企业现金持有量影响因素的实证研究——来自我国上市公司的经验证据

20世纪90年代末,国外企业出现持有大量现金与现金等价物的现象,为什么企业持有大量的现金与现金等价物,以及企业持有现金的后果等问题,逐步得到国外学者的关注而成为一个研究的热点,国外学者主要从权衡理论、信息不对称理论、公司治理机制,以及投资者的法律保护程度等方面展开现金持有量的研究.由于我国的经济与制度环境同国外有很大差别,我国证券市场的发展处于一个转型时期,内部人控制严重,资本市场还不完善,国外的实证结论直接移植到国内缺乏说服力.上市公司现金持有量的影响因素也逐步得到国内学者的关注,但我国的研究还处于起步阶段.本文在理论分析与文献梳理的基础上,以我国部分上市公司为样本,检验了我国上市公司的特质性因素和公司治理机制对公司现金持有量的影响.研究结果表明,公司现金持有量与财务杠杆、银行性债务、净营运资本负相关,与公司的投资机会正相关,权衡理论和优序融资理论得到了经验支持;国有股、董事会规模、股东保护程度与现金持有量负相关;经营者持股与现金持有量正相关;股权集中度、独立董事、以及领导权结构并没对公司现金持有量产生显著影响.本文从现金持有量的角度为我国上市公司治理的不完善性提供了证据,需要我们从股权结构、董事会特征等方面进一步完善公司治理机制,规范公司的现金持有行为.     

An Empirical Analysis of Strike Durations in Ghana from 1980 to 2004

Abstract. This paper provides a seminal analysis of strike activity for an African country in investigating the determinants of strike durations in Ghana over the period 1980–2004. The empirical approach uses a set of well‐known parametric accelerated failure time strike duration models. There is a broad consensus among the different empirical models about the role exerted on average strike duration by strike size, the rate of inflation, enterprise ownership, and political governance. However, evidence on the relationship between strike durations and business cycle activity in Ghana is less clear‐cut.     

Total Board Compensation,Governance and Performance of Spanish Listed Companies

In this paper we present empirical evidence on the relationship between board remuneration of a sample of large Spanish companies and a set of explanatory variables such as performance and size of the company. The objective is to provide additional empirical evidence based on the agency theory for the Spanish institutional context, which differs from most ‘Anglo–Saxon’ model studies. We focus on the impact of a company's governance structure on the relationship between pay and performance. Specifically, we consider ownership concentration and firm leverage as key determinants of the board–shareholders relationship. Our results confirm the positive relationship between board remuneration and company performance, which is stronger for book values than for stock market measures. Industry performance also explains the remuneration and provides useful information for evaluating board behaviour. Company size is also related to board remuneration and affects the pay–performance relationship, although it is not relevant when we use an elasticity approach. Finally, the governance structure of companies is relevant when explaining the power of the compensation–performance relationship, and differences between the impact of ownership concentration and firm leverage on this relationship are found.     

Entrenchment in publicly traded family firms: Evidence from the S&P 500

Family involvement in corporate governance through ownership, management, and board membership presents a unique dilemma for understanding the strategic impetus and costs of entrenchment decisions. The presence of shared family ties and the family-centered goals of firm principals call to question the applicability of extant agency arguments regarding the nature and antecedents of managerial entrenchment. Exploring this, we develop and test a model of family firm-specific determinants (i.e., family ownership and family's involvement in management and governance) of entrenchment in publicly traded firms by drawing upon principal-principal agency theory. Findings of the empirical analysis of family owned S&P 500 firms suggest family firms are motivated to entrench managers when doing so supports the pursuit of family-centric goals. However, the extent to which entrenchment supports such goals varies at different levels of family ownership.     

Corporate Governance und Eigenkapitalkosten - Bestandsaufnahme des Schrifttums unter besonderer Ber��cksichtigung des Informationsaspektes und Forschungsperspektiven

The present paper provides an overview of research concerning the relationship between corporate governance and the cost of equity capital. The purpose is to explore whether and to what extent corporate governance attributes manifest in firms?? cost of capital. Since the separation of ownership and control is seen as the starting point for the academic thinking on this issue, the term of corporate governance from a shareholder perspective is discussed in more detail. Apart from this terminological discussion the emphasis of this paper lies on the critical review of theoretical and empirical literature. In conducting this review, empirical concepts measuring the relevant dimensions and their potential limitations are explained. Based on these limitations I suggest opportunities for expanding research on the relationship between corporate governance and cost of equity capital, thereby showing future research directions.     

