基于风险视角的董事会相对权力与产品市场竞争力关系研究

利用2004~2012年928家深沪上市公司9年8 352个年度样本的大样本面板数据,从董事会治理风险的角度,验证了董事会相对管理层权力对公司产品市场竞争力的影响,检验了股权集中度和控股股东性质对两者关系的调节作用。研究发现,在不考虑股权集中度和控股股东性质的调节作用时,董事会相对权力同产品市场竞争力存在显著正相关关系;在考虑股权集中度和控股股东性质的情况下,股权集中度对董事会相对权力与公司产品市场竞争力之间关系有显著负向调节作用,控股股东性质对董事会相对权力与公司产品市场竞争力之间关系有显著负向调节作用。     

带有转移成本寡头垄断的二次定价及仿真

自主创新能力是企业成功的一个关键要素。以中国沪深两市2007年至2009年261家高科技行业上市公司为研究对象,运用分层多元回归技术,尝试在中国情境下基于高阶梯队和群体断裂带理论的双重视角,实证考察董事会认知异质性总量和结构对企业创新战略的影响。研究结果表明,董事会成员职能背景异质性、教育程度和董事会群体断裂带强度对企业创新战略具有积极的影响,董事会成员行业背景异质性对创新战略没有显著影响。该结果为在实践中优化董事会构成提供了新的决策依据。     

电子商务商业模式设计对企业绩效的影响机制研究

本文实证研究了环境动态性和关系嵌入性对电子商务商业模式设计与企业绩效之间关系的调节作用。研究发现效率型商业模式设计和新颖型商业模式设计对企业绩效具有显著正向影响;环境动态性对效率型商业模式设计与企业绩效的关系具有正向调节作用;关系嵌入性对新颖型商业模式设计与企业绩效的关系具有正向调节作用。     

创业导向与创新绩效：高管团队特征和市场动态性的影响

创业导向对创新绩效的提升具有重要的影响,但创业导向与创新绩效的关系还可能受高管团队特征和市场动态性的影响。根据基于注意力的观点,对创业导向、创新绩效、高管团队的异质性、高管团队的共同愿景和市场动态性的关系进行研究,探讨高管团队的异质性和共同愿景对创业导向与创新绩效关系的调节作用,并进一步研究这种调节作用是否受市场动态性的影响。利用在广东、江苏、山东、陕西和河南5地收集的264份调查问卷,采用多元线性回归和调节效应的检验方法对研究假设进行实证检验。研究结果表明,创业导向对创新绩效有正向促进作用,高管团队的异质性有助于加强创业导向与创新绩效的关系。在稳定的市场环境下,高管团队的异质性对创业导向与创新绩效关系的调节效应更强;在不考虑环境动态性和环境动态性较低的情况下,高管团队的共同愿景对创业导向与创新绩效关系的调节效应不显著,但在动态性较高的市场环境下,可以显著地正向调节创业导向与创新绩效的关系。     

权变视角下联盟网络与新创企业成长关系研究

基于权变视角,整合社会网络理论和战略制度观,探讨了联盟网络对新创企业成长的影响,并考察了制度环境和行业环境的调节效应。以189家中国新创企业的调研数据为基础开展了实证检验。结果表明,新创企业联盟网络关系强度及中心性位置对其成长绩效具有显著的正向影响;制度环境完善性在联盟网络关系强度与新创企业成长绩效关系中发挥着显著的负向调节作用;行业环境动态性正向调节联盟网络关系强度与新创企业成长绩效间关系,却负向调节联盟网络中心性位置与新创企业成长绩效间关系。     

动荡环境下技术多元化与企业绩效关系

基于资源基础理论,探索行业竞争互动和动态环境情境下技术多元化对企业绩效的影响。通过对创业板291家上市公司非平衡面板数据的实证分析,发现技术多元化负向影响企业绩效;行业竞争互动正向调节技术多元化与企业绩效之间的关系;环境动态性负向调节技术多元化与企业绩效之间的关系,且负向调节行业竞争互动对技术多元化与企业绩效关系的正向影响。研究表明,企业在实施技术多元化战略时应该考虑所处行业的竞争动态以及环境的动态性。     

