DRINKING AGE LAWS AND HIGHWAY MORTALITY RATES: CAUSE AND EFFECT

This paper presents estimates of the effects of the drinking age and beer taxes on youth motor vehicle mortality. A simultaneous equation model is used and the results show that the drinking age is a function of mortality rates. The results also show that for eighteen- to twenty-year-old drivers an increase in the drinking age to twenty-one, which is approximately 8 percent, would reduce mortality by approximately 18 percent. Also a 100 percent increase in the real beer tax, which is approximately $1.50 per case, would reduce highway mortality by about 27 percent.     

A RESPECIFIED TAX-ADJUSTED FISHER RELATION

How much will a 1% increase in expected inflation increase nominal interest rates? Irving Fisher's famous equation implies that nominal interest rates will rise in proportion to an increase in expected inflation. Darby and Feldstein, correcting the Fisher equation for taxation, predict a nominal interest rate increase of [1/(1 - T)]% where T is the marginal tax rate: i.e., if T =3, then a 1 % increase in expected inflation should cause a 1.4 % rise in interest rates. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that the rise in interest rates is much smaller than the Darby/Feldstein prediction. Estimates are around 9, varying mostly between 5 and 1.15, which is much closer to Fisher's original prediction. It is important to know the size of the interest rate response to inflation expectations in a world in which inflation and interest rates are volatile and in which tax laws are designed to influence savings and investment through interest rates. In this paper we attempt to close the gap between theorized and estimated effects of inflation by incorporating into the Fisher equation two important aspects of the U.S. tax code: historic cost depreciation and the lower tax rate on capital gains. Our model shows that the effect of expected inflation on interest rates is dampened by the lower benefits from depreciation deductions arid the capital gains tax. Our corrected Fisher equation predicts a 1.12 % nominal interest rate increase, rather than the 1.4 % increase implied by the Darby/Feldstein model. The, our model closes about 56 % of the gap between theory and empirical evidence. The remainder could be closed by additional refinements in the model or better empirical modeling.     

INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPETITION AND THE DEFICIT BIAS

I analyze the dynamic effects of tax competition on public budget deficits. I find that stronger tax competition leads to a fiscal deficit bias at the early stages of financial liberalization. When countries differ in terms of capital mobility, further liberalization leads to external imbalances and diverging fiscal deficits while corporate tax rates converge. Consistent with theory, I find that stronger tax competition increases deficits in a sample of OECD countries, controlling for tax revenues and other standard determinants of fiscal deficits. (JEL E62, F62)     

TAXATION, AGGREGATE ACTIVITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: CROSS-COUNTRY EVIDENCE ON SOME SUPPLY-SIDE HYPOTHESES

Data from sixty-three countries are used to examine the impact of average and marginal tax rates on the level and growth of economic activity. Apparent negative effects of tax rates on growth disappear upon controlling for (1) potential endogeneity of average tax rates to per capita income and (2) the relation between economic growth and per capita income. However, controlling for average tax rates, increases in marginal tax rates have negative effects on the level of economic activity. This evidence supports the hypothesis that reductions in the "progressivity" of tax rates induce a parallel shift upward in the growth path.     

Targeting occupations with varying reputations to increase tax revenue

If the government's goal is to raise tax revenue in a cost-effective manner, which (if any) occupation categories could be targeted with a higher probability of an audit to yield increased revenue? Looking beyond mere opportunity to evade (e.g., self-employment) and starting from the premise that taxpayers in certain occupations evade more than others, the issue is whether these taxpayers respond to a change in the audit rate. Theory suggests that compliance increases in response to higher audit rates; the occupations with the higher evaders could therefore be targeted. This theory is tested by drawing a connection between occupation, reputation, and tax compliance. We assume that taxpayers in occupations with high need for reputation respond to a lower extent to increased tax audits than taxpayers whose achievement does not depend on reputation. The results support the effectiveness of raising tax revenue by targeting specific occupations, non-managers, with a higher probability of an audit.     

Power,justice, and trust: A moderated mediation analysis of tax compliance among Ethiopian business owners

We explored the moderating roles of legitimate and coercive power held by the tax authority in the relationship between procedural justice, trust in the tax authority, and voluntary tax compliance. Drawing from fairness heuristic theory and the slippery slope framework of tax compliance, we predicted that procedural justice fosters voluntary tax compliance, particularly when legitimate power of the tax authority is low and when coercive power of the authority is high. Moreover, we predicted that these interactive effects are mediated by (cognition-based) trust. Finally, we predicted that coercive power of the tax authority is positively related with enforced tax compliance. The results of a field study among Ethiopian business owners supported most predictions. This research is among the first to integrate social–psychological and deterrence-related factors to understand tax compliance behavior in a developing country.     