International corporate social responsibility and post-entry performance of developing market INVs: The moderating role of corporate governance mechanisms

Building on the stakeholder, agency, and resource dependence theories; this paper investigates the role of international corporate social responsibility (CSR) for the post-entry performance of developing market international new ventures (INVs) in the presence of corporate governance mechanisms to overcome their agency and environmental problems. We test and validate the conceptual model using survey data collected from 110 INVs operating in the developing market of Pakistan. Our results show that international CSR promotes the post-entry performance of developing market INVs. Further, we found that this association is moderated by corporate governance mechanisms of ownership, board independence, and returnee board members. Specifically, the relationship between international CSR and post-entry performance is weaker when ownership is concentrated but stronger when outsider and returnee board members are present in developing market INVs. The findings of this study have important theoretical and practical implications for INVs' social strategies and international performance contingent upon corporate governance.     

Does strategic corporate performance depend on corporate financial architecture? Empirical study of European,Russian and other emerging market’s firms

Performance of the firm depends on its structural dimensions: capital structure, ownership structure and corporate governance. Their interactions are known as corporate financial architecture according to S. Myers. In this paper we analyze financial architecture which is a mix of ownership structure, capital structure, control and board’s composition, and therefore, provides the given framework for improving corporate performance. We contribute to the literature by different attributes of our study. In contrast to most empirical papers on performance, we develop integrated rather than segmented approach combining the intrinsic components of corporate financial design in one research model. We introduce new variable to capture the structure of ownership for the purpose of performance analysis. Our third contribution is based on comparative analysis of the influence of financial architecture over corporate performance in rather different capital market environment: developed European and emerging (developing) capital market’s countries. We start with a classic empirical model of the impact of ownership structure, capital structure and other components of financial architecture on the corporate performance. Further we verify the validity of exogenous nature of key variables of the classic model when applying it to companies in developed and emerging market environment. Our results could have some important policy implications for the firms in normal economic environment as well as in the period of global economic crisis. We found that the higher proportion of related ownership which indicates investors with significant voting power and the board’s composition affect firm performance positively. The related shareholders and independent directors seem to add more value to firms while the impact of government ownership differs depending on the country. The emerging market’s sample versus the one from developed countries proves the stronger influence of corporate financial architecture over performance.     

Ownership structure,investors’ protection and corporate valuation: the effect of judicial system efficiency in family and non-family firms

Research on the effect of ownership structure on firm performance shows no convergent evidence concerning the sign and form of the above-mentioned relationship. Similarly, there is no homogeneous evidence documenting family ownership concentration is always positively or negatively correlated with firm value, or irrelevant. This paper analyses whether and how the de facto investor protection provided by the judicial system affects the relationship between corporate performance and ownership structure in 1314 firms operating in four European countries (Germany, France, Italy, and Spain) over a five-year period, 2010–2014. Moreover, we analyse whether judicial system efficiency influences if and how family firms in the controlling coalition collude for expropriating minority shareholders. Our findings show that the level of shareholder protection, derived from judicial efficiency, is relevant to the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance, thus corroborating literature in that institutional contexts matter in explaining such relations. The results suggest the need for more efficient external mechanisms of corporate governance to facilitate investment in equity capital, thus decreasing the country risk perceived by investors.     

Impacts of institutional pressures and the strength of market supporting institutions in the host country on the ownership strategy of multinational enterprises: theoretical discussion and propositions

The ownership strategy of multinational enterprises (MNEs) i.e. the choice between wholly owned subsidiary (WOS) or international joint venture (IJV) is an extensively studied topic in international business studies. Many past studies concentrated on transactional, economic, location attraction, resource seeking and learning rationales for the ownership strategy of MNEs. However, it is important to note that MNEs enter a new institutional environment also when they enter new international markets. Therefore, the ownership strategy of MNEs is also influenced by the external as well as internal institutions. This paper attempts to address the impacts of different institutional pressures on ownership strategy of MNEs using the arguments from institutional theory. The paper also includes discussion about the strength of market supporting institutions in the host country and its impacts on the ownership strategy of MNEs. On the basis of the theoretical discussion, several propositions are developed in this paper. These propositions relate the ownership strategy of MNEs with the impacts of internal and external institutional pressures on it. It is also proposed to consider the impact of strength of market supporting institutions in the host country on the ownership strategy specifically. When the host country has well developed institutions supporting market conforming values, they can moderate the impacts of coercive and normative pressures from external institutions on the MNEs.     

