Life,liberty, and property in slaves: white Mississippians seek ‘just compensation’ for their freed slaves in 1865

After the U.S. Civil War, a group of Mississippi politicians demanded that if their state abolished slavery and rejoined the Union the federal government must reimburse former slaveowners for the value of freed slaves. These politicians challenged the federal government’s authority to abolish slavery without ‘just compensation’ for their legally protected property. Though they failed, their allies and opponents alike believed Congress would compensate former slaveowners once Mississippi rejoined the United States. Their efforts are one chapter in a national story illustrating how white southerners attempted to defend their financial interests in slaves after wartime emancipation abolished slave labor.     

THE MATCHING OF HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS AND POLITICIANS

We use a Chinese firm‐director panel dataset to examine the matching of heterogeneous firms and politicians. On the basis of 36,308 detailed biographies, we identify individuals who previously held bureaucratic positions and classify the rank of each position in the Chinese political hierarchy. Using this direct measure of political capital, we examine how firms with heterogeneous productivity match politicians with different political strength. Our results indicate a positive assortative matching in the political capital market. More productive firms are paired with more powerful politicians. Furthermore, the preference for political capital relative to conventional human capital increases in firms' dependence on external financing and the inefficiency of local governments. Conditional on the endogenous matching, new hires with political capital receive more compensation than their co‐workers in the same cohort. The marginal effect of a one‐step rise on the political ladder significantly exceeds the marginal effect of raising education attainment from, for example, high school to college. (JEL D21, D73, J24, J31, O12)     

WHY DON'T ELIGIBLE FIRMS CLAIM HIRING SUBSIDIES? THE ROLE OF JOB DURATION

Only a small fraction of firms that hire disadvantaged workers claim the federal subsidies for which they qualify, namely, the Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC) and Welfare‐to‐Work Tax Credit (WtW). Subsidy benefits depend partially on job duration, with higher subsidy rates above certain job‐duration thresholds. I estimate the relationship between a firm's WOTC/WtW participation and its eligible workers' job durations. Using unique Wisconsin administrative data, I find that workers' subsidy rates (determined by hours worked) have the expected relationship to participation: Firms with a larger fraction of workers exceeding the programs' job‐duration thresholds are more likely to claim the WOTC/WtW. I also find no evidence that firms systematically modify the job duration of their workers to maximize subsidy payments. (JEL J3)     

PERSISTENCE OF POLITICIANS AND FIRMS' INNOVATION

We empirically investigate whether the persistence of politicians in political institutions affects the innovation activity of firms. We use 12,000 firm‐level observations from three waves of the Italian Observatory over Small and Medium Enterprises, and introduce a measure of political persistence defined as the average length of individual political careers in political institutions of Italian municipalities. Using death of politicians as an exogenous source of variation of political persistence, we find a robust negative relation between political persistence and the probability of process innovation. This finding is consistent with the view that political stability may hinder firms' incentive to innovate to maintain their competitiveness, as long as they can extract rents from long‐term connections with politicians. (JEL D22, D72, O31)     

Information and communication technology adoption in micro and small firms: Can internet access improve labour productivity?

The rapid spread of information and communication technologies (ICT) may increase firms’ productivity with important consequences for job creation and for economic growth. This article contributes to this discussion by analysing the impact of internet adoption on labour productivity and the mechanisms shaping this relationship in Peruvian micro and small manufacturing firms over the period 2011–2013. The article estimates a reduced form where labour productivity is a function of internet adoption and other explanatory factors. Internet adoption is instrumented using a measure of the availability of financial opportunities for micro and small firms in Peru. Findings indicate that internet adoption: (a) increases firms’ labour productivity; (b) reallocates employment away from temporary administrative workers and non‐remunerated workers and expands employment of permanent production workers; (c) leads to the formalization of labour relationships, to the implementation of new organizational practices and to the improvement of training measures. While changes in employment and formalization of workers are linked to labour productivity gains, increases in training measures and organizational changes do not generate any additional productivity increase. Policies oriented to promote the adoption of ICT in micro and small firms can be beneficial to close the productivity gap with larger firms in Peru. Moreover, policies directed to the formalization of the workforce can provide an extra benefit, i.e. additional labour productivity gains in firms adopting the internet. Finally, policies oriented to the development of digital skills are also important to ease the re‐employment of those workers losing their jobs and the achievement of additional productivity gains that new organizational practices can provide.     