THE CREDIT‐CHANNEL TRANSMISSION MECHANISM AND THE NONLINEAR GROWTH AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF INFLATION AND TAXES

With the credit‐channel effect driven by the central bank's open market operations, this paper's model easily gives rise to the nonlinear inflation‐growth nexus, which is evidenced by a number of cross‐country empirical studies. The threshold level of the inflation rate is found to be lower when tax rates are higher. The presence of the credit‐channel effect also provides the rationale for setting positive (and smaller than 1) tax rates on consumption, labor income, and capital income. The optimal tax rates rise as the inflation target declines. Under a fiscal policy rule where labor and capital income taxes move proportionally to each other, the optimal capital income tax rate could be higher than the optimal labor income tax rate. Under a sufficiently large central bank balance sheet, the credit‐channel effect will be so weak that inflation and all kinds of taxes are growth and welfare repressing. This provides a rationale for central banks that have implemented quantitative easing policies to shrink their balance sheets. (JEL E58, E62, O42)     

Optimal income taxation with Kalai wage bargaining and endogenous participation

This paper characterizes the optimal redistributive tax schedule in a search–matching framework where (voluntary) nonparticipation and (involuntary) unemployment are endogenous and wages are determined by proportional bargaining à la Kalai. The optimal employment tax rate is given by an inverse elasticity rule. This rule depends on the global response of the employment rate, which depends not only on the participation (labor supply) responses, but also on the vacancy posting (labor demand) responses and on the product of these two responses. For plausible values of the parameters, our matching environment induces much lower employment tax rates than the usual competitive model with endogenous participation only. However, optimal employment tax rates are larger (in absolute value) when a given level of the global elasticity of employment is more due to search frictions and less due to participation responses.     

NEW ESTIMATES OF THE OPTIMAL TAX ON ALCOHOL

In this paper I use a new data set to estimate the optimal alcohol tax rate. As a benchmark, the empirical results imply that the optimal tax rate is over 100 percent of the net-of-tax price. However, alcohol taxation is a second-best solution to the problems associated with alcohol abuse. I conclude that the optimal alcohol tax rate would be much lower if punishment for drunk driving were more certain and severe. Government provision of information about the health consequences of heavy drinking would also remove part of the efficiency rationale for alcohol taxes.     

Learning in experiments: Dynamic interaction of policy variables designed to deter tax evasion

While neoclassical economic theory sheds insight into the way that audit rates and penalty rates interact when individuals decide to declare income for taxation, it predicts far lower levels of compliance than observed levels of compliance. This paper analyses experimental responses to explore a dynamic interaction between audit and penalty rates as individuals learn how to comply with taxation. It compares the responses of subjects in experiments with responses that are predicted when individuals rely on an adaptive learning process (that offers information feedback about decision payoffs). This comparison suggests that learning is an important consideration when explaining differences between predicted and observed levels of tax compliance.     

Reference dependent preferences,hedonic adaptation and tax evasion: Does the tax burden matter?

We study the effects of the tax burden on tax evasion both theoretically and experimentally. We develop a theoretical framework of tax evasion decisions that is based on two behavioral assumptions: (1) taxpayers are endowed with reference dependent preferences that are subject to hedonic adaptation and (2) in making their choices, taxpayers are affected by ethical concerns. The model generates new predictions on how a change in the tax rate affects the decision to evade taxes. Contrary to the classical expected utility theory, but in line with previous applications of reference dependent preferences to taxpayers’ decisions, an increase in the tax rate increases tax evasion. Moreover, as taxpayers adapt to the new legal tax rate, the decision to evade taxes becomes independent of the tax rate. We present results from a laboratory experiment that support the main predictions of the model.     

Psychological taxing in Flemish municipalities

We analyse whether the psychological pricing in the private sector has a public sector counterpart in tax policy. Analysing the main theoretical arguments for the existence of price points, and applying them to the public sector, suggests that psychological taxing reveals itself by the use of non-0 ending tax rates. The tax rate endings of the local income taxes, which are set by 308 Flemish municipalities in the fiscal year 1998, suggests the presence of psychological taxing. Non-0 endings occur more frequently in municipalities where demand for public policy is more elastic (and where, therefore, the benefits to the politicians from setting a tax just below a tax point is higher). The pre-tax income inequality and the level of the tax rate positively affect psychological taxing. The latter effect is reinforced in those municipalities where the existing tax rate is above the average tax rate in neighbouring municipalities and below their neighbours’ minimum, although this effect has a limited effect and is offset the further below the minimum the tax is set.     

AN ANALYSIS OF THE LAFFER CURVE

The Laffer curve shows the relationship between tax revenue and the personal income tax rate, with tax revenue being a presumably concave function of the tax rate and equal to zero at tax rates of zero percent and 100 percent. If the personal income tax rate is reduced, then tax revenue will decrease (increase) if the economy is on the positively (negatively) sloped section of the Laffer curve. This paper derives a sufficient condition for the economy to be on the positively sloped section of the Laffer curve. In light of the current knowledge of the elasticities of supply of labor and supply of saving, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that a decrease in U.S. personal income tax rates will decrease tax revenue.     