政府行为、股权安排与公司治理的有效性——基于盈余质量视角的研究

本文以我国2000至2005年期间A股上市公司为研究对象,探讨在政府控制的特殊经济环境下,股权安排对会计盈余质量的影响,试图从会计契约角度对公司治理有效性做出新的诠析。本研究发现,控股股东对盈余质量的影响是非线性的,而第二大股东则对控股股东的壕沟防御效应起到有效的遏制作用。研究还发现,在政府行政干预力度加大和内部人利益侵害行为加剧的双重推动下,国有上市公司财务报告质量将进一步被降低。     

The effect of alliance experience and intellectual capital on the value creation of international strategic alliances

This paper investigates the effects of intellectual capital (IC), alliance experience and their interaction on the value creation of international strategic alliances (ISAs). Based on a sample of ISAs formed by US firms, we find that firms with a higher level of IC receive greater announcement-period wealth gains. In addition, the empirical results suggest experience positively enhances the wealth effect of ISAs. Finally, we find a significant positive interaction effect between experience and IC on the wealth creation of ISAs. The results demonstrate the importance of considering the joint effects of IC and experience in assessing the value creation of ISAs.     

Neither Hierarchy nor Identity: Knowledge-Governance Mechanisms and the Theory of the Firm

Building on existing empirical research on knowledge transfer, sharing and integration in inter-firm and intra-firm relations, it is argued that there is little evidence and theoretical reason for assigning exclusive properties to internal or external organization, as such, in a knowledge-governance respect. A more micro framework is then theoretically developed, in which a portfolio of knowledge-governance mechanisms is evaluated according to two criteria: the cognitive `possibility' to sustain certain types of knowledge interchanges; and the comparative cost of the mechanism where more than one is applicable.The results of both the empirical and conceptual analyses conducted cast doubts on the possibility of having a `theory of the firm,' based on the deterministic presence/absence of certain attributes and the possession of exclusive properties – no matter if hierarchy or identity – and call for a more `continuous' (rather than `discrete') and `combinative' (rather than mutually exclusive) notion of governance forms.     

Secondary agency conflicts: A synthesis and proposed measurement model

Secondary agency conflicts typically arise when ownership and control are combined in the hands of dominant shareholders who could then seek to misappropriate returns at the expense of minority shareholders. This type of agency conflict has attracted attention from researchers for the past nearly three decades. However, efforts at measuring secondary agency conflicts have been fragmented and scattered. The absence of a coherent and valid approach to assess the scope and intensity of secondary agency conflicts has impeded progress in both empirical and conceptual development of the topic area. Based on a review of the extant body of literature, this paper develops a composite Shareholder Inequity index that measures the potential for secondary agency conflicts employing three different governance dimensions that are grounded in the agency literature: blockholder power, differential control, and the absence of board neutrality. The index is tested and validated empirically using a sample of 748 publicly listed U.S. firms. The resulting Shareholder Inequity index demonstrates high levels of validity and reliability. Future corporate governance studies can utilize this validated measure to investigate potential secondary agency conflicts more consistently and rigorously in order to strengthen organizational theory development and research.     

Greenfield or acquisition entry: A review of the empirical foreign establishment mode literature

This paper reviews the empirical literature on the determinants of the choice by multinational enterprises between entering foreign countries through greenfields or acquisitions. We discuss and compare the main theoretical perspectives used, provide a detailed overview of the empirical findings, examine why these findings have often been inconsistent, and offer theoretical and methodological suggestions to guide future research.     

基于现代公司治理理论的最优股权结构研究

基于股权高度分散的传统公司治理理论已受到现代经济学的挑战,股权相对集中且存在控股股东是现代股份制度的典型特征.从现代公司治理理论出发,构建了控股股东和监督股东各自的价值模型,定量地证明了最优股权结构的存在性,并从理论上推演出控股股东和监督股东的最优持股比例,以弥补仅从实证角度研究的不足.     

