POSTED PRICES VERSUS BARGAINING IN MARKETS WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

A search model is employed to analyze the choice between posting a price and bargaining for the seller of an asset who is imperfectly informed about both buyer valuations and buyer bargaining abilities. A mean preserving increase in risk of buyer valuations is relevant (and beneficial) to the seller; however, only the mean (and not the distribution) of buyer bargaining abilities is relevant. If is sufficiently high, the seller utilizes a posted price. Interestingly, social welfare decreases in while an increase in reduces expected search costs, it also results in misallocation of the good because the seller is less discriminating. ( JEL D42, D83)     

IMPOSED HEALTH INSURANCE IN MONOPOLISTIC MARKETS: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

The impact of public health insurance on price and output of medical care is analyzed within the context of monopolistic markets for health services. An important result, which is not obtained in competitive markets, is that indemnity benefits cause smaller price increases than service benefits, both directly and indirectly through the effect of benefit structure on the production of information. Various types of price regulation are considered, including limitation to "usual, customary, and prevailing" levels, a frequently used technique. With a simple dynamic model this type of regulation is shown to cause chronic price inflation.     

INFORMATION SHARING AND TACIT COLLUSION IN LABORATORY DUOPOLY MARKETS

This paper reports 45 laboratory duopoly markets that examine the importance of information sharing in facilitating tacit collusion under conditions of demand uncertainty. Sellers in these repeated laboratory markets generally shared information when possible to reduce their demand uncertainty, which led to output reductions in some demand states. Risk aversion is a likely explanation for this sharing, but some sellers also appeared to employ a strategy of information concealment to punish non-colluding rivals. Nevertheless, output choices were similar in control treatments that forced sellers to share or conceal information, so the information sharing itself did not substantially increase tacit collusion. ( JEL C92, D80, L13)     

ACQUISITION AND DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION IN IMPERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MARKETS

In imperfectly competitive markets, incentives for the acquisition and dissemination of information by prices is significantly affected by strategic considerations. Since prices reveal information, firms possessing market power may choose to set prices which are either biased or not adjusted to all available information so as to distort their information content. Even when information is costlessly available strategic considerations may lead firms to remain uninformed. These results are illustrated in a simple Stackelberg model with price-setting firms where the pricing game is preceded by an information acquisition game.     

TESTING FOR EFFICIENCY IN LOTTO MARKETS

State-sponsored lotto games, because they are pari-mutuel and because jackpots with no winner are rolled over into the next drawing, present an excellent opportunity to test for market efficiency. Using data from Massachusetts, Kentucky, and Ohio, we investigate bettors' responses and test for weak-form efficiency. Lotto bets do not have positive net expected returns, thus weak-form efficiency exists. To evaluate strong-form efficiency we utilize the concept of a rational expectations equilibrium. We find that in general lotto bettors' decisions to play generate a level of sales that conform to their original forecasts of expected value.     

EFFICIENT INFORMATION PROCESSING IN OUTPUT MARKETS: TESTS AND IMPLICATIONS

If goods markets efficiently process information, much of received macro doctrine seems of little relevance. Neither unemployment nor the money stock should be leading indicators of inflation. Countercyclical monetary policy will have little effect on inflation. Restrictive monetary policy can have severe effects on real variables if the public is unconvinced the authorities are committed to reducing inflation. When proper account is taken of mean shifts in the stochastic process generating CPI inflation rates, there is little remaining autocorrelation indicative of inefficiency, and filter rule experiments similarly support the hypothesis of goods market efficiency.     

FORCED INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND THE FALLACY OF TRANSPARENCY IN MARKETS

A theory advanced in regulatory hearings holds that market performance will be improved if one side of the market is forced to publicly reveal preferences. For example, wholesale electricity producers claim that retail electricity consumers would pay lower prices if wholesale public utility demand is disclosed to producers. Experimental markets studied here featured decentralized, privately negotiated contracts, typical of the wholesale electricity markets. Two conclusions emerge: (1) such markets generally converge to the competitive equilibrium and (2) forced disclosure works to the disadvantage of the disclosing side. Information disclosure would result in higher wholesale and thus higher retail electricity prices. (JEL L50 , L94 , D43 )     

CUSTOMER OWNERSHIP AND QUALITY PROVISION IN PUBLIC SERVICES UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

The implementation of projects producing external effects is often a source of disagreement and conflict between hosting and nonhosting communities. The article focuses on the impact of participatory ownership on conflict resolution and social welfare in the presence of asymmetric information and imperfect quality monitoring. We show that in such situations the participatory solution may help solve deadlocks that money transfers to a for‐profit operator cannot solve. The analysis highlights three main factors behind this fact. First, a customer‐owned cooperative internalizes, at least partially, the external effects generated by the project. Second, the alignment of cooperative members' preferences with those of the social planner reduces (in some cases eliminates) the distortions caused by information asymmetries. Third, cooperatives require less costly monitoring than their for‐profit counterparts. We also show that cooperatives' productive inefficiency with respect to for‐profits may emerge endogenously as a consequence of a lower pressure to compete on costs for the market. (JEL H23, L33, P13)     

THAT'S NEWS TO ME! INFORMATION REVELATION IN PROFESSIONAL CERTIFICATION MARKETS

Using sportscard grading as an example, we employ field experiments to investigate the informational role of professional certifiers. Empirical results suggest three patterns: first, the grading certification provided by the first professional certifier offers new information to inexperienced traders but adds little information to experienced dealers. This implies that the certification may reduce the information asymmetry between informed and uninformed parties. Second, compared with the incumbent, new entrants adopt more precise signals and use finer grading cutoffs to differentiate from the incumbent. Third, our measured differentiated grading cutoffs map consistently into prevailing market prices, suggesting that the market recognizes differences across multiple grading criteria. ( JEL D8, C93)     