An application of attribution and equity theories to tax evasion behavior

Traditional economic theory often has been utilized in an attempt to explain tax evasion behavior. Although economic consequences are important factors in the understanding of tax evasion behavior, they alone do not appear adequate to describe and predict the phenomenon. The results of two experiments which apply two social psychological theories, attribution theory and equity theory, to tax evasion judgments are reported. In the first experiment, the effects of personal need and degree of societal consensus were investigated. Both variables significantly affected recommended penalty judgments. In the second experiment, the effects of societal need and distinctiveness were studied. Neither societal need nor distinctiveness affected recommended penalty judgments. However, a significant interaction effect was found concerning subjects' behavioral intentions to evade. The present research suggests that both attribution theory and equity theory may be helpful in formulating hypotheses and enhancing our understanding of tax evasion behavior.     

TAX-RATE UNCERTAINTY, FACTOR SUPPLIES, AND WELFARE

Uncertainty about prospective changes in tax rates may increase factor supplies, and hence the tax base, permitting a reduction in tax rates that could result in a net increase in welfare. Under empirically relevant assumptions about attitudes towards risk we find that when an individual exclusively saves or works, the tax base rises in response to greater tax-rate uncertainty, so that welfare could indeed increase. However, when an individual both saves and works, the supply of the randomly taxed factor declines with increased uncertainty, implying that tax revenue and welfare decrease when the nonrandom tax rate is sufficiently low.     

Veblen’s theory of the leisure class revisited: implications for optimal income taxation

Several previous studies have demonstrated the importance of relative consumption comparisons for public policy. Yet, almost all of them have ignored the role of leisure for status comparisons. Inspired by Veblen (The theory of the leisure class. Macmillan, New York, 1899), this paper assumes that people care about their relative consumption and that leisure has a displaying role in making relative consumption more visible, based on a two-type model of optimal income taxation. While increased importance of relative consumption typically implies higher marginal income tax rates, in line with previous research, the effect of leisure-induced consumption visibility is to make the income tax more regressive in terms of ability.     

Decision heuristics and tax perception – An analysis of a tax-cut-cum-base-broadening policy

In this paper, both a conjoint analysis and a lab experiment are conducted to analyze the influence of changes in the tax rate and the tax base on the perceived tax burden. Our results show that the majority of individuals do not make rational tax decisions based on the actual tax burden but rather use simple decision heuristics. This leads to an irrationally high impact of changes in nominal tax rates on the perceived tax burden. Taxpayers favor tax options that apply a lower tax rate on their gross income over a higher tax rate applied on their net income despite the lower actual tax burden of the latter option. This result suggests that politicians could combine increasing fiscal revenues and decreasing subjects’ tax perception. Furthermore, overestimation of tax rate changes increases considerably when information on tax rate is considered first (framing effect).     

Intention to pay taxes or to avoid them: The impact of social value orientation

Economic factors such as audit rates and fines have shown inconsistent effects on tax payments, suggesting that they are not sufficient to explain tax compliance. Moreover, the tax compliance rate is surprisingly higher than what the standard economic model would predict. In the last fifteen years, literature aimed at solving this so called “puzzle of compliance” has increased and pointed out several factors that could possibly explain tax compliance processes, e.g., knowledge of the tax laws, trust toward the political system, as well as personal or social norms. The studies presented here examined the impact of social value orientation on tax morale and intention to avoid/evade taxes. Social value orientation was examined both as a chronic personal orientation (Studies 1 and 2) and as a contextual factor made salient by experimental manipulations (Study 3). The results are supportive of a relationship between social value orientation and measures of tax compliance. Furthermore, results of Study 3 provided evidence for a causal effect of social value orientation on intended tax non-compliance. The effect of social value orientation on intended tax non-compliance was mediated by tax morale (Studies 2 and 3). Results are discussed with reference to their potential practical applications.     

THE MICROECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF MEASURING BRACKET CREEP and OTHER TAX CHANGES

We derive a measure of the bracket-creep-induced inflation tax based on an income-compensation function that recognizes that consumers substitute among deductible and nondeductible goods as the incentives to consume the goods change over time. The measure of the inflation tax is decomposed into a convenient function of marginal tax rates and the change in expenditures on tax deductible goods relative to nondeductible goods that are required to maintain a fixed level of utility. Tentative estimates suggest that the inflation tax as a percentage of constant utility income during the 1970s averaged about 1 percent per year.     

税务稽查的功能、问题及完善路径研究

税务稽查是税收的重要环节,税收越发展,稽查越重要。目前,我国税务稽查工作存在着很多问题和不足,这将直接影响中国整体税务工作的协调发展和国家税收的保全。因此,研究税务稽查的完善路径对于我们构建和谐税收具有重要的理论和实践意义。