动态环境下组织即兴对创业导向的影响机制研究

分析130家样本企业的调查数据,构建了组织即兴、环境动态性和创业导向之间的关系模型。研究发现:组织即兴由即时性和创造性两个维度构成,且这两个维度分别对创业导向有正向显著影响;环境动态性正向调节了创造性与创业导向之间的关系,但并不影响即时性与创业导向之间的关系。     

高新技术企业联盟导向、创业导向与企业绩效关系的实证研究

基于我国195家高新技术企业的问卷调查数据,实证分析了联盟导向和创业导向对企业绩效的影响,以及创业导向和环境动态性在联盟导向与企业绩效关系间的调节作用。研究结果表明:联盟导向和创业导向对企业绩效具有显著的正向影响;创业导向和市场动态性在联盟导向与企业绩效关系中起到正向调节作用;技术动态性在联盟导向与企业绩效的关系中起到负向调节作用。     

并购后控制与并购绩效的关系研究:基于合法性的调节效应

主并企业对被并企业的控制会影响并购绩效,而企业的各种利益相关者对于企业并购的态度即并购合法性会对并购后控制与并购绩效之间的关系产生影响。基于123个样本实证分析得到如下结论:主并企业对被并企业的非正式控制程度对主并企业的并购绩效具有显著积极作用,而正式控制程度与并购绩效之间没有显著相关性;并购的外部合法性对并购后正式控制与并购绩效之间的关系具有显著的正向调节作用,而并购的内部合法性对并购后非正式控制与并购绩效之间的关系具有显著的负向调节作用。研究结论对于中国企业的并购后决策以及如何实现并购目标具有理论指导价值。     

董事会成员地位差异、环境不确定性与企业投资行为

组织中的地位差异是影响组织决策效率的关键因素。基于组织理论,从公司董事会内部地位差异的视角,探讨董事会成员地位差异对企业投资行为的影响机理。以2009年至2013年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,在使用基尼系数度量董事会成员地位差异的基础上,运用STATA 12.0软件和多元回归分析方法,系统分析董事会成员地位差异与企业投资行为之间的关系,并探讨环境不确定性对地位差异与投资行为之间关系的调节作用。研究结果表明,随着董事会成员地位差异的升高,成员间信息交流受到阻碍,从而显著加重了企业投资不足的情况;当外部环境不确定性升高时,董事会成员地位差异与投资不足的关系会得到缓解。研究进一步发现,基于董事社会资本形成的地位差异会加重企业投资不足的情况,而基于政治资本形成的地位差异则与投资不足没有显著的相关关系。当考虑外部环境不确定性的影响时,基于政治资本形成的地位差异会加重企业的投资不足,但随着环境不确定性的升高,基于政治资本所形成的地位差异对投资不足的影响会被削弱; 而基于社会资本形成的地位差异对投资不足的影响并没有随环境不确定性的升高而发生改变。研究结论提高了对于组织内部成员间相互关系的理解,同时也为如何从团队整体角度考虑董事会成员的构成提供了一定的实践指导和理论参考。     

董事会社会资本、公司领导权结构对企业R&D投入程度的影响研究

基于资源依赖理论与管家理论,从内部治理层面探讨董事会社会资本在企业研发战略中的作用.首先构建董事会社会资本模型,同时引入董事会领导权结构,探讨董事会社会资本对企业研发投入的影响机理及边界条件.通过对2010～2012年制造业主板上市公司数据进行实证分析,结果表明:董事会社会资本对企业研发投入有积极的促进作用,并且董事会领导权两职合一时这种促进作用更显著.     

