAW have chosen to make outsourcing a prominent labor/public relations issue suggests that the correlation continues to be perceived by the union movement to be significant, notwithstanding the efforts of the “new” leadership of the AFL-CIO to break that link with respect to union political power by “taxing” member unions and their members to contribute both money and militancy to the 1996 election cycle. Although outsourcing may lead only to the diffusion of union membership either within or between unions, as opposed to the diminution of union membership, this fact has not received a great deal of attention. The net effect on total union membership of outsourcing from one union employer to another union employer is unclear, although the effect on the membership of the union at the outsourcing employer is not. The redistribution of membership within a union as a result of outsourcing is likely to have little immediate impact on union power. However, as even the best case scenario presented above suggests, it may have significant long-run deleterious effects on union bargaining power by taking labor out of a sheltered market and putting it into potentially competitive market. This is particularly likely to be the case when outsourcing (1) places the outsourced work into a different industry or wage contour and (2) creates the possibility of moving from sole-source to multiplesource supplier arrangements. The redistribution of membership between unions as a result of outsourcing is unlikely to have a major impact on union power broadly defined. It can have, however, serious deleterious effects in terms of the power of an individual union, as suggested in my “competitive case” scenario. The fact that one union’s losses due to outsourcing may be another union’s gain is of little consolation to the losing union. That act, in and of itself, may make the threat of outsourcing a potential union “Achilles heel” at the bargaining table by placing it into competition with some other, perhaps unknown, union as well as possibly nonunion competition. The most obvious threat to union power comes from outsourcing that diminishes union membership overall by transferring jobs from union to nonunion employers. The willingness and ability of employers to move work/jobs entirely out of the orbit of union control constitutes, in terms of power and particularly union bargaining power, a revisitation of the phenomenon of the “runaway shop.” It may also be viewed as a proactive form of hiring permanent replacements for (potentially) striking workers. The union options in dealing with such a challenge are to endeavor to preclude outsourcing through legislation or collective bargaining or to chase the work by organizing the unorganized, hopefully with the help of the unionized outsourcing employer. Neither option may be easy, but as the 1996 auto industry negotiations suggest, the former may be less difficult than the latter. The possibility that outsourcing from union to nonunion employer may provide unions with the power to organize from the top (outsourcer) down (outsourcee) cannot be entirely ignored as the issue of supplier “neutrality” reportedly was raised in the 1996 auto negotiations. The adverse effects of outsourcing on union political and financial power, by virtue of its impact on the level or distribution of union membership, can and may well be offset by an increase in union activism—as measured by dues levels, merger activity, organizing commitment, and political action. The adverse effects of outsourcing on union bargaining power are more problematical from the union standpoint. The effect of outsourcing, whatever its rationale or scenario, appears to be to put union labor back into competition. Thus, outsourcing constitutes yet another challenge to the labor movement in its ongoing and seemingly increasingly unsuccessful battle to take and keep U.S. union labor out of competition by proving itself able and willing to organize to the extent of the market and standardizing wages in that market.     

Blurring the boundaries of sports public relations: National stereotypes as sport announcers’ public relations tools

Live media coverage is a key element of the relationship between a sport and its publics. The role of television producers, including announcers, is to connect effectively with the public, creating an entertaining and engaging package that keeps viewers watching. In considering this as an aspect of public relations, this paper explores how national stereotypes function to present a consistent and easily interpretable set of messages that capture publics by reinforcing their existing understandings and by providing resources for enhancing the drama and uncertainty that is such a desirable aspect of the sport audience experience. Mapping the elements of the stereotype of Frenchness in rugby union as a case study, our analysis is based on interviews with well-known French and New Zealand rugby union announcers and analyses of a decade of broadcasts of France versus New Zealand tests. We conclude that the use of stereotypes, based on the creation of differences between national teams, can be conceived of as an effective form of public relations which heightens interest and reinforces patriotic subject positions for viewers and therefore mobilises a national public.     

Union density effects in the supermarket industry

Unions provide higher than competitive wages for members, but their effect on non-union wages is not clear. We investigate the effect of union density on supermarket wages from 1986 to 1993, a period of declining real wages and declining union membership. Full-information maximum likelihood techniques are used to estimate log wage equations for both the union and nonunion sectors. Decomposition techniques then separate the union wage premium into the relative effects of densities and union membership. We find a significant, positive effect of union density for both union and nonunion employees. This effect explains approximately one-third of the union-nonunion wage differential. This research was conducted while Johansson was a graduate research assistant at the University of Minnesota.     

Correlates of union membership and joining intentions in a unit of federal employees

Correlates of membership and joining intentions in the federal sector, where union representation is broadly available but membership is relatively low, are examined. Key independent variables — attitude toward joining, normative influence, perceived instrumentality of joining, union activism, and satisfaction with the union — are all positively correlated with both membership and joining intentions. In regression analyses, attitude toward joining predicted both membership and intentions. Union satisfaction and activism predicted membership, but normative influence and instrumentality did not; and normative influence and instrumentality predicted joining intentions, but union satisfaction and activism did not. Other important variables include: general attitude toward unions, which predicted both membership and intentions; membership in the previous union, which predicted intentions, but not membership; race, which predicted intentions, but not membership; satisfaction with pay, which predicted (negatively) joining intentions, but not membership; and satisfaction with fellow workers, which predicted membership, but not intentions. We attempt to explain why determinants of membership might differ from determinants of joining intentions. This research was supported by a grant from the John A. Walker College of Business, Appalachian State University. The authors gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments of Paul D. Geyer on an earlier draft of the paper.     

Union Organization in Great Britain

Union membership and density in Britain has experienced substantial decline since 1979. The fall in private sector membership and density has been much greater than in the public sector. The size of the union sector, measured by employer recognition, has shrunk. Membership decline has been accompanied by financial decline. Much of the decline occurred before 1997, under Conservative governments. Since 1997 and the return of a Labour government, the position has in some respects stabilized. Currently, unions have a substantially reduced economic impact, but a continued, if limited, role in workplace communication and grievance handling, often as part of a voice regime including nonunion elements.