Reframing the benefits and beneficiaries of public benefits programs

This article uses current research to demonstrate that in addition to the direct benefits received by recipients of four main types of public benefit programs—cash assistance, public health insurance, food assistance, and public housing—non-recipients receive a variety of indirect economic and noneconomic benefits. Non-recipients include individuals, families, organizations, businesses, neighborhoods, and the general public. The review indicates that public benefits programs can indirectly benefit non-recipients economically by increasing economic security; stimulating local, state, and national economies; increasing employment and other measures of economic well-being; generating tax revenues; and providing cost savings. In addition, we determined two main types of indirect noneconomic benefits: enhancing neighborhood quality and the intrinsic rewards gained from fulfilling humanitarian and related values. We then summarize the results of these studies and make suggestions for future research. Finally, based on the reviewed research, we identify methods to reframe negative perceptions of government spending on public benefits programs. By reframing the benefits and beneficiaries of these programs, social workers, professional organizations, lobbyists, politicians, and elected officials can increase societal and political support for public benefits programs.     

Does the early bird always get the worm? market institutions and the timing of employment decisions

Unravelling of appointment dates can be observed in some entry-level labor markets but not in others. A comparison of different markets shows how the costs of breaking contracts and being rematched can affect the timing of appointments and market behavior. If contracts can be terminated at any time by workers and if rematching costs are relatively small compared to the benefits from changing matches, early appointments in an entry-level labor market confers no benefit on firms. Firms then have no incentives to make early offers. However, if the costs offset the benefits from changing employment, firms that cannot compete with their principal competitors may prefer to make offers before some critical information becomes available rather than wait for the time when employment can actually start. Such a labor market may experience early appointments. But if the most desirable firms do not issue early offers, other firms may be rejected in any early period. Therefore, the most desirable firms can work together to halt unravelling. I am indebted to Esquire Donna Gerson and Koh Song Hui who extended help in writing this paper. My special thanks should be given to Alvin Roth for his suggestions and comments.     

The Social Backgrounds of Nazi Leaders: A Statistical Analysis of Political Elites in Weimar Germany, 1918–1933

This article compares the social backgrounds of Nazi leaders and representatives of democratic parties in the Weimar Republic. It does not advance any overarching new narrative on Nazism’s social origins, but rather aims to present a nuanced statistical picture of Weimar’s political elites. The results of this analysis are derived from an index of German members of parliament and from a new dataset, which has recently been collected from the Neue Deutsche Biographie (NDB), Germany’s largest biographical encyclopaedia. Together, these two samples cover more than 2000 German politicians, industrialists, diplomats, political writers, academics, high state officials, and important journalists. This article reveals sociological differences between the politicians who led the Nazi party in parliament and those elites that promoted Nazism in the media, in academia, or within the German civil service. While Nazi politicians in the Reichstag were recruited from a variety of social classes, ranging from industrial workers to members of the aristocracy, National Socialist elites outside the parliament typically belonged to the Bildungsbürgertum and sociologically resembled the highly educated members of democratic and liberal parties. Overall, the picture of a generation of Nazi leaders emerges that was sociologically far more heterogeneous than is often recognized by historians.     

Why dictators hold semi-competitive elections and encourage the use of semi-independent courts: a comment on Thornhill and Smirnova’s “litigation and political transformation”

In this comment, I highlight similarities between Russia’s contemporary political system and other post-Cold War dictatorships. Most modern dictatorships hold semi-competitive elections. That is, regime officials face competition in elections, but playing fields are tilted so as to leave little suspense about who will win. I suggest that semi-competitive elections and the encouragement of litigation by citizens against local and regional officials, as described by Thornhill and Smirnova (Accepted/In press), have similar functions from the dictator’s point of view. They help the ruling elite with monitoring and controlling local officials whose behavior might otherwise alienate citizens enough to threaten the dictatorial elite with overthrow. Thus the real benefits citizens receive from the increased use of the courts to resolve disputes and electoral competition among politicians are counterbalanced by the contribution these institutions make to the prolongation of dictatorship.     