The cost of CEO duality: Evidence from French leadership compensation

This paper aims to provide a detailed analysis of the relationship between board leadership structures and executive compensation. According to agency theory, the combined position of CEO and Chairperson of the Board (COB) entails greater compensation for the CEO in order to reduce conflicts of interest. In the literature, combined board structure is generally considered to generate additional costs for companies. However, the choice of two separate structures implies the payment of incentive compensation for the COB in addition to that defined for the CEO. This paper investigates the financial cost of duality when compensation packages are set for both leaders. Our results suggest that although combined board structure is associated with higher incentive compensation for the CEO, the overall compensation cost to the company is no higher when the chairperson's compensation is considered.     

监事会的本原性质、作用机理与中国上市公司治理创新

针对理论上对监事会制度去留的争论,按照企业本质→企业目标→公司治理机能→监事会的本原性质与作用机理→中国上市公司治理创新这一思路进行了探讨。研究认为,企业在本质上是融契约性与生产性为一体的一组契约联合网络,其目标是持续竞争优势的获取与维系。对此,要求公司治理承担着对等的两项机能——保健机能和激励机能。依此逻辑,监事会的本原性质是通过业务监督与财务监督活动的展开,为缔约者提供了一个减少缔约风险,增加缔约意愿的监督制衡机构的同时,又为以股东为首的利益相关者提供了一个参与机制。最后,指出中国上市公司治理创新也应该以引入符合本原性质的监事会作为突破口。     

Corporate social responsibility in the board room – when do directors pay attention?

When do board directors pay attention to corporate social responsibility (CSR) issues? Board directors have traditionally focused on maximizing shareholder profit and viewed corporate governance narrowly as a way to meet this goal. They have paid little or no attention to CSR issues because they see CSR as a contrast to profit maximization. We argue in this article that companies can no longer ignore CSR. We propose that three conditions must be met in order for boards to pay attention toCSR. First, the board must have a mindset that considers CSR as contributing value to the firm. Second, the board must have relevant competences that enable members to understand CSR issues. Third, compensation of top-level management should reflect CSR performance. The first two conditions are directly linked to human resource development because, in order to embrace the specific challenges that CSR possesses, board members must develop an understanding of the CSR field and related challenges and opportunities for the company.     

Board Activities and the Denationalization of Ownership – The Case of Sweden

This article investigates the effects of a denationalization of ownership on the activities of corporate boards. A simultaneous change in investors' identity on the Swedish stock exchange and the board activities of large Swedish firms was observed during the late 90s. Drawing on the heritage hypothesis we conjectured that there could be a relationship between increased international ownership and increased board activities on firm level. The results show that board activities in terms of range of activities and engagement in the decision process increased during the 90s. No relationship was found between change in ownership identity and board activities, instead the increase in activities seemed to be a general phenomenon, while ownership change was firm specific. To explain this result a hypothesis of legitimization seeking behaviour and indirect influence of denationalization, specific to the period in question, is formulated.     

《萨班斯法案》对美国公司董事会影响的分析

2002年度美国出台的《萨班斯法案》全方位地对安然等事件暴露出来的问题作出相应的调整性规定,必将对公司治理产生深切的影响。《萨班斯法案》对审计委员会提出了修正性和提高性要求,本文选择外部董事、女性董事、财务专家、CEO兼任董事会主席、CEO在提名委员会任职等指标进行分析。实证分析结果说明:《萨班斯法案》有效消除了董事会和管理层任人唯亲的现象,董事会的独立性和专业性均有所提高。其实,《萨班斯法案》颁布之前就有加强公司治理的要求,公司治理就有改进的趋势,但《萨班斯法案》关于审计委员会方面的明文规定加速了公司董事会的变化,使得公司治理改革超越了法律的既定要求。     