TRANSPARENCY IN MARKETS FOR EXPERIENCE GOODS: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

We propose an experimental design to investigate the role of information disclosure in the market for an experience good. The market is served by a duopoly of firms that choose both the quality and the price of their product. Consumers differ in their taste for quality and choose from which firm to buy. We compare four different treatments in which we vary the degree to which consumers are informed about quality. Contrary to theoretical predictions, firms do not differentiate quality under full information. Rather, both tend to offer products of similar, high quality, entailing more intense price competition than predicted by theory. Under no information, we observe a “lemons” outcome where quality is low. At the same time, firms manage to maintain prices substantially above marginal cost. In two intermediate treatments, quality is significantly higher than the no‐information level, and there is evidence that prices become better predictors of quality. Taken together these findings suggest that information disclosure is a more effective tool to raise welfare and consumer surplus than theory would lead one to expect. (JEL L15, C91, D82)     

A MODEL FOR TRAINING PRACTICING PROFESSIONALS IN FAMILY THERAPY*

This paper offers a model for high quality training in family therapy. The unique aspects of the Family Consortium's model are that it: (a) is aimed at practicing professionals; (b) emphasizes structural family therapy principles with strategic and experiential elements; (c) is geared secondarily toward training members as effective peer consultants and trainers; and (d) uses an awareness of the isomorphic nature of training, therapy and family transactions. Part I describes the practical organization structure of the Consortium. Part II discusses the current theoretical philosophy and training approach of this evolving group. Examples are given of how the Consortium has dealt with specific training issues.     

VELOCITY FUTURES MARKETS: DOES THE FED NEED A STRUCTURAL MODEL?

Previous proposals suggesting monetary policy makers target private-sector forecasts have been shown to be problematic. As policy becomes more effective, private-sector forecasts become less informative. Under perfect stabilization private-sector forecasts provide no useful guidance to monetary policy makers about economic shocks. We illustrate a way around this circularity problem by creating a policy futures market linked to the ratio of the (realization of the) policy goal for next period and the current instrument setting. The implication is that extensive information gathering is unnecessary, weakening the argument that central banks need a structural model to conduct policy. (JEL E52, E44, E42 )     

INFORMATION COSTS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF CREDIT MARKETS: A THEORY OF INDIRECT LENDING

This paper explains indirect lending as a strategy for reducing a bank's cost of screening borrowers. Commercial banks appear to "ration" credit by rejecting some direct loan applicants, although they accept higher-risk borrowers who apply for loans indirectly through retailers. However, the more thorough credit check on direct loans causes applicants to sort themselves according to risk. Indirect applicants signal their higher risk through their choice of financing. Since banks gather more accurate information on direct applicants, the two types of contracts should differ in predictable ways. These implications are tested with Federal Reserve data on 5,000 automobile loans.     

ESTIMATING MARKET POWER IN HOMOGENOUS PRODUCT MARKETS USING A COMPOSED ERROR MODEL: APPLICATION TO THE CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY MARKET

This study proposes a novel econometric approach to estimating market power in homogenous product markets. We use a composed error model to estimate the stochastic part of firms' strategic pricing equation. This part is formed by two random variables: a traditional error term, which captures random shocks, and a random conduct term, which measures the degree of market power. This approach allows for the conduct parameter to vary flexibly across firms and within firms over time, and avoids ad hoc structural restrictions for identifying firms' conduct. The empirical application of our approach is based on a well‐known California wholesale electricity market data set, which has been rigorously used to study market power. Our results suggest that realization of market power varies over both time and firms, and reject the assumption of a common or time‐invariant conduct parameter. (JEL C34, C51, L13, L94)     

LATINO HEALTH IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: THE NEED FOR A CULTURE-CENTERED APPROACH

Studies have consistently shown race and ethnicity to be important determinants of health. The specific nature of this influence, however, is still a mystery. In the new millennium, racial and ethnic differentials in health are bound to become a major focus in medical sociology not only because of their persistence but also because of the demographic changes taking place in the United States. It is estimated that racial and ethnic minorities are expected to increase from the current level of 25 % of all Americans to 40 % by 2030 and that minority groups will make up more than half of the U.S. population by 2050. Thus, overcoming health disparities attributable to race and ethnicity has become more urgent in ensuring good health for the nation. This article suggests that analyses of the health status of Latinos, the second largest minority group in the country, must attend to cultural factors. The need for a culture-specific approach to Latino health is indispensable to such discourses in medical sociology.     

ON THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF ASYMMETRIC FOMC POLICY STATEMENTS: EVIDENCE FROM A TAYLOR-RULE PERSPECTIVE

For over two decades, the FOMC has included in its policy decisions a statement of bias toward subsequent tightening or easing of policy. This article examines the predictive content of these statements in a Taylor-rule setting, finding that they convey useful information for forecasting changes in the federal funds rate target, even after controlling for policy responses to inflation and the output gap. Moreover, the evidence suggests that this asymmetry can be represented in terms of shifts to the parameters of the Taylor-rule equation, indicating a greater or lesser degree of responsiveness to information about inflation and output. (JEL E52 , E58 )     

A SELF-MANAGEMENT MODEL FOR SUPERVISION

The authors present a management-of-self model of supervision that is currently being used in the graduate training program in marriage and family therapy at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. The major proposition of the model is that as the supervisee comes to understand how family of origin and family constellation patterns learned in the past are reenacted within the therapeutic context, he/she can then interrupt those patterns of interaction that tend to inhibit his/her therapeutic effectiveness.