Der Einfluss politischer Ereignisse auf die PopularitÄt von Parteien und Politikern und auf das Parteiensystem

Political events, entering the political system as external shocks, can have a sizable impact on the popularity of political parties and politicians. We investigate this impact using as examples the unregistered campaign donations to chancellor Kohl (CDU-Spendenaffäre) and the political handling of the flash flood in the Elbe region shortly before the last federal election. Our special contribution to the literature is the combined analysis of event impacts on the valence dimension of the German party system and the inertia of the ideological dimension. By using a principal component analysis we extract a two-dimensional political configuration containing the position of parties and politicians and voters’ ideal points. We show that the basic ideological structure of the party system remains nearly unaltered even by such prominent events as the Spendenaffäre (donations scandal). The main changes affect the valence dimension. Focusing on voters we show that the greatest change of evaluation of parties takes place within the group of independents while the partisans remain rather stable in their assessments.     

Origins of the epithet ‘government by public relations’: Revisiting Bruce Catton's War Lords of Washington, 1948

While it might make public relations professionals and faculty cringe, the term ‘government by public relations’ is a negative one, implying that governmental decision-making is guided by appearances rather than on the merits. This tag line is a relatively common American put-down of politicians and senior civil servants. This article examines the origins of the term, locating its usage in the WWII memoirs of Bruce Catton, then a government public information officer and later a renowned popular historian of the American Civil War. Catton's use of the term, his 1948 book War Lords of Washington, and his philosophy of government public information are examined in more detail to give context to the phrase ‘government by public relations.’     

Responding to Black Political Interests in the Post-Civil Rights Era: The Substantive Results of Black Political Incorporation

This article analyzes political responsiveness to minority communities through a case study of municipal employment opportunities in Richmond, Virginia. Using equal employment opportunity reports, it analyzes racial exclusion (the representation of minority workers within occupations) and racial subordination (the distribution of minority and nonminority workers across occupations) among Richmond's public sector workers. Additionally, it looks at percentage point changes in the representation of minority and nonminority workers in municipal jobs, to provide a more detailed analysis of the quality of opportunities that are made available as the city's dominant council coalitions changed from a White conservative coalition to a Black liberal regime to a multiracial conservative coalition. Qualitative data from interviews with the city's political actors clarify and support the patterns found in the employment data. The analysis demonstrates that the substantive resources Blacks are likely to gain differ significantly by political regime.     

The composition of public sector compensation: The effects of unionization and bureaucratic size

This paper examines the effect of the political power of public sector unions on the composition of public sector compensation. Public employee unions provide a relatively low-cost vehicle for organizing workers’ political activity in support of the rent-seeking behavior of local politicians. The unions also provide a conduit for employees to capture part of these rents as payment for political services. Since the public has little interest in paying for the political activities of public workers, these payments are most likely to be made through fringe benefits so as to minimize public scrutiny. The authors would like to thank an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions. Any errors remain those of the authors.     

Organizational Uncertainty and Labor Contracts in China's Economic Transition

Lifetime employment was a cornerstone of the Chinese socialist system constructed under Mao. In this system, organizations served the function of social security, and as a result, many organizations were overburdened with bloated work forces and retirees that drew from organizational coffers well into old age. Labor contracts fundamentally alter this system, as they allow firms to end the socialist institution of lifetime employment. Yet there is significant variation on the institutionalization of labor contracts in organizations. Based on a sample of 81 firms in industrial Shanghai, I show that organizations that are experiencing uncertainty in the economic transition are more likely to institutionalize labor contracts on an organizationwide basis. There are two types of organizational uncertainty in the economic transition: economic uncertainty and administrative uncertainty. In cases of economic uncertainty, firms that lost money in 1990 and firms that are burdened by large forces of retired workers are more likely to place their workers on labor contracts. In the case of administrative uncertainty, firms that are at the highest levels of the industrial hierarchy are also significantly more likely to place their workers on labor contracts. Although these upper level firms were the most protected under the command economy, they are being forced to handle the greatest among the responsibilities in the economic transition, and as a result, they experience the greatest sense of being set adrift by the state.     

OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT OF NONCOMPETE COVENANTS

Noncompete covenants or covenant not to compete (CNC) are clauses in employment contracts in which the employee agrees not to gain employment with a competitor firm. In this article, we study the efficiency aspects of such contracts by incorporating the effect of labor mobility restrictions on knowledge transfer across firms, investment decisions by firms, and investment by workers. Following research that shows state‐wise variations in the degree of CNC enforcement, we allow the strength of CNC enforcement to vary as a matter of regulatory policy and derive the optimal strength of enforcement. We also look at how regulations around CNCs should be optimally designed when employers can use collusive agreements, such as “no poaching” agreements, as an alternative to noncompete clauses. Given recent allegations of employer collusion among large Silicon Valley firms, we argue for a cautious approach in designing policies on CNC enforcement. (JEL J24, J41, J63, K31)     