The Determinants and Effects of Board Nomination Committees*

This article assesses the corporate governance-related antecedents of nomination committee adoption, and the impact of nomination committees’ existence and their composition on board independence and board demographic diversity. We conducted a longitudinal study of board composition amongst 210 Swiss public companies from January 2001 through December 2003, a period during which the Swiss (Stock) Exchange (SWX) introduced new corporate governance-related disclosure guidelines. We find firms with nomination committees are more likely to have a higher number of independent and foreign directors, but not more likely to have a higher number of female board members. Further, the existence of nomination committees is associated with a higher degree of nationality diversity but is not related to board educational diversity. We also find that nomination committee composition matters in the nomination of independent and foreign, but not of female directors. Our results suggest that understanding different board roles and composition require a multi-theoretical approach, and that agency theory, resource-dependence theory and group effectiveness theory help to explain different aspects of board composition and effectiveness. Finally, the article discusses the concept of diversity and appropriate ways to study diversity in a boardroom context. * The Editor acknowledges that Hans van Ees, Morten Huse, and Jonas Gabrielsson – convenors of the EURAM (European Academy of Management) Corporate Governance track in 2004 – acted as Co-Editors on this paper.     

董事会规模、内生性与公司绩效研究

纵观有关董事会治理机制的经验研究文献,可以发现绝大多数学者都面临着变量的联合内生性问题.重点关注在内生条件下,董事会规模和公司绩效的关系.使用中国上市公司2004年度数据研究发现,董事会规模是一个影响公司治理的重要因素,但是,与现有的研究文献不同,没有发现董事会规模与公司绩效显著相关.这个结果表明,平均而言,中国公司选择了最优的董事会规模.董事会规模在截面上的变化只是反映了公司运营环境的不同,而非公司对这些治理机制的不合理运用.     

外资参股、董事会特征与商业银行经营绩效——基于中国121家商业银行的实证分析

董事会是公司治理的核心,本文首次从外资股东参与董事会治理的视角,在运用固定效应模型和手工收集面板数据的基础上,使用分组比较研究方法,实证检验了2007-2016年121家商业银行外资参股、董事会特征与经营绩效的关系,结果发现引入外资参股的商业银行中：（1）董事会规模、非执行董事占比、董事会会议频率、专业委员会数目均与经营绩效之间存在显著正相关关系;（2）董事会中外资董事占比的增加,董事会规模、董事会会议频率、专业委员会数目与经营绩效之间的正相关关系均会显著减弱,然而非执行董事占比与经营绩效之间的正相关关系则会显著增强。据此,本文建议商业银行引入外资参股后：（1）应鼓励外资参与董事会治理,适当扩大董事会规模;向外资股东提供适量的非执行董事席位;适度增加董事会会议频率;积极完善专业委员会体系。（2）控制董事会中外资董事占比的不合理增加,确保外资董事与独立董事之间的实质性独立。     

Company Law and Corporate Governance of Start-ups in Germany: Legal Stipulations,Managerial Requirements,and Modification Strategies

Two topics which currently receivesubstantial interest are corporate governanceand start-up companies in the new economy.However, research combining both subjects israre. The present study aims to fill in thisgap because corporate governance is assumed toinfluence start-ups' performance. Sincepeculiarities of start-up companies exclude asimple application of extant governance wisdom,we develop propositions about corporategovernance structures of start-up companies inGermany – a country which has the most activestart-up scene in Europe but is also known forits far-reaching regulations of company law.This regulatory impact is most significantlyassociated with the choice of a legal form ofbusiness organization. While a certain legalform can provide some important advantages, itcan require at the same time corporategovernance structures which could imposeproblems on managing high-tech start-ups.Focussing the increasingly prevalent stockcorporation, we argue that this form, on theone hand, is advantageous for gaining resourcesand for the comprehensiveness of strategicdecision making. On the other hand, regulationsas the obligations to have collectiveresponsibilities in the management board and toset up a supervisory board can be expected todecelerate decision making and thus to putfirms at a disadvantage in high pacedindustries. We suggest that start-ups,therefore, make hidden modifications in orderto design effective corporate governanceconfigurations. The implementation of thesemodifications is facilitated by socialrelationships. First empirical insights intothe governance modalities of German start-upsare offered for illuminating our proposals.Thus, our study contributes to understandhow start-ups try to reconcile the governancedemands of both their business and their legalenvironment.