The determinants of top management pay

Agency theory argues that companies need to structure their top management pay so as to attract, retain, motivate, and reward senior executives. It is implicit in this literature that managers should be rewarded for performance and that company size should not be a significant determinant of compensation. Empirical evidence in many countries has concluded, however, that size is a major determinant of management remuneration and the pay-for-performance link is very weak. This study examines the determinants of senior executives’ remuneration and bonus payments in Hong Kong companies using recently available data. We examine both the level of pay and changes in pay. Corporate size is found to be a major explanator of remuneration levels and of changes in the pay of the CEO and executive directors. Accounting profitability is also a significant explanator of compensation. Performance, as measured by stock returns, has little or no statistically significant relationship with pay; in fact, some of the results show negative relationships. Some share ownership characteristics have influences on the levels of remuneration. In particular, share ownership by directors and share ownership by institutional investors moderate the compensation levels. In contrast, corporate governance variables have little association with change in pay. Overall, the results imply agency arguments that advocate pay-for-performance compensation schemes are not major factors in setting top management remuneration in Hong Kong.     

Decades of research on market entry modes: What do we really know about external antecedents of entry mode choice?

The choice of a mode of market entry is a critical component of the internationalization strategy, and numerous empirical studies have focused on this topic. Prior research, however, has provided mixed empirical evidence and thus, is difficult to interpret and review.This study examines the external antecedents of the choice of entry mode by meta-analyzing data from 72 independent primary studies. We focus on the decision between wholly owned subsidiaries and cooperative entry modes. For each variable, hypotheses about the theoretically expected direction of effect are posited and tested.We find a strong positive relationship between power distance as a cultural trait of the firm's home country and the propensity to establish a wholly owned subsidiary. On the other hand, we find a negative association between country risk, legal restrictions, market growth, and market size and the preference for wholly owned subsidiaries. We extensively discuss the implications of the meta-analytical results and investigate moderating effects of industry type and the time of the study. The relationship between income level of the host country and entry mode depends, to some degree, on the industry type. Service companies exhibit a negative relationship between income level and wholly owned subsidiaries, while manufacturing companies show a positive relationship.     

Bargaining power and the trade-off between the ownership and control of international joint ventures in China

Equity ownership and operational control constitute two crucial elements in the design of the governance structure of international joint ventures (IJVs). Based on the bargaining power theory, this study proposes that discrepancies between majority ownership and dominant control may exist as a consequence of bilateral bargaining, which is attributable to the influence of both contextual and resource content variables. Based on a survey database containing over 700 IJVs in China, our empirical findings illustrate contingencies under which equity share and dominance of control may reveal a trade-off relationship. The foreign partner will be more likely to secure a position of dominant control by accepting ownership concessions when it is at the upstream stage of the IJV, which is characterized by a high dependence on foreign input. Furthermore, while intangible resources furnished by the foreign parent exert positive impacts on the foreign partner’s attainment of dominant operational control in general, the foreign partner’s supply of product related knowledge and marketing expertise is particularly capable of rendering it bargaining power in managing the trade-off between ownership and control whenever necessary. These findings may suggest foreign firms adopt a flexible mindset in their negotiations with potential local counterparts in order to achieve collaborative goals.     

中国上市公司治理水平及其对绩效影响的实证研究

本文构建了中国上市公司治理水平的评价指数,并据此对中国上市公司治理水平的现状、影响因素以及与绩效的关系进行了实证分析。研究结果表明:我国上市公司治理水平总体不高;股权结构对公司治理水平具有显著影响,政府控股型公司的治理水平最高,国有资产管理机构控股型公司的治理水平要高于国有法人控股型公司,而一般法人控股型及股权分散型公司的治理水平介于前两者之间 , 但不存在显著差异;公司治理水平对净资产收益率具有正向影响但对市净率却具有负向影响。本文最后给出了上述研究结论的政策意义。     

中小商业银行公司治理机制与经营绩效关系的实证分析

理论和实证研究证明,良好的公司治理对金融体系稳健运行有十分重要的作用.商业银行公司治理的研究和实践既是银行业改革的迫切要求,也是银行业改革的核心内容之一.本文用36家商业银行2005年的截面数据,对股权结构、董事会、监事会和高管人员薪酬激励等四个治理机制与银行绩效之间的关系进行了实证研究.结果表明,国有与非国有控股商业银行绩效不存在显著差异,第一大股东对银行绩效的影响并不显著,但外部大股东能显著地提高银行绩效.董事会与监事会规模与银行绩效正相关,但独立性难以得到保证.此外,高管人员薪酬激励不能改善银行绩效.