SELF‐EMPLOYMENT,EFFICIENCY WAGE,AND PUBLIC POLICIES

Empirical evidence suggests that unemployed workers are much more likely to become self‐employed than wage‐employed workers. Also, higher unemployment benefits significantly reduce the rate of self‐employment. This article develops a model of self‐employment which incorporates transitions between unemployment and self‐employment. It integrates two strands of theoretical literature—models of occupational choice and the efficiency wage models. In this model, a higher unemployment benefit reduces the self‐employment rate and the transition rate of unemployed workers to self‐employment, which is consistent with empirical evidence. (JEL J23, J58, J64)     

EMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS OF IMMIGRANTS VERSUS NATIVES: EVIDENCE FROM THE BOOM‐BUST PERIOD IN SPAIN, 2000–2011

This article studies whether the durations in unemployment and employment for immigrants and natives respond differently to changes in economic conditions and to the receipt of unemployment benefits. Using Spanish administrative data for the period 2000–2011, we estimate multi‐spell duration models that disentangle unobserved heterogeneity from true duration dependence. Our findings suggest that immigrants are more sensitive to changes in economic conditions both in terms of unemployment and employment hazards. The effect of the business cycle is not constant but decreases with duration at a higher rate among immigrants. We provide evidence that the higher job separation rates and lower capital‐labor complementarity of immigrants are mechanisms that are possibly compatible with these results. We also find evidence of a disincentive effect of unemployment benefits on unemployment duration, which is stronger for immigrants, but only at the beginning of the unemployment spell, especially under good economic conditions. Finally, unemployment benefits increase job match quality only for native workers with temporary contracts. (JEL J64, J61, C23, C41, J65)     

POLITICAL NETWORKS ON TWITTER

This paper examines patterns of political activity and campaigning on Twitter in the context of the 2012 election in the Australian state of Queensland. Social media have been a visible component of political campaigning in Australia at least since the 2007 federal election, with Twitter, in particular, rising to greater prominence in the 2010 federal election. At state level, however, they have remained comparatively less important thus far. In this paper, uses of Twitter in the Queensland campaign from its unofficial start in February through to the election day of 24 March 2012 are tracked. Using innovative methodologies for analysing Twitter activities, developed by the research team, this study examines the overall patterns of activity in the relevant hashtag #qldvotes, and tracks specific interactions between politicians and other users by following some 80 Twitter accounts of sitting members of parliament and alternative candidates. Such analysis provides new insights into the different approaches to social media campaigning which were embraced by specific candidates and party organizations, as well as an indication of the relative importance of social media activities, at present, for state-level election campaigns.     

LABOR CONTRACTS AND FLEXIBILITY: EVIDENCE FROM A LABOR MARKET REFORM IN SPAIN

This paper evaluates the effects of a labor market reform in Spain that removed restrictions on fixed‐term or temporary contracts. Our empirical results are based on longitudinal firm‐level data that cover observations before and after the reform. We posit and estimate a dynamic labor demand model with indefinite and fixed‐term labor contracts, and a general structure of labor adjustment costs. Experiments using the estimated model show important positive effects of the reform on total employment (i.e., a 3.5% increase) and job turnover. There is a strong substitution of permanent by temporary workers (i.e., a 10% decline in permanent employment). The effects on labor productivity and the value of firms are very small. In contrast, a counterfactual reform that halved all firing costs would produce the same employment increase as the actual reform, but much larger improvements in productivity and in the value of firms. (JEL J23, J32, J41)     

The minimum wage and tipped employees

Using data from theCensus of Retail Trade, I estimate that allowing restaurants to use servers’ tipped income to satisfy minimum wage requirements would create at least 360,000 new high-paying jobs and increase total income for tipped workers by at least 8 percent. Conversely, if the minimum wage were increased 10 percent, tipped workers would experience a 4 percent decrease in employment and a 6 percent reduction in hours worked, and all servers (tipped and non-tipped) would experience a 3 to 5 percent decrease in total income because the tipped jobs lost paid more than the minimum wage. By not allowing employers to use all of a worker’s tipped income to meet the minimum wage, state and federal minimum wage laws inhibit the creation of hundreds of thousands of new jobs paying well above the minimum wage. Total elimination of this credit would decrease employment at least 10 percent.